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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ACORN</b>	Anti-Corruption in Nigeria Project
<b>CCB</b>	Code of Conduct Bureau
<b>EFCC</b>	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
<b>DSS</b>	Department of State Services
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>ICPC</b>	Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
<b>FOI</b>	Freedom of Information
<b>NAFDAC</b>	National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control
<b>NDLEA</b>	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
<b>REG</b>	Region
<b>SARS</b>	Special Anti-Robbery Squad
<b>SERAP</b>	Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project
<b>TSA</b>	Treasury Single Account
<b>UBEC</b>	Universal Basic Education Commission

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# SUMMARY

# **NIGERIA ANTI-CORRUPTION PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT SURVEY**



## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Corruption diverts resources from where they are most needed into private hands. It denies the citizenry the right to access basic services while stifling economic and social development, and ultimately, contributes to violations of human rights. In extreme cases, corruption has fueled conflict, political instability while compromising state authority and legitimacy.

Corruption remains the largest impediment to social and economic development in Nigeria. Since independence on October 1, 1960, there has been a clear appreciation of the need to tackle the problem. However, the measures by successive governments to prevent and combat corruption have been largely inadequate, selective and in some instances inconsistently applied. Some observers view lack of sufficient political will as a key obstacle to anti-corruption efforts.

Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari first ascended to power in 2015 on the platform of tackling corruption; his pledge was to stop public officials from looting the country's coffers. Since coming into office, Buhari has taken some significant measures towards addressing corruption in the country including: introduction of the Treasury Single Account (TSA) — a single account to manage government payments, adoption of the Whistle-Blowing Policy and the establishment of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption, to combat the systemic theft of public resources and its pernicious effects on human rights and development.

However, corruption - petty and grand corruption - remains a significant impediment to Nigeria's growth and development, and citizens' access to basic public services such as affordable healthcare, quality education, clean water, and regular and uninterrupted electricity supply. Some commentators even assert that corruption has become worse or taken a different form, suggesting it has become a crime against humanity. Additionally, there have been wide-ranging concerns about the 'legacy of corruption and impunity of perpetrators', selective application of the rule of law and selectivity in the fight against corruption in general.

This report is the outcome of a national survey which was rolled out in September 2018, and highlights important information and statistics about the current state of corruption across key sectors of governance and service delivery in Nigeria.

## **SUMMARY OBJECTIVES OF THE SURVEY**

1. Provide Nigerians and the government with a fair and objective assessment of anti-corruption programmes and initiatives;
2. Provide a benchmark or a baseline against which future progress on the anti-corruption agenda can be measured;

3. Provide a basis for advocacy and engagement with the government, public institutions and agencies regarding the additional measures required to take the anti-corruption agenda forward;
4. Provide evidence for identifying national and sector specific anti-corruption priorities; and,
5. Provide a basis for mobilising the public to call for stronger anti-corruption efforts and reforms.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The national survey targeted a total of 2,655 respondents selected from seven states spread across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria and the capital city of Abuja. The sample was proportionate to population size across these zones. The survey covered the police, Judiciary, power, education and health sectors to assess the state of corruption in public law enforcement and service provision.

Data for the survey was collected through the following methodologies:

1. A random survey was conducted among ordinary citizens using a semi-structured questionnaire. The respondents were picked through simple random sampling of Nigerians above 18 years spread across all the six geo-political zones of the country and the capital city of Abuja.
2. In-depth interviews with key governance experts including representatives of national anti-corruption bodies, trade unions, the business community, media, lawyers, academia, people living with disability and University student leaders.
3. Review of the legal and institutional frameworks guiding anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria to assess their effectiveness.

# SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

## Perceptions on corruption trends in Nigeria

- **Views on the current state of corruption:** Almost 70% of the respondents perceived the current level of corruption as high compared to 15.5% that felt it was low.
- **Views on the current state of corruption in the past five years:** 70% of the respondents said corruption levels either increased or remained the same in the last five years. Only a quarter of the respondents felt corruption reduced in this period.
- **Views on the state of corruption in the next one year:** About 41% of the respondents projected that corruption will either increase or remain the same in the next year.
- **Public awareness on the institutions involved in anti-corruption efforts:** Knowledge on the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was the highest with 47.6% of the respondents making mention of it, followed by the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) accounting for 28.3% of the mentions.
- **Perceived hindrance to anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria:** Respondents identified poor coordination among the different state players as a key obstacle at 18.4%. Lack of political will from the government and weak public support were ranked second at 12%.
- **Civic action against poor governance:** 54.8% of the respondents reported that they had not taken any action against poor governance.

## Personal experiences with bribery in the public service

- **Likelihood of bribery:** There was a 63% probability that an average Nigerian would be asked to pay a bribe each time he/she interacted with the police. The likelihood for bribery in the power sector stood at almost 50%.
- **Prevalence of bribery:** The police were the most adversely ranked on this indicator. For every 100 police interactions reported by the respondents, there was a bribe paid in 54 interactions. The prevalence levels stood at 37% in the power sector and about 18% in education and the judiciary.
- **Perceived impact:** Half of the individuals that paid bribes to the police believed this was the only way to the service sought from the institution. The ranking of the judiciary and health services was less adverse with 16% and 13% perceiving bribery as the main avenue of accessing services in the institutions.
- **Share of national bribe:** The police and judiciary had the largest proportion of total bribes paid at 33% and 31% respectively.

- **Average size of bribe:** The average amount of bribe paid by the respondents was highest among those who paid to the judiciary at about Naira 108,000 (US\$ 298). All the other institutions ranked lower on this variable.

## **Review of the legal and institutional framework for anti-corruption**

The following emerged as cross-cutting issues from the analysis of the legal and institutional framework:


- Apparent lack of political will to consistently enforce the different anti-corruption laws
- Inadequate funding for the various anti-corruption agencies
- Weak public support and/or ownership of the anti-corruption initiatives
- Poor clarity of roles between various anti-corruption agencies
- Public perceptions of politicisation of corruption arrests and prosecutions.

## **SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **The survey recommends the following among other interventions-**

- Establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to conduct a transparent, comprehensive, and impartial investigation into systemic corruption within the Nigeria Police Force, and the judiciary as well as the ministries of power, education and health;
- Legislative and constitutional reforms including the amendment of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act to ensure public access to the asset declarations of public officials.
- Urgent passage of the Proceeds of Crime Bill, the Whistle-blowers Bill, and the Witness Protection Bill among others relevant pieces of legislation.
- Establishment of civil society desks by the Economics and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) to facilitate and improve access to public complaints about corruption in key public service sectors;
- Identification and review of all outstanding cases of judicial corruption, and referral of such cases to appropriate anti-corruption agencies;
- Publication of quarterly budget execution reports that detail monthly state government income from federal allocations and other sources, and state government expenditure in all key sectors;

- Establishment of mechanisms to support and promote strong public participation in anti-corruption initiatives through the provision of a platform for public awareness on corruption and by making the citizens' voice more central in any intervention.



# BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

There have been different efforts to define corruption by many organisations, scholars and commentators. Transparency International for example, defines corruption as ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain,’ and it involves ‘behavior on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them’. The World Bank defines the phenomenon as ‘the abuse of public or corporate office for private gain’ The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act (2000) states that corruption includes bribery, fraud and other related offences.

While there may be some slight variations as to what truly constitutes corruption, it is generally agreed that corruption involves misuse of a position of trust and that it is motivated by direct or indirect gain to suspected perpetrators, their relatives or friends. Moreover, whereas some early scholars<sup>1</sup> in the field argued that corruption in poor economies like Nigeria can be ‘welfare enhancing’, empirical evidence suggests that corruption is far worse than this description, as it invariably impedes sustainable development, and thus disproportionately affects the economically and socially vulnerable, weakens the rule of law, erodes public trust in government, and permeates (and undermines) critical institutions of the state. Corruption can be harmful across national borders-regionally and internationally-and has been stated to undermine ‘economic development and political stability [of countries] while also being a threat to international peace and prosperity, as well as facilitating drug-trafficking, money laundering, and other international criminal activity’.<sup>2</sup>

In the light of globalisation and advanced technology, the consequences of corruption in one country are now easily felt continentally and beyond. Underdevelopment, lack of opportunities, violence, and insecurity in one country

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1

These scholars include Joseph Nye, Samuel Huntington, and Nathaniel Leff.

2

Kimberly Ann Elliot, ‘The Problem of Corruption: A Tale of Two Countries’, *Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus.* 18 (1998): 524.

can bring about forced migration (including economic migrants) and consequently inflows of refugees and mercenaries to other parts of the region. Economic and social migrants may for instance constitute a strain on the resources of poor neighbouring countries, and sometimes lead to rivalry with local population, resentment, violent competition for resources, and ultimately, insecurity. Furthermore, corrupt immigration and customs' officials make countries' borders porous and easily accessible by, for example, drug traffickers and 'terrorists', thereby not only endangering the security and well-being of individual countries in the region, but also foreign countries and potentially international peace.

