Sudan: US Calls for Ceasefire - Sudan's Peace Process At a Crossroads

Parts of Khartoum (file photo)
21 August 2024
analysis

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The recent initiative led by the United States (US), Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland to mediate a cease fire in Sudan represents a crucial effort to address the conflict that has erupted since April 2023. This initiative is vital in a context characterized by ongoing clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have led to a severe humanitarian crisis, with nearly 25 million people needing assistance and around 10 million displaced from their homes.

Historical context and current challenges

The conflict between the SAF and RSF escalated due to disagreements over the integration of forces during a political transition to a civilian-led government and subsequent elections. The deteriorating situation in April 2023 was also exacerbated by weak international positioning and the many deliberate attempts to manage Sudan's future transition to serve specific regional and international strategic interests. Additionally, the failure of the Sudanese civil political movement, its aspiration to grab power and control, and its service to regional and international agendas further contributed to the conflict. The eruption of the conflict in April 2023 not only led to massive displacement and humanitarian crises but also sparked ethnically driven violence. Previous ceasefire attempts, including those mediated in Jeddah by the US and Saudi Arabia, failed due to non-compliance and continued hostilities by both parties. The failures were also attributed to the lack of comprehensive vision and adequate preparation by the US and Saudi Arabia for the negotiations, along with insufficient preparation for follow-up, monitoring mechanisms and guarantees for implementing the agreements reached.

In addition to known challenges, new concerns impact the success of the peace talks. Most conflict parties fear that a ceasefire might lead to a political process involving civilians, which could prompt calls for accountability and bring those responsible for atrocities to justice. These concerns are heightened by the potential loss of political power and economic interests for the involved armed parties if a transition to a civilian government occurs.

One of the main challenges for the current process is the widespread popular distrust towards the UAE, perceived as a supporter of the RSF. The RSF has exacerbated ethnic conflict in Sudan by engaging in targeted killings, village destruction, sexual violence, and forced displacement against non-Arab ethnic groups. These actions have deepened ethnic divisions, caused massive displacement, and hindered peace efforts by using violence and intimidation to further their ethnic and political agendas. These sentiments are based on lived experiences by citizens and credible reports of atrocities committed by the RSF and the role of the UAE in supporting them, making the UAE's role in any peace process contentious. The talks in Switzerland are reproducing the same shortcomings of other platforms. Aimed only at reaching a ceasefire, humanitarian access, and civilian protection, without addressing the broader political transition in Sudan, which would require a wider spectrum of civilian group participation, means a stall in achieving the goals of peace.

Ethiopia has played a complex role in the Sudanese conflict, acting both as a mediator in peace talks and a stakeholder with concerns about regional stability. Ethiopia's proximity and historical ties to Sudan make it deeply invested in the conflict's outcome, especially given its interests in border security and the Nile River. The Ethiopian Prime Minister's visit to Sudan can be seen as extending an olive branch and message of reassurance to Burhan, encouraging him to participate in the talks in exchange for Ethiopia halting its open support for the RSF and the Taqadum group led by Abdalla Hamdok, widely believed to be the political power behind the RSF. At the same time, it is believed that the call between Burhan and Bin Zayed, prompted by policy change and pressure from the US, aimed to signal the possibility of the UAE ceasing its support for the RSF in exchange for accepting its participation as an observer and guarantor in the upcoming talks. This may also explain the transfer of the negotiations from Jeddah to Switzerland.

SAF preconditions and RSF compliance

Another critical factor is the stance of the SAF, which have consistently maintained that any resumption of talks with the RSF depends on the latter implementing the the preconditions agreed upon in the Jeddah talks. These preconditions include the RSF withdrawing from private and public properties they currently occupy and moving out of the areas they control to agreed locations outside the cities.

Since the Sudanese government's official rejection to join the peace process in Switzerland, internal divisions within the SAF leadership have surfaced, with some factions favouring negotiations and others staunchly opposing them. This internal discord, coupled with the SAF's dissatisfaction with the current format of the talks, casts doubt on whether the SAF will maintain its preconditions or whether the RSF will comply, adding another layer of uncertainty to the already fragile peace process started on 14 August 2024 in Switzerland, and expected to continue for 10 days.

Inclusion of marginalized groups and civil society

Another crucial factor for the success of the peace process is the inclusion of marginalized groups and civil society organizations, such as women, youth, resistance committees, neighbourhood committees, families of martyrs, and others. The failure of current political actors, armed groups, and other entities that have dominated and hijacked the political scene in Sudan to address the root causes of the conflict has undermined their legitimate claim to representing the Sudanese. The peace process must be inclusive, ensuring these groups have a voice. This inclusivity is essential for the legitimacy and sustainability of any peace agreement. This is especially crucial considering the transformation of the conflict into highly dangerous ethnic, racial, and regional axes that threaten to drag Sudan into another phase of armed conflict. Even if the upcoming talks conclude with an agreement between the warring parties, failing to involve marginalized groups and civil society organizations in a dialogue about how to address its fallouts could end up sparking conflict in the near future.

International support and accountability

Drawing from international experiences, the success of peace talks requires robust mechanisms for implementation and monitoring. This includes clear and verifiable ceasefire terms, a strong monitoring mechanism with international observers, and sustained international support. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and UN Charter provisions could provide additional safeguards. R2P emphasizes the international community's commitment to preventing mass atrocities, while some provisions of the UN Charter allow for enforcement measures, including sanctions or military intervention, to maintain or restore international peace and security. These frameworks could be pivotal in ensuring compliance with the ceasefire terms and protecting civilians.

Prospects for peace

The recent talks in Geneva, brokered by the UN, highlight the ongoing efforts to find a resolution. However, there are signs indicating the fragility of the process. The success of these talks will depend on the commitment of both the SAF and the RSF to negotiate in good faith and the ability of international mediators to address the underlying issues fuelling the conflict.

Despite the challenges, there are reasons for cautious optimism. The involvement of major international players like the US and Saudi Arabia, who have significant influence in the region, could provide the necessary diplomatic pressure to drive the parties towards a resolution. However, the complexity of the ceasefire agreement and the need for comprehensive implementation, monitoring and the inclusion of various civil forces remain substantial hurdles.

Conclusion

The peace process in Sudan stands at a critical crossroads. The success of the ceasefire talks will depend on addressing deep-seated mistrust, ensuring justice and accountability, and involving marginalized groups in the political dialogue. The international community's role in providing sustained support and enforcing compliance through frameworks like R2P and the UN Charter is crucial. As the talks progress, the world is holding its breath, hoping that this fragile ceasefire will pave the way for lasting peace, rather than another tragic chapter in Sudan's history.

Elhadi Abdalla Mohamed is a Sudanese international development professional, with over 25 years experience developing and managing humanitarian and development programmes within complex emergencies in conflict and disaster zones in East Africa, North Africa and the Middle East (MENA), Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia. As a Sudanese activist, he led the "Sudan Call Humanitarian Initiative" since the start of the conflict, advocating for humanitarian access and the protection of civilians. Elhadi is also the founder and director of the California-based Center for Global Peace and Development.

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