Washington, D.C. — U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, who has been leading the Bush administration's peace efforts in Somalia and Sudan, discussed the situation in both countries - as well as plans to create an 'African Command' for the U.S. military and current developments in Liberia, Guinea and Zimbabwe - in the following interview with AllAfrica's Charles Cobb:
You were very critical yesterday of the decision by Somalia's parliament to kick out its speaker, Sharif Hassan Shekih Adan. Why?
I think that if you are going to have a spirit of reconciliation, which they've all been talking about, a national dialogue, then everyone should be part of that process. Especially the leadership of the federal transitional institutions. And it seems to me that a move to immediately expel or push out the speaker is counter to that spirit. I am not trying to get into the details of the validity of their case against him; my point is that he is part of the institutions and he has a particular perspective in terms of trying to reach out to the Council of Islamic Courts. And whether he has coordinated that with the president, prime minister or others, I can't say, but that's behind you and move forward. And so I think as a symbol to the rest of the country, it was important to reach out to him and not try and push him over. I was also critical of him [the speaker]—of the statements that he has also been making. And I think that the parliament and the speaker bear responsibility for continuing to the transitional federal institution.
Of course the speaker opposed Ethiopian intervention and he was encouraging discussion with the Council of Islamic Courts.
He did oppose Ethiopia's intervention and his call for reaching out for dialogue with the Council of Islamic Courts is the same call we all had prior to Ethiopia's counter offensive. We were all pushing for credible and serious dialogue. So those are what I consider policy differences that should be able to be accommodated within the context of reconciliation and national dialogue. And yes, he continued to oppose Ethiopia's presence in Somalia, but as I told him when I was in Nairobi that's behind us now.
Is it the position of the Bush administration with respect to the Ethiopian intervention that Ethiopia was threatened by the Islamic Courts and that the Islamic Courts were essentially an al-Qaeda front?
On the first, we would say that "yes" that both Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Government were threatened by the Council of Islamic Courts and the statements that they made. In their own rhetoric they were talking about reuniting all Somalis—the whole five stars of Somalia notion which would include [as a single nation] the Ogaden [of Ethiopia], northeast Kenya, Djbouti—the old irredentist movement and that's a threat in and of itself. Secondly, we saw evidence that they were infiltrating trainers into various areas.…
Of Ethiopia?
There is some evidence of infiltration into the Ogaden as well. And of planning of infiltration into Kenya and other places—into Somaliland. Now how far those operations went, I don't have that evidence. Secondly, Ethiopia said it was in Baidoa to train transitional federal government troops and there were skirmishes with Islamic Courts militias attacking an Ethiopian convoy here and there. Then these escalated with the Council of Islamic Courts pushing toward Baidoa in a clear offensive against the government. Yes. We did see a threat to Ethiopia.
And it required in your view a military response by Ethiopia?
Not necessarily…
Because you seemed reluctant about supporting intervention in the beginning, in December. Then the U.S. attitude seems to shift over two weeks.
What happened is we have always counseled Ethiopia from the first time the Courts were trying to—when I say "the Courts" I mean individuals within the Courts—pull Ethiopia into this conflict, trying to drag it in, we were cautioning them that they should not take the bait and get pulled into this. But what became very evident over time is that—and this goes to your second question, were the Courts a front for al-Qaeda—no, I don't think the Courts were a front for al-Qaeda; I think the Courts were a genuine organic Courts based in communities that had come up almost organically to adjudicate cases and provide basic services; but I believe that the al-Qaeda operatives that were in Somalia, hiding out, eventually took over those Courts. Basically they hijacked the Shura [decision-making body]. I say hijacked because they took over the militia or created and built the militia—the al-shabab—which was very extremist in its orientation. They had key positions in the Shura and there was a split within the Shura between those who wanted to seriously negotiate in Khartoum and those who were continuing to push militarily. And so I think al-Qaeda "hijack" is probably the best way to say it, rather than the Courts were a front for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda didn't create the Courts.
Was there something specific that triggered this assessment?
