Washington, DC — Zimbabwe's election campaign is finally underway. President Robert Mugabe and his ruling party, Zanu-PF, face a challenge on March 9-10 from Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change.
The past two years have seen a bitter political battle involving a rising tide of violence and a disastrous economic collapse. While Zanu-PF presents the battle in terms of an argument over whether agricultural land should be taken from white farmers and given to black Zimbabweans, the MDC and other critics say the land issue is being used by President Mugabe to whip up support for his re-election and justify dubbing his opponents a mouthpiece for the former colonial power, Britain.
Attempts by the international community, particularly South Africa, Nigeria, the United States, the EU and the Commonwealth, to persuade Harare to reduce the tension and play by fair rules, have met with little success. Violent intimidation has continued and, most recently, a number of new laws have been passed, apparently designed to give Mr Mugabe's party the advantage.
Mark Chavunduka, editor of one of Harare's independent newspapers, the Zimbabwe Standard and Eliphas Mukonoweshuro Professor of Politicial Science at the University of Zimbabwe, both strong critics of President Mugabe, are in the United States to press for increased international pressure on the government. Chavunduka was tortured in 1999, with his reporter, Ray Choto, and charged with treason for reporting a coup plot in the army.
The two men visited allAfrica.com on February 1 and, in a wide-ranging interview, talked about what they believe are President Mugabe's strategies for winning the forthcoming election - in particular, a 'militarisation' of the election campaign machine, the reluctance of the international community to act against him and their fears for the future. Excerpts:
Would you say that, despite the passage of the latest laws, there is still a chance for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe?
Mark Chavunduka: There can't be. Because if you look at the new legislation, one of its more laughable provisions is that it makes it a crime to speak against President Mugabe, to criticize him or members of his senior cabinet. What I'm doing right now, by criticising him, I'm committing a crime. There can't be a fair election where one of the candidates is immune from criticism - how else can any other candidate present his credentials without attacking what he perceives to be the shortcomings of the incumbent?
You have to remember that all the previous legislation has not been removed from the statute books, so they're actually adding to all the legislation inherited from the colonial era. So we are now operating under a more repressive situation than under the colonial regime.
President Mugabe's apparent attitude is often seen by foreign press coverage as astonishing, and it sometimes seems as though he almost wants to be provocative. How does one explain that?
Mark Chavunduka:Well I don't think there's any other way of explaining it. Firstly, he's become totally impervious to any form of criticism or advice. And secondly his only preoccupation at the moment is how to stay in power; he's not too fussy about whether he uses legal or extra-legal means of doing it. So that is his mind set and he's not going to be worried too much by how the international community perceives his actions.
How do you deal with the accusation that the MDC has played into the hands of the former colonial masters and is a neo-colonial mouthpiece?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: It is cheap. We know Zanu-PF propaganda, I grew up in Zanu-PF and abandoned it at the first indications of dictatorship, so I know their strategies. Some of the things they are doing, what has that got to do with neo-colonialism? You arrive in a village you rape every child there, every woman there - what has that got to do with British neo-colonialism? We are dealing with a gang of rogues, thugs and criminals who will use any strategy to cast aspersions on a loyal, democratic and opposition party.
Why have the southern African nations in SADC been so ineffective in this crisis?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: The whole approach of the African Union and of the SADC and indeed, of the black diaspora, with very few exceptions, has been one of mind-boggling solidarity, regardless of the particular credentials of the regime that they seek fellowship with. But also you must understand that dictators are very much frightened of precedents. If you support the removal of a dictator in one country you are setting a precedent and giving an example to democratic forces in your own country to mobilize and gain more space for democratic freedoms.
Why, given the damage that the Zimbabwe situation has done to the South African economy and to the hopes that the region might become an economic powerhouse led by South Africa, has Mr Mbeki failed to get a grip on this situation?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: South Africa has been a major disappointment. There is a fear of a 'demonstration effect'. If you look at the constituents of the ANC, there is Cosatu [Confederation of South African Trade Unions], the SACP [South African Communist Party], and the main ANC. For Cosatu, read ZCTU [the Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions]: there is a real possibility of a parting of ways between the ANC and Cosatu and the Communist Party. Mbeki is afraid of the demonstration effect.
