South Africa: United States Relations - The Political Dimension

11 June 2009
document

The following is a paper as prepared for delivery by Moeletsi Mbeki at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC on June 10, 2009. The paper was presented as part of a conference on United States-South Africa relations after recent elections in both countries.

South Africa's double vision

In foreign relations South Africa suffers from double vision – the vision of the political elite and that of the people.  In the eyes of the political elite, South Africa is a weak, poor, African country though it has some rich, mainly white, people.  From this image a number of things therefore follow from the political elite's perspective.

  • South Africa needs help from rich countries
  • South Africa was wronged by rich western countries and therefore now occupies high moral ground in relation to them
  • South Africa must club together with other weak and poor countries and must therefore not distinguish itself from them in any way

The mass of the people of South Africa of all races on the other hand, have a different image of their country. According to their image:

  • South Africa is a rich, strong country though it has some or even many poor people
  • South Africa is a strong democratic country surrounded by weak countries many of them ruled by incompetent and/or corrupt governments
  • South Africa to some extent must insulate itself from its neighbours though it must sympathize with their oppressed masses
  • South Africa must associate, as an equal, with other strong countries

Origins of ANC foreign relations

The adoption of the armed struggle in 1961 by the ANC and its partners for the first time since its founding in 1912 compelled the ANC to have a foreign policy.  To prosecute the armed struggle the ANC required foreign backers who would provide it with the following:

  • Military training for its armed cadres
  • Supplies of weapons and other military equipment
  • Financing for the long logistic chain
  • Assist with formulation of strategy and tactics

Prior to the adoption of the armed struggle the ANC had been involved in many of the conferences of the Pan African Movement which had culminated in the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.  It was also a participant in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia that led to the emergence to the Non-Aligned Movement.  None of these activities however could be construed as fundamental to the ANC's relations with the big wide world in the sense that they were of no strategic significance to the ANC's core political activities at home.

The armed struggle was different in that it required foreign material support to enable the ANC to carry out its domestic agenda which was to defeat apartheid and bring about democracy in South Africa.

To prosecute the armed struggle the ANC therefore had to enter into relations with countries that provided it with the wherewithal to undertake its military agenda. These were the communist countries, that is, China and the Soviet Union and their allies on one hand and the members of the Organization of African Unity especially Algeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia.

A second turning point in the evolution of the ANC's foreign policy was triggered by the ideological dispute between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  This dispute which had been simmering for several years below the surface since 1956 with the denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev came into the open in 1963 when the Chinese published the secret exchanges that had been going on between the two giant communist parties.  The ANC felt compelled to take the side of the Soviet Communist Party.  It closed its office in Beijing in 1964 and withdrew its representative from China, prominent trade unionists and communist, JB Marks. China had been the first country to train and arm the first group ANC guerrillas.

By breaking with China and instead nailing its colours to the mast of the Soviet Union the ANC thus became an important partisan in the Cold War.  This was to become a defining moment in the evolution of the ANC's foreign policy.  On one hand the ANC cast China as an adversary by taking the side of the Soviet Communist Party.  Secondly it also cast the United States, which was the leader of the West in the Cold War, as its adversary.

Impact of 30 years of ANC in exile on ANC government

The foreign policy decisions that the ANC made in the early 1960s were to have a major influence on its relationships with the United States, with China and with the people of South Africa.

It was during this period when the ANC in its attempt to prosecute the armed struggle ended up as dependent on the Soviet Union and its allies.  This long history of ANC's dependence explains South Africa's double vision.  While the ANC in exile became dependent on its international supporters the people in South Africa prosecuted their struggle largely on their own initiatives.

In its relationship with the United States the ANC in exile had a long history of hostility towards the U.S. government.  There were however many American citizens like the Kennedy brothers, The Congressional Black Caucus, TransAfrica, Trade Unions and the Churches who continued to assist the people of South Africa with their struggle against apartheid.  This is the dynamic that has driven and continues to drive the political relationship that the ANC in government has with the United States.

The great majority of South Africans see the United States as a friend who was supportive during their hour of need, despite disagreements on tactics for example during the Regan administration over 'constructive engagement'.  The ANC government on the other hand has an ambivalent attitude towards the United States government and the United States in general and is thus prone to exaggerate and even search for areas of difference.  This approach came out during South Africa's two year tenure at the Security Council and also in the fall out between the ANC and TransAfrica in the mid 1990s.

The main elements of the bilateral relationship between the United States and South Africa

Notwithstanding what I have said above, the ANC government has to work with the United States government. The United States is the world's leading power in virtually every respect and intends to stay that way:  It is the largest economy in the world; it is a leading technology innovator; it has the largest global military capacity; it is the largest consumer of the world's natural resources.

When the United States looks at regional powers like South Africa it therefore  asks itself what can South Africa do to enhance the United States position as a superpower.  Conversely it asks itself what regional powers like South Africa can do to undermine United States dominant position.

The ANC government on the other hand is much more ambivalent about its role in the world.  As we have indicated in our discussion about South Africa's double vision the ANC government sees South Africa as a weak country that must identify with other weak countries.

These two conflicting visions, that of the United States and that of the ANC government, have been a source of friction between the two governments reflected for example in their different positions in connection with the crises in Zimbabwe.
There are however areas where the ANC government and the US government see eye-to-eye.  Both governments understand that South Africa is the largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa and that it is therefore in a position to contribute to improving the welfare of the continent.

South Africa also has a large diversity of minerals that are considered strategic by both South Africa and the United States.  South Africa makes these resources
available to the world economy at market prices.

The two governments also recognize the importance of keeping the Cape Sea Route open to world shipping and free from piracy. Since coming to power the ANC government has therefore re-equipped the navy and the air force with the capacity to keep the Cape Sea lanes open and policed.

There are other areas of convergence between the two governments:

  • Support for the capitalist economic system
  • Maintaining good relations with other Western Powers especially United Kingdom and the European Union
  • Acceptance of English as main common language including support for religious and cultural diversity
  • South Africa is well disposed towards American multinational corporations

Conclusion

I have tried to show that political relations between the United States and South Africa are multifaceted.  In the time available I could not go into all the nuances. of this relationship.  Despite the ups and downs I have discussed in this presentation, I hope I have made the point that there are many more commonalities between the two countries than there are differences.

Moeletsi Mbeki is the deputy chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs, an independent think tank based in Johannesburg.

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