Well. We have information. We had information on the planning and operations all along. And it became very clear that if they had gone to the negotiating table with the goal of helping govern Somalia, they could have gone to the table and done just that. The Transitional Federal Government is extremely weak. They could have had a major influence within the government if that were the objective. But the continued push militarily suggested that there was a different objective. And their own statement, I think, affirms that, and the call for global Jihad, the call for reuniting all Somalis under the five stars.
Should the U.S. bombing and the attempt to capture the men considered responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania be considered part of the effort against the Courts while strengthening the transitional government or as something separate?
It's obviously part of it, but our effort to get Somalia not to be a safe haven for these terrorists is longstanding. It's been there since 1998. It was before the Courts, during the Courts, and will certainly be after the Courts. It stands independent of an assessment of the Courts themselves. But what certainly these particular three operatives felt more comfortable when the Council of Islamic Courts was in control of Mogadishu. And as a result they came out of hiding. And we were able to pick-em up. I think that's where the relationship goes between the Courts and these three operatives. And then we saw evidence that these operatives—or at least a couple of them—were providing logistics and supplies and support for the al-Shabab militia of the Council of Islamic Courts.
By "pick-em up" I assume you mean identify their location in Somalia.
And their activities.
Was the effort to kill them or capture them?
You mean the C130 strike?
Yes. The operation against those three.
We're not just after those three. Those three are the ones who have been indicted for attacking our embassies, but there is an al-Qaeda cell in Somalia; people like Issa Osman Issa are part of that al-Qaeda cell. He was responsible for the bombing of the hotel in Mombasa. Aden Hashi 'Ayro trained in Afghanistan and is one of the commanders of Council of Islamic Courts militia, the al-Shabab. All of these individuals we would consider to be on the terror list, as extremists who pose a threat to U.S. interests and to the region.
How do you respond to the criticism from Africa about this attack—the U.S. C130 attack. Even Djibouti, which is certainly an ally of the United States, was critical?
Their statements of concern or criticism were based on faulty information that there were multiple attacks and that there were many hundreds of civilians that were killed. None of that is true. I just think that they had bad information, and they were reacting to very bad information.
One of the things you said yesterday was that the past had to be left behind. Much, I think, depends on what kind of government emerges in Somalia. The transitional government seems extremely weak. It wasn't even able to get to Mogadishu without Ethiopian troops. Why should anyone assume that it is a viable government at all?
Well, they are extremely weak but they are the legitimate government of Somalia, and they need to build their capacity and they need to build their legitimacy. And they can do that by reaching out broadly to the Somali people. We heard—very forcefully—that the transitional federal government is their government, it's the people of Somalia's government. Weak or not weak, it's their government. And we were told very clearly that we need to support that government. And we've been doing so. We have always done so, but we have done more by encouraging them quietly. From this past summer we have been told that while we encourage them quietly, we also need to support the government as the legitimate government of Somalia. We certainly have been trying to do so, understanding that it is still very weak and has a lot of work to do to gain the support of the Somali people broadly.
And there is the question of peacekeeping. Reportedly, five African nations have agreed to provide some forces. But so far, we have only heard Uganda say specifically that it is willing to provide peacekeeping troops. Can you name other countries that are committed to providing peacekeeping troops?
We have not really been taking the lead on trying to find troops. We took the lead on getting UN Security Council resolution 1725 passed at the request of the African Union. And in getting it passed there were two countries that were identified as troop-contributing countries by IGAD—Uganda and Sudan. For obvious reasons—Sudan has its own internal problems and others didn't think they were appropriate, therefore Uganda emerged as the key candidate. And Uganda said it was willing to contribute. So we have been focusing, and continue to focus, on getting them deployed. But the effort to get other troop-contributing countries deployed by Kenya. I haven't had the opportunity to talk to the foreign minister to find out the results of his mission.
And speaking of Sudan. The foreign ministry of that country has been demanding an apology from the United States for the raid of its diplomatic mission in Iraq earlier this week. What's your response?
I think the DOD (Department of Defense) probably has a response to that question. They're the ones who would know best what actually happened. But I am almost positive that we didn't raid the Sudanese embassy. If we were in search of insurgents, it would have been with the permission of those who are on site. I think DOD knows the details better than I do.