If a labour-based political party could mobilize opposition forces in Zimbabwe, what would stop the same thing happening in South Africa? And in South Africa it would be more effective because you have credible politicians who are lurking in the wings - Winnie Mandela who has been alienated from the main ANC politics, and the dark horse, Cyril Ramaphosa, with his very solid labour credentials: so I think it is in Mbeki's interest that the alternative in the offing in Zimbabwe is not viable - [the message being] "therefore, Cyril Ramaphosa, Cosatu, Winnie Mandela - think again."
Can we go back to Mugabe's motives? There is a view that he wants to stay in power and therefore this entire problem has been generated by his own personal ambition. But is there more to it than that? Are there other stake-holders in the army and elsewhere who stand to benefit from his victory and are determined to keep him in power?
Mark Chavunduka: There's no doubt that the top ranks in the army have benefited immensely from Mugabe's patronage, not least because of their operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). You have a situation where, as soon as they get into the DRC on military operations, the top brass of the army make a beeline to go and concentrate on their private business interests, so they are the people who are really benefiting from Mugabe's patronage system. But having said that, we understand that the army has been involved in political manoeuvres to seek assurances from the opposition that if Mugabe leaves, his safety is guaranteed and there are no retributions against him, so the army could continue to benefit, even under any other government. But to say that they are forcing Mugabe to stay in power, I don't think so; they are trying to secure sanctuary for him and having done that they are quite happy to see him go because they too realize that he's become a liability not only to the party, Zanu-PF, but to Zimbabwe as a whole.
So how can we explain his being so strong, if powerful blocs in the society don't want to see him continue in office?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: Well one thing we have to realize in the Mugabe power scenario is that, for a long time now, the difference between ordinary activities and crime has been very blurred and here we are not talking only about economic crime, but ordinary crimes like murder, torture and other things. So there are ministers in government who are really frightened about their fortunes in a new political dispensation. A new government coming to power in Zimbabwe might not necessarily pursue these people but that doesn't stop civilians from seeking justice in the courts.
There are also issues of economic plunder and pillage. Some of the ministers are extremely rich and it cannot be explained in terms of legitimate means. They have so much money overseas that it doesn't tally with their business activities at home and with their salary. So these are the fears that they have. Mark has mentioned one minister who is afraid of tomorrow because he has nowhere to run to; he cannot run in the region because they are waiting for him; he cannot run here to the US because of what is being put in place in terms of smart sanctions.
What we are beginning to see is that the elected lieutenants of Mugabe are not now playing a leading role in putting strategies for his survival; it is the non-elected [directly appointed] MPs who have been made ministers [without] any democratic credentials; we are talking of the minister of information, of agriculture, of justice; those are the people now with Mugabe's ear. They do not have any other constituency except Mugabe himself and they remain in power at Mugabe's pleasure.
There was an interesting article in the Financial Gazette saying Nigeria's President Obasanjo was recently trying to arrange behind the scenes for a guaranteed safe exit for Mugabe so that he could leave the country if he lost the election. Is that plausible?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: I think that the opposition has always had that position, that they do not believe it will be in the interest of the country to embark on politics of retribution and I think the leader of the opposition has on several occasions been on record as saying that. The only difference is that now he has approached the regional leaders and I know for certain he has written to President Obasanjo undertaking that there will be no retribution, that despite his soiled legacy, Mugabe still deserves some respect as the founding prime minister and the founding president of Zimbabwe.
Assuming free and fair elections, most press reports say the outcome would be very close. From that we have to assume that there is still a constituency very supportive of Zanu-PF. What is the basis for that support?
Mark Chavunduka: I'm not so sure that I agree that Zanu-PF still have that formidable level of support. Firstly there's going to be no free and fair election; but if that were going to be possible, it would not be a tight race at all. The vote would be overwhelmingly in favour of the opposition.
