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The Rapid Support Force (RSF) militia's greatest challenge in Sudan is not military but political. Since the war erupted on April 15, 2023, the RSF has made significant territorial gains, covering an area roughly equivalent to France and Germany combined. Despite this, its military successes have not translated into political gains. Rather, they come with escalating political costs. Hemedti's quest for power necessitates building a political constituency and legitimacy both domestically and internationally, a goal he has thus far failed to achieve.
The RSF's political challenge lies in its ability to achieve a critical transformation, which requires a shift in its political approach. It faces a dual pressure: on the one hand, it seeks to cultivate local political support to gain legitimacy within Sudan, while on the other, it seeks international recognition. This necessitates evolving from a militia rooted in violence and coercion to an entity capable of engaging in political processes and governance. The RSF's strategy can no longer rely solely on military dominance; it is required to adapt to broader political norms and meet global expectations. Failing to make this transition means its quest for power will remain unsustainable. This is why the RSF's political defeat is ultimately more crucial for a peaceful Sudan than a military one.
The RSF has long operated in the shadow of the Sudanese state, benefiting from state sponsorship even well before receiving formal legislative recognition under Bashir. Bashir's regime provided the RSF with a political sanctuary, silencing and arresting critics of its leadership, and providing political patronage for its military and financial expansion. After Bashir's fall, the RSF no longer enjoys the political sponsorship of the state that is solid enough to advance its military and financial ambitions, while avoiding the responsibilities of governance, service provision, and constituency-building essential to statecraft. The RSF faced the challenge of repositioning itself within the evolving political landscape during and after the 2019-21 transitional period.
During the transitional period, the RSF attempted to fill its political patronage gap through local donations and aid. However, these efforts revealed its leadership's limited grasp of Sudan's political complexities. The 2021 coup was the RSF's first failed attempt to recreate a political environment that allowed it to operate without bearing governance responsibility, and most importantly without criminal accountability. Similarly, the Framework Agreement represented another bid to secure a Bashir-like arrangement - where the RSF could expand its military and financial empire while leaving governance and political stewardship to others, and of course, ensuring criminal impunity. When the Framework Agreement talks collapsed, the RSF lost its political foothold, driving it toward a new strategy that culminated in the events of April 15, 2023.
Afterwards, the RSF initially sought to consolidate its control by appointing military leaders to oversee captured SAF bases. However, nearly a year of failed mediation efforts and growing political opposition within Sudan, even from groups like the civilian coalition Taqqadum (which is widely seen as aligned with the RSF's narrative), forced the RSF leadership to recognize that there are no shortcuts to building the political constituency necessary for its political survival. As a result, the RSF aimed to establish a political base. It began forming "Civil Administrations" in Al-Gezira, followed by South, East, and Central Darfur. According to RSF statements, these administrations comprise local committees primarily from tribal and civil society backgrounds, tasked with overseeing service delivery and security in RSF-controlled areas. In Al-Gezira, for example, the 31-member Civil Administration Council sought local negotiations to gain support, while in South Darfur, appointed locality heads are required to form three-member councils in consultation with tribal and community leaders. Despite the absence of meaningful improvements in daily life within RSF-controlled areas, the formation of civil administrations highlights the RSF's ambitions and struggles in building a political constituency.
The RSF's efforts to form these structures have led some to view it as an attempt to create a parallel government, similar to the dual authority seen in Libya. However, instead of directly taking over local governance, the RSF is more focused on creating a local political presence that allows it to legitimize its control. The RSF understands the importance of establishing a political base not only to secure its control during the war but also to position itself in any post-conflict arrangement.
Some argue that the RSF already has a political constituency, rooted in its recruitment of fighters from tribes in Darfur and Kordofan. These are often referred to as its "community base" or "community incubator". However, this perspective is flawed for two reasons. First, the RSF strategically avoids using its recruitment hubs as a political base. Relying on these regions for political support could lead to internal dissent and dissatisfaction if the RSF fails to provide tangible benefits. Darfur and Kordofan, despite the long history of peace deals between different parties, have intentionally been kept politically represented by armed actors. Building any form of a civilian political base in Darfur is avoided by all armed actors, particularly the RSF. A politicized civilian base in recruiting hubs for armed groups directly challenges their political narrative, demands greater accountability and representation, and disrupts their efforts to consolidate power. Second, securing national and international legitimacy requires the RSF to build alliances beyond Darfur and Kordofan.
The RSF is battling to build a political constituency while maintaining the internal power dynamics centred around Hemedti's family. This balancing act is precarious, as internal tensions are already surfacing within the militia. The documented conflict over leadership succession within the RSF has led to internal confrontations in Khartoum, Sennar, and North Kordofan. The ongoing war has emboldened newly recruited militia leaders and mercenaries, whose growing political ambitions threaten the Hemedti family's dominance. These rising figures pose a direct challenge to the RSF's internal cohesion, risking a fracture that could destabilize its leadership. This tension between expanding political influence and preserving internal hierarchy highlights the RSF's vulnerability, where even small missteps could unravel its fragile command structure.
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Building a political base remains a formidable task for the RSF, as it faces waning control over its forces, growing international scrutiny for its crimes, and slow-moving negotiations. Yet, as the conflict persists, political polarization - fuelled by racist rhetoric exchanged in Sudanese social media - could bolster the RSF's position. Meanwhile, the SAF (or the Sovereignty Council, as they prefer to be called) offers no meaningful political vision for the country - as expected. Their repression of the remaining civic space stifles the emergence of a political discourse capable of challenging the RSF's agenda, leaving a vacuum that the RSF seeks to exploit.
Defeating the RSF's political vision is not merely about overcoming a military force but dismantling a vision that thrives on division, marginalization, and the erosion of Sudan's civic life. The real challenge lies in articulating a cohesive, inclusive political alternative that addresses the deep-rooted grievances the RSF exploits. This demands urgent, collective, and wise reflection from all sectors of Sudanese society on what a post-conflict future should look like - one that restores dignity, ensures justice, and builds a sustainable political system free from the cycles of violence and coercion. Only through such a shared vision can Sudan move beyond the grip of militias and their sponsors.
Tahany Maalla is a policy and governance specialist with expertise in political analysis, public sector reform, and digital government. She focuses on Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Tahany holds a Master's degree in Public Policy from the University of Nottingham and a Master's in Public Administration from Harvard Kennedy School.
