Ethiopia: Human Rights Under Siege: How Security Forces in Oromia Fuel Terror, Fear to Control Residents Through Lawlessness

opinion

Addis Abeba — In mid-January 2025, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published its overview of the human rights situation in Ethiopia for 2024. The report stated that human rights continue to be violated, pointing to extrajudicial killings, unlawful imprisonments, arbitrary arrests, attacks on civilians, and restrictions on freedoms of expression. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) moreover reported that Ethiopia is among the worst jailers of journalists in Africa. The Freedom House ranked Ethiopia as "not free" in 2023, and the World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index for 2024 ranked Ethiopia at 134th place (of 142 countries).

These reports are, unfortunately, similar to those issued over the last years and read like "business as usual" in Ethiopia. This is, I argue, not the case. I believe that the human rights situation is not only significantly worse, but also that the reasons, motivations, and nature of human rights violations are new and quite unprecedented. Yet again, the international community ignores what is going on and is without much hesitation supporting the sitting Abiy Ahmed government and its copious projects on urban beautification.

On 14 January, Jawar Mohammed asked his Facebook followers to send stories and pictures of murders committed by militia members. In response, numerous stories were posted, not only accounting for killings but also on how the militia and local administrators were harassing, extorting money, and arresting people on a daily basis. A few days later, a video showing a young boy being executed point-blank by uniformed men was shared on social media. Since then, additional videos of a young boy being executed have appeared on social media.

Claims shared on social media should always be treated carefully, but in this case the posts speak to a pattern and, moreover, confirm findings from my own recent research on human rights violations in Oromia. What has emerged is a situation without law and order where government agencies at the grassroots level are acting with little or no accountability and culpability in harassing people. Rampant corruption and impunity are key drivers here, and the region's insecurity has made labeling people as supporters of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) a rewarding means to extract money. The central government's demands for increased revenues have exacerbated the situation as tax collection has become similar to criminal extortion schemes. Control is, in other words, maintained through lawlessness, and security is preserved through insecurity.

Harassment, Violence Grip Oromia

The main institution responsible for coordinating security in Oromia at the regional level is the Biiroo Bulchiinsaafi Nageenyaa (Office of Administration and Security) and the Bulchiinsaa Nageenyaa (Peace and Security Office) at the zonal and district level. There is also an office called Mana Marii Nageenyaa (Security Council) that exists at regional, zonal, and district levels. These different institutions are tasked with maintaining security and investigating so-called "anti-peace elements."

There is, however, a parallel, and informal, structure that is rather unknown, yet which seems to play a particularly important role, namely the Koree Nageenyaa (the Security Committee). The Koree Nageenyaa became known through a Reuters report in February 2024, which documented the existence of a secret committee at the regional level responsible for the numerous extrajudicial killings taking place in Oromia. Said to have been established in 2019, Reuters reported that the committee was led by Shimeles Abdisa, the president of Oromia, and that it included the head of the Prosperity Party (PP) in Oromia and the head of security for Oromia.

While the Reuters report was detailed and revealing, it failed to understand that the Koree Nageenyaa is not only one committee at the regional level but something replicated at zonal and district levels throughout Oromia, working in parallel to institutions like the Bulchiinsaa Nageenyaa. It usually has five members, and at the district level, it consists of the district head, the head of the district security office, the police chief, and others. The Koree Nageenyaa operates as a rather informal institution, coming together on an ad hoc basis at the different levels. While its jurisdiction is unclear, what is apparent is that the very structure of the Koree Nageenyaa has enabled the government to enact security measures far removed from the public eye.

The government uses a variety of institutions and mechanisms to ensure control. One is the well-rehearsed networks of informants. While the EPRDF's and le'amist (Amharic; one to five)--groups of five with one leader operating in neighborhoods, universities, and workplaces--was discontinued when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power, the widespread use of informants at the grassroots level has continued--and increased.

The current government's mechanisms for control are far cruder and blunter compared with the era of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Particularly important and directly affecting people's lives at the grassroots level are the local militias and the so-called Gaachana Sirnaa. The militia has its root in the abiot tebeqa (Amharic; the protectors of the Revolution) created during the Derg period. What is new is the establishment of a separate Office of the Militia in Oromia in 2021, the subsequent growth in the number of militias, and the extended authority they are given. Members of the militia are given uniforms--for which the local people are forced to pay--and are sometimes armed.

Gaachana Sirnaa can best be translated as the "protector of the system" or "protector of the regime" and was established by proclamation in 2022. While presented as a voluntary grassroots initiative, people are forced to attend training for both the Gaachana Sirnaa and the militia. The Gaachana Sirnaa is separate from the militia and has, according to the proclamation, the right to bear arms, which implementation seems to vary across the region. People joining Gaachana Sirnaa are often given little training and lack the discipline common for other law enforcement agencies.

Both the militias' and the Gaachana Sirnaa's main task is to keep law and order in their respective localities. The Gaachana Sirnaa is in addition charged with monitoring individuals in different localities by verifying "the identity of persons that are not residents of the Kebele or neighbor." Both agencies are formally under the local administration, but it seems that they are in reality accountable to the Koree Nageenya.

A System Built on Extortion, Corruption

Patrolling their neighborhood, managing checkpoints, and constantly asking people for their ID cards, the members of the militia and the Gaachana Sirnaa are widely reported to be incessantly harassing people. Interlocutors narrated being stopped and questioned by the militia on a daily basis and for no reason: "These people lack training, they are brutal, and they are demanding money from you."