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: I think what you should also remember is that we have had a dry run of the presidential election in which Mugabe lost - the constitutional referendum. That's why Mugabe is now insisting that voting should not be on the basis of a national constituency. He wants it to be on the basis of parliamentary constituencies because he's realised that the strategy of intimidation works if people are restricted to a particular parliamentary constituency.
That is the reason why the MDC is going to court challenging that; they have won in the court of law, the High Court, but I think Zanu-PF is appealing now to the Supreme Court because they do not want to abandon the constituency approach to voting, even though in the past two presidential elections the whole country was turned into one national constituency. If that [referendum] had been a presidential election then Mugabe would have been out of power; they don't want a repetition of that in this election.
I think there is a marked denudation of Mugabe's support in his traditional stronghold, the rural areas. A piece of land does not mean anything to anybody if there are no support services, if there is no health, no education. The cost of living now in the rural areas is higher than in the urban areas! So you can see, on the basis of that, there has been a spectacular erosion of the support that Mugabe used to enjoy in the rural areas.
So it could be a close-shave election. If it is a close shave, the only reason will be that Zanu-PF has opened all the floodgates to rig the election. Of course this is what is happening; we're no longer talking about whether the election will be free and fair but of the magnitude of rigging. It is a foregone conclusion that the election is rigged; it stands rigged even before the first ballot is cast.
What's happening in Matabeleland?
Mark Chavunduka:I think Matabeleland is suffering in the same way that other provinces are. The Professor has [described elsewhere] the system of command centers which have been set up at national level and then replicated in all the provinces of the country. Basically these are structures which comprise the army, the police, the Central Intelligence Organisation, Zanu-PF youths and the militia. What they do is mobilize, through violence, support for Zanu-PF in the forthcoming elections and they have been brutalizing people in all the areas where the command structures are in place.
Matabeleland has not escaped that, so they are facing the same problem that others are. I think Zanu-PF to a certain extent has lost hope [there] because the people of Matabeleland were beaten up badly and killed during the time of the Gukurahunde [the war of repression waged by the Zimbabwe army in Matabeleland during the early '80s in which tens of thousands may have been killed] and in the last parliamentary elections, those provinces emerged as the strongest support bases for the MDC. So one would have thought that the government would have given up on those areas as lost provinces - but no, they have also been targeted for assault and intimidation.
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: What is happening on the ground in Zimbabwe now is that, for the first time since independence, there is a recognized official infrastructure of violence that permeates all the corners of the country - the command centre system that he referred to. Orders are rapidly transmitted from the command centre in Harare, in the shortest possible time. Why do we say that? Because we have seen the simultaneous occurrence of similar events throughout the country, like the closure of schools, for instance. One could only conclude that these orders must have been transmitted from the same source.
In the past they used to use underground party structures to perpetrate violence so that they could then afford plausible denial. That is gone. This structure we are talking about is above board; it operates and is perceived to be operating with chilling efficiency by everyone who cares to investigate its permeation in society.
Apart from the command centre system, we are also talking of the deployment of 18,000 soldiers in civilian clothes who are campaigning on behalf of the ruling party. So we are seeing a militarisation of the campaign structure; what is, in actual fact, in place are not civilian campaign structures but military command structures. For the opposition to penetrate the rural areas it would have to meet those structures with similarly militarized structures. And of course you are describing a civil war if that happens.
So is the MDC preparing to respond in kind?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: No, the MDC is not preparing for anything. Certainly they don't have the resources and they don't believe in violent confrontation of that nature. But of course, the patience of the ordinary civilians on the ground is wearing thin. You know, they are beginning to organize now to resist so that their neighbourhoods are not terrorized by these state-sponsored thugs. What I am only saying is that if you want a free and fair campaign the military structures have to be abandoned by the ruling party, otherwise the only way that the MDC can penetrate is if it has military structures of the same nature, which it does not have.
And presumably, you don't expect Zanu-PF to abandon those structures?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: Oh no, the government is not going to abandon those structures. They are going to ensure that they remain in place. The strategy is: "Let's go ahead and win the election by whatever methods and then after that, present the international community with a fait accompli: [they will] have to deal with the government that is in place." I think that is their strategy.
