A decade ago, Europe responded to Rwanda's incursions into the DRC with sanctions. Today, it's turning a blind eye - with devastating consequences for the Congolese.
In April 2012, a group of largely Tutsi Congolese military officers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) mutinied and crossed the border into Rwanda, where they announced the creation of a new rebel group, the M23. The movement went on to launch attacks into eastern Congo, motivated by a litany of grievances, from alleged betrayal by the government in Kinshasa to concerns about the security of the DRC's Tutsi minority, who have long faced waves of persecution and prejudice.
Many also suspected Rwandan meddling. M23's leaders had taken part in a string of previous Rwandan-backed insurgencies before integrating into the military in a 2009 peace deal. These suspicions were quickly superseded by "overwhelming evidence", as the United Nations (UN) collected testimonies of defected M23 members who explained how Rwanda had been assisting the group since its inception. Intercepted radio communications and the presence of Rwandan ammunition in eastern DRC further supported this account.
Despite denials from Kigali, the international reaction was swift. In July 2012, just two and a half months after the rebellion had started, the United States cancelled a small military aid package to Rwanda and exerted significant diplomatic pressure. Subsequently, the European Union and various member states (which then included the UK) announced the suspension of planned budgetary support to Rwanda, which was - and still is - highly reliant on these contributions to fund state spending.
In October 2013, Washington notched up the pressure and added Rwanda to a list of countries that support child soldiers due to the M23's alleged recruitment of young children. The designation effectively blocked them from all US military support.
Later that same month, Rwanda caved and dropped support for the M23. Within a few days the group was defeated by the combined forces of the Congolese military and a South African-led United Nations brigade. Most of the group's remaining leaders fled to Uganda (which is also alleged to have backed the rebels), and remained largely dormant for the next eight years.
Fast forward to November 2021. The M23 once again began a military assault in eastern DRC. As with the prior insurgency, the UN quickly gathered "substantial evidence" that Rwanda is backing the militia, leading to denials from Kigali and sanctions from the US. For instance, in 2023 Washington returned Rwanda to its blacklist of countries that support child soldiers, temporarily barring it from military aid.
The rest of the story, however, has changed dramatically since a decade ago. Not only have the EU and UK failed to suspend planned budgetary support to Kigali they are also signing off on new assistance packages at a seemingly unprecedented scale, from hundreds of millions of dollars in financial assistance to direct military aid. Instead of a quick defeat following unified donor pressure, the M23's rebellion has lasted over two years, and only shows signs of expanding.
Europe slams Kigali while arming it
On 1 December 2022, a week after the United Nations handed the Security Council a detailed report which found that Kigali had provided the M23 with weapons and ammunition, the European Union announced that it would be providing the Rwandan Defence Forces with 20 million Euros ($22 million). The money was for Kigali's military operations in northern Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province, where it is helping Maputo battle Islamists from the Ansar al-Sunna group.
Research suggests that Paris played a key role in pushing for the EU decision, despite publicly criticising Rwandan support for the M23 later that same December. Analysts say this is likely to protect a multi-billion dollar liquified natural gas project in northern Mozambique, where French conglomerate TotalEnergies owns a major stake.
Since then, the M23 has seized towns and villages across North Kivu, displacing over a million people, many of whom have fled to overcrowded IDP camps in the provincial capital Goma, which the militia is currently encircling. This has led to an "unprecedented humanitarian crisis" according to the International Organisation for Migration, and "created an urgent need for large-scale humanitarian aid" which is unlikely to be delivered due to the instability.
Human rights groups also charge the M23 with indiscriminate bombing, as well as extrajudicial killings and gang rape in areas that it has occupied.
In response, the EU has urged Rwanda to cease its support for the M23. And yet, its military collaboration with Kigali appears to continue unabated. On 17 March, Marc Botenga, a member of Europe's Parliament, posted a disgruntled tweet, stating that the EU was offering Rwanda's forces in Mozambique "a new tranche of €20 million".
A spokesperson for the European Union told African Arguments that they could not comment on this "as discussions at the Council are confidential". They nonetheless noted that the EU's "support to the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique" is part of an attempt to help "restore stability and security" for people in Cabo Delgado, and it comes "at the request of the Mozambican government."
Meanwhile, individual member states continue to collaborate with Rwanda on defence issues. In February, the Polish President, Andrzej Duda, visited Kigali, where he announced that Poland had signed two agreements with Rwanda on a range of issues, including cybersecurity.
President Duda later tweeted: "If Rwanda is in danger, we will also support it. That's why we talked so much today about education, including military education...". A week later, The Rwandan, an independent newspaper, reported that Kigali had acquired anti-drone systems from a Polish company as part of an undisclosed defence agreement.