Corruption dilutes states' democratic power and compromises service delivery. Research has shown that corruption affects the poor more than the rich. In terms of service delivery, the poor are more likely to rely on public services than the rich and the privileged. Additionally, where public service delivery is unavailable or compromised, the poor are likely to spend a larger proportion of their income to access the private alternatives.

## **CHALLENGES IN EVALUATING NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS**

Although the negative effects of corruption are not in question, conceptual issues make it difficult to measure it. How do you define corruption? What constitutes a corrupt act from one culture to another? It therefore becomes difficult to assess the performance of anti-corruption programmes and initiatives.

There is a consensus that corruption is undesirable in all jurisdictions. Globally, almost all countries have tried to put in place measures to prevent, control and respond to corruption. Different policy, legal, institutional tools and instruments have been applied in different situations to respond to corruption.

Measuring the efficacy and effectiveness of these anti-corruption interventions, and ascertaining the specific contribution of each remains a challenge. Simple observations like a reduction in corruption cases have been used in some situations. Additionally, it may also imply corruption has taken a different form or simply 'migrated' to a different sector. In situations where focus goes to reporting, an increase in reporting levels may either imply more corruption incidents or improved public awareness to report it. Methodological and approach problems also arise in measuring the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives. Some assessments dwell on the entry point - a quick assessment of the number of anti-corruption systems established. This however may not reveal much especially where such initiatives may be a result of external forces like donor pressure. Then there are critical issues of scope, whether to assess the country as a unit or focus on specific sector interventions (for instance the health sector) or specific institutions within a sector.

# ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN NIGERIA

Anti-corruption measures in Nigeria are as old as the Nigerian state. As early as the 1960s, corruption was identified as a key issue in public administration. Successive constitutions of Nigeria since independence have always contained, in varying degrees, accountability provisions, which in some respects allow for the imposition of liability on public officials guilty of acts of corrupt enrichment and abuse of the public trust.<sup>3</sup> For example, the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 (as amended) requires that elected as well as certain appointed holders of public office take an oath.<sup>4</sup> It also requires them to declare their assets and pledge to abide by a national Code of Conduct.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, under chapter two of the Constitution dealing with Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, high-ranking public officials, including the President, are obligated to promote and realise the security and welfare of the Nigerian citizens.<sup>6</sup> They are also required to ensure their freedom and happiness, on the basis of social justice, equality of status and opportunity.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the chapter obligates the president and other high ranking state officials to ensure that the material resources of the nation are harnessed and distributed in a manner that serves the common good of all Nigerians; and to prevent the exploitation of Nigeria's human and natural resources for any reasons other than for the good of the community.<sup>8</sup> Significantly, it requires them to eradicate all corrupt practices and abuse of power.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, the chapter imposes a watchdog duty on the citizens in

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3

Nigeria has had at least eleven Constitutions at different stages of its political development between 1914 and 1999. The Constitutions are the: Lugard Constitution of 1914; Clifford Constitution of 1922; Richard Constitution of 1946; Macpherson Constitution of 1951; Federation Constitution of 1954; Independence Constitution of 1960; Republic Constitution of 1963 which was in operation until 15th of January 1966 when the Civilian Government of Althaji Tafawa Balewa was overthrown in the first military coup d'etat; Presidential Constitution overthrown four years later by the Muhammadu Buhari Administration; and the 1989 Constitution drafted under the Ibrahim Babangida Administration in 1990s and the 1995 Draft Constitution under the Sani Abacha military regime which never took effect. The 1999 Constitution drafted under Abubakar regime is the one presently in force in Nigeria.

4

See CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, 1999. The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, for example, provides in part that the President shall swear to uphold the Constitution in the interest of the well-being and prosperity of Nigeria; to preserve the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy contained in the Constitution; to comply with the Code of Conduct contained in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution; and not to allow his personal interest to influence his official conduct. See id.

5

See id. 14(1).

6

See id. 16(1).

7

See id. 17.

8

See id. 15(5).

9

order to protect and preserve public property and prevent misappropriation of public funds.<sup>10</sup>

The 1999 Constitution also provides for the Code of Conduct for public officials<sup>11</sup> which require public servants to avoid conflicts of interest.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, it prohibits them from simultaneously receiving remuneration for two public offices and engaging in private practice while in the employ of government.<sup>13</sup> The Code of Conduct also bars public servants from accepting gifts or benefits in kind for themselves, or any other person, on account of anything done, or omitted to be done, in the discharge of their duties.<sup>14</sup> It also prohibits abuse of office.<sup>15</sup> The Code defines, 'abuse of office' as 'any arbitrary act prejudicial to the rights of any other person when the public officer knows that such an act is unlawful or contrary to any government policy.'<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, the Code of Conduct prohibits the president, vice-president, state governors, deputy governors, and other enumerated public officers from maintaining or operating foreign bank accounts.<sup>17</sup> Public officers are required to declare their assets and those of their families immediately after taking office, at the end of every four years in office, and at the end of their terms.<sup>18</sup>

The Constitution establishes the Code of Conduct Bureau and the Code of Conduct Tribunal to deal with acts of political corruption by top ranking state officials.<sup>19</sup>

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See id. 24.

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See id. Fifth Schedule Part 1 to the Constitution, id.

11

See id.

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See id.

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See id.

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See id.

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See id.

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Id.

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See id.

18

See id. Third Schedule Part 1 to the Constitution, id.

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According to Section 12 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, ‘any allegations that a public officer has committed a breach of or has not complied with the provisions of the Code of Conduct shall be made to the Code of Conduct Bureau.’<sup>20</sup> The Bureau is vested with the responsibility to receive and examine among others, all declarations of assets by high ranking state officials; ensure compliance and where appropriate enforce the provisions of the Code of Conduct.<sup>21</sup> The Bureau is also empowered to receive complaints about non-compliance with or breach of the Code of Conduct; investigate the complaint and where appropriate refer such matters to the Code of Conduct Tribunal.<sup>22</sup> The Tribunal tries cases of non-compliance with or breach of any of the provisions of the Code of Conduct by a public officer.<sup>23</sup> The National Assembly may confer on the Tribunal additional powers necessary for it to be more effective in the discharge of its functions.<sup>24</sup> The Tribunal may impose a punishment ranging from vacation of office or seat in any legislative house; disqualification from membership of a legislative house and from holding any public office for a period of up to 10 years; to seizure and forfeiture to the state of any property acquired in abuse or corruption of office.<sup>25</sup> The exercise of the constitutional prerogative of mercy shall not extend to any such punishment.<sup>26</sup> However, any defendant who is dissatisfied with this sentence may appeal to the Court of Appeal.<sup>27</sup>

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See id.

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Fifth Schedule Part 1 to the Constitution. The Code of Conduct Bureau comprises a Chairman, and nine other members, each of whom at the time of appointment shall not be less than fifty years of age and shall vacate his office on attaining the age of seventy, except that a removal may occur on the ground of inability to discharge the functions of his office. See Third Schedule Part 1 to the Constitution.

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See id.

22

See id. The Constitution provides that the Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman and two other persons. The Chairman shall be a person who has held or is qualified to hold office as a Judge of a superior court of record in Nigeria and shall receive such remuneration as may be prescribed by law. Id.

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See id.

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See id.

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See id.

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See id.

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See id.

Furthermore, the Tribunal cannot impose a custodial sentence: that power is reserved only for the courts.<sup>28</sup>

Section 88 of the 1999 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to conduct an investigation into the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department; the disbursing or administering of money appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly among other actions. One of the purposes of this investigative power is to ‘expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of funds appropriated by the National Assembly.’

Other initiatives to combat corruption in Nigeria have historically included the 1977 ‘Jaji Declaration’ by former president Olusegun Obasanjo; the ‘Ethical Revolution’ by former president Shehu Shagari in 1981; ‘War Against Indiscipline’ by the General Muhammadu Buhari in 1984; ‘National Orientation Movement’ by General Ibrahim Babangida in 1986; ‘Mass Mobilisation for Social Justice’ by General Babangida in 1987; ‘War Against Indiscipline and Corruption’ in 1996 by General Sani Abacha, the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices (and Other Related Offences) Commission in 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission 2002 by Olusegun Obasanjo<sup>29</sup>.

Several federal and state legislation have provisions aimed at checking corruption. A good example is the Freedom of Information Act 2011 and the local government laws of the various states. The Administration of Criminal Justice Act of 2015 significantly altered the criminal justice process, replacing the Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Act. It contains important provisions to raise efficiency and effectiveness in the quality of justice delivery in Nigeria.

