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On 10 May 2024, the Tumaini ('hope' in Swahili) Peace Initiative for South Sudan was launched in Kenya's capital Nairobi. The initiative seeks a final peace settlement by including the holdout groups that have not signed the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The launch was a high-powered event graced by six heads of state and well-attended by high-ranking officials and diplomats from across the world, witnessing the declared attempt to settle the history of armed conflicts in South Sudan once and for all. After some days of formal talks, on 16 May, the participants signed a commitment document, stating their willingness to remain engaged in the talks and to renounce violence. Whilst optimists describe the initiative as a renewed hope and find confirmation in the commitment document, others are sceptical of the initiative's ability to significantly change the landscape of localised violence in South Sudan.
The Tumaini initiative is significant in two ways. First, it may rearrange the political chessboard in South Sudan by generating international goodwill and, ideally, financial support for the forthcoming elections - planned for December 2024 - by presenting the current political leadership as peacemakers. Second, the initiative thrusts Kenya, which hosted talks between the government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) that led to the The latter comes with its fair share of transnational dynamics and implications on the regional peace and security governance in the wider Horn of Africa.
Initially, talks between the South Sudanese government, especially representatives from the ruling SPLM and the movements that did not sign the 2018 peace agreement, were held in Rome. Building on the strong role of Christian churches in peacemaking in South Sudan, t. The main organisations involved were the former SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum's Real SPLM, the former SPLA Chief of Staff Paul Malong's South Sudan United Front (SSUF), and the former SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas Cirillo's National Salvation Front (NAS). Together with smaller factions, these holdout groups formed a variety of shifting alliances such as the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) and, later, the Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Group (NSSOG).
The negotiations went through several rounds starting in January 2020 but finally stalled in 2022 without having reached a conclusive agreement. Several agreements on ceasefires and security arrangements between the government and the involved holdout groups were signed but never implemented due to a lack of commitment by the South Sudanese government and persistent splits within the umbrella organisations of the holdout groups due to their divergent and shifting political interests.
During a visit to Nairobi in February 2023, South Sudan's President Salva Kiir officially requested Kenyan President William Ruto to take over the facilitation of the Rome process. The move was surprising for many, including the Community Sant'Egidio who were not consulted prior to this decision. President Ruto accepted the request and Kenyan's diplomatic corps started to establish communication channels with the holdout groups. Ruto appointed retired General Lazarus Sumbeiywo as the lead mediator. Sumbeiywo facilitated negotiations between the SPLM and the Sudanese government leading to the CPA, which was instrumental in South Sudan's eventual independence.
The holdout groups reacted differently to the Kenyan-led initiative. Some actors, such as Malong (who resides in Nairobi) and Amum sent positive signals and have since joined the talks. Others, especially Thomas Cirillo, showed scepticism and have kept out of this round of talks so far. Given that Cirillo's NAS is, by far, the strongest in military terms of the initial parties to the Rome talks, his absence is a significant setback to the talks. On the other hand, in a surprising move, the Kenyan negotiators convinced another holdout group, Stephen Buay's South Sudan's People's Movement/Army (SSPM/A), to participate in the talks. Buay's Bul Nuer militia is militarily relevant in parts of Unity State and Warrap and, as reports indicate, has a strong contingent fighting in Sudan's war at the side of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
However, even with Buay's inclusion, the armed capacities of the involved holdout groups are confined to comparably small areas of South Sudan, which renders the idea that these talks would indeed 'end' the armed violence in the country highly unrealistic. Even the participation of a significant contingent of civil society protagonists in the talks, among them the exiled founders of the People's Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA), is unlikely to make a difference. Against this background, which is well known by all the lead protagonists, it is imperative to reappraise the interests of the main actors of these peace talks.
What's in it for Kenya?
The Tumaini Peace Initiative signals Kenya's grand (re)entry into the heart of regional mediation efforts and the politics of peace in South Sudan. The choice of Lazaro Sumbeiywo - a seasoned mediator who has been a constant figurehead in peace processes in Sudan and South Sudan for three decades - as the lead mediator signals Kenya's unyielding interest in South Sudan's affairs and affirms the keen and persistent interest of the Kenyan presidency to influence and shape processes and outcomes of South Sudan's fragile transition process. Regionally, the Tumaini Peace Initiative affords Kenya a real and timely opportunity to rival Ethiopia in Nairobi's perceived quest for regional hegemonic (re)positioning.
