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Since the opening of the last round of talks in Jeddah between Sudan's warring factions, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) last October, the RSF has expanded its control over Darfur, and recently seized al-Gezira state. Militarily, it has achieved this through hit-and-run tactics, attacking SAF garrisons with the aim of depleting its supplies and munitions, forcing them to withdraw from their positions, effectively allowing the RSF to take over territory.
The RSF has thus occupied the cities of Wad Madani, capital of al-Gezira state, along with al-Geneina, Nyala and al-Daein in west, south and east Darfur, marking a particularly serious turning point in the current conflict in Sudan. The occupation of these cities allows the RSF to further expand its control and military operations in strategically vital regions in the rest of Sudan, thus allowing the conflict to continue and intensify further. Already, more than 15,000 people have been killed, 10 million residents of Khartoum have been forced to settle in neighbouring cities, and more than 1.5 million Sudanese have been displaced to other countries all while 17.7 million face acute famine.
The RSF's expansion into Darfur which took place on 30 October 2023 and 4 November 2023 reflects the intention of RSF commander Lieutenant-General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo or "Hemedti" and his advisors to gain total control over all Khartoum, after capturing the states of Kordofan, White Nile and al-Gezira. This expansion happened while the Jeddah negotiations were ongoing. This strategy is a result of the RSF wishing to replenish and expand its forces, having previously been unable to fully control Khartoum or, as they originally planned, to capture Lieutenant-General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan and other leaders of the SAF.
At the same time, there is another possibility that Hemedti and his advisors want to use their expansion as a bargaining chip, to turn the focus of the Jeddah talks from humanitarian aid for Sudan's beleaguered civilians to political talks that will end with a new power-sharing agreement between the RSF and SAF. In other words, the plan that is being implemented on the ground has now divided Sudan into two parts, with the RSF occupying western Sudan and parts of Khartoum, while the SAF controls other areas of the capital, its alternative capital in Port Sudan, and eastern and northern Sudan. This is very similar to the Libyan model, in which the powerful warlord General Khalifa Haftar controls eastern Libya, while the internationally recognised government, headed by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, controls western Libya.
The RSF's decision to pursue control of Darfur is a result of several social and military factors. Darfur is of social significance to the RSF as the hinterland of the Rizigat ethnic group, the main social component of the RSF, from which most of its leadership and soldiers hail. Hence, the intention of the RSF is not only to expand its territory, but also to replenish itself with new tribal recruits, and train those recruits in the military garrisons it has captured.
The capture of Darfur also has significance in military terms. The city of Nyala is particularly important, due to its proximity to the Central African Republic, providing the RSF with a link to its supply lines there in terms of soldiers, weaponry and support supplied by the Russian Wagner Group. At the same time, Nyala airport's well-built runways and facilities have the capacity to accommodate a wide range of aircraft, enabling comprehensive logistical support to the RSF. The use of this airport helps the RSF not only in supplying itself and bringing support from its foreign backers, but also opens the possibility of the use of airplanes to attack SAF positions such as that in Wadi Sydna, which the SAF has been using as its main airbase to attack RSF positions in Khartoum. Previously, the RSF has relied mostly on infantry forces, while the SAF has employed artillery and its air force. Hence, controlling the airport will allow the RSF to match the SAF's airstrikes capabilities. The usage of Nyala airport is expected to pave the way for the RSF's capture of al-Fashir, capital of North Darfur state, and then the city of al-Ubayid, capital of North Kordofan state, as part of the RSF's plan to take over the whole region of southern Sudan, and then in likelihood other neighbouring states.
Nyala fell to the RSF as a result of successive waves of attack on SAF bases in the city. The intensity and quick succession of eight attacks had depleted the military supplies of the SAF bases, already isolated from Khartoum and lacking reinforcements as a result of the SAF's primary occupation with the battles for Khartoum. The capture of Nyala has already given the RSF a strategic advantage; they now hold 80 percent of Darfur.[1]
After the capture of Nyala and al-Geneina, south and west Darfur respectively, the RSF have committed what are believed to be genocidal massacres of local communities in Darfur, spreading fear across the region. Sudan's conflict gained an ethnic dimension with the targeting of local communities like the Masalit in al-Geneina where 5,000 people have been killed and another 8,000 displaced. These and similar actions have, for example, encouraged local ethnic leaders in the city of Zalingei to surrender to the RSF without any resistance, after the SAF withdrew from the city.[2]
In expanding its control over Darfur and committing such acts, the RSF may have made a strategic mistake, turning potential allies against it. This happened when the RSF moved its forces to the city of al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur and the administrative centre of the entire Darfur region. The city is the homeland of the Zaghawa ethnic group, the constituents of both the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement-Minni Minawi (SLM-MM). Both the JEM and the SLM-MM were believed to be close to Hemedti and the RSF, having signed the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) in late 2019. Hemedti had used his position as the head of the Sudan government peace delegation to form close ties with the Darfur factions of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) of which both the JEM and SLM-MM are members. However, this alliance came to an end with the RSF imposing a siege on al-Fashir, resulting in the SLM, JEM and other Darfur factions actively switching sides and joining the SAF in defence of al-Fashir. Their loyalties shifted as a result of the perception that an attack on al-Fashir represents a threat to the Zaghawa, and the possibility of internal splintering among the political factions. This outcome would threaten the political leverage the SLM-MM and JEM had gained through claiming to represent their clans in Darfur in the talks with the Sudanese government that led to the JPA.
The brutal and genocidal acts of the RSF have also given their enemy, the SAF, additional legitimacy in the eyes of the people of Darfur and the Darfuri political factions. This is despite the historic role of the SAF in using the Janjaweed, who later became the RSF, against non-Arabs in Darfur, in what Alex de Waal has termed as counterinsurgency on the cheap.
Additionally, the threat of the RSF taking control of al-Fashir opens the possibility of encouraging non-Arab ethnic groups in the region, such as the Berti, Dajo, Fur, Kanein, Masalit, Tunjur and the Zaghawa, to form an alliance with each other and other groups against the RSF, thereby undermining the RSF's military superiority and plans to capture the other states of Sudan. These non-Arab groups already have historical grievances with the Arab-origin Rizayqat, a territory of which stretches from Sudan to Chad and Niger, and counts among its members Hemedti himself, and many of his backers in the RSF. If this pans out, the RSF's control over the Darfur region would face resistance, opening the door to another front in Sudan's civil war.
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With the conflict taking an ethnic dimension, a belief is growing that the RSF intends to resettle the Arab militiamen it has been recruiting from Mali, Niger and Chad into the areas it has attacked and occupied in Darfur, with the intention to then use these fighters to control the whole of Sudan. These campaigns in the south of Sudan thus give the RSF no incentive to take action to end the conflict any time soon. They further encourage the SAF and its supporters from the former regime to continue fighting to return to power under the facade of restoring Sudan's stability. Both scenarios spell catastrophe for Sudan's democratisation.
End Notes
[1] Author's interview with Mohamed El-Hadi, Secretary-General of the National Umma Party, a member of the Civilian Front Against War.
[2] Ibid.
Abbas Hamza is an accomplished freelance journalist and political analyst with 20 years experience. He possesses a deep understanding of Sudanese, Arab, and African affairs. He has provided comments to news outlets and appeared on several radio and TV news channels including BBC Arabic and Aljazeera. Follow him on his blog: https://a2005hassan.wixsite.com/abbash-blog
