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Path to Resilience

Report on the Findings of the Fragility and Resilience Assessment Methodology

Mali Peacebuilding, Stabilization and Reconciliation

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Acronyms

| | |
|---------------|--|
| CAF | Conflict Assessment Framework |
| CSO | Civil Society Organizations |
| FRAMe® | Fragility – Resilience Assessment Methodology |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| PSR | Peacebuilding, Stabilization, and Reconciliation |
| SDF | Security Defense Forces |
| SF | System Functionality |
| ULSHB | School of Letters and Human Sciences-Bamako |
| WANEP | West African Network for Peacebuilding |

Executive Summary

This report reflects the findings from the Conflict Assessment Analysis conducted by the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and the Fragility – Resilience Assessment Methodology (FRAMe®), an instrument developed by Creative Associates International and administered by the University of Letters and Human Sciences of Bamako (ULSHB).

The Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) provide important information regarding the conflict dynamics in each commune. With input from more than 400 respondents, the Peacebuilding, Stabilization, and Reconciliation Project is equipped with nuanced information about the drivers of conflict, actors within the conflict dynamic, and the impact.

FRAMe® provides citizens’ perspective on how the overall governance system—state and non-state actors such as private companies, CSOs, Security and Justice—intersects with the conflict dynamics and what actions are required to build resilience in each commune¹.

| FRAMe® Dimensions | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Leadership | 2.8 |
| Administration | 2.6 |
| Financial Management | 2.4 |
| Service Delivery | 2.6 |
| Citizen Participation | 2.9 |
| Security | 2.3 |
| Justice | 2.1 |
| Economic Foundation | 2.5 |

Specifically, FRAMe® gathers an understanding of how functional eight dimensions of the governance system are and offers insights as to why a dimension contributes to overall resilience as reflected in seven fragility-resilience factors. In short, the factors illuminate the efficacy of the system.

Conflict Assessment Findings

As expected, Mali’s conflict is multi-dimensional, and drivers vary from one locality to the next, reflecting each commune’s unique power dynamics, inter-group relations, histories and culture. But the data collected for this assessment shows that, broadly speaking, there are four conflict dynamics common to all PSR intervention areas.

- Competition for natural resources;
- Weak governance;
- The struggle for legitimacy; and,
- The breakdown of social cohesion

These drivers are intertwined; where the State is absent and fails to administer justice, people will take matters into their own hands. Where there is conflict between pastoralists and farmers, it often manifests as ethnic conflict, breaking down social cohesion in a community. This is clear in respondent comments on the consequences of conflict, where deteriorating social cohesion, economic opportunities, security and governance are cited repeatedly.

FRAMe® findings provide a deeper understanding of how the governance system, as perceived by citizens, could foster resilience, or, left unaddressed, exacerbate conflict and violence. As is demonstrated by FRAMe® findings, re-establishing the State functions will be important, but the means by which this is accomplished must reflect the complexity brought on by the devolution of power through different regimes and successive and cumulative rules – complex frameworks that include formal laws,

¹ FRAMe® a proprietary instrument and is copywrite and a registered trademark to Creative Associates; the unauthorized external use is strictly forbidden without specific written consent.

informal influence, customs and traditional practices – have determined who holds power in Mali, what constitutes that power, and how those in power relate to their constituents.

The findings indicate that the patterns of fragility and the paths to resilience do not differ significantly between the North and Center part of the country, but there are differences between regions.

FRAMe® Factors

Social Cohesion-Local society can pursue collective action problems and resolve disputes

Trust and Confidence-Populace and governing actors have a mutual trust in each other that they will respect decisions made.

Inclusion-Various groups within the community are represented in political and social processes and how well actions reflect this representation.

System Legitimacy - Populace is willing to “buy in” to the social contract promulgated by the governing actors and uphold obligations under it.

Civic Infrastructure- Both physical (e.g. a town hall) and notional (e.g. history of cooperation) assets available to civic society.


Decision Making-Local governance structures have the authority and competence independently to effect meaningful change at the community level.

Performance-Society achieves what it sets out to do. whether that’s trash removal or recover from an epidemic.

Functionality of Governance System

The functionality of the Mali governance system shows there are pockets that contribute to resilience, but they are largely fragile.

- **Leadership** - A governance system has many leaders who have authority and influence. In reviewing the FRAMe® findings, the perceptions of the commune leaders are that they work toward bringing about resilience.
- **Citizen Participation** - Like Leadership, Citizen Participation is perceived to be key to advancing community resilience but there is a need to revise the mechanisms as the citizens do not perceive that engaging in the governance system is changing performance of the system, especially in the areas of security, justice, and financial management.
- **Security** - FRAMe® findings indicate that addressing the issues surrounding security are more complex than presence of State actors.
- **Justice** - This dimension is consistently perceived as contributing to fragility and will undermine attempts to deal with conflicts that require adjudication such as access to and use of land and water.



Efficacy of the Governance System

FRAMe® factors measure the efficacy of the governance system and shed light on actions that can ensure that each dimension can contribute to resilience. The findings challenge us to determine whether there are systemic problems within the system of governance in Mali; problems that hold in place traditional roles and relationships among different ethnic or economic actors, but do not recognize or respect the needs of others and as such, even if the system is inclusive, and promotes social cohesion, the overall governance system is not trusted, or perceived as legitimate.

For Mali, the efficacy of the system is largely challenged by two factors, mutual trust that actors in the system will respect decisions made (trust and confidence), and the social contract (system legitimacy). They undermine nearly every dimension. Even where the dimension is perceived as functioning, the overall trust and confidence and legitimacy of the system are questioned. In a highly conflict affected state, the concerns here will retard attempts to strengthen or establish social cohesion, and performance of the system.

Implications

The findings indicate that the patterns of fragility and the paths to resilience do not differ significantly between the North and Center part of the country. The full report provides the nuanced differences by region, and for each commune. However, the implications listed here are largely universal to all areas.

- **Early Warning Response System** - The EWRS will be effective if citizens report, and if the responses are perceived as respecting the rights, needs, and concerns of all citizens. FRAMe® findings indicate that it will be critical to focus on two factors: citizens trust and confidence and system legitimacy. Both factors reflect respect for actions taken and a willingness to participate in programs established by leaders in the community. Given the low perceptions of Security this will be a major challenge.
- **PDSECs** - Implementing the PDSECs provide the most concrete evidence of a functioning governance system. Primarily designed to ensure the delivery of basic services and programs that improve daily life, enhance human development, and foster economic growth, it will be critical to address the FRAMe® findings related to Service Delivery and Financial Management. To actualize the PDSECs it will be critical to address the overall process in which citizens are engaged in contributing to the development of plans, and the execution of the plans. Further if there is to be any hope of citizens respecting the decisions made about the delivery and cost of services and programs, currently deemed a fragile aspect of both service delivery and finance, it will be critical that the engagement process be seen as reflecting citizens' needs and have some involvement in setting priorities, and that the citizen understands the budgetary limits, how Council decisions have been prioritized, and the use of public funds.
- **Conflict Dynamics of Resource Management** - Access to land and water are key drivers of conflict overall, varying by degree depending on security, climate affected changes in availability of land and water, and policies that are perceived to benefit dominate groups. Findings for all of the dimensions in the governance system must be reviewed as it relates to resource management but in particular a spotlight on Administration, Security, and Justice is warranted.
- **Women Agency** - The FRAMe® findings suggest that women could be a path to resilience currently not tapped within the governance system. While they find the system overall contributing to resilience, they continue to play a muted and subordinate role in influencing changes. This is reflected in their perceptions of civic infrastructure and decision making. Building women's agency through their influence within the family and identifying how this influence could be expanded to enhance the system overall provides a safe and effective way to build their authority and opens new roles and paths for young women to follow.

- **Dynamics of Leadership** - Leading communes along the path to resilience will require more than bringing the State back to what is perceived as ungoverned spaces. The lack of trust between citizens, which may be exacerbated by the absences of the State, is also a reflection of frayed relations, frustration, and power dynamics that exist which cannot be addressed by the State. Placing all the responsibility and expectation that the State is the only actor to facilitate peace and foster stability is not a recipe for success.
- **Youth Development.** Youth perceptions register a frustration with the governance system. Analysis of the CAF and FRAME® data indicates a concern about future economic and social opportunities. While they respect their elders, as reflected in the fact that they see Leadership as inclusive, their lack of trust and confidence in the system indicates that the current system of governance will not address their concerns. As a strategy, it will be important to increase youth leader's agency in decision making processes that are now limited to commune elders. As part of this strategy, an emphasis on working with elders, not just youth, to explore ways in which they can create opportunities for youth to take a leadership role for issue of the commune writ large, and not just those perceived as relevant to youth will be important.

1. Introduction

Understanding the complexity of the governance system in Mali is a critical element of the PSR project. It is complicated by history and custom; attempts to devolve responsibility and authority; and a mosaic of peoples, who all seek to be recognized and respected. Efforts to manage this complexity through the devolution of power through different regimes and successive and cumulative rules – complex frameworks that include formal laws, informal influence, customs and traditional practices – have determined who holds power in Mali, what constitutes that power, and how those in power relate to their constituents². Since 2012, conflict and insecurity has been the single greatest obstacle to successful decentralization in Mali. The Tuareg rebellion helped to usher in a string of military coups, rebellions, and extremist activities. Insecurity now plagues huge swaths of the country, including most of the central and northern regions; and the conflict has upended the rules of local governance, disrupted the roles of the powerful and the governed, and subverted the relationships between them.

The Conflict Assessment carried out for the USAID Stabilization, and Reconciliation Project (PSR) illuminates how the conflict plays out in each commune. As expected, conflict is multi-dimensional, and drivers vary from one locality to the next, reflecting each commune's unique power dynamics, inter-group relations, histories, and culture. But the data collected for this assessment shows that, broadly speaking, there are four conflict dynamics common to all PSR intervention areas.

- Competition for natural resources;
- Weak governance;
- The struggle for legitimacy; and,
- The breakdown of social cohesion.

These drivers are intertwined; where the state is absent and fails to administer justice, people will take matters into their own hands. Where there is conflict between pastoralists and farmers, it often manifests as ethnic conflict, breaking down social cohesion in a community. This is clear in respondent comments on the consequences of conflict, where deteriorating social cohesion, economic opportunities, security, and governance are cited repeatedly.

In response to these conditions, the PSR project employed the Fragility – Resilience Assessment Methodology (FRAMe®).³ This methodology provides citizens' perspective on how the overall governance system intersects with the conflict dynamics and what actions are required to build resilience in each commune. In preparing this report, consideration was given to how a governance system can exacerbate violence even if the system is perceived to be performing by focusing on which constituents benefit from the system and which do not. Further, because FRAMe® gathers citizens' perception on the whole system of governance, the data – analyzed in concert with conflict findings from the Conflict Assessment – sheds light on factors that may require moving beyond reestablishing state presence to ensure peace. The seven factors that underscore fragility and resilience highlight the relationships between different segments of a commune and offer ways in which to reconstitute them in order to build resiliency, moving beyond the state-citizen social contract. Therefore, using a systems approach, FRAMe® provides insights in two key areas of how governance relates to building resilience in conflict area:

² For a more complete understanding of the effects of decentralization on peacebuilding, stabilization and reintegration see Annex B.

³ FRAMe® Creative's Governance Fragility Resilience Assessment Method (FRAMe) is a mapping tool that assesses the sources and dynamics of community fragility as well as the efficacy of governing institutions. Across a series of single identity focus groups, Creative's Governance FRAMe employs a Likert scale that provides a standardized lens through which to analyze eight functional dimensions and seven stability factors (right) of governance. A more completed overview of the FRAMe® is provided in Annex C.

- Functionality of the system. Do citizens perceive that the overall system provides the basic services, security, and economic opportunity?
- Efficacy of the system. Does the system itself, even if functional, recognize and respond to the needs, identities, and concerns of all citizens?

The findings will be used to inform direct interventions that will contribute to establishing a governance system that fosters community resilience. While it will primarily focus on interventions at the commune level, implications as to the necessity to address program and policy reforms at the regional and national levels of government will also be highlighted.

Considering the above, key observations stand out.

Functionality of the System

The functionality of the system reflects how well the responsibilities delegated, accepted, or assumed by default to different actors result in improved public services, facilitate livelihoods, assure security, and advance overall social welfare. FRAME® defines these responsibilities in terms of governance system dimensions.

The text box to the right displays the eight FRAME® dimensions of a governance system and the overall scoring of these dimensions from PSR analysis of citizen perceptions in Mali. A score from 2.5 to 4.0 indicates that a dimension is contributing to resilience. Below 2.5, it is contributing to fragility.

| FRAME® Dimensions | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Leadership | 2.8 |
| Administration | 2.6 |
| Financial Management | 2.4 |
| Service Delivery | 2.6 |
| Citizen Participation | 2.9 |
| Security | 2.3 |
| Justice | 2.1 |
| Economic Foundation | 2.5 |

Leadership and Citizen Participation contribute to the resiliency of the overall system, while Security and Justice are the primary dimensions that exacerbate fragility. Each of the dimensions are addressed in the full report, but Security, Leadership, Justice, and Citizen Participation are highlighted here because of interesting findings in each dimension as it to moving northern and central regions of Mali from fragility to resilience.