And there are the broader Sudan questions. One large one is, with all of the attention focused on Darfur, concern about what is going on there and the pressure on Khartoum, whether or not the North-South deal isn't getting lost or even becoming unraveled?
There are continuing issues there—the boundary between the North and South so that they can divvy up oil revenues appropriately, and a number of other issues that have not been resolved. We have been relying very much on an Assessment and Evaluation Commission to follow-up on implementation of the agreement. The biggest concern I had was the recent SPLA-militia fighting; concern that the North may have had a hand in stirring up this fighting between the SPLA and various militia. We are trying to talk to both the SPLA and the government. I think that both sides continue to be committed to implementation of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) and that is the foundation for transformation of Sudan. I think there is more confidence-building that needs to happen, but both sides are not prepared to try and break the CPA fundamentally.
But if you're a Southerner, how could you have confidence in Khartoum watching what's going on in Darfur?
Well, I think that's a fair question and if I were a Southerner, I would be very concerned. The North needs to understand that. The situation in Darfur absolutely leads people to question whether they can be part of this—whether there's any serious intent to have a unified Sudan under democratic broad governance.
The reverse seems to be happening. Darfur is becoming more insecure. Aid delivery by UN agencies is being treatened by this continuing conflict. The South can choose to secede in 2011. Is that at all a possibility?
Well I hope not. I have to believe that Darfur will be more stable long before 2011. I think the key to Darfur is getting credible and capable peacekeepers on the ground with the support, planning and logistics that they need. I think we have two agreements: the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Abuja Agreement that will help us to get there. Especially, implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement is the necessary next step. People will say you need the political process and the military process to go hand in hand. Frankly I think that getting a credible and capable peacekeeping force on the ground is the key even to the political process because you continue to have these divisive rebel groups.
Is there any indication that Khartoum is willing to accept a "credible and capable" force on the ground?
We have to test it. President Bashir has written a letter to Kofi Annan saying that he is prepared to allow for a hybrid force—a UN and AU force entirely made up of African forces but with logistical support and command and control assistance from the UN. So I think that that formula can work if we can get those forces on the ground.
In another vein, but still in this area of security in Africa: We understand that the White House and the Pentagon have definitely decided to create an "African Command" as a sixth geographic command of the U.S. military. We also understand that they have chosen a commander. Can you confirm that there will be an African command? Can you confirm that a decision has been made on a commander? And can you tell me where the headquarters of such a command will be located?
I think that work is still under consideration. It's not just the Pentagon. The State Department has been very much a part of the team that has looked at the development of an "Africom." I've had three people from my own staff involved in it. The Political-Military Bureau of the State Department has been the lead in that planning process. There has been inter-agency cooperation on this issue. I think Secretary Rumsfeld has already reported that President Bush approved establishing an Africa combatant command and that's about as far as its gone. In terms of the structure that's still in the planning process. As far as the location, that's still part of the planning process. There hasn't been any appointment of a commander. People talk about the Deputy Combatant Commander for EUCOM [European Command] as a possible candidate. That's because that person has traditionally been in charge of Africa. But I think there is still a lot of work before we know where it is going to be located, and who's going to run it, and what its structure will look like.
What's the purpose of such a command? What would it do?
This is an idea that has been kicking around for more than a decade. I think there is a clear understanding that Africa is a huge continent and that U.S. engagement is significant. African countries have stepped up in terms of doing a lot of the peacekeeping that takes place across the continent. I would expect the mission of this command to look like that of other commands, but it will also to have some other components. For instance, clearly it has to be involved in training—you know the strong work we're doing through the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program (ACOTA). We would expect it would have some work in civil-military affairs like CJTF-HOA [Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa] does in trying to support communities. The airlift that HOA did for Somalia and Northeast Kenya would be an example of a humanitarian mission. And certainly there continue to be operations that work with host countries to track down terrorists. Like you see going across the Sahel with the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative. The full range of operations and engagement would be part of this command, and it just recognizes that Africa is not a subset of Europe. As I said, it's not an idea that is unique to the Bush administration. Academics have been talking about, debating and encouraging this for a long time.
