Washington, D.C. — Rwandan troops have penetrated far into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in what DRC government officials charge is an invasion aimed at exploiting the central African nation's mineral riches. For their part, the Rwandan government claims that they are militarily involved in the DRC because the Interahamwe - held responsible for close to a million deaths in Rwanda in 1994 - threaten national security from bases in the DRC.
In an interview with allAfrica.com Richard Sezibera, Ambassador to the United States from Rwanda said security requires more than border patrols but his nation is prepared to withdraw its troops from the DRC as soon as there is evidence that Kinshasa is willing to take on the Interahamwe.
Excerpts:
Congo officials, including the ambassador here in Washington say that if Rwanda was just at the border you could make the case that your country's involvement in Congo was related to security concerns. But because Rwandan troops are all over the Congo they charge that something other than security is the reason for their presence. Why do Rwandan troops have to be so deep inside Congo? And would you respond to the United Nations report charging that Rwanda is exploiting Congo's raw materials?
First, looking at Rwanda's security concerns in territorial terms is missing the point completely because a country's security it is true is defined within the territory of that country. But threats to a country's security are not necessarily limited either to inside its borders or to the proximity of its borders. In 1996 we had our troops around our borders. But because the Interahamwe operated with impunity from the Congo under Mobutu then it was impossible for us to keep our own security inside the country. They infiltrated from the borders into our own country. And they came as close as 20 miles outside our capital Kigali through the infiltrations. And this put back our efforts at national reconstruction and national reconciliation.
So one cannot look at security as just a territorial problem. We know very well that the Interahamwe who pose a threat - the genocide forces that pose a threat - to Kigali are based not only in Kinshasa. They're in Bujimai. They're in the Kasai. They're in Katanga. They were in Pweto. Thousands of them crossed over into Zambia when we fought them in Pweto. The threat therefore is dealt with where it is. And the argument that countries should protect their forces from their own borders is good one in an ideal world. But in practice that is not what happens. For example, you have United States forces based on Okinawa, Japan. They are protecting the territory of the United States. That gives them strategic depth. So the concept of strategic depth for Rwanda is extremely important. And until and unless the Congolese cooperate with us on that, then that simply cannot happen.
Let me give you another example. We do have our forces in a place called Kindu. Kindu is very near Kassai. Why do we have our forces very near Kindu? Because the Kabila government - Kabila senior - had promised to bring the war to Kigali. And Kindu has the capacity - if you put jets that Congo and her allies have - they have the capacity to actually cause damage to Kigali from the airfield in Kindu. So our presence in Kindu prevents that from happening and therefore assures our security. If we were to follow their [Congo officialdom] reasoning we would not be protecting our people. In actual fact we would be putting them in danger.
About the question of the UN report I will just say a few things. One, the report is poorly done and extremely biased. Why do I say that? On the one hand the report says they received cooperation from Rwanda. We gave them a list of all companies that have been trading with the Eastern Congo and some of them have been trading with eastern Congo since the 1960s - 1967, 1968. The trade from eastern Congo has always gone through eastern Africa. It is the natural trade route with or without the war. Secondly, we do have what is called the CEPGL(Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs or Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes). This community encompasses Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo - the DRC. The idea behind the CEPGL was to allow for the free movement of goods and peoples across the three countries. We do not even need passports for our citizens to cross from one country to another. This agreement has never been abrogated. So you have Rwandans trading in Congo. You have Rwandans moving freely and trading freely in Burundi. You have Congolese - thousands of Congolese - doing business in Rwanda, teaching in our schools under the treaty of CEPGL. This war did not stop the CEPGL and so trade within that context is legal. Third, Lusaka [Agreement] provides for an inter-congolese dialogue that will lead to a new political dispensation in the Congo. And under Lusaka, all participants under the inter-congolese dialogue are at an equal status. So the government in Kinshasa, the rebels of RCD, of MRC, of RCD-Kissingani, and members of the non-armed political opposition and civil society will take part in the dialogue on an equal basis. In the meantime, before the new political dispensation comes into place in the Congo the different groups that are administering the different parts of the Congo are doing it legally. As long as they do it with the laws of the DRC. So for people to trade in areas controlled by the RCD or MRC or RCD-Kissangani is not illegal; it is legal and legitimate under the CEPGL and under the Lusaka Agreement. This is a fundamental point, which I think the report missed.
How can a group or groups in rebellion against the Kinshasa Government of the DRC be operating under the laws of the DRC? If you're in rebellion surely every act associated with the rebellious group would be, in fact, illegal.