- **Security.** FRAME® findings indicate that addressing the issues surrounding security are more complex than the presence of state actors. Traversing this complexity is critical, because this dimension of governance is a priority in the GOM development plans, central to economic opportunity in both northern and central Mali and achieving the goals of the Peace Accord in the northern communes. The following quote captures nearly all the stated grievances about the provision of security. It is paradoxical that grievances raise concerns about the absences of the state, but at the same time blame the security presence as the problem.

A very troubled GAO woman said: "Since 2012, the outbreak of the crisis, the northern and central regions, the municipality of Gao has not known peace. At present, insecurity is increasing by the day despite the massive and disturbing presence of national and international security forces who do nothing to protect us. For me the massive presence of MINUSMA, G5-Sahel, French forces puts us in danger and jeopardizes all our efforts to restore peace. It is time to question everything and look for new solutions for a definitive exit from this crisis that has lasted too long."

A review of the citizens' perception indicates that two factors, in addition to basic performance (i.e., providing a general feeling of safety) will need to be addressed. Citizens generally feel that the police and security forces are not accountable to local citizens—a reflection of trust and confidence.

Additionally, and possibly a result of a lack of trust, citizens challenge the legitimacy of the overall

system of security. There is little difference between citizens' perceptions in the north and the center regions.

- **Leadership.** A governance system has many leaders who have authority and influence. In reviewing the FRAME® findings, the citizens perceive leaders are able to work together in an effort to build resilience. As will be discussed later in the report, the leaders that citizens look to for this do not include government officials, given the absences of the state in many communes. This varies between different identity groups, but it does suggest that there exist a body of people that can work together, can share in the responsibility of carrying out the functions of the system, and are accepted by the citizens. It also suggests that a different relationship between the state, primarily represented by the commune councils and the state administrative officials, and leaders of non-state institutions must be considered; moving away from a compliance-driven relationship to one of mutual cooperation and commitment, especially given the absences of the state.
- **Citizen Participation.** Like Leadership, Citizen Participation is perceived to be key to advancing community resilience. Even though citizen participation contributes most to resilience, the fact that in nearly half of the communes, citizens do not have trust and confidence in participatory mechanisms (defined as citizens' ideas not perceived as legal, or that Civil Society Organizations are coopted) is problematic. Further, and as will be elaborated upon, citizens do not perceive that engaging in the governance system can change the performance of the system, especially in the areas of security, justice, and financial management.
- **Justice.** Justice is the weakest dimension of the governance system. Unlike the three dimensions discussed above, there are no peculiarities; the execution of justice is perceived as bias towards favored groups. FRAME® findings indicate that officials target marginalized groups. The results are that citizens seek redress outside the official system.

Efficacy of the Governance System

The FRAME® findings underscore conflict theory that explores finding the balance between the rigidity of the state structure and more fluid traditional structures. Government policies, procedures, and regulations define how things ought to be, and integration of citizens is based on their ability to comply with the system. The establishment of most governance systems is inherently biased to past practice and of those in power⁴, and as such, make it difficult for those outside the established hierarchy to comply. Thus, the challenge is whether there are systemic problems within the system of governance in Mali – problems that hold in place traditional roles and relationships among

⁴ Because FRAME® reflects an institutional reform logic model defined as Limited Access-Open Access Order, where a limited access order aligns with fragility and an open access order reflects resilience

FRAME Factors

Social Cohesion-Local society can pursue collective action problems and resolve disputes.

Trust and Confidence-Populace and governing actors have a mutual trust in each other that they will respect decisions made.

Inclusion-Various groups within the community are represented in political and social processes and how well actions reflect this representation.

System Legitimacy - Populace is willing to “buy in” to the social contract promulgated by the governing actors and uphold obligations under it. **Civic**

Infrastructure- Both physical (e.g. a town hall) and notional (e.g. history of cooperation) assets available to civic society.

Decision Making-Local governance structures have the authority and competence independently to effect meaningful change at the community level.

Performance-Society achieves what it sets out to do, whether that's trash removal or recover from an epidemic.

different ethnic, tribal, or economic actors, but do not recognize or respect the needs of others. As such, even if the system is inclusive, and promotes social cohesion, the overall governance system is not trusted, or perceived as legitimate. FRAME® factors, as described in the text box, measure the efficacy of the governance system. The findings suggest that the system itself will require transformation.

- **Trust and Confidence and Legitimacy of the System.** Using the FRAME® factors as a map, the findings show an overall sense that the system is inclusive, but the system itself is not trusted or perceived as legitimate. The leadership may be representative and reflective of the population, but the actions carried out through the system, especially as it relates to justice, security, and financial management is not representative of the needs of all the people. An example is the importance of farming to the economy, and the system is structured to enhance necessary inputs to this economic sector, such as land ownership. Conversely, conflict data collected for PSR suggest that the governance system is not designed to enhance herder economy activity. This is of importance in central Mali and is further underscored by the data reflecting citizens' perceptions of citizen engagement. As will be highlighted in this report, generally the perception of citizen engagement is high, but as noted, trust and confidence in the social contract agreed to through participatory mechanisms is not forthcoming.
- **Building through Relationships.** The combination of decentralization and the upsurge in conflict since 2012 have created a relationship vortex that is complicating efforts to re-establish the state, address localized conflict dynamics, and lay the foundation for sustained peace. Two of the seven FRAME® factors—inclusion and social cohesion—most reflect the nature of relationships in the PSR communes. The two factors have a common thread in that they are highly reflective of the ability of members of a community to work together toward a shared vision. They are also highly localized, reflecting the culture of the commune, established practices and values, and tradition. As will be illustrated in this report, the governance system is perceived to be inclusive and that it is fostering social cohesion. What must be considered however, is the fact that the changing nature of the power dynamics brought on by competition for natural resources, weak governance, the struggle for legitimacy, and the breakdown of traditional social order, will be detrimental to these factors.
- **Intergenerational tensions.** Customary hierarchy is being tested by young men and women. Perceived as exclusionary and ineffective, it is precipitating tension between old and young, and creating conditions where young are vulnerable because they feel disconnected and under presented in the current governance system. While the Conflict Assessment report indicates that poverty, lack of work, and education are all noted as push factors of youth joining extremist organizations, it is important to consider the effects of intergenerational dynamics in communes. FRAME® data shows that male and female youth feel excluded from the overall governance system, but mostly as it pertains to leadership. Of the 45 communes, young women in 29 communes feel leadership is exclusive, representing only favored groups. Young men felt this same way in 24 communes. Overall, the youth question system legitimacy which translates to 'as buying into and accepting decisions made by leaders.' The factors are defined in the next section; however, this perception suggest that the needs of youth, defined as respect and recognition, are not being met by the governance system and possibly the participatory mechanisms.
- **Gender conundrum.** FRAME® findings suggest that adult women see the governance system as it is currently constituted to foster resilience. Young women are far less optimistic. In reflecting on the findings and considering the perceptions of respondents in the Conflict Assessment, where the value of women to fostering peace is highly regarded, albeit through their traditional role as mothers, there is opportunity to build women's agency by helping them recognize and build upon their roles as peacemakers in the broader community.

- **Managing expectations of state influence.** FRAME® provides insights into the interdependencies of different dimensions of a governance system, not just the state-citizen social compact. The lack of trust between citizens, which is exacerbated by the absences of the state, is also a reflection of frayed relations, frustration, and power dynamics that cannot be addressed by the state. Elders and traditional leaders who eschew the involvement of youth is something that must be addressed, helping them to think differently about their roles and the rules that define their roles if trust is to be established system wide. FRAME® findings of one of the seven factors—Trust and Confidence – calls attention to the absences of ‘mutual trust in each other and respect for decisions made.’ Placing all the responsibility and expectation that the state is the only actor to facilitate peace and foster resilience may not be a reasonable expectation. While the data reflects the perception that performance (another of the seven FRAME® factors) is of key concern, there are other concerns registered about other actors in the system, including civil society.

FRAME® Report Content

This report is laid out in four sections. Section Two provides an overview of FRAME® and how citizens’ perceptions provide insight about the relationship between governance and peace. In Section Three, an in-depth analysis of the FRAME® data illuminate points of fragility and resilience in the governance systems, and the factors that contribute to both points on the continuum. Findings are disaggregated by north-center, regions, and communes. Each sub-section offers the implications of the findings for moving communes from conflict to resilience. Section Four provides summary of the implications and challenges that should be considered by program and policy makers.

2. Fragility and Resilience Assessment Methodology – FRAME®

Overview of FRAME® In PSR

FRAME®, in conjunction with the Conflict Assessment report⁵, provides program and policy makers a nuanced understanding of what conflicts exist in communes of northern and central Mali and how to address them from a governance system, citizen-driven perspective. Whereas the Conflict Assessment provides a snapshot as to what the conflicts are in the 45 communes, FRAME® answers the ‘why’ question. Why is the governance system contributing to the fragile conditions that lead to conflict; why are some communes more resilient; and how is this explained from a systems perspective?

FRAME® data were collected in 45 communes in the seven PSR regions of Mali: Ségou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka and Taoudénit. Single-identity focus groups were conducted, reflecting the perceptions of older men, older women, younger men, younger women, and members of the elected councils. These perception reflect the realities and understanding of how the governance system serves each group. It provides insights for local leaders, policy makers, and program developers on issues ranging from transparency and responsiveness to ways in which to mitigate conflict through adjustments to the system in place. For example, in Dinangourou, Mopti citizens indicate that they seek justice outside of the state system, and as such see justice leaders as inclusive. Interventions that are designed to

⁵ Through a grant from the PSR, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) assessed the conflict dynamics in northern and central Mali. The USAID integrated conflict analysis framework (ICAF) was adapted for the Malian context. A team of 225 investigators conducted 406 interviews, of which 27% were women.

improve the civil justice system must account for this. It is not simply a matter of improving the system; interventions must address the trust and confidence citizens have in traditional justice versus state justice.


The mix of focus groups disaggregates generational perspectives, gender differences, and citizen-state perspectives. Participants were drawn from interviews conducted during the citizen engagement and orientation workshops, and from recommendations from PSR staff and University of Letters and Human Sciences of Bamako (ULSHB) lecturers and enumerators. Nearly 1600 people participated in 230 focus groups, five focus groups per commune. Of the 1600 people, 650 were women, and nearly 700 were under the age of 35.

The findings from FRAME® will inform a systematic programmatic response with a view to reconciliation, and improved governance that fosters trust, inclusion, social cohesion, the legitimacy of actors in the governance system, and system performance to provide a path forward that aligns with Creative's PSR proposed theory of change:

If communities are better able to identify and deal with threats to social cohesion and security; if the relationship between citizens and their rulers is improved [and confidence strengthened]; and if young people, [women and marginalized groups] are engaged in development and democratic change, the result will be communities' resilience to violence and conflict, as well as the foundations for peacebuilding, stabilization and reconciliation will be strengthened.

As illustrated in Figure 1, using FRAME® data, PSR will implement activities to move communes along the path to resilience, traversing three phases: establishing trust, enhancing knowledge and capacity to govern, and fostering collective action.

Figure 1. Path to Resilience



FRAME® and the Path to Resilience

FRAME® uses a governance system approach to provide better understanding about where there are pockets of fragility and resilience, and a more complete explanation as to why these conditions exist. Building from the *New Deal for Fragile States' Peace and State Building Goals* report⁶, FRAME® measures eight dimensions of a governance system's functionality: Leadership, Administrative Management, Financial Management, Service Delivery, Civic Participation, Security, Justice, and Economic Foundations.

In turn, each dimension is assessed for its efficacy as determined by seven factors, defined in the text to the right. FRAME® provides a numeric value for the qualitative responses of citizen groups. Using a 4-point Likert Scale, FRAME® explains which factors contribute to the fragility or resilience of a dimension, with '1' reflecting a Fragile condition, '2' Somewhat Fragile, '3' Somewhat Resilient, and '4' Resilient. The benchmark of 2.5 on the Likert Scale is the tipping point as to whether a factor contributes to fragility or resilience of a dimension.⁷

⁶ OECD (2011), *International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't we do better?* OECD Publishing

⁷ 2.5 is used as the tipping point value because it reflects the rounding. Values 2.4 or less round down to 2, which is considered somewhat fragile or fragile, and 2.5 rounds up to somewhat resilient or better.