And of course there is more in Africa than conflict on the Horn. So, I'd like to get your thinking about Liberia. Specifically, your response to a criticism which holds that given Liberia's special relationship with the United States, and its importance as a symbol of positive change and stability in Africa, that not nearly enough assistance has been going to that country.
Liberia had been in war for fourteen years. It now has an elected president, an elected parliament. It is a post-conflict country and there is a lot of rebuilding that is necessary; a lot of reconstruction that is necessary. This notion of a special relationship with the United States is certainly true. It doesn't mean that it's a relationship of dependency. The Liberian people are plenty capable of trying to establish trade relationships, and investment relationships that are going to be the basis for sustaining their economy. It's not going to come out of foreign assistance. Too much of a concentration on foreign assistance is problematic. Now that said, the United States is a huge contributor and will continue to be so. But this is not an administration that is looking to establish dependency. We have allowed Liberia to come into the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) very early; to be one of those countries to try and encourage those trade relationships. We will look at trying to achieve debt cancellation, not on a bilateral basis but to try to urge it on a multilateral basis and to assist with that debt cancellation. The focus should be, can we get more foreign investors, more American investors there, can we establish a better and closer trade relationship, and can we continue to open our market for Liberian goods.
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I am sure President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf would agree with you on trade and investment. On the other hand, the country has been almost totally devastated by a very long war. So there is this question of money for reconstruction that really falls outside of the trade and investment issue. It's more akin to reconstructing Europe after World War II….
Well, yes and no. Rwanda was even more devastated than Liberia after its genocide. But Rwanda has done a lot to re-energize its own economy; using assistance, absolutely, but Rwanda doesn't see itself as a special child of America. And Liberia shouldn't either. America is there to assist, support and to help but the Liberian people are going to have to establish the relationships with the World Bank, with the African Development Bank, other countries that can invest and with the United States. Certainly we would hope that American investors and American companies will go to Liberia but their development is not going to be based on assistance, it's going to be based on establishing those trade relationships and establishing those investment relationships.
And while we're in West Africa, the strike in Guinea seems to be becoming increasingly violent and spreading nationwide. What should we make of this strike, and of President Conté who's been head of state for what, two decades? I lose track of the longevity of some of these presidents?
This is a case where we can try and do conflict prevention. I've been arguing that instead of waiting until something very bad happens in a country—an insurgency or a coup d'etat, for example, that we need to get ahead of it. So we've been focused on trying to get the domestic opposition and the government to work together to try and figure out how they can increase space for governance—space for political participation. Demonstrations should be legal; it's an expression of the will of the people and we would expect the government to act with restraint, and most importantly we would hope they can come together to resolve this situation.
And speaking of presidents that have been in office for a very long time, let's talk about Zimbabwe and President Mugabe. I didn't notice this issue come up when President Bush met with President Mbeki, or a few days ago when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma. Have President Bush and President Mbeki simply agreed to disagree about South Africa's diplomatic role, or have they resolved their differences? Where are we with this?
We continue to hope that South Africa would take a more active role with Zimbabwe. Certainly in the discussion [of Presidents Bush and Mbeki], they talked about many countries both in Africa and globally. Zimbabwe was certainly one of the subjects touched upon. I don't know about the meeting between foreign minister Zuma and Secretary Rice. I think that meeting especially concentrated on South Africa's role on the Security Council and our working together in the context of the multi-lateral agenda globally.
What specifically are you looking for from South Africa at the United Nations?
We're looking for responsible engagement. We're looking to work closely together; we've been doing so all along. The Security Council gives us another opportunity, another forum to coordinate, collaborate and hopefully work together to solve some of these issues of peace and security.
Does it have a special role given both its strength and its credibility? Especially with regards to the severe conflicts in Sudan and Somalia?
Typically when we deal with African issues we go first to the African members of the Security Council. And so I definitely expect that we will be working very closely with South Africa. Also, South Africa has been very much in the lead on conflict mediation, and on the diplomatic importance of the African Union in peacekeeping matters.