The Public Procurement Act No. 14 of 2007 is another legislation aimed at preventing corruption in Nigeria. The Act covers all aspects in public sector procurement including the procurement of goods and services. The Act established the National Council on Public Procurement and the Bureau of Public Procurement as the regulatory authorities responsible for the monitoring and oversight of public procurement setting standards harmonising existing government policies and practices, and developing the legal framework and capacity for public procurement in Nigeria. Section 53(1) of the Act empowers the Bureau to review and recommend for investigation any matter related to the

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See id.

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The Jaji declaration sounded the commitment of President Olusegun Obasanjo in taking early steps against corruption. The ‘ethical revolution’ as conceptualised under Shehu Shagari was an admission of sorts that corruption was deeply ingrained in the national psyche and a revolution was needed to tackle it. This was taken further by President Muhammadu Buhari who adopted a ‘war against indiscipline’. But it is under Sani Abacha and later Olusegun Obasanjo that the affront against corruption took a more institutionalised approach following the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices (and Other Related Offences) Commission in 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission in 2002.


conduct of the procurement process by any Ministry or agency of government, if it considers such investigation desirable so as to detect or prevent the violation of any of the provisions of the Act.

Nigerians have witnessed an increased level of arrests and prosecutions, and recovery of stolen assets. However, public goodwill for the fight against corruption was squandered due to mixed signals and outright failure in some instances to take decisive action in clear cases of corruption. In other instances, anti-corruption institutions have been seen to work in an uncoordinated manner and at cross purpose.

It is against this background that this survey was conceptualised. The survey aims to provide a credible platform on which Nigerians could reflect on anti-corruption efforts undertaken, the achievements, challenges and lessons to take forward.

## **OBJECTIVES OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT SURVEY**

- Provide Nigerians and the government with a fair and objective assessment of anti-corruption programmes and initiatives;
- Provide a benchmark or a baseline against which future progress on the anti-corruption agenda can be measured;
- Provide a basis for advocacy and engagement with the government, public institutions and agencies in regard to what additional measures are necessary to take the anti-corruption agenda forward;
- Provide evidence for identifying national and sector specific anti-corruption priorities;
- Provide a basis for mobilising the public to call for stronger anti-corruption efforts.



## METHODOLOGY

### SAMPLING

The national survey targeted a total of 2,655 respondents selected from seven states spread across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria and the capital city of Abuja. The sample was proportionate to population size across these zones. The states were picked at using stratified random sampling with special consideration to the demographic, socio-economic, general accessibility, security and geographical considerations. Beyond the state and zonal level, the survey sought to spread the respondents across local government area councils to ensure fair representation.

As per the proportional representation of the sample, Rivers State contributed 17.4% of the sample closely followed by Kano with 16.4%. Enugu comprised the least proportion of the sample at 9.4%.

The survey covered the police, judiciary, power, education and health sectors and sought to assess the state of corruption in public law enforcement and service provision. The police and the judiciary are central in the effective implementation of anti-corruption efforts. Their inclusion therefore sought to gauge the extent to which the Nigerian public view the level of corruption in these two institutions given their mandates and central role played in ensuring justice for those affected by corruption. The power, education and health sectors were identified as basic services that impact ordinary citizens with corruption reducing accessibility of these services thus affecting socio-economic development and increasing the level of poverty.

## **DATA COLLECTION**

The survey was conducted nationally between September and December 2018. Data for the survey was collected through three methodologies. First, a survey was conducted among ordinary citizens using a semi-structured questionnaire. The respondents were picked through simple random sampling of Nigerians above 18 years spread across all the six geopolitical zones of the country and the capital city of Abuja. The objective of this strategy was to get the personal experiences of ordinary citizens regarding corruption in the selected sectors and institutions. The questionnaire also sought to register the perceptions of the citizens on government anti-corruption efforts.


The second methodology comprised in-depth interviews with key experts in the governance arena including national anti-corruption bodies, trade unions, the business community, media, lawyers, academia, people living with disability and university student leaders. This strategy was based on the consideration that this category of individuals would have a deeper interaction with the issues around corruption and are thus likely to share deeper insights than ordinary Nigerians.

Lastly, the survey also reviewed the current legal and institutional frameworks guiding anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria to assess their effectiveness.

## **SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS**


A total of 2655 respondents, selected from seven states spread across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria and the capital city of Abuja were sampled to participate in the survey. The sample was proportionate to population size across these states, with the largest proportion of respondents drawn from Rivers and Kano states.

Figure 1: Sample distribution by States



The largest proportion of respondents (25.8%) was drawn from the South West zone of the country, with North Central and North East zones each comprising 13% of the sample.


Figure 2: Sample distribution by zones



### Residence

The total national sample had a higher distribution from the urban areas at 54.7% against 45.3% selected from the rural setting. This deviates only marginally from the 50-50 par distribution across the rural urban divide in Nigeria. The proportion of urban dwellers was slightly higher and provided an ample pool of respondents who are more likely to interact with public institutions while seeking services.


Figure 3: Sample distribution by residence



### Gender

Across gender, the response rate among men was significantly higher than women at 63.8% and 36.2% respectively. This outcome may be traced to the social and cultural set up of the Nigerian society with men being more ready to participate in public discourse like corruption.


Figure 4: Sample distribution by gender



### Age group

The sample was almost evenly distributed across the different age groups. The 25-34 age cohort contributed about a third of the sample at 32.3%. 17.1% of the sample comprised individuals above 45 years. From an economic perspective, about 60% of the sample fell between 25 and 44 years representative of the youthful and more active section of the population in the job market. Additionally, this segment of the population is more likely to seek critical social services like health and education as covered in this survey.


Figure 5: Distribution of respondents by age group



### Education level


Most of the respondents (about 41%) had been educated to the secondary school level. This combined with 27% of the respondents reporting tertiary level education meant 68% of the respondents had secondary level education. Only 7.6% of the sampled population reported having no formal education. The implication of this sample structure is that the respondents had a fairly good grasp of corruption issues in Nigeria

Figure 6: Highest level of education



## Employment status

The bulk of the respondents were self-employed or persons working in family businesses or farms at 50%; a further 25% were either full time students or unemployed. This makes a total of 75% who are most likely under-employed or unemployed. The implication of this sample structure on a corruption survey is two-fold. First, these are sections of the population whose dire economic status means that they are disproportionately affected by corruption. Secondly, this is a population segment that almost entirely depends on public services. Their low incomes may not afford the alternatives provided by the private sector. Corruption in public service delivery therefore adversely affects their access to basic services like health and education.



**Figure 7: Employment status**

### Personal income

Majority of the respondents reported a personal income of below 21,600 Naira per month. Those with a monthly income above 180,000 Naira constituted just 2.2% of the sample.





Figure 8: Distribution by personal income

## DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

Data for the survey was analysed using different approaches. The questionnaire data was processed through Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The resultant statistics are presented in a mix of tables and graphs.

The information from the in-depth interviews and review of legal and institutional frameworks is presented in a separate section of this report in prose format to triangulate the data collected through semi-structured questionnaires.




# PERCEPTIONS ON CORRUPTION TRENDS IN NIGERIA

Almost 70% of the respondents perceived the current level of corruption as high compared to 15.5% that felt it was low. The high corruption perception is a major indictment to the efforts by the government in tackling corruption. The policy implication is that while the government may be exerting a lot of effort, this is either not being felt by the ordinary Nigerian or the efforts have not been convincing enough.

## Perceived level of corruption

Across the gender divide, more males (71%) perceived Nigerians to be highly corrupt compared to 68% among female respondents. Upon combining the proportion of male and female respondents that returned a medium and high perception of corruption, both ranged around 81%. The differences across gender are therefore insignificant.

Across the different age groups, the age cohort of 25-34 years expressed the highest level of concern on the current level of corruption. About 34% of the respondents in this group viewed the level of corruption in Nigeria as high. This could be attributed to the fact that this group is more socially and economically active and more likely to suffer from the various manifestations of corruption. However, it is disconcerting to note that a combined 70% of the respondents between age 18 and 34 (48.1% among 18-24 and 30.9% among 25-34 cohorts) returned a 'do not know opinion' on this question.



The policy implication here could be that the government should focus on increasing transparency and accountability. Figure 9: Perceived level of corruption

be that majority of the respondents in this group are either disenchanted with the management of public affairs in Nigeria including corruption or that the various anti-corruption initiatives are yet to reach them.