No. It depends on how you define legality. In 1996, Mr. Mobutu was in power. His government could have been construed to be legal. The question was, was it just and was it legal. Those are two different things. During colonialism, the territories under Belgian colonialism were administered under laws made and passed by the Belgium Parliament. So they were there legally but were they legitimate and were they just? I don't think so. So to be in rebellion does not mean you are illegitimate, necessarily.
But in addition to that, the Lusaka agreement was signed by the Congo government, so they recognized the rebellion as valid partners in the search for a new political dispensation. They affixed their signatures to this document freely and willingly.
Is the government of Joseph Kabila a government the Rwanda government feels it can deal with? Does it have legitimacy?
Well the Rwanda government can deal with any Congolese administration that takes into concern our legitimate concerns. If the Kabila is serious in addressing the very real problems that Congo's neighbors have then we feel comfortable dealing with it.
Do you think it is?
Right now we have had encouraging speeches from Kinshasa. So in terms of talk there is a change. We have given them the benefit of the doubt. Now we have to see acts - on the ground. We judge people not by what they say, but by what they do.
Is there a time frame for "acts on the ground?" Do you have to see acts within the next month, the next two weeks, the next year? Is there a deadline?
No. If they could do it as soon as possible that is what we prefer. There is a timetable that was established under Lusaka by the Joint Political Commission. We in Rwanda see the resolution of the Congo with three key components all of which must act in tandem -must occur in tandem. One is cessation of hostilities and disengagement. This has occurred and we took the initiative to disengage our troops even further than is provided for under Lusaka because Lusaka provides for 15 kilometers; we withdrew 200 kilometers to give peace a chance. That has occurred. The two other things that have to occur are the inter-Congolese dialogue and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of the non-signatory forces under Lusaka, which include the genocidal forces. These two things have to happen in tandem. We are encouraged to hear that the preliminary talks for the inter-Congolese dialogue will take place in July. As far as Rwanda is concerned, once the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the forces - Interahamwe forces - occurs we have no more business being in the Congo and we will leave.
What does the "reintegration" of Interahamwe forces mean? I'm not clear on that.
We have said that we are willing to take them in Rwanda if they can be disarmed and come back we are willing to take them in. We have already reintegrated over 15,000 inside our own country. Those who choose not to come to Rwanda as long as they don't constitute a threat to Rwanda, then they can go wherever they want to go.
Let me make one other point about the demobilization. Because I have heard people say, 'You know it is so difficult to disarm these people, who is going to do it?' Our position has been, and continues to be, that disarmament is not the problem. We have disarmed thousands and thousands of Interahamwe. The problem has been that you disarm them and other people rearm them! So it actually is a problem of rearmament. The DRC and her allies continue to rearm the Interahamwe. The international community should make sure that this stops. There are UN resolutions establishing an embargo on arming the Interahamwe. They have never been acted upon. The international community should make it very clear that any government that arms the Interahamwe. So people who associate with the genocidal forces, there should be a consequence to that. And the international community should be at the forefront of doing it. It is not a question of Rwanda disarming people who committed genocide. Genocide is an international crime and involves international responsibility.
Shifting gears. What is your reading of Secretary Powell's trip to Africa? Does this represent something new in U.S. Africa policy? He stopped in Uganda and had discussions with President Museveni. Does it have any implications for the Great Lakes area?
I think it was important that he visited Africa. There was concern that the new administration would not be engaged with Africa. I think he went in with a positive message - the fight against HIV/AIDS, which is a pandemic, and so the more people can see what it is and help mobilize resources to fight against it is positive.
Was it new? I don't think so. His predecessor had visited Africa a number of times. I think it is important that the American government, and Americans keep engaged with Africa. When Kagame met Secretary Powell in February, his message was that there are 780 million Africans. One cannot close their eyes to 780 million people anywhere.
Will his trip have an effect on the Great lakes region? I hope so.
I have to say, however, that the major problems of Africa will be solved primarily by us - Africans - and that includes the Great Lakes region. I we do not believe that the west will solve Africa's problems. They can help us but we are not of the kind that blames our problems or our successes on others. We have a responsibility to ourselves and our peoples to solve the problems that Africa and the Great Lakes region have.
I was asking about something "new" coming out of Powell's Africa travels because the trip was coming up early in the Bush Administration and at a time when the Middle East and the Balkans also loom large as U.S. foreign policy concerns. I was wondering whether Africa was being put higher up on the list of Administration concerns than might be expected, and whether as an African ambassador you might have some insight into this.
I think it was a pleasant surprise to us all that Africa was as high on the Bush administrations agenda as it seems to be. We would hope that it continues. There are more successes on the African continent than problems, and the more the successes are brought up, the better. Among the successes, I count Rwanda.
