Africa: Ethiopia and Somalia - Back to Square One

29 January 2025
analysis

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A year after intense diplomatic frictions, Ethiopia and Somalia appear to have found room to manoeuvre and address their differences. The Ankara Declaration of 11 December amounts to the return to normalcy in their bilateral engagement, more so in light of the pressing security challenges facing Somalia and the immediate region. Two takeaways stand out as major pillars of the agreement: recognition of Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and admission of Ethiopia's unparalleled importance to the peace and security of Somalia. Ethiopia's quest for sovereign access to the sea via Somaliland now appears to have been put on hold, while ascertaining the continued presence of the Ethiopian troops/peace keepers on the ground in Somalia and the potential inclusion of Ethiopia in the Africa Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) troop contributing countries.

At the outset, the whole deal signifies the growing weight of Turkey in the affairs of the Horn of Africa. Turkey succeeded where others more close to the affair including immediate neighbours, IGAD, and the AU have failed to seek a solution to the problem. Recent maritime and defence agreement (of February 2024) and the oil and gas cooperation deal (March 2024) have heightened Ankara's influence over Mogadishu, making it a sizeable actor in the security and economic sectors of Somalia. Though not as strong as the immediate pre-2018 times in Ethiopia, Turkey equally enjoys strong ties with the government of Abiy Ahmed. Altogether, the dynamics might offset, at a major scale, adjacent powers operating in Somalia, particularly Egypt. In this regard, the government of President Hassan sheikh Mohammed has to carefully navigate the presence of competing security interests in Somalia.

Ethiopia's MoU with Somaliland has set the ground for tense diplomatic frictions of regional magnitude. It inadvertently provided a windfall to the government in Mogadishu, which invoked the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in projecting the cause of Somalia among potential allies. Somaliland's three decades de facto independent existence, coupled with exemplary democratic credentials, would not dissuade Mogadishu from successfully invoking the principles and rallying international support to its cause. This occurred amidst the volatile peace and security realities in the Republic, and the growing fragmentation between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. Ethiopia's move lent a lifeline to a rather cornered political establishment in Mogadishu. Efforts by Somalia leaders to blemish and dismiss the contributions of Ethiopian troop and peace keepers in combating terrorist and extremist groups operating in Somalia has unnerved sensibilities across the board. But there was recognition across the board, by regional, continental and global bodies, that Ethiopia remains vital to the peace and security architecture of Somalia, either unilaterally or within broader frameworks. Nonetheless, the government of Hassan Sheikh made the bilateral affairs with Ethiopia and the involvement of Ethiopian troops in peace keeping operations in Somalia conditional on the former abandoning its quest for sovereign access to the sea via Somaliland.

Ethiopia's MoU with Somaliland (January 2024), on the other hand, appears premature, for the objective realities on the ground were not conducive for such a move to materialize. In the absence of strategic endorsement and potential leverage by a given regional or global power, it was clear from the onset that the gamble would backfire on Ethiopia. UAE, though apparently in favour of the move, has refrained from openly supporting the deal. Ethiopia's week internal and diplomatic posture made it difficult to initiate such a grand project of greater consequences to the wider region. Desperation apparently led Addis Ababa into the hands of a lesser player, i.e. Somaliland, who successfully brandished the allure of access to the sea in exchange for illusive recognition. The government of Abiy Ahmed jumped the gun and committed a serious diplomatic blunder entering into an ineffectual deal with a breakaway state desperately seeking international recognition. Ethiopia's miscalculations stem primarily from ignoring the geopolitical ramifications of such a bold move. The country soon found itself hard pressed between regional and global backlashes of immense proportions, and was seeking a way out of the potential quagmire.

The Ankara Declaration bears meaning within these contexts. Short of providing the much-desired respite for both parties, however, it equally unnerves others involved in the equation. Ethiopia has to convince the new government of President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) on the current standing of the January 2024 MoU, and the meaning and tenet of holding 'technical talks' with Mogadishu over the issue of Ethiopia's access to the sea. The fact that the Ankara Declaration didn't mention Somaliland or the 2024 MoU, leaves room for anticipation. If the adherence to the principles of Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity were suggested specifically in reference to the outstanding deal with Somaliland, then Ethiopia stands out to be a loser in the overall equation. In the context of the 2018 agreement with Hargessia and the DP World, for Ethiopia to acquire 19% stakes on the port of Berbera, scaling down the prospect to mere utilization of available infrastructures might not assure Somaliland leaders of Ethiopia's commitment to the 'recognition' clause.

Somalia has to choose between Turkey and Egypt as a primary defence and maritime security partner. Given the volatile relationship between Cairo and Ankara, and the tense rapport between Turkey and the UAE and other Arab League powers, Somalia could face additional challenges. Mogadishu's ongoing tensions with Jubaland, Puntland and Somaliland stand the risk of exacerbation, for stakeholders from the immediate region and the Gulf would intervene in the affairs of the country to advance immediate strategic interests. Recent altercations in Jubaland lend ample credence to the above observation. Regional state leaders, the likes of Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe), and Saeed Abdullahi Deni, of Jubaland and Puntland, respectively, might acquire political lifelines in their bids to rally respective supporters compared to the possible backlashes awaiting President Hassan Sheikh in the aftermath of Ankara Declaration.

On a positive note, Ethiopia's foreign policy posture was forced back to the time tested method of principled and institutional approach in handling its international engagements. Statement by the Prime Minister, scripted and formal, signify a major departure from previous pronouncements. Coexistence, cooperation and region-wide development were amplified. Ethiopia's quest for access to the sea, through Somalia (including Somaliland), or another country, now has to be sought after careful consideration of all factors. Long existing proposals to utilize Somalia's expansive shorelines as alternative routes to the sea can be a point of discussion in forthcoming negotiations. Nonetheless, their realization remains pending upon the peace and security realities of Somalia. Given prevailing uncertainties, such a venture would be unattainable in the near future.

A more significant outcome of the Ankara talks is likely assurance on Ethiopia's continued presence on the ground in Somalia. Diplomatic ties could be re-established soon, and Somalia might allow Ethiopia to be part of the forthcoming AUSSOM peace keeping operations. President Hassan Sheikh's public pronouncement on Ethiopia's sacrifices in the struggle against terrorism and the peace and security of the republic speaks volumes. But this has to be equated against the complications of the last couple of months, and especially in connection with the Al Shabaab resurgence, the standoffs in Puntland and Jubaland regional states, and the imagined and actual places of regional actors like Kenya and Egypt in the dynamics.

To conclude, irrespective of the conflagrations of the recent past, Ethiopia and Somalia have put their bilateral relations back to square one. It takes grounded and sober leadership to build up on future trajectories. Ankara specifically signifies the future over past imperfections. Of course, this remains more of a wish given an array of complex factors militating against its realization. Let the recent fiasco be a lesson on how to carefully navigate the difficult terrain the Horn always represents for Ethiopia and others in the vicinity.

Belete Belachew Yihun is a foreign policy and international relations analyst specializing on the Horn of Africa and Middle East/Gulf. He currently resides in the USA.

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