Under the prevailing geopolitics and changing international political order, however, it may prove more difficult for Kenya and its presidency to pursue the foregoing interests compared to the times of the CPA negotiation in the mid-2000s. President Ruto's perceivable eagerness to work with traditional Western allies will have to contend with how to simultaneously maintain good relations with the Gulf countries, China and other key actors that are now playing significant roles in South Sudan's economy, security, and politics. It will be of great interest, therefore, to observe how the Tumaini Peace Initiative unfolds, at what costs and benefits for Kenya and the region, as well as the implications for conflict dynamics and peace in South Sudan.
This process has been initiated and is led by the Kenyan president at the invitation of his South Sudanese counterpart. The two leaders and their respective interests are, therefore, most likely going to shape the process and its outcomes. This (re)affirms a regular pattern of mediation initiatives within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which are often presidency-led processes pursued through executive decision-making.
At a personal level, Ruto is likely to take advantage of this initiative to enhance his popularity both in Kenya and beyond by portraying himself as a peacemaker and a regional integrationist with a pan-African stance. This is implied in the sheer size, number, and distribution of the delegates during the launch event. It also coincides with Ruto's appointment of a special envoy to champion AU reforms. Thus, Ruto is likely to instrumentalize the South Sudan talks to pursue both his personal political interests as well as Kenya's interests (hegemonic, economic and security) in South Sudan and beyond.
Bringing peace to South Sudan?
As highlighted above, the talks are unlikely to have significant impact on violent conflicts in most parts of South Sudan. They are also not going to result in a return of refugees from neighbouring countries, especially since Thomas Cirillo, whose militia has its stronghold in the border regions with Uganda, is absent. However, the initiative is a promising offer to South Sudan's 'outcast big men'. Figures such as Pagan Amum and Paul Malong, once centrepieces of the political-military marketplace in the country, have been dwelling in its political margins since being exiled. This peace initiative carries with it a promise for these individuals to negotiate their re-entry into Juba and assume some appointive political positions.
The initiative, therefore, offers them a chance to return to South Sudan's political inner circle. Thus, it supports their individual aspirations while, at the same time, broadens the SPLM's power base, especially among the Shilluk - the constituency of Pagan Amum, who would then follow the reintegration of the influential Shilluk military figure Johnson Olonyi into the SPLM mainstream - and in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, the home turf of seasoned military leader Paul Malong.
The inclusion of Stephen Buay in the talks offers an opportunity to appease the long-standing violent turmoil among Bul Nuer clans in Mayom, Unity State, which features Kiir's security advisor Tut Kew Gatluak as Buay's main adversary. The killing of Tut's brother by then Mayom's county commissioner sparked significant controversy and a spill-over of this localised conflict to the already fragile areas of Twic in Warrap and Abyei. Furthermore, making peace with Buay would probably weaken his military support for the RSF in Sudan, which is one of South Sudan's regional interests guided by the idea of being seen as neutral in the Sudanese conflict to become a credible player in the IGAD negotiation efforts. However, soon after the end of the first round of the talks, Buay accused Tut of trying to assassinate him in Nairobi through US-sanctioned security agents and threatened to leave the talks.
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Considering all these peculiar impacts, that do not justify the considerable interest the talks are generating internationally, the initiative is benefiting President Kiir more than any other actor. This process is likely to boost the legitimacy and credibility of South Sudan's transitional government in its quest to generate interest and practical support for the planned elections. By being present in-person and taking the opportunity to engage in conversations with leaders of the holdout groups as well as controversial civil society representatives, Kiir is projecting an image of a statesperson committed to peace in his country. The audience is the international community and South Sudan's lost friends in the West, in particular. A success of the talks, which is likely for at least some of the participating groups given Malong's and Amum's appetite to settle, may result in a more sympathetic appraisal of Kiir's place and role in shaping South Sudan's tumultuous political transition.
Therefore, this round of talks might bring back a few once formidable figures to the political marketplace, even though their stars have been waning significantly in recent years. The talks may also generate momentum behind an electoral process that the SPLM leadership desperately wants in its quest to finally end the lifecycle of the transitional power-sharing government. However, a healthy portion of realism regarding these negotiations' ability to lead to a final peace settlement in order as they are highly unlikely to bring peace to South Sudan.
Dr Ibrahim Sakawa Magara is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow under the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep) based at Coventry University's Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR). Ibrahim is also an Adjunct Lecturer at St. Paul's University in Kenya. He holds a PhD in international politics from Loughborough University, in the UK. Dr Jan Pospisil is an Associate Professor (Research) at Coventry University's Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR). His work focuses on peace and transition processes and political settlements, peace mediation, competitive regionalism, resilience, and South Sudanese and Sudanese politics. Jan is a co-investigator in the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep) programme, funded by UK FCDO