Then, the average of a dimension’s seven factor scores is used to determine whether that dimension is contributing to fragility (below 2.5) or resilience (above 2.5). These scores on the Likert Scale of the eight dimensions are then plotted on a spider diagram (see Figure 2) to visually portray dimensions that contribute to fragility (i.e. scores less than 2.5) and those that contribute to resilience (i.e. scores greater than 2.5).

With this information, USAID can focus its programs to improve the functionality and the efficacy of the governance system. To improve the functionality, programs should target those dimensions that are presently contributing to fragility and thereby help move a governance system through the three Phases of Resilience (Figure 1) towards a more resilient and less fragile state.

Programming to improve a dimension should seek to bolster those factors within that dimension that have low Likert scores, particularly those factors that are essential to move from one phase to the next (see Text Box to the right). Figures 2 and 3 on the next page provide an example. To build the resiliency of the financial management dimensions, rated as a 2 in Konna it will be important to address the citizens perception of civic infrastructure and system legitimacy. Defined as the ability of citizens to actively engage in budgeting process and use of revenues respectively, the citizens rated civic infrastructure as a 1, not able to participate and system legitimacy as a 2. The citizens do not feel the Council spends the revenues collected or received on citizens needs. Reviewing the means by which citizens participate in the budget process, including helping them understand the limited resources the Commune Council receives from the State as well providing easy to understand and transparent reports on how the Council uses the funds will be essential in rebuilding trust between citizens and the commune.

FRAME® allows the analysis of a governance system to move beyond functionality. New studies by the World Bank and OESC⁸ have noted that only focusing on functionality is insufficient; the efficacy of the system is also important. To address this, it is necessary to look at the citizens’ perceptions of both the efficacy and functionality of the governance system as a whole. Factors highlighted in light red in Figure 3. – trust and confidence, social cohesion, and inclusion – should be highly observable in all dimensions of the governance system to move from Phase 1 (Trust & Confidence) to Phase 2 (Knowledge & Capacity). Factors highlighted in light yellow – system legitimacy and civic infrastructure – are associated with Phase 2, i.e., indication that citizens can affect change in each dimension. Finally, a resilient commune should be able to foster collective action that is sustainable. The factors highlighted in green reflect this: decision-making, and performance.

Phases to Resilience
FRAME® Factors



Phase 1. Building Trust.
Social Cohesion-Local society can pursue collective action problems and resolve disputes
Trust and Confidence-Populace and governing actors have a mutual trust in each other that they will respect decisions made.
Inclusion-Various groups within the community are represented in political and social processes and how well actions reflect this representation.

Phase 2. Enhance Knowledge and Capacity
System Legitimacy - Populace is willing to “buy in” to the social contract promulgated by the governing actors and uphold obligations under it. **Civic Infrastructure**- Both physical (e.g. a town hall) and notional (e.g. history of cooperation) assets available to civic society.

Phase 3. Foster Collective Action
Decision Making-Local governance structures have the authority and competence independently to effect meaningful change at the community level.
Performance-Society achieves what it sets out to do, whether that’s trash removal or recover from an epidemic.

⁸ World Bank. 2017. *World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law*. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0950-7. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO; OECD (2018), *States of Fragility 2018*, OECD Publishing, Paris. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264302075-en>

As shown in **Figure 3**, to move Konna, Mopti, through the three phases, attention must be paid to confidence and trust (Phase 1), structure interventions to reinforce and expand the system’s legitimacy and ensure that civic infrastructure is more effective (Phase 2), and ensure that decisions made and actions taken (performance) foster collective action (Phase 3). In this example, leadership is a dimension that is contributing to fragility. To establish trust between leaders and citizens it is necessary to broaden the representation and develop more effective communication tools, using evidence that demonstrates the actions leaders claim to have taken. This example illustrates the starting point of activities that are intent on reestablishing the social contract between citizens and communes. A case study providing a comprehensive approach for developing interventions that reflect CAF and FRAME® findings provided in Annex A.



As a complement to the findings from the other foundational objectives, especially the findings from the conflict analysis that defines the grievances that drive conflict and violence, in each commune, the mapping of commune influencers and leaders, FRAME® data provides an explanation as to why conditions exist—from a governance perspective; and what actions can be taken so the governance system contributes to resilience.

3. National Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

To explain the national patterns of fragility and resilience, we look first at the dimensions that contribute to fragility and resilience and the associated factors which explain this. Next, we look at the factors to ascertain if there are patterns overall in the system that would weaken the system, even those dimensions that foster resilience. For example, Trust and Confidence, one of seven factors which explains if a dimension is fragile or resilient, is widely perceived to some degree as contributing to fragility in each of the eight dimensions in Mali. Finally, Table 1., at the end of this section provides an overview of the dimensions and factors and illustrates where attention must be paid to ensure each dimension contributes to the overall resiliency of the governance system. This table aligns the factors with the three phases on the path to resilience.



Dimensions. Fragility of the overall governance system is primarily a function of three dimensions, as circled in red in Figure 4: justice, security, and financial management. In the aggregate, citizens noted two factors that explain their perceptions of justice; little judicial accountability (Trust and Confidence), and

the need to bypass the system (System Legitimacy). Security is most affected by the prevalence of crime (Performance), lack of accountability of the policing apparatus to the community (Trust and Confidence) and lack of any opportunity of dialogue with security apparatus working in their community (Civic Infrastructure). The third dimension that most contributes to overall fragility is financial management and aligns with the problems with delivery of basic services⁹. The three factors that explain this condition are interrelated: citizens perceive the commune of providing limited opportunity to participate in any budgeting process (Civic Infrastructure) and note there is little ability to track use of revenues (Trust and Confidence). The third factor, Performance, is related to the lack of sufficient revenues. Likewise, citizens feel that services are provided for a dominant group at the expense of others, and that there are insufficient funds for services.

The Leadership and Citizen Participation dimensions offer more hope. Both dimensions are perceived to contribute to resilience. Citizen Participation is the strongest; perceived by citizens to be somewhat inclusive and able to make decisions. What is concerning is the fact that high marks for opportunities to participate in the governance system has not translated into building trust and confidence of the governance system. As noted in Fig. 5, both system legitimacy and trust and confidence are at the core of fragility. Considering the definitions of the FRAME[®] factors, this suggest that participation does not generate decisions that are acceptable to or reflective of all of the citizen's needs, nor does it garner a commitment from citizens to share in the responsibility of implementing the decisions.

Leadership, garnering an overall score of 2.8, is largely perceived as inclusive and trusted. Young men and women, however, have a lower perception of Leadership, rating it at 2.3. Perceptions about Leadership vary from a low score of 2.1 in Kidal, to a 3.7 in Taoudénit.

Factors. FRAME[®] factors, as noted above, provide an explanation as to why dimensions lead to a fragile state, or build resilience. Figure 5 highlights this. Aggregating all the responses of focus groups from the 45 communes, Inclusion is the factor that most contributes to resilience. Defined as representative and making decisions that reflect the larger community, it establishes an opportunity for the voices of different citizen groups to participate in dialogues and decisions about the conditions in their communes. This factor is rated overall as near somewhat resilient (2.8). All the remaining factors, however, score under 2.5 highlighted by the red line, and reflect a governance system that is not responding to the needs of the people. In their totality they represent a lack of trust among agencies, a breakdown of the social contract, and ultimately the inability of the governance system




⁹ Citizens perception of the delivery of services is not related to one particular service, they are asked to think about a range of services, including power, education, water, and health as examples.

to address societal needs.

Path to Resilience. In the aggregate, FRAME® findings suggest some capacity in communes to move towards resilience. Table 1 maps the FRAME® findings with the journey to resilience. The right-hand column ‘SF’ indicates the system’s functionality by dimensions. For each dimension, the factors that align with the three phases of transition are provided as they relate to the factors that, in their absence, contribute to fragility and those that can foster the path to resilience. As is shown, two dimensions, leadership and civic participation, highlighted in green, provide the strongest foundation and contribute the most to resiliency of the governance system. As expected, justice and security, followed closely by financial management highlighted in red exacerbate fragility. The efficacy of the system, as noted in the last row, is largely attributed to two factors, mutual trust that actors in the system will respect decisions made (trust and confidence), and the social contract (system legitimacy) are key factors that address nearly every dimension as shown in Table 1. Further, it is important to note, that many of the factors barely contribute to the path to resilience, reflected with numeric scores of 2.5 or 2.6 (with 2.5 as the tipping point between contributing to fragility versus contributing to resilience). The importance of this overview is to recognize that all seven factors as related to each dimension are important to meeting the PSR objectives: sustained peacebuilding, stabilization, and reconciliation. And, while it is not necessary that activities be sequential, it is important to recognize that for the program interventions to be sustainable, all factors must be considered.

Table 1. PSR Path to Resilience

| | | Phases to Resilience | | | | | | | SF |
|------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-----|
| | | Trust and Confidence | | | Knowledge and Capacity Building | | Collective Action | | |
| Dimensions | | Social Cohesion | Confidence & Trust | Inclusion | System Legitimacy | Civic Infrastructure | Decision-Making / Local Discretion | Performance | |
| | Leadership | 2.8 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
| | Admin. Management | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.6 |
| | Fiscal Management | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 2.4 |
| | Service Delivery | 2.3 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.5 |
| | Civic Participation | 2.8 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| | Security Environment | 2.8 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2 | 2.3 |
| | Justice & Rule of Law | 2.2 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| | Economic Foundations | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| | System Efficacy | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.3 | |




4. Patterns of Fragility and Resilience by Geographic Focus and Region

Geographic Focus

Using the number of FRAME® dimensions that are fragile or nearly fragile as a measure of each regions Path to Resilience, the Northern regions of Mali have 6 dimensions that contribute to fragility while the Center regions have 3 dimensions. Major weaknesses in both North and Center are in Justice, Fiscal Management and Security (see spider diagram).

On the path to resilience. Table 2 (page 19) shows where each dimension is on the Path to Resilience as explained by the factors. The patterns of fragility and resilience differ in the North and the Center, (findings for the North are in blue) placing each region at different places on the path. In the North, Administrative Management, Service Delivery, and Economic Foundation are all fragile, while in the Center, these dimensions are contributing more to resilience. While Security is of major concern in both regions, there is a slight difference in the factors that explain the fragility of this dimension. In the Center, there is a perception that some citizens are protected by security forces—as reflected in the inclusion factor although they acknowledge many groups are left out and that few citizens are able to participate in discussions about security. In the North, this the perceptions of security reflect an absence of the State, Efforts to bring State security back will need to address the perception that security is not inclusive and to ensure that the efficacy of the security protocols meet the needs of all citizens. While the Path to Resilience is different for each dimension, as shown in Table 2, the factors provide insight as to the



efficacy of the governance system. There is more Social Cohesion in the Center than in the North, and the Center is more inclusive. Both areas suffer from lack of Trust and Confidence. To build trust and confidence in both regions, local leaders, especially those representing the State, will have to demonstrate that they will carry through on decisions made, or that decisions made in fact will provide services or protection for all residents in the commune. Further, in the North, citizens do not feel they have any agency, limiting their ability to influence decisions, as noted in the low perceptions of Civic Infrastructure, a factor that weakens many of the dimension. Responses from focus group participants indicated that there are opportunities to

participate, but that the participation is not effective. In Financial Management, the participants indicated that they have little opportunity to effect budgetary decisions. Finally, it will be important to address those factors that are just barely perceived to contribute to resilience. In the north, actions that precipitates social cohesion are recognized, but given a rating of 2.3, much work must be done for those actions to bridge difference between groups in the communes. In the south, focus group responses recognize effective citizen engagement but to make it contribute more to resilience, there should be a focus on maintaining or increasing trust through engagement mechanisms (e.g., civic infrastructure).

The seven factors that explain the perception of each dimension differ for each dimension, but in the aggregate, as shown in the last row of Table 2, the factors that most explain fragility are Trust and Confidence, System Legitimacy, and Performance. FRAME® findings for inclusion in central Mali most likely reflect more cohesion among dominant, marginalized, and minority groups than in the north, but the degree to which the marginalized or minority groups concerns and needs are addressed seems limited


given that citizens' trust and confidence is considerably lower. Patterns of fragility in northern Mali vary slightly from central Mali, but trust and confidence, and the legitimacy of the system track with each other in central and northern Mali, suggesting that addressing systemic issues in governance is key. In addressing the questions of trust and system legitimacy, difference in access to natural resources and land, the emergence of new actors, and the competition for power and control must be considered. There is some variation in the actors from one region to the next: in the central regions of Mopti and Ségou, the most prominent and oft-mentioned actors are the pastoralist Peulh and farming Dogon, who clash over access to pastures and farmland. Survey respondents in the northern regions (Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Taoudenit, and Timbuktu), which are generally characterized by a drier terrain and home to more nomadic and pastoralist groups, all mentioned wells and water access points as a point of conflict. Respondents in some of these regions specifically mentioned nomads or pastoralists and fishermen as conflict actors.

