The Last Word — In a sting operation, Uganda's Chieftaincy of Defense Intelligence and Security (CDIS), formerly the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), kidnapped Dr. Kiiza Besigye from Nairobi. Besigye is a leading figure in opposition politics, the longest serving and bitterest opponent of President Yoweri Museveni. CDIS accuses him of treason and have audio and video recordings of Besigye negotiating with arms dealers for weapons to use in a violent overthrow of the government. In one of recordings, he is asking for a weapon to shoot down a helicopter. Was this a plan to assassinate Museveni? I have sufficient evidence to convince me that the recordings are not generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI).
How did Besigye come to this tragic position? It is exactly 25 years since he launched his open challenge to Museveni's presidency. Since then, he has been the most consistent critic to the president. In his struggle to liberate Uganda from what he sees as Museveni's misrule, Besigye adopted a position of "no retreat, no surrender." While such consistent, principled and tenacious resolve is admirable, it also comes with its own pathology: obsession with victory in one's aims can lead to reckless behavior.
In many ways, therefore, Besigye is very much like Museveni. They are both fanatically devoted to their aims: Museveni to cling to power by all means at all costs and Besigye to grab it from him by all means at all costs. The mistake Besigye makes in this struggle it to take the war from the terrain where Museveni is most vulnerable (electoral competition) to one where the president is most comfortable and has overwhelming advantage - violent conflict. Museveni is a specialist in violence, and he is most calm and effective when facing military opponents. In fact, each time Museveni feels threatened my electoral competition, he retreats to violence because it is the weapon he best understands.
Two months ago, I visited Besigye at his home in Nansana. We spent an entire morning and part of the afternoon together. We discussed the deteriorating governance situation in Uganda. During this discussion, he impressed me with his deep concern for the future of Uganda. Yet I did not get the impression that he thinks the solution to this governance quagmire is violent conflict. A few days later, while having lunch with the Chief of Defense Intelligence, Maj. Gen. James Birungi, he warned me that Besigye was up to some plot for violent conflict. I dismissed it out of hand arguing that although Besigye does not believe in elections as a vehicle for political change, he doesn't believe in armed conflict anymore. Instead, I argued, Besigye believes in using popular insurrection to topple the government along the lines of the Arab Spring.
It was, therefore, most surprising to me when security sent me the recordings of his arms negotiations a day after he had been kidnapped and before he appeared in Uganda. I sent them to friends for investigation if they are AI generated. The answer was returned to me in four hours - they are genuine. I have therefore been wondering what led Besigye to this tragic path. Yet looking back, Besigye's dancing with violent conflict should not surprise us. It seems to me that like Museveni, Besigye believes in violence as an instrument of change and democratisation. How?
When he first escaped from Uganda in 2001, Besigye planned armed resistance. I got a lot of intelligence reports of his activities. I felt this approach was bad for his supporters specifically and for the future of democracy in Uganda generally. It meant that his supporters involved in the civic struggle for democracy inside Uganda would easily be targeted and arrested on allegations of colluding with him. This would undermine the general civic struggle for democratisation as opposition to the government could easily be linked to him. It was also bad for us in the press. I used to host a daily radio talk show. Government banned Besigye from appearing on radio talk shows saying he was promoting armed rebellion.
Unlike many naïve idealists in Uganda's intellectual circles who lack historical context, I am aware that democracy can be promoted, and the boundaries of free expression expanded, in both contest against, and collaboration with the state. I learn this lesson from Martin Luther King Jr, Nelson Mandela and Kwame Nkrumah. So, I went to Museveni and asked him to allow me to host Besigye. I also asked him to allow chiefs of intelligence to appear on my show with Besigye to challenge him. I once hosted Besigye with then CMI chief, Brig. Nobel Mayombo and another time with the coordinator of security services, Gen. David Tinyefuza. In both cases, the two had turned me down. And in both cases, I personally went to Museveni and appealed to him for help. He instructed Mayombo and later Tinyefuza to appear on the show. The debates were lively and marked the high point of democratic expression in Uganda.
I spent hours and hours on phone with Besigye, then in exile in South Africa, arguing with him about both the futility of armed rebellion in Museveni's Uganda. I also tried to show him that even if it succeeded, it could only replace one authoritarian system with another. This is because once someone captures power by force of arms, they will always retreat to the same instruments to hold and retain that power. At one time I thought I had convinced Besigye because when he returned to Uganda in 2005, he stopped calling for armed rebellion. Instead, after the Arab Spring in 2011, he seemed to have become a convert of popular insurrection.
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Yet again, Besigye's approach to popular insurrection lacked strategic sense. He seemed to embrace protest as an end in itself instead of being a means to an end - the end being political negotiations leading to a settlement. I felt he was protesting for the right to protest. He also developed disdain for elections and convinced himself and his followers that elections are meaningless.
This tended to dampen voter turnout. Yet all evidence shows that elections present a severe threat to Museveni's hold on power. The higher the voter turnout, the higher was always Besigye's share of votes.
Yet Besigye convinced himself that he has won all previous elections and Museveni cheated him. With an obsessive desire to remove Museveni from power at all costs and by all means, I am therefore not surprised that Besigye has again retreated to violent conflict, including planned assassinations, to achieve his political aims.