### Q1. How would you describe the current state of corruption in Nigeria today

qc1. Gender:		Low	Medium	High	Don't Know	Total
Male	n	272	222	1156	42	1692
	%	16.1%	13.1%	68.3%	2.5%	100.0%
Female	n	140	101	681	39	961
	%	14.6%	10.5%	70.9%	4.1%	100.0%
Total	n	412	323	1837	81	2653
	%	15.5%	12.2%	69.2%	3.1%	100.0%

$X^2(3, N=2653) = 9.89, p < 0.05$

Table 1: Description of current state of corruption in Nigeria by gender

qd. Age group		Low	medium	High	Don't Know	total
18 - 24	n	97	69	398	39	603
	%	23.5%	21.4%	21.7%	48.1%	22.8%
25 - 34	n	111	103	618	25	857
	%	26.9%	31.9%	33.7%	30.9%	32.3%
35 - 44	n	130	108	487	11	736
	%:	31.6%	33.4%	26.6%	13.6%	27.8%
45+	n	74	43	331	6	454
	%	18.0%	13.3%	18.0%	7.4%	17.1%
Total	n	412	323	1834	81	2650
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Table 2: Description of current state of corruption in Nigeria by age**

### Views on the current state of corruption in the past five years

It can be noted that a combined 70% of the respondents believed corruption levels either increased or remained the same in the last five years. This proportion includes about 56% of the respondents who actually perceived corruption levels to have actually increased in this period. Only a quarter of the respondents believed corruption reduced in this subject period. This perception does not




Figure 10: Perceived change in corruption levels in the last 5 years

augur well of the policy and political pronouncements and anti-corruption efforts instituted by the government within the same period. It is also a pointer that majority of the public may lack confidence in the political will to tackle corruption. Though perceptions have their own limitations, the government cannot claim to be winning the anti-corruption war if Nigerians do not seem to share such sentiments.

### Zonal comparison of the current state of corruption in Nigeria in the past 5 years

Across the different zones of Nigeria, South East had the most adverse perception on the change in the level of corruption in the past five years with about 75% observing that corruption increased in the period.

The Northern zones were more positive with about 44% stating that corruption had increased in the last 5 years. Additionally, the zone had the largest proportion of respondents (about 36%) stating that corruption levels decreased in the last five years.

**Q2. Comparing the current state of corruption in Nigeria with five years ago, would you say corruption has:**

REG. Region:	Increase	Remained the same	Decreased	Don't Know	Total
South West	n 359	73	105	13	550
	%65.3%	13.3%	19.1%	2.4%	100.0%
South East	n 206	19	19	6	250
	%82.4%	7.6%	7.6%	2.4%	100.0%
South Central	n 344	68	23	24	459
	%74.9%	14.8%	5.0%	5.2%	100.0%
North Central	n 154	57	127	9	347
	%44.4%	16.4%	36.6%	2.6%	100.0%
North West	n 277	97	252	58	684
	%40.5%	14.2%	36.8%	8.5%	100.0%
North East	n 159	53	139	13	364
	%43.7%	14.6%	38.2%	3.6%	100.0%
Total	n 1499	367	665	123	2654
	%56.5%	13.8%	25.1%	4.6%	100.0%
<b>X<sup>2</sup>(15, N=2654) = 353.04, p&lt;0.05 (Relationship was significant)</b>					

**Table 3: Zonal comparison of the current state of corruption in the past 5 years**

**Views on the state of corruption in the next one year**

When asked to project the level of corruption in the coming year, about 41% believed it will either increase or remain the same with about a third of the

respondents expecting corruption levels to increase. This perception should trigger reflection among the various anti-corruption bodies in Nigeria. When juxtaposed against the different institutions established and, laws and policies currently being implemented, it raises the critical question whether the measures are comprehensive enough, consistent or if there is need to amplify public participation and communication on anti-corruption efforts. This kind of public perception is likely to dilute the public support needed for successful anti-corruption initiatives.




Figure 11: State of corruption in the next one year

### Reasons for a projected increase in the level of corruption in the next year

About a third of the respondents (31.5%) believed the ruling elite is only pursuing their selfish interests and therefore corruption levels can only increase into the future. Additionally, about a quarter of the respondents (24.9%) believed the current anti-corruption efforts are not comprehensive enough. The poor state of the economy was also seen as possible reason why the level of corruption is likely to remain high. It is thus imperative that the public is exposed to more anti-corruption efforts at the political and administrative level. Additionally, the state of the economy remains a concern to the ordinary Nigerian.

About a half of those who said the level of corruption will decrease in the next one year believed the government was doing a lot in this front and that the efforts will bear results soon. About a quarter of the respondents who were optimistic about future corruption levels reducing based their hope on elections bringing into power a new government and a new set of leaders who would apply more vigour on anti-corruption efforts.

<b>CORRUPTION CASES WILL INCREASE BECAUSE...</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Most leaders are corrupt and only pursue personal interests</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>31.5</b>
<b>If the elections do not result to a different government</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>10.4</b>
<b>Current anti-corruption efforts remain inadequate and unconvincing</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>24.9</b>
<b>Poor service delivery and a weak economy will continue to promote corruption</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>17.2</b>
<b>Ordinary citizens condone corruption</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>7.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>760</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 4: Reasons for projected increase in the level of corruption in the next year

<b>WHY NIGERIANS THINK CORRUPTION INCIDENTS WILL DECREASE IN THE NEXT ONE YEAR</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Because the current Government is trying all possible means to fight corruption to the end</b>	<b>323</b>	<b>50.1</b>
<b>The elections and possible change in government are likely to boost anti-corruption efforts</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>26.7</b>
<b>As a result of the continued public education and enlightenment on corruption</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>7.5</b>
<b>Others</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>15.7</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>644</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 5: Reasons for projected decrease in the level of corruption in the next year

## Public awareness on the institutions involved in anti-corruption efforts

The survey also sought to establish the extent to which the ordinary Nigerians are aware of the different state institutions involved in anti-corruption efforts.

Knowledge on the Economic and Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC) was the highest with 47.6% of the respondents making mention of it. This was

followed by the Independent

Corrupt Practices

Commission (ICPC)

accounting for 28.3% of the

mentions. Other notable mentions were


the police at 7.7% and the Code of

Conduct Bureau at 4.8%. It is noteworthy

that some anti-corruption bodies are

more visible than others, and a reflection of the import of this in the successful

delivery of the anti-corruption agenda in Nigeria is necessary.




**Figure 12: Public awareness on institutions involved in anti-corruption efforts**

## Perceived hindrance to anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria

Asked what they view as the major hindrance to anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria, 18.4% of the respondents identified poor coordination among the different state players as a key issue. Lack of political will from the government was ranked second at 12%. Interestingly, respondents also ranked weak public support at the same measure as lack of political will.

Other notable mentions included weak anti-corruption laws and a general social acceptance of corruption in the country.

Although the different state anti-corruption institutions may have distinct mandates, there is some reasonable perception that the efforts lack the essential level of coordination. The general acceptance by Nigerians that




**Figure 13: Hindrances to anti-corruption efforts**

they have not done enough to support anti-corruption efforts coupled with social acceptance of corruption could be an issue of ample interest to policy makers and other\_anti-corruption actors.

### Public proposals to strengthen anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria

Looking ahead, 28.3%

Nigerians would like to see the government institute action against all corruption suspects irrespective of their status in society. There is also a notable proportion of citizens (23.9%) who would wish to see a reinvigorated legal and institutional framework to combat corruption. There is a general perception that action against corrupt individuals is selective and shields some sections of the Nigerian society based on their status. This perception is the basis of the expectation that the next government will exert anti-corruption action fairly across board.



**Figure 14: Public proposals to strengthen anti-corruption efforts**

In terms of the legal and institutional framework, there is a view that there are critical gaps that need to be sealed. This is the basis of demands for legal and institutional reforms.

### Civic action against poor governance

Asked what action they have taken in the past one year in response to situations they perceived as manifesting poor governance, 54.8% reported not taking any action. This should be an issue of great concern to both state and non-state actors in the anti-corruption arena. If half of the respondents are unwilling to initiate action, then it may point to a deeper societal problem. Although the survey did not delve into reasons why the respondents failed to act, it may be deduced that there may be low confidence levels that appropriate measures would be taken even if the respondents took action. This assumption is supported by the finding below that 17% of those who acted got a response they considered as appropriate.

Action taken against poor governance	n	%
Complained about a bad service from a government office	289	10.5%
Complained about a bribery experience at a service delivery point	282	10.2%
Sought to know how a government procurement was done	194	7.0%
Discussed the failings or successes of an elected official	299	10.8%
Discussed the failings or successes of federal or state government officer	185	6.7%
None	1516	54.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2765</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 6: Civic action against poor governance**

### Government response to the action taken

Of the proportion of respondents that took action on corruption in the past 12 months, 17% believed the response by the government body was acceptable. A whopping 82% of the cases were either not responded to or the responses were not deemed to be appropriate enough by those who reported. This erodes public confidence in corruption reporting entrenching perceptions that no action will be taken or response issued by the authorities concerned even if they reported. However, it is also likely that the bodies to whom the incidents were reported may have responded appropriately but this was not communicated to the complainants on time or at all.




Figure 15: Whether responsible government agency gave an acceptable response



# PERSONAL EXPERIENCES WITH BRIBERY IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

## INTRODUCTION

This component of the survey sought to register Nigerians' personal experiences with bribery while seeking public services. Due to the nature of

bribery in public service delivery, this section was more likely to capture petty bribery as a form of corruption.