Important here is how the OLA insurgency has produced opportunities for local militias to abuse their authority, and one source said that "the security situation has created a huge market for the security agencies." The local militia can label anyone for being an OLA supporter and collect money. The common phrase is that "someone comes to you and says that we have credible information that you have links to this and that organization." No further evidence is needed, and everybody knows it is about money. Refusal to pay easily leads to arrests, and the collaboration between local law enforcement agencies and government offices ensures the person remains in jail. Once there, "you don't get out unless you pay." One source told the story about a relative who was detained, accused of having links to OLA, but "the real reason was that they needed money from him... I had to pay 45,000 birr to have him released."

Moreover, in eastern parts of Oromia, in areas with a cash economy based on khat trade, local militias harass people by going around to people's houses at night demanding money. Accordingly, "They go to one house one night, to another house the next, and after a while they start again with the first one. If you refuse to give, they will beat you." If someone goes to the market and sells khat, the militia will come and visit him at night, asking for a share of his profit.

Militias, other law enforcement agencies, and local administrators are also actively involved in enforced conscriptions to the military. Such conscriptions have increased significantly since the middle of 2024 and have also become an important means of extracting money from the people.

Reports detailed how underage boys were being held at detention centers and that parents were approached by officials who offered the release of their sons in return for ransom--ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 birr.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) also documented how boys as young as 11 years old across Oromia had been subject to enforced conscription. As different zones and districts had been given quotas of boys to be recruited, local officials had to resort to forced conscription in order to meet the target. The military does not normally accept enforced conscripts, but those rounded up are often reluctant to report their cases, being afraid of reactions from local officials when they are sent back to their home areas.

The increase and the ever-present militia and Gaachana Sirnaa at the grassroots level have proven to be pivotal in tightening the government's control of the people in Oromia. These agencies are, at the same time, given relatively free rein and can operate without much scrutiny. The result is a situation where harassment in the guise of control has taken on a life of its own, producing a situation of unpredictability, terror, and fear.

The questions that then emerge are whether this is part of the government's policy, is it something it has allowed to develop, or has it lost control over its own institutions? The answer to these questions is not straightforward. While the militia and other agencies were put in place to maintain control, the current government lacks the necessary institutional "muscles" to keep them in line. This is in clear contrast to the EPRDF, which kept tight control over the state institutions meant to maintain security. The result is a situation where these grassroots agencies have carved out quite a degree of autonomy and where they both are executing the government's policies and utilizing them for their own benefits.

Rampant corruption is a key reason for the current situation. While both the Derg and the EPRDF governments invested much in combating corruption, mechanisms put in place to curtail this loosened after 2018, and recent studies show that corruption has become a major problem in Ethiopia. Transparency International ranked Ethiopia 98th (of 180) on its corruption index in 2023, and increased public corruption is said to have "strongly affected socioeconomic development and governance." Interlocutors across Oromia all testified to corruption being present at all levels, becoming "part of the official system," and something "out of control." As a result, it has become nearly impossible to get any public services without paying bribes.

What has exacerbated the situation is the government's need for cash. The new Corridor Development Project and other similar "vanity" investments cost money, and while they partly are paid for with foreign aid, a significant portion has to come from domestic revenues. The current national budget, which initially was increased with 21% from the previous year, swelled with an additional 56% in November 2024. About 282 billion birr was to be covered by domestic taxes, which seems to come in addition to the pre-November goal of increasing revenue collection from 613 billion birr to 1.5 trillion birr.

In Oromia, a new tax proclamation has allegedly increased taxes between 300 and 1,000%. The proclamation also detailed different types of mandatory fees and "volunteer contributions" for rural residents, which included payment for militias, contributions to road construction, feeding of students, and national defense.

It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of these tax increases, which come at a time when a worsening economic situation had already severely affected people's livelihoods. Inflation has remained high and salaries stagnant, and while inflation has eased some over the last year, it has contributed to a poverty rate of ca. 69%, and estimations said that inflation would drive an additional 10 million people into poverty during 2024.

While this alone has created a nearly unbearable situation for ordinary people, the current situation with lack of law and order and rampant corruption has significantly exacerbated the conditions. The new tax regime has created opportunities for local authorities to overcharge the people at will. This is particularly true in the rural areas, and one source described the conditions as: "There is no law at all; it's anarchy... anybody can ask for anything."

It is important to note that for the militia and local administrators, extortion is not about amassing wealth but about surviving. Increased cost of living and stagnant wages are affecting everyone, and people are doing what they can to get by. Militia members are paid little or no salary, and one source said that militia members explained that collecting money was the way they could "feed their families." What this also reveals is how Ethiopia's social fabric is being impacted, as expressed by another source: "Fathers will steal from the children and brothers from their brothers and neighbors from their neighbors... corruption is what is creating this; everyone is struggling to survive."

The situation of keeping control through lawlessness has proven very effective, something made evident during the above-mentioned Corridor Development project. Despite tens of thousands of houses and businesses being destroyed, with, as noted, short notice and often without compensation, hardly any protests have been voiced. Those who expressed opposition were immediately imprisoned. One source explained the situation as follows: "Everyone knows what may be next: jail and torture, and that is why everyone is quiet." This new situation has not only led to an increase of human rights violations, but they have created a situation of unpredictability and randomness. While people with certain profiles previously would be considered at risk, this is not the case anymore. Anyone can be targeted. The current situation of lawlessness is moreover untenable, and the critical question is where people's breaking point is. AS

Terje Østebø is a professor at the Center for African Studies and the Department of Religion, University of Florida. His research interests are Islam in Ethiopia, contemporary Islam and Islamic reform in the Horn of Africa, Oromo politics, and ethnicity in the Horn. He is the author of Islam, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Bale Insurgency, 1963-1970 (Cambridge 2020); Localising Salafism: Religious Change among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia (Brill 2012). He has published in journals like the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Journal of Modern African Studies, Religion, and Journal of Islamic Studies.

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