Table 2. Path to Resilience – Northern and Central Mali


| Phases to Resilience | Trust and Confidence | | Knowledge and Capacity Building | | | | Collective Action | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|-----|---------------------------------|-----|-----------|-----|-------------------|-----|----------------------|-----|------------------------------------|-----|-------------|-----|-----|-----|
| | Factors | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Social Cohesion | | Confidence & Trust | | Inclusion | | System Legitimacy | | Civic Infrastructure | | Decision-Making / Local Discretion | | Performance | | SF | |
| | N | C | N | C | N | C | N | C | N | C | N | C | N | C | N | C |
| Leadership | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 3 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 |
| Admin. Management | 2.0 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.8 |
| Fiscal Management | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| Service Delivery | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.8 |
| Civic Participation | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 3.1 |
| Security Environment | 2.7 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.5 |
| Justice & Rule of Law | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Economic Foundations | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.8 |
| System Efficacy | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.4 | | |

Youth and Intergenerational Tensions. The role of youth in the conflict – and the conflict's effects on them – were widely mentioned in the Conflict Assessment and varied between regions. Disaggregated FRAME® findings highlighted in Figure 7 show different patterns of youth perceptions between the

northern and central parts of the country. The primary difference is in citizen participation. Youth in the center see openings in citizen participation, as represented by a rating of 3 for this dimension, where the youth in the north do not as they rated it at 2. Perception of youth for the Security dimension also reflect a difference, where youth in North perceive it as much more of a contributor to fragility than in the Center. Perceptions of the other dimensions track nearly the same. Youth economic opportunities, as indicated by perceptions of economic foundation are similar, but are playing out differently. Respondents to the survey employed for the Conflict Assessment indicate that in the northern regions, it is both the cause and consequence of conflict. Youth often turn instead to alternatives like smuggling, trafficking cigarettes, drugs, weapons and ammunition across the desert, and/or joining self-defense militias or criminal organizations. Youth in the central regions face similar hardships, but here youth as an entity are seeking a greater voice in the future of the country, and they want their voices respected. In some communes they are challenging traditional leaders and customary models, indicating it is unfair that some youth receive favored status due to the influence of their parents and the succession in authority, Intergenerational tensions between youth and adults is greater in the north than in central Mali with the largest difference in Citizen Participation and Leadership (as seen in Figure 7). Given these are dimensions that allow for influence over decisions and administrative processes, it underscores the limits of youth participation in overall governance and development in the north and that the system is not responding to youth needs.



In the center, youth perceptions of the overall system are lower than adults, except for service delivery. They feel nearly the same as adults about their opportunity to participate and that their voices have affect. This suggest that through effective participatory opportunities, designed to bridge intergenerational tensions, a path to address the youths’ findings from conflict analysis regarding their frustration with traditional leaders and customary models of succession in authority, can be forged.




Insecurity. The lack of state presence and the rise in criminal enterprises have exacerbated an already difficult context for managing conflict and jeopardized peace efforts. Notably, there has been an uptick in the circulation and possession of weapons in northern Mali. The population in the northern regions is frustrated and disappointed that the 2015 peace agreement has borne no fruit, and they are losing confidence in the local and national state institutions that have failed to implement the terms of the agreement. Central Mali, on the other hand, has been characterized by intergroup violence. Of concern is the proliferation of self-defense and vigilante militias and the arrival of violent extremist groups, and the clashes between them. In addition to civilian deaths, this has led to high levels of displacement, as people flee areas of insecurity – both were

mentioned by respondents as critical social consequences of the conflict. In Figure 8, the factors that explain the weak perceptions of security and justice are performance, trust and confidence and system legitimacy. The conflict analysis, however, suggests that different types of interventions will be necessary to address the security concerns. For example, in northern Mali the factors relate to the absence of the state, but in the center, it is the inability to control intergroup conflict. In the center, however, there is a perception that security forces may be able to work together to provide, to some degree, equal protection, but that citizens have limited influence over decisions. Creating an environment where citizens and security communicate and share information could improve the trust and confidence and performance perceptions, moving the structure for providing security from compliance to engagement.


Perceptions of Women. The perceptions of women are surprisingly positive and track the same in the north and the center of the country. A review of the conflict assessment findings helps explain these perceptions. In some regions, such as Gao, women are key leaders in decision-making but, as in Tarkint, they are not sought out or asked to participate in public meetings. Women organize themselves into associations and may sit on peace and reconciliation committees. Their social role means that they could build connections between authorities and those involved in conflict. This pattern repeats itself in several other regions. Providing support to women to recognize and build on the agency they have gained through their roles as peacemakers provides avenues to bring about necessary change in roles and relationships for young men and women. As accepted agents of change within traditional roles, they can further expand their sphere of influence within communes. This varies from region to region and between communes in the same region. For example, in Tessit, respondents to the CAF questionnaire indicate that women do not want to participate in peacebuilding where in most of the other communes in the region they have taken an active role.

It will be important to address the frustrations of young women. When the data is disaggregated by age, younger women have a lower perception in some regions in the north. This aligns with the overall intergenerational patterns of young people as noted above.



Variations between Regions

While the Government of Mali is promoting development plans for the north and the center of the country, achieving the plan objectives will be dependent on addressing the regional differences. As is reflected in Fig. 10, the regions differ on their Path to Resilience. Strategies and interventions for each region will be dependent on which part of the system is most fragile or where there is some resilience to build upon. Taoudenit, an area that has only recently been upgraded to a region, is an outlier. Its distance from Timbuktu, let alone Bamako, has resulted in nearly the complete absence of the state. Thus, the citizens' perceptions reflected here should be further discussed with the community leaders but suggest a sense of self-reliance and no expectation of state support. In calculating the differences between regions, minus Taoudenit as an outlier, there is the most divergence of patterns of fragility in financial management, economic foundations, and justice. Financial management range between 1.9 in Kidal, and 2.7 in Segou. Economic Foundation range between 2 in Kidal and 2.8 in Segou, while the variance in justice is from a high of 2.6 in Kidal, and a low of 1.7 in Menaka.




Gao Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

The PSR project will work with eight communes in Gao. Drawing from the Conflict Assessment, the responses from Gao paint an image of a region where public life has ground to a halt. Insecurity, state absence and increasing distrust have all contributed to economic and political stagnation. It is a vicious cycle: the aspects that respondents cited as drivers of the conflict are intensifying the longer they go unresolved. As social cohesion disintegrates, economic activity declines, people are less trusting of their political leaders, and people are less likely to talk to their neighbors. And with an absent state, any formal mechanisms for improving the situation have disappeared.

Path to Resilience in Gao. Perspectives on the governance systems in Gao, however, offer path forward to resilience. As highlighted in text box to the right and detailed in Table 3 (page 23), civic participation and leadership are viewed as contributing most to resilience in the overall governance system, providing a foundation from which to address factors that contribute to the fragility of other dimensions. Citizen Participation benefits from high perceptions of all seven factors. Focus group participants see Leadership as inclusive, but don't particularly trust them. Working with leaders by capitalizing on the more positive perceptions of civic participation provides a starting point and can both address challenges to fostering cohesion and trust. Financial Management, Administrative Management, Security, and Justice all are affected by low perceptions of Performance. Confidence and Trust, and Social Cohesion explain the fragility of six dimensions: Leadership, Administrative Management, Financial Management, Service Delivery, Justice, and Economic Foundations.

Reviewing the FRAME® findings in relation to the three phases on Gao's path to resilience, Table 3 (page 17), indicates that there is a foundation of trust in confidence in six of the eight dimensions. It will be important to reinforce factors of social cohesion and inclusion, especially as it relates to respecting the decisions made through the interaction of all actors. Building capacity to improve the value of Civic Infrastructure with a special concentration on



introducing ways in which women can build their agency and influence will be important to four of the dimensions. It should lead to overall improvements in performance and should expand citizens' knowledge about what is necessary to delivery basic services – a critical element associated with financial management. Further, determining how elements associated with Civic Infrastructure can increase accountability and trust within security will be important both in terms of peoples' safety, but also regarding improving conditions for trade and commerce. Economic Foundations is currently one of the stronger dimensions but is subject to decline if the conflict and violence are not addressed.

The key aspects of conflict identified by respondents to the Conflict Assessment are social cohesion and trust. These two concerns correspond with FRAME® factors and indicate that a renewed effort must be taken to create conditions where neighbors talk with each other and begin to trust their political leaders. As it relates to efficacy of the entire system, two factors – inclusion and decisions making – are contributing to noted resiliencies. Building from these, two more resilient factors can be a path to reinforce and improve social cohesion (2.6) and civic infrastructure (2.5). As the efficacy of these factors grow, they will contribute to and solidify social contracts between actors and have a related impact on improving perceptions about financial management and service delivery. In both dimensions, citizens' perceptions reflect a lack of respect for the decisions made, even if they recognize the decisions are being made. The lack of respect for decisions is central to low perceptions and lack of trust and confidence in the system.

Table 3. Gao Path to Resilience

The diagram shows three sequential phases to resilience: *Trust and Confidence*, *Knowledge and Capacity Building*, and *Collective Action*. Below this, a table lists various factors and their scores across different dimensions.

| Phases to Resilience | <i>Trust and Confidence</i> | | | <i>Knowledge and Capacity Building</i> | | <i>Collective Action</i> | | SF | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|-----------|--|----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-----|-----|
| | Factors | | | | | | | | |
| Dimensions | Social Cohesion | Confidence & Trust | Inclusion | System Legitimacy | Civic Infrastructure | Decision-Making / Local Discretion | Performance | SF | |
| | Leadership | 2.8 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.8 |
| | Admin. Management | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.7 |
| | Fiscal Management | 2.6 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 2.6 |
| | Service Delivery | 2.4 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
| | Civic Participation | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 |
| | Security Environment | 2.8 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 2.3 |
| | Justice & Rule of Law | 2.0 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| | Economic Foundations | 2.6 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
| | System Efficacy | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.3 | |

A review of Figure 12 indicates that there are limited differences between the perceptions of women and youth versus the aggregate findings that include older men and council. By explanation, the higher perceptions of women reflect the fact that, according to the responses from the CAF survey, the women can influence peace efforts through their work in associations and through the family. This influence appears to be respected by men, but most of the responses indicated their opinions are not sought out in public meetings that include men.

It is important to note that citizens' perception of the overall governance system provides an understanding of a roadmap to building community resilience as it relates to the conditions in the commune. Difference between the communes in Gao further provide guidance to build the foundations necessary for peace and stabilization. Individual analysis of each commune will be completed, the process by which this will be accomplished is provided in Annex X, however Figure 13 shows the variance in the efficacy of the system at the commune level. Citizens perceptions of the overall functionality of the system as illustrated above in Figure 11 indicates that all of the dimensions except for Justice and Security contribute to resilience somewhat. Thus, what the variance in






Figure 13 provides is an understanding of the starting point in each commune to enhance the resilience of those dimensions that are somewhat contributing to resilience and to establish a path to resilience for those dimensions that are fragile. For example, citizens perception of the fragility – resilience factors in Tessit and Ouattagouna – indicate that the underlying base for a resilient governance system is fairly strong , where in the other communes, especially Ansongo, Gao, and Tarkint, the basic foundations will need to be established.

Kidal Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

Of the northern regions, Kidal has suffered some of the greatest insecurity throughout the conflict. It is a crossing point for trans-Sahara trade, both licit and illicit. It has been home to a MINUSMA force, Malian army detachments and French troops, and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has claimed control over the region. The toll on civilians has been enormous.

Path to Resilience in Kidal. The FRAME® findings reflect four communes in the Kidal region. While the overall system of governance is largely weak, as shown in Table 4 (page 19), Citizen Participation and Justice offer some resilience. Citizen Participation contributes most to resilience, although perceptions of its lack of performance and inability to foster social cohesion suggest that civil society organizations are not focused on bringing communities together. Perceptions of Justice and Security are higher than in other regions. Citizens’ perception of the Justice dimension indicates a lack of ability to hold officials accountable (Civic Infrastructure), and question if there are sufficient material resources (i.e., maintain records, track pending cases). Leadership seems to reflect the fact that citizens perceive that the state has imposed its choices for village chiefs and local leaders, which citizens believe should be picked through traditional procedures, as stated in the Conflict Assessment for Kidal. The toll on the citizens is most reflected in the low perceptions of Financial Management, and Economic Foundations, both critical elements for improving overall social welfare in Kidal.



On its Path to Resilience, considerable work will be required to build overall trust and confidence. As show in Table 4, social cohesion, confidence and trust, and inclusion contribute to the fragility of five of the eight dimensions. Because Leadership is weak in all three, it will be critical to address this to build resilience for the system. A review of the citizens’ perception of the Fragility and Resilience factors in concert with the dimension findings in Kidal suggest that it will be important to tap into higher perceptions of inclusion and seek opportunities to use this as a means to address the concerns about leadership. The low perception of the economic foundations reflects insecurity. It has brought formal economic affairs in Kidal to a standstill because of insecurity. Poverty is rampant as markets have closed, livestock has died, and unemployment has soared. Kidal, too, is reliant on its *Plan de Développement Economique, Social et Culturel* (PDSEC) for economic development, but the plans have gone unwritten and unfunded as the government has been in disarray.