The rationale of this approach was to get feedback from Nigerians on the net effect of the various anti-corruption measures by the government in improving access to key services. Bribery experiences were recorded in the key sectors of education, health, policing, judiciary and power. The first two sectors were chosen based on the centrality of the sectors in social life and the likelihood that a good proportion of ordinary Nigerians depend on public services to access education and health. Policing and judiciary were selected due to local and regional culpability of these institutions to petty bribery. The survey also focused on the power sector given its importance in the Nigerian economy.

Data analysis for this section of the report was conducted under five different and interrelated variables. The different indicators are defined below.

## INDICATOR 1: LIKELIHOOD

Likelihood is the probability of respondents being asked for or expected to pay a bribe when interacting with a particular sector in the preceding 12 months. It was derived as the number of all bribe demand situations registered in a sector as a proportion of all the interactions registered in that particular sector.

$$\text{Likelihood} = \frac{\text{Total number of bribe demand situations for institution X}}{\text{Total number of interactions recorded for institution X}}$$

There was a 63% probability that an average Nigerian would be asked to pay a bribe each time he/she interacted with the police. The likelihood for bribery in the power sector stood at almost 50%. Viewed from a policy perspective, it implies security and power services may be out of reach of the ordinary Nigerian or they come at a cost. Since 50% of the survey respondents reported either being unemployed or working in a family venture, this situation is a real concern. Additionally, about 48% of the respondents were from the lowest income group and are excluded from accessing basic services if they have to pay a bribe as a pre-condition for the service.




Figure 16: Likelihood of bribery

## Where respondents encountered bribery incidents

The table below shows the institutions where respondents reported encountering a bribery incident.

INSTITUTIONS	YES		NO	
	N	%	N	%
Pre-primary schools	15	14.3%	90	85.7%
Technical/vocational training	26	11.5%	200	88.5%
Primary schools	110	13.5%	702	86.5%
Secondary schools	305	28.9%	752	71.1%
Universities	280	41.7%	391	58.3%
Hospitals and other Medical and Health services	369	20.5%	1430	79.5%
Police	974	63.7%	554	36.3%
Power (Electricity and related)	857	49.3%	880	50.7%
Judiciary/Courts	149	27.9%	386	72.1%

**Table 7: Institutions where respondents reported encountering a bribery incident**

## Payment of bribe

Among the respondents, almost 70% who interacted with the police in the last 12 months preceding the survey paid a bribe. The bribery payment was also notably high among those who sought services from the power sector at 49%. It can be noted that almost half of the respondents reported having interacted with these two sectors. The implication is that ordinary Nigerians are in constant need to seek services from police and energy sector institutions. High bribery levels could thus affect the ease of access to such services.

INSTITUTIONS	YES		NO	
	n	%	n	%
Police	829	66.6%	415	33.4%
Power (Electricity and related	647	49.2%	669	50.8%
Hospitals and other Medical and Health services	254	22.6%	872	77.4%
Secondary schools	207	27.0%	561	73.0%
Universities	199	38.8%	314	61.2%
Judiciary/Courts	95	22.7%	324	77.3%
Primary schools	81	15.9%	429	84.1%
Technical/vocational training	20	18.3%	89	81.7%
Pre-primary schools	11	19.0%	47	81.0%

**Table 8: Payment of bribe**


## INDICATOR 2: PREVALENCE

This indicator measured the probability that a bribe would be paid to a sector upon interaction by respondents. It was derived as the proportion of the number of bribes recorded in a particular sector and the total number of interactions registered in that sector. A higher value indicates the high prevalence of bribery in a sector. The following is the formula that was used in its derivation.

$$\text{Prevalence} = \frac{\text{Total number of } \times \text{bribes were recorded for institution } X}{\text{Total number of interactions recorded for institution } X}$$

The police were the most adversely ranked on this indicator. The high prevalence of bribes implies a dire situation where for every 100 interactions reported by the respondents, there was a bribe paid in 54 of such interactions. In a situation where the majority poor rely on public provision of security services, the implication is that the service would be out of their reach. Seen from the context of the sample structure, where the majority are poor, unemployed young individuals, the implication is that the bulk of the population is marginalised in the provision of security services.

The prevalence levels stood at 37% in the power sector and about 18% in education and the judiciary. A bribery prevalence of close to 40% and above should be a major concern in a country where power provision services are majorly in the hands of the public sector.



**Figure 16: Prevalence of bribe**


### INDICATOR 3: PERCEIVED IMPACT

This indicator captures the respondents’ perception on whether they would have received the services they sought from a particular institution if they failed to pay a bribe. It was derived from those respondents who reported having paid a bribe and received a service. It sought to bring out the value that the bribe payers had on the bribes paid as the only way to get services.

$$\text{Impact} = \text{institution } X \frac{\text{Total number of respondents who would not get services without a bribe}}{\text{Total number of respondents who visited institution } X}$$

It is worth noting that half of those who paid bribes to the police believed this was the only way to access whatever service they sought from the institution. The ranking of the judiciary and the health services was less adverse with only 16% and 13% perceiving bribery as the main avenue to access services in the institution.

**Figure 17: Perceived impact of bribery**




## INDICATOR 4: SHARE OF NATIONAL BRIBE

This is the proportion of bribes an institution accounts for relative to the total amount of bribes recorded by the survey in a particular country. It reflects the proportional culpability of an institution as measured by the amount of bribes received.

$$\text{Share} = \frac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in institution } X}{\text{Total amount paid in all institutions}}$$

Whereas the police rank first in the three other variables above, it is notable that the share of bribe claimed by the judiciary is quite high relative to its ranking in other variables. The judiciary and police are almost at par in terms of the proportion of total bribes (in Naira value) reported to have been paid. It can only be deduced that the judiciary either has a stronger extractive power when it comes to bribery demands or that the average premium attached to judicial services is much higher, therefore compelling Nigerians to be more willing to part with large amounts of bribes.

**Figure 18: Share of national bribe**



## INDICATOR 5: AVERAGE SIZE OF BRIBE

This indicator captures the average size of bribe per respondent. It is the measure of how much each bribe payer had to pay on average to a particular institution. It

is the arithmetic mean of all bribes paid to an institution relative to all the respondents that reported paying a bribe to that particular institution.


$$\text{Average size of bribe} = \frac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid} \in \text{institution } X}{\text{Individuals who paid a bribe} \in \text{institution } X}$$

The average amount of bribe paid by the respondents was highest among those who paid to the judiciary at about Naira 108,000 (US\$ 298). All the other institutions rank much lower on this variable. This means that the formal judicial system may be more accessible to the richer sections of the society that have a stronger ability to pay larger bribes, thus excluding the other sections of the population from accessing justice.

Access to power attracted the lowest average size of bribe. At face value, this may seem like a positive situation. However, it may as well imply low coverage of power services across the country and therefore a lower push to pay bribes for this service. It may also imply that the richer sections of the society may not have many challenges accessing public power services hence the lower amounts of bribe paid by the poorer sections of the population.

<b>RANK</b>	<b>INSTITUTION</b>	<b>AVERAGE SIZE OF BRIBE</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Judiciary/Courts</b>	<b>107,939.4</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Police</b>	<b>12,253.4</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>11,566.3</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Hospitals and other Medical and Health services</b>	<b>6,462.3</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Power (Electricity and related</b>	<b>5,143.1</b>

**Table 9: Average size of bribe**



# LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA

## INTRODUCTION

The commitment to tackle corruption is firmly grounded in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria under Section 15 (5) **‘the State shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power’**.

Section 24(f) stipulates a duty of every citizen to ‘declare his income honestly to appropriate and lawful agencies and pay his tax promptly’.

Section 128 (2b) grants the House of Assembly powers to ‘expose corruption, inefficiency of waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it’.

To support the various constitutional provisions, Nigeria has quite a comprehensive legal and institutional framework to combat corruption - which would ideally support the fight against corruption. The section below provides a snapshot of the legal frameworks and the corresponding institutional framework.

### **The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act**

The Act came into effect on June 13, 2000. Its key object is to ‘prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt practices and other related offences’. The Act establishes the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC). The commission has both investigative and prosecutorial roles.

Among the key components and offences provided under this Act include:

- Demand and offer of bribes by public officials
- Bribery
- Fraudulent acquisition of property
- Seizure of property, and
- Making false statements among others.

It is notable that the Act is quite comprehensive in its coverage. In actual sense, most of the corruption cases experienced in Nigeria can be handled under this Act and its attendant body, the ICPC.

However, key experts observe that there are instances where the specific legal provisions are not enforced or only partially enforced. According to the experts, ICPC is poorly funded as compared to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), calling for a deeper analysis of the different mandates and the corresponding budgetary allocations. What cannot be discounted is the fact that ICPC does not receive enough financial allocations to effectively deliver on its mandate. One of the experts actually observed that the public education role under ICPC suffers serious funding challenges. When this issue is read in the

context of poor appreciation of anti-corruption efforts by the citizens, it is easy to draw a correlation between the funding challenges and low public support of government anti-corruption efforts.