Do you think smart sanctions will have any effect? And where are the assets being held that will have to be frozen?
Mark Chavunduka: Definitely they will work. We have said that we prefer a system with staggered implementation of sanctions, it is much better than imposing blanket sanctions on Zimbabwe because, that way, you only serve to make the circumstance of the ordinary Zimbabwean more difficult. But if they are targeted at particular individuals...
Where the money is, is difficult to say - I wish I knew! - but a substantial part of it must be in Europe and the US. But it's going to be a very difficult task [to track it down] because a lot of it is hidden through various shell companies and syndicates which could be very difficult to trace.
The Commonwealth's failure to suspend Zimbabwe at the foreign ministers meeting in London: was it a surprise? A disappointment?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: Well I think we're starting to realize that the Commonwealth is a club that relies only on moral pressure, and they are very quick to give exceptions and excuses to any country that seriously erodes and abandons the values which they claim to be the basis of cooperation within the Commonwealth. I think the Commonwealth is a toothless bulldog.
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What do you want the US to do?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: We have been trying to talk to anybody who would listen. That does not mean standing on street corners and giving out pamphlets. We were trying to look at opinion-makers within the establishment, the American government and try, in the first place, to discover the extent to which our perception of the problem is shared. From there we are trying to suggest ways in which the US, together with the rest of the international community, could find appropriate methods of engaging the Zimbabwean government to stop a catastrophe that is likely to happen in the event of a contested election; that has been our message. It is better, and less costly in terms of resources and human lives, that the government be engaged this side of the presidential poll.
Will the media survive the onslaught of the new legislation?
Mark Chavunduka: It depends on how far they are willing to go. We have already resolved to fight these laws where we can.
The latest example of one of their strategies is from yesterday [Jan 31, 2002]. We had three reporters arrested, one from The Standard and two from the Daily News; what they do is arrest reporters on spurious allegations and then they set long remand dates, so that papers and journalists might suffer financially under the weight of the legal bills. Those are quite heavy for us; for example after Ray [Choto] and I were arrested in 1999, our bill - which is not yet completely paid off - is over two million Zimbabwe dollars [currently US$36,000 although the Zimbabwe dollar has suffered a steep decline during the past two years]. There is no way that we could pay that bill on our own, the paper would have collapsed, so we got assistance from outside and we were able to continue fighting the case.
The government, even when it brings a case against us and loses, pays for it with taxpayers' money. We need funds to defend ourselves. But what they have done is to make it a crime for papers to receive material or financial support from outside to suffocate us financially.
We've decided on two things. One is to ignore the laws and continue fighting as we've been doing; and two, we've decided to put in place mechanisms to ensure that we can continue to receive external support. The government has been totally dishonest on the question of foreign funding because they made amendments to the Political Parties Finance Act to stop the opposition from receiving funds from abroad, yet we know they are receiving millions of dollars from Libya. So call it illegal or whatever, we are also putting in place our own mechanisms to enable us to survive.
This is a very bleak vision. What do you see in the future for Zimbabwe?
Eliphas Mukonoweshuro: Well it is frightening... one can only see a deluge. I don't think we're likely to experience any semblance of political normalcy. As long as Mugabe will have stolen the election and declares himself the president of Zimbabwe it will be a contested legitimacy. We are likely to see chronic instability, untold suffering, substantial departure of skilled manpower; we are likely to see the country being reduced to the level of peasant subsistence.
You mentioned that by talking to us in this way, you may be committing a crime in terms of the recent legislation. What do you think will happen when you return to Zimbabwe? You've already had a confrontation of a very serious nature with the security forces in the past.
Mark Chavunduka: Quite frankly, I'm not even thinking about what will happen. If they are going to arrest us when we go back then so be it. But the position that we have taken as independent editors is that we consider these pieces of legislation as being illegal and therefore, to our thinking, they are null and void.
We are going to continue doing our work as we have been doing, making sure that we have done as many background checks [on our stories] as we can, as we have always done, and basically that is the position we are going to take. I'm not even going to waste time worrying myself about whether I'm going to be arrested in Harare airport or not. We're dealing with a rogue regime and anything could happen.