Table 4. Kidal’s Path to Resilience.

| Phases to Resilience | Trust and Confidence | | | Knowledge and Capacity Building | | Collective Action | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-----|
| | Factors | | | | | | | |
| | Social Cohesion | Confidence & Trust | Inclusion | System Legitimacy | Civic Infrastructure | Decision-Making / Local Discretion | Performance | SF |
| Leadership | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.3 |
| Admin. Management | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.3 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|-----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Dimensions | Fiscal Management | 1.8 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 1.9 |
| | Service Delivery | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.4 |
| | Civic Participation | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.6 |
| | Security Environment | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 1.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.4 |
| | Justice & Rule of Law | 2.8 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 2.6 |
| | Economic Foundations | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| | System Efficacy | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.1 | |

The difference between youth and women, as a contrast to all focus groups indicate that the two identity groups have slightly higher perceptions for many of the factors. The important exception is Inclusion. Here their perceptions are slightly lower, possibly reflecting the view that citizens believe the leaders—commune councils and village chief, are appointed by the GOM. A more positive observation is the fact that women and youth do see more resilience overall, suggesting that building their capacity to work together while simultaneously supporting leaders to foster social cohesion could build and reinforce new relationships necessary to addressing the challenges faced in the region.

A review of the communes indicates that there are different patterns of fragility and resilience. As noted, individual analysis of each commune is provided in Annex X; however, **Figure 16** shows little consistency in citizens’ perceptions of the seven factors. Each commune seems to have different pockets of resilience and fragility. In Anefit, civic infrastructure and social cohesion provide points of departure. For Tessalit, it will be important to build from higher perceptions of inclusion and system legitimacy. In




Kidal, higher perceptions of inclusion and decision-making coupled with low perceptions of trust, confidence, and system legitimacy indicate that the system itself may be problematic because it is not reflecting the needs of all of the different groups, even if it performs. Assouk is the exception in the region, with higher perceptions across all factors. It may reflect findings from the CAF survey, where citizens indicated that traditional methods of addressing conflict seem to be effective.

Menaka Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

Respondents in Ménaka suggested that the causes of the conflict are numerous, complex and intertwined. For example, Ménaka's inhabitants rely largely on livestock for their livelihoods and have to deal with water scarcity in the best of times. Interviewees described conflict over watering points and access to pastures. As happens elsewhere in Mali, the conflict tends to fall along ethnic lines. This was the driver most frequently described by survey respondents, and it's one that has been aggravated by environmental degradation and the encroachment of the Sahara, further limiting available resources. Overall drivers include natural resource issues, ongoing violence and insecurity, the slowdown of economic activity, and deterioration of social cohesion and inter-group relations. The concerns raised in the Conflict Assessment are reflected in the FRAMe® perceptions of the governance system.

Path to Resilience. Menaka's path to resilience is by far the most difficult of all of the regions. As is illuminated in the Figure 17, every dimension is under stress, with no dimension perceived as contributing to resilience. Table 5 (page 21) shows where there are limited pockets of resilience, with Leadership having four factors: Social Cohesion, Inclusion, Civic Infrastructure and Performance, upon which can be built. Because all the dimensions range between 1.7-Justice, and 2.4-Leadership, a review of the efficacy of the system overall is necessary. In a system this fragile, Phase 1 factors of social cohesion, confidence and trust, and inclusion have to be the starting point. Fundamental relationships between people, and between leaders of state, non-state institutions and citizens must be addressed for the region to pass from Phase 1 to Phase 2 on the Path to Resilience. As a start, and in response to the quagmire of issues garnered from the Conflict Assessment, a focus on Administration to address conflict over access to natural resources should be considered as a first step. Respondents attribute ineffective land management and protection of natural resources to administrative officials who are no longer connected to the needs of the people. Managing resources are central to generating revenues for services and tied to improvements in the economy. The respondents highlight an interdependency between financial management and service delivery. The absence or limited availability of services makes it difficult to generate revenues, and vice-versa.




FRAMe® factor findings for Menaka reflect a pattern of fragility that is steeped in mistrust of the overall system with System Legitimacy, Trust and Confidence, and Performance, as shown in the last row in Table 5. Most likely this stems from the citizens' perception that the system is not inclusive, with indicators of this being the lack of representation of non-elite groups in everything from leadership to economic foundations. Respondents to the conflict assessment are concerned that continued mistrust will erode the little social cohesion between different groups. To move Menaka communes on the path to resilience, focus on the three factors associated with Phase 1 –Inclusion, Trust and Confidence, and Social Cohesion, should be a priority. Support to local leaders must ensure that they understand the importance of going beyond compliance (i.e., respondents in the focus groups indicated a need to hold participatory meetings). It will be necessary to ensure the processes allow for all voices to be heard and decisions are reflective of the different identity groups.

Table 5. Menaka’s Path to Resilience


| Phases to Resilience | Trust and Confidence | | | Knowledge and Capacity Building | | Collective Action | | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-----|-----|
| | Social Cohesion | Confidence & Trust | Inclusion | System Legitimacy | Civic Infrastructure | Decision-Making / Local Discretion | Performance | SF | |
| Dimensions | Leadership | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.4 |
| | Admin. Management | 2.3 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.1 |
| | Fiscal Management | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| | Service Delivery | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.1 |
| | Civic Participation | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| | Security Environment | 2.3 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 2.1 |
| | Justice & Rule of Law | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| | Economic Foundations | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| | System Efficacy | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.9 | |

A review of the perceptions of youth and women illustrate the importance of decisions being reflective of all identities. Young adults’ perceptions of each factor indicate that the system of governance does not allow for their needs to be reflected in decisions made. Trust and confidence, a factor that reflects a mutual respect for decision made, and system legitimacy, a factor that translates into sharing responsibility for carrying out decisions made. As in other regions, women, especially older women have higher perceptions. In responses to the conflict analysis, they are expected to play a key decision-making and cooperative role in the peace process, and they are expected to take a leading role in educating children and encouraging their husbands to end all violence by appealing to their conscience. While



the role of women is still subordinate to men, the value placed on their involvement in decision-making and facilitating the peace process through their roles as mothers is reflected in their perceptions.

The three communes in Menaka reflect a consistent pattern of the degree to which factors contribute to fragility. With the exception of decision-making, Alata is more fragile than Anderamboukane. In reviewing the conflict assessment responses, this may be attributed to even less government presence. One of three primary drivers of conflict is sociopolitical divides. Menaka's respondents have limited trust




in the decisions made, noting in the conflict analysis that most decisions are made in secret.

Timbuktu Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

The new region of Taoudenit was cut from the cloth of Timbuktu, and what remained of the latter hosts a population more concentrated along the Niger River. The region's capital city, also called Timbuktu, and other towns were deeply affected by the 2012 Tuareg rebellion, during which the MNLA seized towns and the Malian army fled in the face of the rebels' advance. The security situation has not improved much since then. Respondents talked about the widespread distrust, poverty, displacement, injustice, and insecurity they have experienced over the course of the conflict. CAF respondents stated that it was understood that: "(...) in Tenenkou the mobility of people and their property is heavily mortgaged, due to the arbitrary abduction of violent radical groups in the bush, there are places where Peulh cannot go and where others are forbidden to the Bambara."

The dynamics of the conflict in Timbuktu are similar to those in other parts of northern Mali, but with some key differences. One of the most important differences is the lasting effects of the Tuareg rebellion of 2012. Tuaregs laid claim to what the rebels described as the state of "Azawad," encompassing much of northern Mali. Indeed, survey respondents in Timbuktu cited independence movements as fueling the conflict. But the MNLA opened a Pandora's box of other armed groups that have struggled for control over the north, including Timbuktu. Further, its previously rich cultural life has been suppressed by ideologically driven practice of Islam.




Path to Resilience. The perception of the functionality and efficacy of the governance system in the Timbuktu region reflects the conflict dynamics derived from the Conflict Assessment. Timbuktu region’s Path to Resilience as presented in Table 6 (page 24), offers points of departure that can serve as a foundation to build the resiliency of the system. The Leadership and Citizen Participation dimension offer a starting point. Citizens sense that both dimensions strive to be inclusive but reflect a need to enhance social cohesion. A weakness in both dimensions is confidence and trust. Establishing, or reestablishing, mutual confidence and trust between citizens and governing institutions, both state and non-state organizations, will be important to address weakness in Financial Management, and Service Delivery. Respondents to the Conflict Assessment indicated that the lack of a functioning justice system has resulted in families turning inward, seeking justice within their own trusted communities. The FRAMe® findings mirror these concerns. Lack of trust in the justice system is the driving factor for the 1.9 of Justice Dimension.

With regard to the overall efficacy of the governance system, the FRAMe® factors reflect the concerns raised by the respondents in the Conflict Assessment. Respondents made it clear that the social costs of the conflict have been high. Distrust has increased within communities, and particularly between ethnic groups; those interviewed said that groups are wary of one another and have turned inwards, cutting off inter-group relations. Except for inclusion, none of the factors contribute much to resilience. Trust and confidence and system legitimacy, the two factors that are most reliant on constructive relationships between people and organizations, are both perceived as contributing to fragility and are reflective of the social cost of the conflict. Reinforcing and expanding the efficacy of two factors critical to building trust and confidence: inclusion and social cohesion will be an important starting point. Interventions that can improve citizens’ perceptions in these areas should translate into reforming governance actions and practices that build trust. Linking this to dimensions, the target dimensions should be security, justice, and financial management.

Table 6. Timbuktu Path to Resilience

| Phases to Resilience | | Trust and Confidence | | | Knowledge and Capacity Building | | Collective Action | | SF |
|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-----|
| | | Social Cohesion | Confidence & Trust | Inclusion | System Legitimacy | Civic Infrastructure | Decision-Making / Local Discretion | Performance | |
| Dimensions | Leadership | 3.0 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
| | Admin. Management | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.6 |
| | Fiscal Management | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 2.3 |
| | Service Delivery | 2.6 | 1.8 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| | Civic Participation | 2.8 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| | Security Environment | 2.5 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 2.1 |
| | Justice & Rule of Law | 2.1 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.9 |


| | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Economic Foundations | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
| System Efficacy | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.2 | |



In the Timbuktu region, there is little variance between the perceptions of youth and women. Youth have slightly lower perceptions in two factors: decision making and performance, but in general citizens responses of all identity groups reflect a governance system that cannot address or respond to conflict.

A review of the individual communes' perception of the governance system as defined by factors illustrates the importance of customizing approaches that foster peace. In Ber, all the factors that define whether a dimension contributes to fragility or resilience are weak and reinforce the need to focus on the three factors that contribute

to the first phase on the path to resilience: inclusion, trust and confidence, and social cohesion. In other communes, such as Dire, Timbuktu, Soboundou, and Bourem, at least one of the factors that contributes to building trust, inclusion, is perceived as contributing more to resilience. The Intersectional Analysis for the Timbuktu communes takes into account the different patterns fragility and resilience in the governance system and link them to the corresponding conflict dynamics.



Taoudenit Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

PSR has the smallest program footprint in Taoudenit: two communes Agouni and Taoudenit¹⁰. The eponymous capital of the Taoudenit region is about as far away from Bamako as one can get while remaining in Mali. The region is extremely remote, very sparsely populated, and underattended by the distant state. Its people struggle to access basic resources, and they're vulnerable to armed and criminal groups that traverse the Sahara. The situation is particularly bleak in this northernmost part of the country.

Taoudenit Path to Resilience. Taoudenit has only been designated as a region since 2017. FRAME® findings suggest that the remoteness of the region has required a type of self-governance, especially in Agouni, a sentiment reinforced by the comments collected from the focus group participants.

Participants indicated they are more involved in non-state leadership of the locality. This is reflected in the citizens perception of Leadership. Security, Justice, and Economic Foundations are all fragile in Taoudenit, reflecting the insecurity. The remoteness of the area and the lack of access to markets is reflected in lower perceptions of the economic foundation dimension. The conditions are so poor

that the Commune Council resides in Timbuktu. The fact that the Council leadership is not located in Taoudenit is reflected in citizens' low perceptions of the system's legitimacy.