There are also some dominant views that EFCC enjoys more goodwill both from the government and development partners when it comes to funding. From the donors' perspective, the mandate of the EFCC is likely to elicit more goodwill especially in regard to the global nature of some of the economic crimes under its mandate.

A longstanding leadership vacuum at ICPC was also identified as one of the challenges hampering the commission's mandate. The Senate only approved the nominations of the Chairman and the Commissioners in December 2018, more than one year after the initial nominations were made. Such inordinate delays are likely to send the wrong signals in terms of the government's commitment as well as affect staff morale.

### **Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act**

The law was enacted in 2004 to create the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. The Commission has a wide mandate touching on economic and financial crimes. The membership of the commission elucidates the strong bias on offences of this nature. Its membership is drawn from the following among others:

- Governor of Central Bank
- Ministry of Finance
- Securities and Exchange Commission
- Corporate Affairs Commission
- Commissioner for Insurance
- Comptroller General

There is some notable apprehension on the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Act that grants the President the power to remove any of the commission members on the grounds of public interest. Although this has not happened to date, it can create an impression that the Commission may receive directions from the appointing authority or that its composition can be unduly altered.

Expert opinions indicate the Commission has made substantial progress in the pursuit of its mandate. The most prominent has been arrests of key corruption suspects and seizure of stolen assets. Interestingly even as ICPC seems to view EFCC as better funded, there is a view within and outside the latter that it suffers from financial constraints.

The experts noted with concern the drama around arrests made by EFCC. Although the arrest of corruption suspects is within its mandate and actually necessary, some experts felt these dramatic arrests do not lead to successful

convictions. The arrests, it was observed, serve to heighten public expectations on EFCC which may not always be achieved.

An analysis of the mandates of the EFCC and ICPC indicates overlapping and competing roles. This situation is likely to cause confusion especially if the two institutions fail to coordinate effectively.

### **Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)**

The Bureau is founded under the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act (1991) with the mandate to 'establish and maintain a high standard of public morality in the conduct of government business and to ensure that the actions and behavior of public officers conform to the highest standards of public morality and accountability'.

Its roles include:

- Receiving declarations from public officers
- Reviewing the declarations for compliance with public ethics
- Receiving, processing and acting on complaints regarding the conduct of public officers.

The code of conduct for public officials forms a critical component in combating corruption. The Bureau in Nigeria is critical in this aspect. However, like other similar bodies pursuing this mandate across the globe, CCB has some challenges. First, the sheer amount of documentation needed to deliver on this mandate is overwhelming. Secondly, there is lack of comprehensive coverage of assets to be declared especially in the context of close relatives, poor public access to and scrutiny of the declarations.

Other critical institutions involved in anti-corruption include the police who provide a key link through investigations and other related enforcement, the judiciary as an adjudicating agency as well as the Attorney General (at the Federal level under section 174 and State level under Section 211 of the Constitution). The Office of Attorney General is specifically critical as the formal government advisor and defender of public interest.

### **Implementation challenges under the current legal and institutional framework**

- Even with the fairly strong legal and institutional framework, there are fundamental challenges that have to be resolved if Nigeria is to make notable progress on the anti-corruption agenda. These include:
- Apparent lack of political goodwill to consistently enforce the different anti-corruption laws
- Inadequate funding for the various anti-corruption agencies
- Weak public support and/or ownership of anti-corruption initiatives

- Poor clarity of roles between various anti-corruption agencies especially EFCC and ICPC, and the Special Presidential Investigation Panel and EFCC with regard to asset recovery
- Public perceptions of politicisation of corruption arrests and prosecutions.

### **Legal and institutional gaps towards effective combating of corruption**

Even with the current legal and institutional framework as traced under the Constitution and various laws, the following should be put in place -

- Proceeds of crime law---this legislation would support the tracing, freezing and confiscation of assets acquired through corruption. At the time of this report's publication, a bill had been passed by the House of Representatives and was awaiting passage in the National Assembly.
- Whistleblower protection law--- The Whistleblower Protection Bill is yet to be passed into law. It is otherwise known as "an Act to protect persons making disclosures for the public interest and others from reprisals, to provide for the matters disclosed to be properly investigated and dealt with and for other purposes related therewith" The non-passage of the Bill by the National Assembly has been widely criticized. The Bill has been in the National Assembly since 2007. Stemming from the failure of the National Assembly to pass the Bill, the Muhammadu Buhari Administration introduced a Whistleblowing Policy in December 2016.
- Campaign finance law-- At the time of this report's publication, the bill had been passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and was awaiting presidential assent.



# CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## CONCLUSIONS

The government ascended to power on the promise of tackling corruption. The commitment to restore integrity in public service was quite evident in various political, legal and policy pronouncements with the government taking notable steps to deliver this promise although these efforts were not as successful as expected. Additionally, there are legitimate concerns across the citizenry that the political will to fully deliver on this promise has been generally insufficient.

In terms of the legal and institutional framework, Nigeria has a well-developed set of anti-corruption laws and institutions. However, there are gaps in the implementation of some of the laws. The anti-corruption institutions have also in some instances created perceptions of selective enforcement of these laws. The wide array of institutions also seem to have conflicting and sometimes competing mandates. This is evident across the EFCC, ICPC and the Code of Conduct Bureau.

Even with very good laws against corruption, there are legislative gaps that serve to create room for corrupt practices. There is also need to enact laws on Proceeds of Crimes, Whistleblower Protection and Campaign Finance. Additionally, arising from the ever evolving practice of corruption, the current laws also have gaps that may create room for graft. The Public Procurement law is particularly weak on key provisions to prevent corruption in procurement processes.

Arising from the survey, there is ample evidence to conclude that corruption remains a major challenge in Nigeria. The numerous interviews with the general public and the experts point to a level of appreciation of the deleterious ramifications of graft in the country over the decades. On the flipside, this provides sufficient public goodwill to the federal and state governments to tackle the vice.

While grand corruption makes big news in Nigeria just like in other countries, the survey clearly indicates that petty bribery is rampant and affects the delivery of basic services, and is most likely a result of citizens trying to circumvent administrative hurdles or curtail government bureaucracy.

The survey uncovers insufficient participation and involvement of the general citizenry and the private sector in anti-corruption efforts. While bodies like ICPC have focused on public education, there is still low appreciation of government efforts to tackle corruption. The low levels of corruption reporting indicated in the survey and poor perceptions could improve if the citizenry plays a more central role.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **To the Federal Government of Nigeria**

- Establish an independent commission of inquiry with subpoena power to conduct a transparent, comprehensive, and impartial investigation into systemic corruption within the Nigeria Police Force, and the judiciary as well as the ministries of power, education and health;
- Prosecute without delay and according to international fair trial standards anyone implicated in corruption and other serious abuses within the Nigeria Police Force, and the judiciary, the power, education and health sectors;
- Improve financial oversight of the Nigeria Police Force, the ministries of power, education and health as follows:
- Require the Nigeria Police Force, the ministries of power, education and health to publish quarterly budget execution reports
- Order an independent financial audit of the Nigeria Police Force, and the ministries of power, education and health by a qualified auditing company that conforms to international standards for auditing public sector entities; and ensure that the audit report is made public.
- Ensure proper and effective coordination among all anticorruption agencies.

### **To the National Assembly**

- Be more proactive in the fight against corruption by passing the Proceeds of Crime Bill, the Whistle-blowers Bill, and the Witness Protection Bill among others;
- Immediately publish all reports of investigations on corruption and corruption-related matters in the judiciary, education, power and health sectors among others that have been conducted by the National Assembly since the return of democracy in 1999;
- Urgently amend the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act to ensure public access including by defining specific terms and conditions for public access to the asset declarations of public officials, as provided by the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 (as amended). Any such terms and conditions should be based on the public interest to know, and on the principles of transparency and accountability;

- Subject the Nigeria Police Force, the ministries of power, education and health to greater legislative oversight by requiring these ministries to submit quarterly expenditure reports;
- Hold regular public hearings into allegations of corruption in the police, the ministries of power, education and health.

### **To the Nigeria Police Force**

Streamline and prioritise internal control mechanisms by establishing an Ethics and Integrity Unit at each police station. The unit should include a human rights officer, an anti-corruption officer, and an officer responsible for service delivery complaints. These personnel should be assigned the exclusive duties to:

- Receive and investigate complaints of bribery and corruption against police officers filed by members of the public;
- Liaise with community leaders and civil society organisations in regard to incidents of police bribery and corruption within the community;
- Report incidents of police extortion and bribery to the divisional police officer, and appropriate internal and external oversight bodies; and
- Protect members of the public who file complaints against police bribery and corruption from harassment, violence, or any other form of reprisal.
- Ensure that the Ethics and Integrity Unit is able to effectively perform its work by designating a line item within the police force budget for the unit, and by providing sufficient funding, training, and institutional support to its personnel;
- Publish detailed quarterly reports of the number, type, status, and outcome of complaints received by the Ethics and Integrity Unit;
- Prioritise the prompt, thorough and effective investigations of senior police officers implicated in embezzling and misappropriating police funds or taking monetary 'returns' from subordinate officers; and junior and senior police officers implicated in extorting money from complainants, criminal suspects, and other members of the public, and promptly submit investigation reports to the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice for prosecution;
- Improve financial oversight of state commands by requiring them to submit monthly revenue and detailed expenditure reports for each police division to Force Headquarters, and by conducting and publishing periodic and comprehensive internal audits of these reports.