Rwanda is stamped with a particular kind of image. Terrible genocide. It is difficult to imagine how after such bitter conflict reconciliation is possible.
I think Rwanda in 1994 to many people was a lost cause. We had lost over 1 million people. We had over 3 million refugees outside our borders and over 3.5 million internally displaced. Infrastructure was totally destroyed. Our elite had been decimated or had taken part in the genocide. So we faced very, very difficult condition then. Some people at that time when they took a look at what Rwanda was, they thought it should be a UN protectorate - the way Kosovo is and the way East Timor has been. Or the way NATO has taken over for a long time the Balkans - Bosnia. We disagreed. We disagreed because we thought that even though Rwanda had reached the nadir in terms of mans inhumanity to man, we believed that we could rebuild it. And so we gave ourselves four major strategic challenges. One was national reconciliation and reconstruction. It was very difficult at that time. We took the strategic decision that all Rwandans should come back home, including those who committed genocide. The innocent and the guilty should all come back home because they were all Rwandans and we would learn to live together. Secondly, under that national reconciliation and national reconstruction we decided to remove all ethnic mention on identity cards, mention of religious affiliation and we put in place mechanism that allowed people to advance in all spheres on merit, not regional or ethnic origin. The second strategic decision that we made was to be politically inclusive. We had eight political parties and they all took part in government and in parliament, the idea being that we didn't believe that a winner take all system would help us in Rwanda it would entrench more division than bring in unity. The third strategic decision that we took was to liberalize the economy even though at that time there was no economy to speak of. And this has born fruit. Our economy has been growing at more than 7 percent a year since 1994. As a matter of fact from 1994 to 1995 it rebounded by about 36 percent because of the decisions we took early enough. And lastly, we took the strategic decision that we would not allow anybody or anything to destabilize the security we had paid dearly for. And I think we have been by and large successful. In 1998 we held the first local elections and people voted across ethnic lines. Now that was just four years after the genocide; it was an incredibly successful exercise. In 1999 we held elections at higher levels; secret voting, over 95 percent participation. So that has given us hope that national reconciliation is slowly but surely taking place.
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Is it fair to characterize the genocide that took place in Rwanda as ethnic conflict or tribal conflict or was something else going on? And secondly, Burundi next door seems less stable than Rwanda. Are you concerned that Burundi's instability will destabilize Rwanda?
The first question is difficult. Is it ethnic? Is it tribal? Scientifically speaking - strictly speaking - there are no ethnic groups or tribal groups in Rwanda. We speak the same language, share the same culture, live together, intermingle, and share the same clans. But the history of division over the years, beginning with colonialism and ending with our post-independence history has created facts on the ground in which some people see themselves as Tutsis or Hutus as a result of victimization, basically. So the genocide was not about ethnic conflict. There was a small group of political opportunists who wanted to hang on to power and created a mythical division between our people. Taught it for years and decades and unfortunately it became a self-fulfilling prophecy. So post genocide Rwanda cannot simply ignore those realities but we relieve we can go back to the Rwanda that we had before these divisions came in and our policies are geared toward that.
Burundi. Does Burundi cause us problems? I wouldn't like to say much about Burundi. I will just make one comment. Diversity is not a problem. Diversity becomes a problem if one decides to politicize it. So for example, if you make ethnic groups or religious groups or any other rigid identity - it can be religion, it can be ethnicity, it can be race - if you politicize that and form political parties based on that then you are creating a recipe for disaster because political pluralism entails the idea that today's majority can be tomorrow's minority. But if [politics] is based on rigid identifications then you have permanent majority and a permanent minority and that is a recipe for disaster because if you decide that you form a Tutsi party or a Hutu party then if I am Tutsi I cannot change my identity to Hutu or vice versa and the only way one can access to power under rigid political identities is through violence, which is the problem with Africa in my opinion.
Isn't the government of Rwanda really seen as a "Tutsi" government? A government specifically of Tutsi exiles?
I think that is a myth. First of all it is very difficult to know who is Hutu and who is Tutsi. But if you look at our cabinet, for example. Those who in past carried identity cards mentioning their ethnic origins the majority were identified as Hutu. The same thing with our parliament. We have not done the exercise in the armed forces - and we will not - but I am sure if you did the same thing you would find people who in the past identified themselves as Hutu are the majority. So I think that is a myth. Secondly, what happens if people intermarry? If I call myself Hutu and I marry Tutsi what is my child? And that has happened for centuries now. I think it is partly a myth created by the media. I hear "Tutsi-dominated government" maybe because the President is seen as Tutsi. I don't hear people talk about "Texan-dominated government." These are labels that people give us that are unfortunate in my opinion.