Table 7. Taoudenit Path to Resilience

| Phases to Resilience | | Trust and Confidence | | | Knowledge and Capacity Building | | | Collective Action | | |
|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-----|
| | | Factors | | | | | | | | |
| Dimensions | Leadership | A | Social Cohesion | Confidence & Trust | Inclusion | System Legitimacy | Civic Infrastructure | Decision-Making / Local Discretion | Performance | SF |
| | | T | 3.8 | 4 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4 | 4 | 3.4 | 3.8 |
| | Admin. Management | A | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 4 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3 | 3.6 |
| | | T | 2.6 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.8 |
| | Fiscal Management | A | 3.4 | 3.8 | 4 | 4 | 3.8 | 4 | 3 | 3.7 |
| | | T | 3.2 | 1.8 | 3 | 3 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 2 | 2.6 |

¹⁰ In coordination with USAID, Taoudenit will no longer be a PSR commune. The analysis of the commune has been retained until data from a second commune is collected and analyzed.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Service Delivery | A | 3.6 | 2 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.4 |
| | T | 2.2 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
| Civic Participation | A | 3.8 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 4 | 3.5 |
| | T | 2.6 | 2.6 | 3.6 | 3.2 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 2.9 |
| Security Environment | A | 3.8 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 |
| | T | 2.8 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 2 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| Justice & Rule of Law | A | 3.4 | 2.8 | 3.8 | 3 | 1.6 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.1 |
| | T | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2 | 2 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
| Economic Foundations | A | 2.8 | 3.6 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 3 | 3.4 | 3.0 |
| | T | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| System Efficacy | A | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.4 | |
| | T | 2.6 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.3 | |

As in other regions, women again seem to feel the system of governance provides opportunities and reflects their needs. The one exception is decision making, where here women's perceptions reflect their role as subordinate and as peacemakers through the family, but not a public role as articulated in the Conflict Assessment. Youth perceptions of social cohesion, trust, and inclusion, lower than women, adult men, and Councils, is a strong indication that they could seek other organizations with which to exercise influence.




Mopti Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

Over the last couple of years Mopti has seen some of the worst violence in the area. The region is, in many ways, a Sahelian melting pot: it sits at the intersection of northern and southern Mali and abuts Mauritania and Burkina Faso (though both borders are fairly porous and quite dangerous). The Niger River opens into an inland delta in Mopti that creates a fertile region where farmers grow such crops as rice, millet, shallots, maize and sorghum; herders raise livestock; and fishermen ply the river. Frequently, as elsewhere in Mali, these livelihood groups coincide with ethnic groups. But in conflict, this diversity has made Mopti fragile, and its fragility had been exploited by armed groups.

The dynamics of conflict in Mopti are also changing faster than anywhere else in the country and are characterized by limited freedom of movement and speech, the rapid and violent deterioration of social cohesion, the emergence of violent extremist organizations and other armed groups, and corruption and

abuses by the state. The complexity of the conflict was reflected in the drivers that respondents said were at its core. These drivers range from economic and livelihood issues, to religion and ethnic identity, to governance and political problems. Because the conflict in Mopti is complex and evolving quickly, it is also difficult to characterize whether something is a driver or impact of the conflict. Many factors are both – they are the result of prior conflict but also further exacerbate the conflict.

Mopti’s Path to Resilience. PSR works with fourteen communes in the Mopti region, the largest program footprint. The FRAME® findings for Mopti provides insight as to how the citizens’ perceptions of the governance system shed light on deep crevices that will exacerbate conditions and foster more violence, and those aspects of the system that can be reinforced and serve as paths to resilience. As captured in the text box below, Security, Justice and Financial Management contribute the most to the overall fragility of the system. Civic Participation still offers a means by which to foster resilience, but all




other dimensions are showing signs of stress under the changing conflict dynamics. Table 10 (page 28) shows the overall system is perceived as inclusive, but the citizens’ confidence and trust in each dimension is very low. Efforts to move along the path to resilience can build from the citizens’ current willingness to work with other groups, and a feeling that civil society organizations are independent(i.e., not co-opted by one dominant group). This will be especially important if any social contract and mutual respect for decisions made by leaders in the region are to hold. Citizens, for now, are willing to work with the Commune Councils. It will be important to address confidence in Administration, and Financial Management. Administration will have a direct bearing on access to resources, and Financial Management on ensuring use of public financial resources are used to provide services for all people in the region.

Table 10. Mopti Path to Resilience


| Phases to Resilience | Trust and Confidence | | | Knowledge and Capacity Building | | | Collective Action | | SF |
|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|-----|----|
| | Social Cohesion | Confidence & Trust | Inclusion | System Legitimacy | Civic Infrastructure | Decision-Making / Local Discretion | Performance | | |
| Leadership | 2.7 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.7 | |
| Admin. Management | 2.6 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.7 | |
| Fiscal Management | 2.6 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 2.3 | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Service Delivery | 3.0 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
| Civic Participation | 3.0 | 2.8 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.0 |
| Security Environment | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| Justice & Rule of Law | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Economic Foundations | 3.0 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
| System Efficacy | 2.7 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.2 | |

There is little variation between perceptions of the youth, women and all others in the overall efficacy of the governance system. The FRAMe® findings reflect the responses of the Conflict Assessment. In the region, as reported by respondents in the CAF survey, it is believed that women, as mothers, must be on the front line to raise awareness throughout the community, to hold meetings between young people to strengthen the ties that existed before the conflict. Women in the region actively participate in decision-making and play an important role in identifying solutions for peace and social cohesion. Youth have less confidence, but all three groups question the legitimacy of the system.




There is greater difference between communes than identity groups. In **Figure 27**, Dioungani commune is by far the most fragile. With the exception of inclusion, perceptions of the efficacy of the governance systems of Koro and Konna communes are the least responsive to citizens' needs. As noted in the Intersectional Analysis for both communes (found in Annex A), Leadership is highly questioned. The most resilient communes are Segue and Tenenkou.



Segou Patterns of Fragility and Resilience

At the outset of this project, Ségou was seen as a buffer zone: vulnerable to conflict but not yet as engulfed in it as neighboring Mopti. But the survey results show that conditions in Ségou are largely similar to regions in conflict. There is limited social cohesion and inter-group dialogue, diminished peace and reconciliation mechanisms, and increased insecurity. Notably, however, respondents from Ségou still seemed to have expectations of the state – that it would hold elections, collect taxes, and provide services – whereas in other regions, the state was so far gone that those expectations had long since faded.

Segou’s Path to Resilience. Shoring up the Segou region as a buffer and shifting it to resilience must acknowledge that the role of the state is important, but it will also be important to address the role of the citizens in building sustained resilience. The opportunity to build sustained resilience in Segou are high. Perceptions of Leadership and Citizen Participation indicate that, with some attention, they can serve as a base for changing perceptions about the functionality of other dimensions. However, observations about leaders, especially state leaders, pulled from the Conflict Assessment mirror the fact that this dimension is weakened by concerns of unfair execution of authority and actions that seem to benefit leaders rather than citizens. This is reflected in the three factors that explain Leadership functionality: decision-making, performance, and worst of all—trust and confidence. For Leadership, each of these three factors reflect a sense of not being heard. These concerns and other factors of efficacy carry over to Financial Management. Here, citizens have voiced their concerns about the use of public funds, noting in their focus groups response that funding of services is leading to conflict not social cohesion, as the perceptions is that funds do not benefit minority groups. Further they challenge the legitimacy of the dimension, as evidence by the perception that most people do not pay for services. The totality of these concerns indicate that citizens will not respect the



decisions made and may not assume their role in a social contract, which for financial management is the willingness to pay for services. As in other regions the lack of security and justice is weakening the functionality of the whole system of governance.

The fact that all dimensions except for Citizen Engagement, are not trusted by citizens reflects the concerns raised in the Conflict Assessment. As the conflict has increasingly affected Ségou, trust between different ethnic and livelihood groups has deteriorated. Respondents said worsening social relations, distrust, hatred and division were the greatest social impacts of the crisis.


A summary of the FRAME® scaled responses calls into question the actions of business community in general, perceiving them as predatory; an avoidance of bureaucratic process if at all possible; and a lack of respect for any standards of service deemed necessary by service providers. As one of the three factors that are foundational to Phase 1 on the Path to Resilience, it will be critical to address this if the region is to continue to be a buffer.

Table 11. Segou Path to Resilience

| | | Trust and Confidence | | | Knowledge and Capacity Building | | Collective Action | | SF |
|------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-----|
| | | Social Cohesion | Confidence & Trust | Inclusion | System Legitimacy | Civic Infrastructure | Decision-Making / Local Discretion | Performance | |
| Dimensions | Leadership | 2.7 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
| | Admin. Management | 2.6 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.7 |
| | Fiscal Management | 2.6 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 2.3 |
| | Service Delivery | 3.0 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
| | Civic Participation | 3.0 | 2.8 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.0 |
| | Security Environment | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| | Justice & Rule of Law | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| | Economic Foundations | 3.0 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
| | System Efficacy | 2.9 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.5 | |


Figure 29 reflects a difference in youth perceptions that mirrors the finding from the Conflict Assessment. Youth generally are more frustrated with their inability to participate effectively, and as a result, question the decisions made, and do not see the system as fostering social cohesion.

A young person interviewed for the CAF stated the challenge as follows *“The municipality of Ségou and the youth are fighting for the management of the youth center. This place belongs to young people, but it has always been managed by the town hall, it is now that the young people want to take care of the management of in order to be able to use the revenues generated for the promotion of youth.”*



Women’s perceptions in the Segou region also reflect a pattern of fragility that is different than other regions. This is the only region where the women’s perceptions of the efficacy of the system are not higher than all others. The Conflict Assessment sheds some light on why this may be. It is the only region that respondents did not recognize as highly the role of women in peacemaking as other regions. They are credited with influencing the family, but respondents did not see women as having influence over husband or male elders in the home.

FRAME® findings for the communes in the Segou region reflect the creeping effect of violence and conflict. Those communes such as Niono and Diabaly in the northern part of the region, see less efficacy in the governance system. The Phase 1 factors on the Path to Resilience are all lower than the communes further south and closer to Bamako. Taking action in these communes per the findings reflected in the intersectional analysis will be critical to keeping Segou as a buffer region. For those communes closer to Bamako and those that have access to more secure transit routes such as Segou and Markala, there may be greater expectations of the State’s role in improving the functionality the governance system.



5. On the Path to Resilience

The functionality of the Mali governance system shows there are pockets that contribute to resilience, but they are largely fragile. In many places, the Leadership and Citizen Participation dimensions provide a place to start on the path to resilience, especially as it relates to improving Service Delivery, Administration, and Financial Management. Economic Foundations vary across the 45 communes and are heavily influenced by the lack of security. Justice is consistently weak and will undermine attempts to deal with conflicts that require adjudication such as access to and use of land and water.

As noted in the introduction, the patterns of fragility of the dimensions illuminate several very important concerns. Even where the dimension is perceived as functioning, the overall trust and confidence and legitimacy of the system are questioned. In a highly conflict affected state, the concerns here will hinder attempts to strengthen or establish social cohesion and improve performance of the system.

The implications of the FRAMe® findings for the PSR project are highlighted below. The findings indicate that the patterns of fragility and the paths to resilience do not differ significantly between the North and Center part of the country. Thus, the implications referenced will need to consider in all regions and communes, with approaches and priorities for each commune adjusted to specific findings from the Conflict Assessment and FRAMe® and presented in the intersectional analysis found in Annex A.

Early Warning Response System. A major activity of the PSR project is building and linking the national Mali Early Warning Response System (EWRS) with the communes. The EWRS will be effective if citizens report, and if the responses are perceived as respecting the rights, needs, and concerns of all citizens. Beyond building the functionality of the EWRS, FRAMe® findings indicate that it will be critical to focus on two factors: citizens trust and confidence and system legitimacy. Both factors reflect respect for actions taken and a willingness to participate in programs established by leaders in the community. Given the low perceptions of security, this will be a major challenge. FRAMe® findings highlight the importance of moving beyond increasing the presence of legitimate security actors. Citizens' responses to the Security dimension factors demonstrate their frustration with not being able to secure information about incidence and not being able to hold security actors accountable. Per the Conflict Assessment, herders and young women feel security protocols and procedures reflect an elite definition of who warrants protection.

Other organizations tasked with responding to early warnings will also have to demonstrate that they are acting on behalf of the community, not just their respective constituents. Repeated concerns about the breakdown of social cohesion by respondents to the Conflict Assessment, and in the FRAMe® focus group reflect a heightened concern that the governance system overall could do more to foster cohesion. Assurance to all ethnic, gender, and age groups will need to be made demonstrating that the EWRS indicators reflect their concerns and needs. Further, it will be important to demonstrate that responses made by administrators of the EWRS are not biased towards or against any group. Finally, Commune Councils, village chiefs, and religious leaders will have to work to rebuild a social contract between different identity groups, as well as with their respective institutions and the State if the EWRS is to function properly.