### **To the Police Service Commission**

- Establish mechanisms for police whistle-blowers to anonymously and directly report incidents of police extortion, embezzlement, and other corrupt practices to the Police Service Commission;
- Strengthen the investigatory capacity of the Police Service Commission by providing adequate funding, staff, and training to enable the Department of Discipline to independently investigate complaints of police corruption and other serious abuses;
- Collaborate with anti-corruption agencies such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to ensure prompt, thorough and effective investigation and prosecution of allegations of police bribery and corruption.

### **To the Code of Conduct Bureau**

- Ensure that all police officers file periodic declarations of the total value of all personal assets, and conduct random audits of these asset declarations;
- Make public the asset declarations of public officials, including police officers, the judiciary as well as senior officers of the ministries of power, education and health, as provided by the Constitution;
- Thoroughly investigate and verify the asset declarations of any public officer who fails to fully comply with constitutional provisions on assets declaration, and promptly pursue the cases before the Code of Conduct Tribunal;
- Publish detailed quarterly reports on the work of the Code of Conduct Bureau including the number of public complaints received, the number of public officers investigated, and the names of those officers sanctioned by the Code of Conduct Tribunal.

### **To the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)**

- Investigate, arrest, and prosecute according to international fair trial standards, or publicly explain the reasons for not prosecuting, high-level officials of the ministries of power, education and health implicated in large-scale corruption;
- Establish Civil Society desks to facilitate and improve access to public complaints about corruption in the police, judiciary and the ministries of power, education and health among others;
- Be more proactive in launching and following through criminal investigations into allegations of corruption;

- Open investigations into the operations and allegations of bribery and corruption by the officers of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC);
- Reopen and ensure full implementation of the recommendations by the ICPC following its investigation of the UBEC and discovery of massive corruption and mismanagement of the UBEC funds. The investigation resulted in the recovery of stolen N3.4 billion, meant to improve the quality of education and access to education of every Nigerian child but several recommendations by the ICPC remain unimplemented, and N54.78 billion (US\$351.54 million) is allegedly still missing. The ICPC investigated UBEC and the 36 State and FCT Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEBs) in 2007. The investigation covered the period January 2005 to December 2006, and followed the petition submitted to the ICPC by the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) in January 2007.

### **To the State Governments**

- Make public quarterly budget execution reports that detail monthly state government income from federal allocations and other sources, and state government expenditure, including allocations to the state judiciary and ministries and on provisions of basic public services like education and health;
- Hold public hearings as part of the budget-making process to allow for greater public scrutiny of government spending priorities;
- Publish annual state budgets immediately upon their passage and disseminate these widely, including posting them on the internet;
- Comply fully with Freedom of Information (FOI) requests and make public commitment to ensure the full application of the FOI Act in respective states;
- Make public all contracts awarded to private contractors;
- Encourage and assist civil society participation in the oversight of ministries and public service agencies.

### **To the National Human Rights Commission**

- Establish a special task force in collaboration with the civil society to thoroughly and effectively investigate allegations of systemic corruption within the Nigeria Police Force, and the judiciary as well as the ministries of power, education and health, and make public the findings of any such investigation, as well as work with the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation and anti-corruption agencies to ensure the effective implementation of the report's recommendations
- Regularly and closely monitor complaints of corruption within the Nigeria Police Force, and the judiciary as well as the ministries of power, education and health and act on any such complaints

- Actively press the Nigeria Police Force, the ministries of power, education and health to ensure transparency and accountability in their respective functions and activities and to promptly and satisfactorily remedy any complaints of corruption brought to their attention
- Advocate for sanctions and prosecution of anyone involved in corruption within the Nigeria Police Force, the ministries of power, education and health

### **Other Recommendations to the Federal Government and 36 States of the Federation**

- Conduct institutional integrity analysis within the police, judiciary and the ministries of power, education and health to identify key structural and operational factors likely to predispose the institutions to corruption;
- Actively support and promote strong public participation in the anti-corruption initiatives by providing a platform for public awareness on corruption and making the citizens' voice more central in any interventions. Ghana's Anti-Corruption Coalition, a grouping bringing together state bodies, private sector, religious groups and civil society is perhaps a key learning point for Nigeria on this issue;
- Review and simplify the administrative procedures impeding access to basic public services to remove opportunities for rent seeking among rank and file staff;
- Establish citizens' complaint desks in the police and ministries of power, education and health headed by Ethics and Integrity Officers, where such desks are not already in place, to provide platforms for citizens to air complaints and seek redress touching on corruption;
- Make civil servants' salaries more competitive and to match inflation. In situations where salaries remain markedly low compared to the private sector, it becomes less probable that civil servants will resist the temptation to use their offices for private gain or look for other ways to generate additional income leading to cases of high absenteeism in critical sectors;
- Develop and adopt international standards of judicial accountability to guide and frame the establishment of domestic systems of judicial accountability that are effective, objective, transparent and in line with constitutional and international human rights law;
- Thoroughly and transparently investigate allegations of age falsification among judges, and ensure effective prosecution and accountability for corrupt judges;
- Provide effective remedies to individuals whose human rights have been violated owing to wrongful convictions or any other miscarriage of justice by corrupt judges;
- Ensure that all judges are appointed on merit to avoid selection of corruptible judges;

- Improve conditions of service and working environment for judges and end processes for unfair promotion and transfer of judges to eliminate judges' vulnerability to bribery;
- Revisit the report on judicial corruption by the late Hon. Justice Kayode Eso by publishing the entire report, and effectively implementing all the recommendations made by the panel.

### **Recommendations to the Chief Justice of Nigeria and the National Judicial Council**

- Identify and review all outstanding cases of judicial corruption and refer such cases to appropriate anti-corruption agencies;
- Apply the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers in a consistent and transparent manner, with full respect for the fundamental guarantees of fair trial and due process;
- Grant suspected corrupt judges the right to have disciplinary decisions reviewed by a higher judicial tribunal;
- Improve the process of selection, appointment of judges, and promote their continuing education and training, protect their professional integrity and enforce disciplinary proceedings in a fair and consistent manner;
- Publish annual reports of all activities involving the judiciary, including expenditure, and provide the public with reliable information about its governance and organisation, including the number of judges found to be corrupt;
- Ensure that the Chief Justice of Nigeria and all other judges make periodic asset disclosures;
- Promote proactive disclosures of conflicts of interest by judges as soon as they become apparent and self-disqualification when they are (or might appear to be) biased or prejudiced towards a party to a case; when they have previously served as lawyers or material witnesses in the case; or if they have an economic interest in the outcome
- Encourage victims of judicial corruption to speak out so that they can enjoy access to effective remedies.

### **To the United Nations, the African Union and members of the International Community**

- Issue public and private statements denouncing corrupt practices in Nigeria, including bribery, extortion, and embezzlement in the public sectors, particularly in the police, the judiciary and the ministries of power, education and health; and call on the Nigerian authorities to investigate all outstanding allegations of corruption involving these sectors promptly, thoroughly and effectively and to hold anyone found to be involved to account;

- Impose condition funding to the Nigerian government, including financial and technical assistance, on measurable progress on holding accountable public officers implicated in corruption in the police, judiciary, and ministries of power, education and health;
- Target funding and technical assistance for the Nigerian government to initiatives that directly improve financial transparency and address accountability for corruption by the police, the judiciary, and officers of the ministries of power, education and health;
- Require all officers in the police, the judiciary and the ministries of power, education and health who participate in international missions or training courses to publicly declare the total value of all personal assets;
- Impose visa bans on senior public officers in the police, the judiciary, and ministries of power, education and health credibly implicated in corruption.

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# ANNEXURES

## NIGERIA NATIONAL CORRUPTION SURVEY 2018 QUESTIONNAIRE

Hello, My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I am conducting a survey on behalf of SERAP. The survey seeks to capture your experiences on bribery and perceptions on the state of corruption in Nigeria. The interview will not take more than 30 minutes and your responses will be kept completely confidential.

