Two global disinformation experts discuss how the criminalisation of 'fake news' became an excuse for a clampdown on journalists and popular online commentators.
DOUNIA MAHLOULY: The Covid-19 crisis and subsequent war in Ukraine arguably raised public concerns about disinformation. In Europe and the United States, this issue has introduced a debate on the rising popularity of the far right and is also associated with a Russian brand of media populism. How relevant is this concept in the case of Egypt?
CHRIS BARRIE: This is not as obviously relevant in the case of Egypt. Certainly, Egypt's President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi employs populist rhetoric, othering political opponents and fuelling conspiracies of treasonous journalists. And scholars have noted parallels here. But I would hesitate to understand this as part of US/European populist currents. Egypt has a long history of populist-nationalist leaders employing styles of rhetoric and governance typical of contemporary populism. What is more, we know that authoritarian populism has a long vintage not only in the Middle East and North Africa but worldwide. The style of populism on display in Egypt has more in common with the logics of authoritarian politics and governance.
DM: What is the legal framework around disinformation (or 'false information') in Egypt?
CB: A law was introduced in 2018 that explicitly criminalised the dissemination of "fake news". The law targeted journalists but also social media accounts with more than 5000 followers. The precise definition of fake news or disinformation was left, arguably, intentionally vague. More recent scholarship has demonstrated that activists used anonymous accounts or tried to stay below the 5000 threshold in order to evade censors. The law also introduced additional administrative burdens for anyone wishing to set up a news website and prohibited journalists from filming in non-authorized spaces.
The Covid-19 pandemic opened the door to newly stringent laws against the dissemination of information online. Amid calamitous attempts by the Egyptian government to respond to the developing public health crisis, the Sisi regime ratified laws criminalising the posting of false information relating "to the situation of an epidemic". Journalists were exempt from this law. But this did not stop other journalists from facing trial as a result of their reporting on the pandemic.
DM: What kind of 'disinformation' is more likely to be regulated?
CB: The precise ambit of the legislation that has passed in recent years is difficult to determine. This is likely by design. Legislation introduced in 2018, ostensibly to stymie the flow of "fake news," has been obviously instrumentalized by the Sisi regime. The same goes with legislation passed that reportedly aimed to curb Coronavirus misinformation.
There are countless examples of this. Many of these demonstrate the obvious extent to which laws aimed at curbing disinformation are, in fact, instruments of political repression. This is, of course, a global phenomenon as reported by the Center for International Media Assistance. In Egypt, it took the form of medical professionals and human rights activists facing arrest after posting online about the public health emergency in Egypt. In the case of Sanaa Seif, activist and sister of imprisoned activist Alaa Abdel-Fattah, the apparent crime was the same - except that his time the political contours of the arrest were more obviously visible.
The targets of disinformation claims are many. Journalists are targeted and accused of pedalling false news - an accusation that often goes hand in hand with alleged membership of outlawed or "terrorist" groups. In reality, this is often a euphemism for the Muslim Brotherhood - whether the accusation is substantiated or not.
DM: In your opinion, how should we approach 'disinformation' in repressive political environments and jurisdictions with tight media regulations?
CB: This is an important question. At present, when studying authoritarian regimes, scholars have more readily been drawn to questions of "censorship" and other forms of constraining the information environment. In my own work, I have studied how to measure changes in media freedom using the text of news wires alone.
But this trend of studying only censorship or constraints on media freedom has changed in recent years. Scholars have begun studying how authoritarian regimes have weaponized allegations of fake news and disinformation in order to silence dissent. This is part of a broader trend, I think, of re-understanding how authoritarian regimes control information environments - Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman refer to contemporary authoritarians as "informational autocrats" or "spin dictators." No longer is their rule by fear alone or the censorship they practice total. Instead, they rely on instruments like punitive tax audits, appeals to national security or, as here, to weaponized notions of protecting publics from "fake news."
DM: Is there evidence to suggest prominent news sources are spreading prejudicial misinformation or defamatory content?
CB: In Egypt, we do know that President Sisi made a series of power grabs on news media organizations. Major news organizations, such as Youm7, are now in the control of the Egyptian Media Group, which in turn is controlled by Egyptian intelligence services. One would expect that newspapers whose owners are directly or indirectly linked to the State be less critical of the president. In fact, across the board, we find that both state- and privately-owned newspapers are strikingly less critical of the president after the 2013 coup. This indicates that the hold of President Sisi on the news media is relatively complete and not reliant solely on who runs a particular outlet.
We do know, however, that prominent news sources have fallen in line. Given their high circulation, it is about these that we should be principally worried. Al-Ahram, for example, is Egypt's main newspaper of record. In 2016 it published a twenty-page special issue detailing all of the successes of President Sisi over the preceding two years. This is in stark contrast to the plainly critical - and comparatively unconstrained - reporting that we observe in Al-Ahram in the two years prior.
DM: Is there evidence to suggest that foreign actors are spreading disinformation in Egypt?
CB: There is research looking not necessarily at foreign actors spreading disinformation in Egypt but at coordinated inter-state information operations in which Egypt has participated. In fact, on some counts, Egypt is one of the biggest spenders in this type of computational propaganda. But the same report also identifies Egypt as a target of this type of state-backed information operation-principally by Russia and Turkey.
Similarly, there was a large-scale takedown of Muslim Brotherhood-linked accounts that aimed to disseminate positive stories about the organization, which has been designated a terror organization by the Egyptian State. The locations of these pages were largely hidden but many also contained plainly pro-Qatari and pro-Turkiye content.
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DM: Is there evidence to suggest that disinformation played a role in Egypt's 2023 presidential election?
CB: There was certainly evidence of disinformation circulating during Egypt's 2023 presidential election. But rather than a concerted campaign, this more often took the form of laudatory media reporting and a near-total absence of substantive criticism of the Sisi regime. And we know that media censorship like this tends to make the public more favourable toward incumbents and increase the pro-government vote share.
Indeed, in a context like Egypt, the primary concern should be the constraints placed on the circulation of information by the Sisi regime. A report issued by the Egyptian Coalition for Human Rights and Development (ECHRD) is a case in point. The document, ostensibly an investigation by an independent NGO, takes the form of a breathless takedown of "Western media" for its bias and negative reporting on the presidential elections, noting how many outlets depicted the elections as a "foregone conclusion" (which, of course, they were). What is more, Amnesty International reported on hundreds of arrests of protestors and others accused of spreading "false news."
Dr Christopher Barrie is a lecturer in Computational Social Science, Protest, Conflict, Communication, Middle East Politics at the University of Endiburgh. Dr Dounia Mahlouly is a Lecturer and Course convenor for SOAS postgraduate courses 'Studies in Global Digital Cultures' and 'International Political Communication'.