PDSECs—Implementing the PDSECs provide the most concrete evidence of a functioning governance system. Primarily designed to ensure the delivery of basic services and programs that improve daily life, enhance human development, and foster economic growth, it will be critical to address the FRAMe® findings related to Service Delivery and Financial Management. Both dimensions weaken the overall path to resilience and will have consequence as to the implementation of the PDSEC. Citizens' perceptions reflect a lack of concrete evidence of performance, but a closer look at other factors indicated that concerns expand beyond this and must be addressed. The delivery of basic services is perceived to be biased towards dominant groups and as such contributing to violence of others and resulting in overall

inequality. Closely related to service delivery, citizens' perception of financial management mirrors the concerns about service delivery: public funds are used to benefit elite groups. To actualize the PDSECs, it will be critical to address the overall process in which citizens are engaged in contributing to the development of plans, and the execution of the plans. Further, if there is to be any hope of citizens respecting the decisions made about the delivery and cost of services and programs – currently deemed a fragile aspect of both service delivery and finance – PSR and other USAID programs must address overall system legitimacy.

Conflict Dynamics of Resource Management – Access to land and water are key drivers of conflict overall, varying by degree depending on security and climate-affected changes to availability of land and water, and policies that are perceived to benefit dominant groups. Findings for all of the dimensions in the governance system must be reviewed as it relates to resource management, but a spotlight should be shone on Administration, Security, and Justice. Even though Administration is a dimension that is perceived to foster resilience—more so in the center than in the north – citizens do not perceive administrative actions to contributing to social cohesion or generating trust, indicating that the efficacy of Administration is in question. Citizens' reflections of Security and Justice dimensions reflect an overall dissatisfaction. Even if performance were better (i.e., conflict suppressed and justice adjudicated), citizens seem to question if the policies guiding the execution of security and justice reflect the needs of all citizens, especially those not associated with farmers (key contributors to the overall economic base of Mali) and older men (the dominant leaders).

Women's Agency. The FRAME® findings suggest that women could be a path to resilience currently not tapped within the governance system. While they find the system overall contributing to resilience, they continue to play a muted and subordinate role in influencing changes. This is reflected in their perceptions of civic infrastructure and decision-making. Building women's agency through their influence within the family and identifying how this influence could be expanded to enhance the system overall provides a safe and effective way to build their authority and opens new roles and paths for young women to follow. The one exception to this implication is the Segou region, where women's perception are lower than youth and all others.

Dynamics of Leadership. Leading communes along the path to resilience will require more than bringing the state back to what is perceived as ungoverned spaces. The lack of trust between citizens, which may be exacerbated by the absence of the state, is also a reflection of frayed relations, frustration, and power dynamics that exist, which cannot be addressed by the state. Placing expectation on the state as the only actor responsible for facilitating peace and fostering stability is not a recipe for success. Elders and traditional leaders who eschew the involvement of the young must be addressed by helping them to think differently about their roles and the rules that define their roles, if trust is to be established system wide. The low marks assigned to trust and confidence in leaders overall is evidence that even if leaders are perceived to be inclusion (i.e. reflecting the population) the lack of trust and confidence indicates an underlying concern about the acceptance of the decisions made by leaders.

Youth Development. Youth perceptions register a frustration with the governance system. Analysis of the CAF and FRAME® data indicates a concern about future economic and social opportunities. While they respect their elders, as reflected in the fact that they see Leadership as inclusive, their lack of trust and confidence in the system indicates that the current system of governance will not address their concerns. As a strategy, it will be important to increase youth leader's agency in decision making processes that are now limited to commune elders. As part of this strategy, an emphasis on working with elders, not just youth, to explore ways in which they can create opportunities for youth to take a leadership role for issue of the commune writ large, and not just those perceived as relevant to youth will be important.

Annex A. Intersectional Analysis Case Study: Dinanagourou

An Intersectoral analysis between governance and conflict will highlight the interconnection between conflict factors and the functionality of the governance system. The data used for this analysis is extracted from interviews and focus groups of the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF), as well as single-identity focus groups based on the Fragility – Resilience Assessment Methodology (FRAME®). The two data sets reflect the perspectives of residents from the 46 commune partners of the PSR project, which offer an understanding of how the concerns, grievances and frustrations of individuals limit efforts in Mali to lay the foundations for peace, stabilization and reconciliation.

The intersectoral analysis is system-based, providing PSR staff, Malian leaders at national, regional and community levels, as well as USAID, with a more complete understanding of the complex, non-linear dynamics taking place in each commune. Combined with the Conflict Analysis report, which provides high-level data on the patterns, trends and motivations of conflict dynamics at the national, regional and communal levels, **intersectoral analysis between governance and conflict** provides a means of assessing the impact of programmatic or political interventions on government institutions closest to citizens.

A case study on Dinanagourou provides an example of the development and use of the intersectional analysis.

Region/Commune: Mopti/Dinangourou

The analysis of conflicts in the commune of Dinangourou highlights three sets of grievances that, unchecked, can make the local governance system much more fragile.



- **Assassinations and killings of people by armed bandits and radical groups.** Since the beginning of 2018, the commune of Dinangourou has experienced a resurgence of tensions between armed bandits and radical groups of the Peuhl and Dogon communities. In addition to the displacement of many to nearby communities, including the Bankass and Bandiagara communes, these communal tensions expose local people to killings day after day. Abandoning their essential subsistence assets in the commune, these populations are victims of reprisals by armed bandits and radical groups. These reprisals are fueling insecurity in the commune.
- **Self-defense militias.** Under the May 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, the government reduced its military presence in Kidal, and parts of Menaka, Timbouctou, and Gao. It also scaled back the number of soldiers in Tenenkou, Youwarou, and Douentza. This withdrawal gives the impression to the population that their security is not assured by the state, because of the security vacuum. This perception led to the emergence of militias. The commune of Dinangourou is no exception in this area where militias, mainly of Peuhl and Dogon origin, proliferate. This is the case of the Association for the Salvation of the Sahel, which operates in Mopti, including Dinangourou. This militia seeks to defeat the Dan na Ambassagou militia of Dogon origin. However, without any legal basis, such militias are therefore a source of anxiety and insecurity. They make small arms available, increasing instances of vigilante justice.
- **Illicit trade (weapons, drugs, smuggling, etc.).** An excellent trade area due to its proximity to the border with Burkina Faso, the town of Dinangourou includes semi-rural and village markets. In addition to traders from neighboring urban centers (Koro and Bankass), these markets supply many traders, both Malian and Burkinabe. Malian sellers sell millet, sorghum, cowpea and small ruminants. These markets are also popular for smuggling illegal goods. This smuggling is likely to fuel insecurity along the border with Burkina Faso.

Analysis of the data collected through FRAME[®], highlights major dimensions that can both weaken or strengthen the local governance system in Dinangourou. Citizen participation, leadership and service delivery are the most important dimensions contributing to the resilience of this system. On the other hand, Fiscal Management, the Security Environment, Economic Foundations and Justice/Rule of Law are the dimensions that contribute to weakening the local governance system.

Unlike men (adult and young people), women are better supported by NGOs such as CARE on production activities and trained in drying, processing and storing their production for self-consumption and sales. In addition to the lack of unoccupied arable land, these men are facing the partial exploitation of land by Burkinabe nationals. Once well received in the commune, this exploitation displeases some peasants of Dinangourou who claim ownership of the land. Also, adult men blame the government for not taking measures to stop deforestation by some peasants, both Malian and Burkinabe. Finally, uncontrolled transhumance on both sides of the border destroys farmland.

Local elected officials are accused of seeing this cross-border area as a vast opportunity for self-enrichment rather than as potential for development of the commune. More often than not, respondents believe that elected representatives do not listen to the people, and do not give them the necessary support to identify common problems, common solutions and joint funding. Also, in terms of taxes, few public meetings are held to allow discussions or questions about taxation. Finally, the nonchalance of the rulers in the management of security, despite the warnings given by the populations, is deplored. This nonchalance fuels the crisis of confidence between rulers and the governed. Consequently, local development is virtually nonexistent.

For example, the first figure shows that civic participation and leadership contribute the most to resilience, while the second one illustrates the vulnerability of men, both adults and youth. In addition to dying under the bullets of bandits and radicals, many adult men are missing or are assassinated for no obvious reason. Young men, venturing in search of grass for animals, are also murdered. These men have not felt under state protection since 2012. They no longer rely on the rulers to ensure their safety. In addition to the absence of the SDF in Dinangourou, there are also no patrols in the commune. Having no adequate means to defend themselves, these populations try to take their destiny into their own hands to ensure their safety and that





of their property. The stalemate of the situation is manifested by denunciations often based on pre-existing tensions and the stigmatization of certain ethnic groups (Peulhs and Dogons) and (Burkinabe) in the ranks of bandits. Often followed by marginalization, this stigmatization creates tensions between national (Malian) communities, and between national and cross-border communities (Malian and Burkinabe). Men, both adults and young people, are the ones most affected by these tensions. This is consistent with the results of the CAF analysis, which found that the Malian state appears to be more concerned with managing conflicts in piecemeal fashion rather than in a comprehensive way. The feeling of not being listened to or rightly supported and nonchalance in the management of security affairs create frustrations, and fuel insecurity.

An in-depth examination of the factors in each dimension of the governance system that can weaken or strengthen local development shows a close link between conflict and governance. This figure illustrates this link. The most weakening factor for local development is performance, followed by local autonomy/decision making and civic infrastructure.

A review of respondents' responses identifies factors by target group. For example, if civic participation involves close and regular collaboration between community members, elected officials and other members of the governance system, performance (insufficient arable land unoccupied, the re-sale of land ownership, the clearing of the forest, the lack of listening, support and meetings around the management of taxes) contributes to fragility.


A reading of the first figure on the next page shows that adult women are positive about their inclusion in the governance system. The graph corroborates this inclusion of adult women in almost every dimension of the governance system, except fiscal management. This finding is consistent with the CAF analysis, according to which the claim of ownership of the land, nonchalance in the management of security and the inadequacy of fiscal administration leads to the frustration of a part of the population, and then to their low adherence to local development initiatives. A vicious cycle, fueling insecurity in Dinangourou.

Performance. Performance contributes to fragility in four of the eight dimensions Dinangourou: Leadership, Service Delivery, Civic Participation, Justice/Rule of Law. Mayors are unable to



provide their staff with adequate training (Dimension 7). They depend mainly on taxes that are insufficient to cope with basic services (Dimension 5). People and their property are not safe (Dimension 3). Justice is corrupt (Dimension 2).


Local autonomy/decision making. As shown on the next page, local autonomy/decision making is the second factor that contributes to fragility of five (5) dimensions of governance: Economic Base; Justice/Rule of Law; Fiscal Management; Administrative Management; and Leadership Civic Participation for adult men, and all dimensions for young men without exception. The Social, Economic and Cultural Development Plans (PDSEC) serve as the basic for development planning affecting Economic Foundations, shown as



Dimension 1 in the figure on the next page-Factor 2 Decentralization. There is a lack of sufficient funds local revenues as revenues flow from the national government, noted here as affecting the Financial Management Dimension above. The SDF fails to guarantee the safety of people and their property, one of several factors weakening the Secure Environment dimension. Corruption spreads to all spheres of the judicial system noted as Dimension 7 in the figure on the next page.

Civic infrastructure. Civic infrastructure remains the third factor impeding the resilience of Dinangourou's governance. This factor contributes to the fragility of four (4) dimensions of governance out of a total of eight (8): Justice/Rule of Law, Economic Foundations, Administrative Management, and Financial Management.

Few meetings are initiated to discuss the development affairs of the commune leaving men feeling disconnected from businesses affecting the fragility of Economic Foundations dimension. Citizens do not feel they can participate in the decisions made in the budget process, Financial Management Dimension. Citizen are concerned that the commune houses a temporary prison just enough time to transfer the inmates to the neighbouring commune of Koro (Dimension 7).



Summary of The Results of the Intersectional Analysis.

The summary table below shows an interdependence between the factors and dimensions involved in the governance system. It also highlights the actors who bring about conflict following the grievances. Activities are designed to address the grievances, taking into account citizens perceptions of the relevant governance dimensions and factors.

Determining and Designing Interventions.

Development of the activities must demonstrate how the activity builds overall resilience, defined as addressing the underlying perceptions of the factors. This requires determining which PSR activities in each objective align with or can address the grievance. Once determine, then the activity must address the rating of the dimension and the factor that explains either the resilience or fragility of the dimension.

The factor rating, which is reflective of the citizens perception, is the starting point. For example, if the activity is to work with the security forces in the commune, it is necessary to understand the citizens perception of the different factors. In the case outlined below, one of the key issues is to ensure that the starting point addresses citizens questioning the legitimacy of the security apparatus, especially as it relates to young men. In the case below, men, especially young men have dim perceptions of the legitimacy of security. This case addresses one of three major grievances in Dinangourou. Two additional grievances specific to this commune are: Proliferation of self defense militia and illicit trade (weapons, drugs, smuggling, etc.)

Sequencing, Layering and Integration.

A situation room process has been developed that brings together the Objective Lead, Regional Program Manager for Mopti, and the relevant Commune Coordinator to review the actions recommended. During this review the team will identify the following.

