To some, the title of this article may suggest the Namibian state is a criminal entity.
Others would unequivocally contend that organised criminal activities have occurred involving the political elite, local businessmen and international capital.
Why be concerned about criminalisation of the state?
Criminalisation of the state transforms the triangulation of capital, the state and governance that may have led to an era where crime and law enforcement are ever more complicit.
Ultimately, crime transforms sovereignty, citizenship, class, law and the political economy.
One such choreographed act is the infamous Fishrot saga, aided and abetted by members of the highest organs of state.
Parliament enacted the Marine Resources Act (2015), which provided unfettered discretionary powers to the Minister of fisheries and marine resources to dish out fishing rights and quotas.
As the state's decisionmaking arm, Cabinet endorsed this amended legislation which culminated in the uprooting and decimation of ordinary fishermen.
They had no idea what the chief architects of this crime had in mind when the following sentence was inserted into the amendment: "The state is entitled to utilise or harvest marine resources to advance any social-economic, cultural or other governmental objectives in the public interest, through an entity or person designated by the minister, or on direction from Cabinet."
Unsurprisingly, the 'public interest' in this instance did not refer to the Namibian public, but, as it turned out, to an inner circle of state and governing party beneficiaries.
Almost without exception, as French political scientist Jean-François Bayart reminds us, the link between holding positions of power within the state apparatus and the acquisition of wealth is clearly related to the political hierarchy and networks.
But is Namibia a 'criminal state'? And do organised crimes such as Fishrot or other high level misdeeds determine state practices, or is it the state that shapes organised crime?
Bayart outlines six indicators that try to explain the criminalisation of politics and state institutions.
Central is the participation of a collective and semi-clandestine power structure in economic activities considered criminal in international law, or which are so classified by international organisations or in terms of moral codes which enjoy international currency, and the insertion of such economic activities in international crime networks.
Fishrot undoubtedly meets the above criteria as the concerted and clandestine collusion between the local elite and an international fishing corporation conspired to loot the country's resources for their own interests.
In the global realm of politics, politicians are usually perceived as morally bankrupt individuals who contest for public office to accumulate wealth.
The criminalisation of politics has its genesis in the absence of a moral compass that tends to permeate throughout the political elite.
As Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe argues in the 'Aesthetics of Vulgarity', the experience of the postcolony makes it clear illegal activities are not confined to ordinary people.
WHO ARE WE?
Fishrot is not the first, nor will it be the last act of malfeasance in Namibia; rather, it is an 'introduction' of what is yet to shock and rob the Namibian public.
With the discovery of oil and gas, should ordinary Namibians expect to benefit from the oil boom if they are currently not benefiting from diamonds, fish, gold, uranium, copper and other natural resources?
Perhaps they should be reminded that the late president Geingob unequivocally said 'the oil is not ours', echoed on more than one occasion by National Planning Commission director general Obeth Kandjoze.
Perhaps it is worth noting that former attorney general Sacky Shanghala once told the public "fishing quotas are not for everyone".
I believe the claim is true, largely for circumstantial reasons, but confess, I don't know for certain.
Considering the political season we're in, president Nangolo Mbumba and his deputy, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, seem to have rebuffed the 'oil is not ours' narrative and claim it belongs to Namibians.
Unfortunately, they did not specify to which Namibians.
The secrecy around the acquisition of exploration prospecting licences for oil and gas implies it could possibly be the same fat cats and their coterie of friends, acquaintances and mistresses at the expense of ordinary Namibians.
The looting of the SME Bank is another example of how the state was used as a vehicle for organised criminal activity.
As The Namibian has editorialised on numerous occasions, the political and economic elites in this crime have not been held accountable and have been treated with kid gloves by the responsible state institutions.
Contrary to Mbumba's recent assertion that Namibia is not for sale, it seems the country has been on auction to the highest bidder (for quite some time) as the current elite has been engaging in economic romance with global capital to rob ordinary citizens quite literally to a point of death.
To cut to the chase, a recent UN Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis shows that 1,4 million Namibians, or 48% of the population, are experiencing acute food insecurity.
More disturbingly, 800 people have died in the Omaheke region over the past two years because of hunger. What has become of our country?
Has it become a country of suffering and smiling? And how do we address Vladimir Lenin's question of 'what ought to be done?'
If not contained, criminalisation of the state culminates in law breaking and the dialects of disorder.
- - Rui Tyitende is a political scientist based in Windhoek.