Chinese engagement with Africa is on an uptick after a period of decline.
The ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing, which ended on 6 September, demonstrated both continuity and change in China's partnerships with Africa.
Less grandiose than the 2018 iteration, the summit nonetheless highlighted China's continued attraction for African leaders. 51 African heads of state were present - many more than are scheduled to speak at the UN General Assembly this month. However, the summit also revealed potential tensions between China's geopolitical ambition and the views of a diverse and rapidly changing continent.
Debt and sovereignty
The first point of contention is over debt. China stopped short of offering broad-based debt relief at FOCAC, which many African states hoped for to allay rising concerns over debt sustainability. Instead, it pledged $50.7 billion in credit lines and funding over the next three years, with an emphasis on trade and investment partnerships.
Related contentChina-Africa relationsThis is a substantial figure but far less ambitious than pre-2016 levels. China's reluctance to offer sweeping debt cancellation reflects caution shaped by domestic financial constraints and global economic uncertainty. It also signals a shift towards a more restrained and pragmatic lending policy, focused on trade relations rather than debt-driven infrastructure investments.
This may prove to be a more sustainable and mutually beneficial strategy. China is prioritizing the growth of African exports, especially in agriculture and natural resources. Such an approach aligns Africa's economic development goals with China's need for secure access to resources, particularly in areas such as energy security.
China's lending to Africa has sparked concerns about its sustainability and its impact on African sovereignty. Critics, particularly in the West, accuse Beijing of setting 'debt-traps.' A 2022 Chatham House report concluded that there are no grounds to allege that China is using debt as a mechanism to gain political control - Chinese lenders account for 12 per cent of Africa's external debt, lower than the share held by multilateral institutions or private creditors. However, infrastructure remains central to China's engagement in Africa, providing Beijing with significant strategic leverage.
The 30 new infrastructure projects announced at FOCAC across key sectors such as transportation and energy are part of the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI integrates African economies more tightly into Chinese markets and supply chains, further solidifying China's influence and long-term presence on the continent. In so far as these investments drive local economic growth, they will continue to be welcomed by Africa's leaders.
China vs the West
FOCAC also had sharper focus on competition between China and the West for influence in Africa. Beijing has significantly expanded its scholarship programmes, offering training in China on state administration and party governance for African officials.
China is positioning itself as a reliable partner for African nations seeking development without the conditions typically attached to Western aid.
This strategy serves a dual purpose: it strengthens China's relationships with African elites while promoting a single party governance model that contrasts with Western democratic ideals. By emphasizing governance, alongside its infrastructure investments, China is positioning itself as a reliable partner for African nations seeking development without the conditions typically attached to Western aid.
But China is also seeking to build alliances against a US-led West, a geostrategic priority that may cut against the grain of Beijing's seemingly open-handed offer of mutually beneficial trade and investment.
Meetings at FOCAC between President Xi and the military leaders of Mali and Sudan were contrary to African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) norms opposing the recognition of putschist leaders, and out of line with vehement anti-coup sentiment across most African states. They underscore China's willingness to prioritize alignment with countries that share its anti-Western stance, even if it means breaking with established norms in Africa.
African leaders are wary of zero-sum diplomacy. Rather than being forced to pick a side in a looming geopolitical confrontation between China and the West, they seek favourable terms for investments, aid, and trade through pragmatic relations across an increasingly multipolar global economy.
African nations can strategically engage multiple global powers to maximize their own benefits.
The number of external partners engaged in Africa has grown significantly, and FOCAC's inception 24 years ago inspired other global powers - including the EU, US, India, Turkey, Russia, and the UAE - to strengthen their ties with the continent through dedicated summits. African leaders have more options than ever, creating opportunities for triangulation - African nations can strategically engage multiple global powers to maximize their own benefits.
Collaboration not competition in Africa?
Indeed, the continent is already host to significant projects showcasing collaboration between Chinese and Western economic actors. An example is Guinea's Simandou iron ore project. Set to be the world's largest and highest-grade new iron ore mine, the project will add around 5 per cent to global seaborne supply when it comes online. Australian-British Rio Tinto owns two of the four Simandou mining blocks as part of its Simfer joint venture with China's Chalco Iron Ore Holdings (CIOH) and the government of Guinea. Rio Tinto holds a 53 per cent stake, while CIOH holds the rest.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
Similarly, the Lobito corridor, which is essential for transporting minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia to the Atlantic coast through Angola, has attracted both Chinese and Western investment. Chinese companies are set to play a major role in the corridor's development, but Western partners are also involved, offering Angola the chance to engage with multiple powers simultaneously. Despite serious geopolitical tensions and differences elsewhere in the world, there remains potential for cooperation between Western companies and Chinese ones in Africa.
Before FOCAC, Indonesia hosted its second Africa Forum in Bali. Though only three African heads of state attended, the summit happening at all demonstrates that new players from all over the world are coming to Africa.
African states will continue diversifying their international relationships, seeking broader economic and security partnerships. Ground-up collaboration between Western and Chinese actors will continue and deepen. For policymakers in Beijing - and in Washington - the challenge will be to balance sharp-edged bilateral geopolitical competition with the flexibility and respect necessary to navigate the complexities of a rising Africa.