Sequencing: For each activity consider if there is anything that should happen before this activity is implemented. For example, if the activity requires women to be a voice in the ins stating their concerns about security forces behavior towards them, they should already have participated in some capacity building program about empowerment so they can effectively voice their concerns. Using the mapping data from the commune, the team will identify which local CSO could work with PSR to facilitate the much-needed training.

Layering: Next, determine if the activity can add value to another part of our project—i.e. support an activity in another objective or another program from another implementing partner. The case below suggest that the at a minimum Activity 1 would add value to national early warning program.

Integration: finally, determine other national or international programs that PSR should work with. In the case below this would include the USAID Justice and civic engagement programs and coordination international and national security defense forces.

| Summary of intersectional analysis results | | | | | |
|--|---|--|--|---|---|
| Grievances | FRAMe® Factors | FRAMe® Dimensions | Actors | PSR Activities | Starting Point Activity Design |
| Killings by armed bandits and radical groups | Social cohesion Legitimacy of the system Trust and confidence | Leadership Safe environment Justice and rule of law Citizen participant | Dogons, Peulhs Armed bandits and radical groups Adult men and young men Farmers and herders | <p>Objective 1.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Establish small groups that represent or can communicate with the actors associated with the grievances. 2) Work directly with relevant authorities to develop a secure reporting system that protects the person sharing information, giving special attention to the concerns different types of challenges women of different ages face. <p>Objective 3</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3) Offer youth alternatives that allow them to | <p>Objective 1.</p> <p>Staff review indicated that some of the local militia representing different groups may actually be able to work together. The Security Dimension -- Social Cohesion Factor is rated as a 3. This indicates there is a foundation from which to build on.</p> <p>The challenge is using this as a means to work through the militia to build legitimacy with the local populations.</p> <p>Activities must first start with building legitimacy (rated as 2.2 for Security). Since the State is perceived as only one of many security actors, the starting points is to bring in state and local militia together and then develop a program that allows citizens, especially women , to safely meet and express their concerns. This begins to address the problem that citizens do not see security as accountable to the people. Young men are most reluctant to trust security. They rated Trust and Confidence as a 1, an issue to be addressed under Objective 3.)</p> <p>Young men in Dinangourou question the legitimacy of the security and leadership rating</p> |

| | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| | | | | <p>choose different paths. This includes building skills that allow them to gain incomes through agriculture and sensitizing them to the dangers of aligning with armed and radical groups.</p> <p>4) Ensure that all youth 18 or older have identification cards</p> | <p>both dimensions as a 2. Young women have better perceptions. To ensure that alternative opportunities are open to youth, and that training to sensitize youth to the dangers of joining radical groups the activity must also include working with businesses and elders to help them understand the concerns of youth, especially as it relates to youth feeling the leaders do not respond to the needs of youth express them.</p> <p>To realize this activity, it will be necessary to first build a relationship between the security apparatus—both state and local militias. This can be tied to the activities in Objective 1 designed for this purpose. Because there is a perception generally that security is at least inclusive, particularly by young men, there is a base to build from. The barrier that must be overcome is the fact that young people fear security. Some action must be taken to increase transparency and accountability, possibly a joint campaign on the value of registering and securing ID.</p> |
|--|--|--|--|---|--|

Annex. B. Evolving Government Structure on Building Resilience

The faculty of the School of Letters and Human Sciences of Bamako who were part of the FRAME® team provided additional research on the challenges of communes as it relates to decentralization, changing roles and responsibilities of communes, and the effects of the 2012 uprising.

Rules of Decentralization. Mali is an ethnic and geographic mosaic that covers 480,000 square miles and is home to 18 million people. It is perhaps due to the country's size and diversity that the principles of decentralization have persisted in Mali through three phases of governance since independence in 1960. Through these regimes, successive and cumulative rules – complex frameworks that include formal laws, informal influence, customs and traditional practices – have determined who holds power in Mali, what constitutes that power, and how those in power relate to their constituents.

Socialism for all. Independent Mali was born under a socialist regime headed by the Sudanese Union African Democratic Rally. Through its single-party rule, the regime aimed to restore the dignity of Malians that had been cut down by colonialism. Its vehicle was socialism, placing the collective interest before the individual (Badian 1967, 73). Socialism also helped define the geography of the country's decentralized administrative structure, as laid out in the first constitution:

The territorial authorities of the Republic of Mali are: regions, circles, boroughs, municipalities, villages, nomadic fractions. Every other community is created by law. These communities are administered freely by elected councils and under the terms of the law. In local authorities, the government delegate is responsible for the interests of the republic, administrative control and law enforcement.

Military dictatorship. In November 1968, the socialist government was overthrown in a coup d'état that ushered in 23 years of dictatorial military rule. Beginning in 1974, the Military Committee for National Liberation led the country under single-party rule. Efforts, however meager, at setting forth rules of decentralization persisted. For example, the regime passed a law in 1977 establishing Bamako as a district subdivided into six municipalities with decentralized local authorities. A 1988 law created the Regional and Local Development Fund, a state trust account intended to help balance regional and local budgets.

But while the letter of the law may have proclaimed decentralization, in practice the regime's version of decentralization was contrary to the spirit of the law. Only a single party could put forward candidates for elected office at all levels. This history informs Mali's politics today, in which Malians are skeptical of government authority, having lived through decades of unrealized promises of decentralized local governance.

The advent of democracy. The dictatorship crumbled, and democracy was introduced to Mali in 1991. The country entered a phase of citizen participation in public life that was so successful it became a model for democracy in West Africa. A new constitution was drafted in 1992, laying the groundwork for a new decentralized system of governance that aimed to bring power closer to the people by involving them in the management of public affairs.

Roles and Responsibilities in Local Governance. Throughout the 1990s, Bamako enacted a panoply of laws intended to define the roles and relationships of the government and its citizenry. These laws built upon the Constitution, establishing a framework of rules that addressed such factors as: the community code; the status of civil servants in local jurisdictions; conditions for the appointments and responsibilities of state representatives at the community level; conditions and modalities for making decentralized state services available at the local level; the approach to management of local jurisdictions; and tax resources for municipalities. These rules sought to lay out the structure of power – who could hold it, how they would attain and exercise power, and which domains they would oversee.

Under this new, democratic system of local governance, the municipality was to be the basic unit of governance (other units include regions, *cercles*, and communes.) Municipal-level authorities were to be more self-reliant and accountable, and they were to be responsible for three broad sectors: health, water and education.

Beyond formal local authorities, other entities have come into play, demonstrating the ability for a variety of stakeholders to cooperate at the local level. Among them are technical service providers, non-governmental organizations and traditional village authorities. These groups may be involved in tax collection, elections, development projects, environmental issues and security. They often work in conjunction with municipal councils and other local authorities.

Local governments, however, face a number of challenges in implementing this decentralization. For example, in some administrative units, the local systems of government have yet to be established. In Gao, for instance, the regional assembly is nonexistent.

Local officials also face a challenge in the very source of authority at the local level. The decentralization process in Mali has largely been “a process of top-down political construction that is added to a political legitimacy embodied by elected officials and a moral legitimacy represented by the parents of pupils and the authorities (village chief). It has to deal with these two types of legitimacy that have nothing to do with preconceptions and institutional presuppositions.” (Traoré 2011) Despite legislation on decentralization, neighborhood, village and political party authorities are often chosen because of their dynastic familial associations, rather than because they are best qualified for a position. Moreover, it is the richest families – those able to distribute beneficences – who end up elected to office. In other words, Mali’s local authority is hierarchical and invested in long lineages of elders who are chosen to lead their communities. The importance of this system poses a serious challenge to government-decreed structures of local power.

There’s a key piece missing from the puzzle in Mali’s local governance system: as clear definition of the roles of the citizen – their rights, responsibilities and duties to their community and nation. This has served to undermine the governance system; without a clear place carved out for the citizen, governance remains, as Traoré said, a top-down construction with little incentive for the participation in public life that the system envisioned.

Relationships and Reality. Mali has had some success in decentralization. The government has, in recent years, made efforts to transfer specific responsibilities for such services to local authorities. Community Health Centers and Community Health Associations, for example, are important players in strengthening and supporting broader health services at the local level. The government has also indicated its intent to transfer management of public water works to commune-level management, to include developing and maintaining infrastructure for drinking water.

Perhaps one of the most ambitious initiatives of decentralization are the PDSECs – Plans de Développement Economique, Social et Culturel, or highly localized development plans that outline economic, social and cultural priorities based on consultations with the community. Dr. Moussa Sow notes that the PDSECs were designed as a participatory approach through which data on development wants and needs is collected at the village and commune level; then, through community-level sessions the PDSECs select which of these are priorities to be funded by municipality-level resources. The PDSEC process has clearer expectations for the role of both government and citizen, and how the two can collaborate to achieve local development priorities.

Local government in Mali has, however, more often than not failed to meet the expectations of its people. A key roadblock is in the lack of funding and the actual disbursement of resources. A PDSEC may clearly define priorities, but whether those priorities will ever be funded is a different question altogether. Communal budgets are insignificant to begin with; a majority of local funding comes from NGOs, which do not necessarily take local priorities into account. But even those meager budgets often go unfunded;

elected officials cannot implement programs or provide services without funding from their higher-ups that may never be disbursed. The effect is that local governments become “empty shells,” particularly in rural areas. (Opcit, 43)

Further, corruption and mismanagement can cause significant issues in local authorities’ ability to actually exercise their responsibilities to deliver services and achieve development objectives. Land management, for example, has become a particularly thorny issue. Local elected officials have gotten involved in speculation; in some municipalities, an official will sell a single plot to several different buyers, which is strictly prohibited by law, and which serves only to enrich the official. The Minister of State Domains and Land Affairs noted that “Kati’s only state district, surrounding the city of Bamako, has created more titles in three years (2012-2015) than has been created for all of Mali in fifty years.” (B.A.S. Sow 2016, 251)

Another key concern is that groups of lower social status are regularly excluded from power, such as the Rimaybe in Peulh areas. Power, then, becomes concentrated in the hands of the leader of the most prominent of social groups. In the rural commune of Haire in Douentza cercle, for example, it is the Wekebe who hold social, economic and political power. Without access to power, lower-status groups are left out of decision-making processes, further isolating them and excluding them from public life.

An Upended System. Since 2012, conflict and insecurity has been the single greatest obstacle to successful decentralization in Mali. The Tuareg rebellion helped to usher in a string of military coups, rebellions and extremist activities. Insecurity now plagues huge swaths of the country, including most of the central and northern regions, and the conflict has upended the rules of local governance, disrupted the roles of the powerful and the governed, and subverted the relationships between them.

In 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, launched an uprising, declaring its intent to create a new nation that consisted of nearly two-thirds of Mali’s territory. The military was ill-prepared to fend off this rebellion, and the rebels were able to seize control of villages and towns across northern Mali (Mbonimpa 2016, 140).

The MNLA had the backing of Islamic extremist groups like Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), both affiliates of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. As these groups took over, they set forth their own rules of power and governance, which manifested as gross human rights abuses like forced marriages, rape, sexual slavery, stonings, amputations, and enlistment of child soldiers. These groups raised funds through such criminal practices as illicit drug and weapons trafficking and kidnapping for ransom.

In the face of this violence and subversion of law and order, many government officials have fled altogether; elsewhere, the state is present but weak. This causes serious distrust and disillusionment among the population:

The mere presence of the state is not enough. The institutions that represent it will have to put themselves at the service of the people. People, especially the poorest, feel left behind by the state when they find its actions unfair. If they feel they are victims of injustice or abuse ... creating a gap between the rulers and the governed. In this case, this gap becomes a place where jihadist actions take place. (Tounkara and Gaye, 2019)

As security has deteriorated, intergroup conflict has escalated. Across the country, tensions between such groups as farmers, fishers and herders – which often coincide with ethnic divisions – have cost hundreds of lives. Where the state has been unable or unwilling to provide security, the bruised and battered population has cobbled together self-defense groups to protect themselves from further harm.

Violent armed groups have also emerged, such as the Macina Katiba in Mopti, which have taken advantage of the state’s absence and intergroup tensions to claim territory across the central and northern regions (Civil Society White Book for Security and Peace 2019, 29). This violence has also prompted

large-scale displacement of the population, further disrupting the rules and roles of local communities, and has stymied economic activity as roads and markets become too dangerous.

Many of these armed and extremist groups have become deeply enmeshed in local communities. The population, therefore, will not report on them for fear of reprisals. This makes it exceedingly difficult for whatever law enforcement is present to do their job. The result: further degradation of the formal rules of local governance and a descent into lawlessness.

In short, Mali has historically laid out a grand vision for a decentralized government that brings decision-making power over public policy closer to the people. In practice, meager resources, mismanagement, competing power structures and, most disruptively, widespread conflict have thwarted effective decentralization. This has left a distrustful and frustrated population and weakened the ability of communes able to fend for themselves.