### A Interview Details

Interviewer Name  
(Capital)

Interview date(ddmm)

Start Time (24 hour)

### B. Respondent Information

State

LGA

Ward/ Street

### C. Residence

<b>Rural</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Urban</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>D2.Gender</b>	
<b>Male</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Female</b>	<b>2</b>

### **D Respondent Age**

<b>18 - 24</b>	<b>01</b>
<b>25-34</b>	<b>02</b>
<b>35-44</b>	<b>03</b>
<b>45+</b>	<b>04</b>

### **E. Highest level of education attained**

<b>Informal education / No formal Education</b>	<b>01</b>
<b>Primary School Only</b>	<b>02</b>
<b>Secondary School</b>	<b>03</b>
<b>Tertiary training</b>	<b>04</b>

## **F. Employment status**

<b>Student</b>	<b>01</b>
<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>02</b>
<b>Self-employed /Employed in family business or farm</b>	<b>03</b>
<b>Employed in Private sector</b>	<b>04</b>
<b>Employed by Government /Local Authority /Parastatal</b>	<b>05</b>
<b>Employed in community sector e.g. church , NGO</b>	<b>06</b>
<b>Retired</b>	<b>07</b>

## **G. Personal income**

<b>Personal Monthly Income (Naira)</b>	
<b>Less than 21,600</b>	<b>01</b>
<b>21,601 to 54,000</b>	<b>02</b>
<b>54,001- to 180,000</b>	<b>03</b>
<b>180,001- 540,000</b>	<b>04</b>
<b>above 540,000</b>	<b>05</b>

### General Questions on the state of corruption

1. How would you describe the current state of corruption in Nigeria today?

Low	Medium	High	<i>Don't Know</i>
01	02	03	98

2. Comparing the current state of corruption in Nigeria with five years ago, would you say corruption has:

Increased	Remained the same	Decreased	<i>Don't Know</i>
01	02	03	98

3. Thinking about the next one year, do you think the incidences of corruption in Nigeria will

Increase	Remain the same	Decrease	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>NR</i>
01	02	03	98	99

4. Why do you say so?
- 
- 

### Institutional anti corruption perception

5. Could you kindly name 3 institutions doing anti corruption work in Nigeria

1	
2	
3	
4	<b>Don't Know</b>

6. How would you rate the success of each of the institutions you mentioned in reducing the levels of corruption? (**List the institutions in the same order mentioned above**)

<b>Institution</b>	<b>Poor (01)</b>	<b>Average (02)</b>	<b>Very good (03)</b>	<b>Don't Know (04)</b>
<b>1.</b>				
<b>2.</b>				
<b>3.</b>				
<b>4.</b>	<b>Not Applicable ( for those who answered Don't Know in question above</b>			

7. What do you think are the major hindrance on anti corruption efforts in Nigeria? (Max 3 choices)

<b>1</b>	<b>Poor coordination / cordination between different government agencies</b>	
<b>2</b>	<b>Lack of political will</b>	
<b>3</b>	<b>Lack of support by citizens</b>	
<b>4</b>	<b>Apparent acceptance of corruption by both the government and the citizens</b>	
<b>5</b>	<b>Fear of reprisals for reporting</b>	
<b>6</b>	<b>Belief that things have not changed for the better</b>	
<b>7</b>	<b>Weak anti corruption laws and institutions</b>	
<b>8</b>	<b>Selective investigation/prosecution</b>	
<b>9</b>	<b>Punishment and sentence does not reflect seriousness/level of offending</b>	
<b>10</b>	<b>Others (Please specify)</b>	

8. What would you want to see the next government do to strengthen anti corruption efforts in Nigeria? (Max 3 choices)

<b>1</b>	<b>Take legal action against all corruption suspects regardless of their status</b>	
<b>2</b>	<b>Review and strengthen all anti corruption related laws</b>	
<b>3</b>	<b>Reform anti-corruption institutions</b>	

<b>4</b>	<b>Minimize judicial corruption</b>	
<b>5</b>	<b>Sensitive lawyers to their role in fighting corruption</b>	
<b>6</b>	<b>Expand public education and awareness on anti corruption</b>	
<b>7</b>	<b>Provide free access to information to citizens on public affairs</b>	
<b>8</b>	<b>Recover all assets corruptly acquired by government officials</b>	
<b>9</b>	<b>Introduce campaign finance legislation</b>	
<b>10.</b>	<b>Please specify</b>	

9. At a personal level, which of the following actions against poor governance have you taken in the past 12 months?

	<b>Action</b>	
<b>1</b>	<b>Complained about a bad service from a government office</b>	
<b>2</b>	<b>Complained about a bribery experience at a service delivery point</b>	
<b>3</b>	<b>Sought to know about how a government procurement is done</b>	
<b>4</b>	<b>Discussed the failings or successes of an elected official</b>	
<b>5</b>	<b>Discussed the failings or successes of federal or state government officer</b>	
<b>6</b>	<b>None</b>	

10. If you took any action above, did the government body responsible provide an acceptable response?

<b>Yes</b>	
<b>No</b>	

### **Personal experiences on service delivery related bribery**

**11.** Please tell me which of the following public institutions you have visited/ interacted with personally in the last 12 months, looking for services. ( **only interview those who interacted with at least 3 of the institutions below**)

<b>Institution category</b>	<b>Institution type</b>
<b>Educational institutions</b>	<b>Pre Primary</b>
	<b>Technical /vocational training</b>
	<b>Primary</b>
	<b>Secondary</b>
	<b>University</b>
<b>Hospitals and other Medical and Health services</b>	
<b>Police</b>	
<b>Power (Electricity and related)</b>	
<b>Judiciary/ Courts</b>	

12. When visiting these organizations/institutions/offices, did you encounter any bribery incidences? Interviewer to explain bribery

incidence here may mean bribe was demanded, implicitly expected or offered by the respondent

<b>Institution category</b>	<b>Institution type</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>Educational institutions</b>	<b>Pre Primary</b>		
	<b>Technical /vocational training</b>		
	<b>Primary</b>		
	<b>Secondary</b>		
	<b>University</b>		
<b>Hospitals and other Medical and Health services</b>			
<b>Police</b>			
<b>Power (Electricity and related)</b>			
<b>Judiciary/ Courts</b>			

13. Did you pay a bribe as expected or demanded above, if yes what is the total amount paid last 12 months

<b>Institution category</b>	<b>Institution type</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Educational institutions</b>	<b>Pre Primary</b>			
	<b>Technical /vocational training</b>			
	<b>Primary</b>			
	<b>Secondary</b>			
	<b>University</b>			
<b>Hospitals and other Medical and Health services</b>				
<b>Police</b>				
<b>Power (Electricity and related)</b>				
<b>Judiciary/ Courts</b>				

14. For those who refused to pay bribe when asked or expected to pay, did you get the service you were seeking?

<b>Institution category</b>	<b>Institution type</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>Educational institutions</b>	<b>Pre Primary</b>		
	<b>Technical /vocational training</b>		
	<b>Primary</b>		
	<b>Secondary</b>		
	<b>University</b>		
<b>Hospitals and other Medical and Health services</b>			
<b>Police</b>			
<b>Power (Electricity and related)</b>			
<b>Judiciary/ Courts</b>			

15. (For those who paid) Do you think you would have received service if you had not paid the bribe?

<b>Institution category</b>	<b>Institution type</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>Educational institutions</b>	<b>Pre Primary</b>		
	<b>Technical /vocational training</b>		
	<b>Primary</b>		
	<b>Secondary</b>		
	<b>University</b>		
<b>Hospitals and other Medical and Health services</b>			
<b>Police</b>			
<b>Power (Electricity and related)</b>			

**Respondent details - THIS PAGE WILL BE TORN OFF**

Thank you very much for your time. You have given us a lot of useful information. Occasionally my supervisor contacts people to see how the survey went. For this purpose ,would you please fill in the following details?

<b>Name</b>	
<b>Telephone Number</b>	

Interviewer Declaration: I certify that this interview has been personally carried out by me with the correct respondent. I further declare that all the information is truthful and as told to me by the respondent. I understand that any discrepancy discovered during back-checking of this questionnaire will result in the cancellation of this interview.

\_\_\_\_\_ .(Signed )

<b>Stop time (24 Hour)</b>				
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FOR SUPERVISOR'S USE :

Name \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Quality Control... (Do not ask this question)</b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Signature</b>
<b>ACCOMPANIED</b>	<b>1</b>	
<b>SPOT CHECKED</b>	<b>2</b>	
<b>PHYSICAL BACK-CHECK</b>	<b>3</b>	
<b>TELEPHONE BACK-CHECK</b>	<b>4</b>	





**SERAP** is a non-profit, nonpartisan, legal and advocacy organization devoted to promoting transparency, accountability and respect for socio-economic rights in Nigeria. SERAP received the Wole Soyinka Anti-Corruption Defender Award in 2014. It has also been nominated for the UN Civil Society Award and Ford Foundation's Jubilee Transparency Award. SERAP serves as one of two Sub-Saharan African civil society representatives on the governing Committee of the UNCAC Coalition, a global anti-corruption network of over 380 civil society organizations (CSOs) in over 100 countries.

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