EU and UK flood Kigali with new investments
The military packages are in addition to the unprecedented sums that Europe and the UK are providing to Kigali.
Since April 2022, the United Kingdom Home Office has handed the Rwandan government £240 million ($303 million) as part of the ruling Conservative Party's embattled plan to send asylum seekers to the tiny central African country. Unlike the EU, the UK has never publicly criticised Rwanda for backing the recent M23 insurgency, and remains silent on the question of whether it is even happening.
Meanwhile, on 18 December 2023, the EU announced that it would invest more than 900 million euros ($977 million) in Rwanda under the EU's Global Gateway strategy for 2021-2027. Investment areas include "health, critical raw materials, the agro-food industry, climate resilience and education".
In February 2024, the EU then signed a memorandum of understanding with Rwanda on the development of its minerals sector. One of the pillars of the agreement is to support Rwanda's "sustainable raw mineral value chains" through measures such as "strategic projects of mutual interest (i.e. joint ventures)". Such collaboration is vital according to the document because these minerals are "necessary for the green and digital transition".
This prompted outrage from Kinshasa, which accuses Rwanda of illegally benefiting from its raw materials. Many scholars agree: "Rwanda's economy is dependent on exports to [the DRC], and also on smuggling of minerals from the eastern Congo" says Professor Jason Stearns, who previously coordinated the UN group of experts on the DRC. He adds that "most gold from Rwanda that is exported was smuggled into Rwanda from the [DR] Congo".
In response to African Arguments' inquiries about the mineral deal, an EU spokesperson stated: "The partnership with Rwanda signed on 19 February 2024 has as one of its main goals to support the sustainable and responsible sourcing, production and processing of raw materials. The objective is to increase traceability and transparency and to reinforce the fight against illegal trafficking of minerals."
They also noted that similar agreements have been signed with a range of other countries, including the DRC.
Why has Europe changed its tune on Rwanda?
Daniel Levine-Spound, of the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, argues that part of the reluctance to cut Rwanda off comes from the fact that the country "has effectively marketed itself as a reliable partner for a number of international actors".
"Look at the Central African Republic for instance. In CAR Rwandan troops are deployed as part of the [UN] mission and also [as part of] a bilateral arrangement between Rwanda and CAR," he explains, "In the UN Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan, Rwanda is one of the largest troop and police-contributing countries. Rwanda has been willing to enter into negotiations with the United Kingdom [over asylum seekers], and Rwanda is willing to deploy troops in Mozambique in areas that are priorities for France".
Stearns adds that this "military diplomacy" comes at a time when Western countries such as France are trying to scale back their direct military involvement in the region and looking to back local allies instead.
"Rwanda is a key candidate," says Stearns, who explains that not only is Kigali the "largest African contributor to UN peacekeeping", but its bilateral military engagements in Africa are seen as serving as a "counterweight to the Wagner group".
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Indeed, geopolitical concerns are a vital part of the West's calculations, according to Onesphore Sematumba of the International Crisis Group (ICG). Western countries "know they are in geostrategic competition with other emerging powers in the region [like] China, Russia, Gulf countries, etcetera," he argues. "They will obviously be careful not to let Rwanda easily fall into their rivals' clutches just because of the M23 issue".
These concerns would have likely been exacerbated by a recent Rwandan government press release that states that China has provided it with attack drones.
In addition, the Congolese government's response to M23's re-emergence hasn't helped it gather international sympathy, according to Levine-Spound, who highlights Kinshasa's "open embrace of armed groups... such as the Wazalendo". This is a coalition of eastern Congolese rebels that are currently fighting the M23, often in conjunction with the DRC's military. It reportedly includes Hutu extremist militias that promote genocide ideology, and which are accused of massacring civilians.
"In open statements, you'll hear Congolese leaders [supporting] the Wazalendo - obviously that's not good for the image of the Congolese government, and I think from a human rights perspective is really concerning," says Levine-Spound, who nonetheless notes that this came in response to Rwanda's intervention, not as a valid basis for it.
Factors like this have led to complete international indifference to Rwanda's actions on Congolese territory, which Levine-Spound argues should be investigated as a potential commission of the crime of aggression. Indeed, Rwandan armed forces are no longer simply supplying armed groups but are making direct on-the-ground military incursions into eastern DRC, where they are assisting the M23 in capturing and holding territory.
Yet as the conflict has escalated, the world has largely failed to notice, with every half-hearted condemnation of Rwanda followed by a new support package.
Jesse Copelyn is a freelance journalist. He has a master's degree in violence, conflict and development from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).
