Sudan: Bolstering Efforts to End Sudan's Civil War

Sudan's war is causing untold misery and threatening to spill over into the neighbourhood. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2025, Crisis Group explores how the EU and its member states can assist urgently needed efforts at mediation and relief.

Sudan's ruinous civil war rages on with no end in sight. The conflict that began in April 2023 is causing untold human misery, with tens of thousands killed and millions uprooted from their homes. Famine was declared in North Darfur in August 2024, and the UN has warned that the hunger crisis could be one of the worst in modern history. Sudan is increasingly divided into zones of control, with one of the main belligerents, the Sudanese army, holding the north and most parts of the east, while the other, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), dominate the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan. The capital, Khartoum, remains a war zone, mostly under the RSF's sway, though the army is regaining ground. Despite a resurgence for the army, which took back Wad Medani, capital of the Gezira state and an agricultural and trading hub, in early January, and much of greater Khartoum late in the month, neither side appears able to achieve victory. That means the war could drag on even longer, destabilising neighbouring countries and exacting an ever greater toll on the Sudanese people. Outside powers, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the RSF's chief backer, and Egypt, which supports the army, are fuelling the hostilities.

Diplomatic efforts to end the war have not been equal to the moment. Attempts to foster talks between the two warring parties have mostly stumbled just past the starting line. A crucial problem has been the failure of external players to push their allies toward serious negotiations. Western powers, including the U.S., have sought to organise new talks, but with little success. The latest actor to take up the mediation mantle, Türkiye, will need help to make progress where others have faltered.

To bolster negotiations and help avert further humanitarian catastrophe, the EU and its member states should:

  • Support mediators, including those with the Ankara-led initiative, working to halt the fighting. Make full use of European ties with the Gulf states and Egypt (which have strengthened over the past year) to nudge the belligerents to the table;
  • Form a contact group of EU foreign ministers to coordinate member state diplomacy and highlight the need for Europe to be more engaged in efforts to resolve the conflict;
  • Maintain or increase humanitarian spending on Sudan, and in affected regions of Chad, including by pushing member states to honour commitments made at the April 2024 Paris conference; and work with all influential outside parties to press for greater humanitarian access;
  • Support existing efforts, including those by the African Union (AU), to encourage dialogue among Sudan's political and civil society groups about a stable post-war future, including a substantial role for civilians.

Women wait to collect food at a location set up by a local humanitarian organisation for people displaced by the war in Sudan, in Meroe in the country's Northern State, on January 9, 2025. AFP

An Intractable Conflict

The war that has now consumed much of the country began in Khartoum. In 2019, after the military ousted former President Omar al-Bashir on the back of months of popular protests, the leaders of the army and RSF - Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti", respectively - moved swiftly to fill the void at the apex of the Sudanese state. They each took top positions on the Sovereign Council, an eleven-member military-civilian body that assumed the head of state role during the post-Bashir transition. As chair and vice chair, Burhan and Hemedti wielded the real power, with a transitional civilian government led by technocratic Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok tasked with running the country. In October 2021, they banded together to carry out a coup removing that government.

Burhan and Hemedti's subsequent cohabitation lasted little more than a year. By early 2023, relations between the two had deteriorated, leading to a tense standoff that escalated into armed conflict that April. At first, fighting was mostly confined to Khartoum and its surroundings, allowing for hopes that it could conclude swiftly. Saudi Arabia, alongside the U.S., attempted to broker a ceasefire that May, leading to the Jeddah Declaration, an agreement that sought to protect non-combatants and civilian infrastructure. The accord also required the sides to allow unrestricted humanitarian access. The belligerents soon violated it, however, and talks broke down. The conflict then spread into Darfur, with the RSF and affiliated Arab militias taking control of El Geneina, capital of West Darfur, in June. Rights groups recorded the killing of thousands of Masalit, a non-Arab ethnic group, by the RSF. By December, the RSF had taken control of all five states in Darfur. There have been reports of widespread sexual violence, mostly targeting women and girls, in Darfur and other parts of the country where combat has been at its most intense.

A second round of Jeddah talks fared little better than the first, with the two sides blaming each other when they failed. In January 2024, the intelligence services of Egypt and the UAE convened a face-to-face meeting in Manama, Bahrain. These back-channel negotiations brought together Abdelrahim Dagalo, Hemedti's deputy (and brother), and Shams al-Din Kabbashi, Burhan's deputy. They, too, fizzled out when news of the meeting leaked and Burhan recalled Kabbashi. A second round of Jeddah talks fared little better than the first, with the two sides blaming each other when they failed. In January 2024, the intelligence services of Egypt and the UAE convened a face-to-face meeting in Manama, Bahrain. These back-channel negotiations brought together Abdelrahim Dagalo, Hemedti's deputy (and brother), and Shams al-Din Kabbashi, Burhan's deputy. They, too, fizzled out when news of the meeting leaked and Burhan recalled Kabbashi.

The outgoing Biden administration imposed sanctions on the leaders of the RSF and the Sudanese army ... for the sometimes criminal conduct of their forces.

In early 2024, the U.S. decided to involve itself more deeply in resolving the conflict, appointing a special envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello. The U.S. first sought to hold a new round of talks in Jeddah, including the UAE and Egypt. When these did not happen, they marshalled another new initiative in Geneva, co-hosted by Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, with Egypt and the UAE attending as observers. Once again, the effort was unsuccessful in bringing the belligerents together for talks. In January 2025, the outgoing Biden administration imposed sanctions on the leaders of the RSF and the Sudanese army - Hemedti and Burhan, respectively - deeming them responsible for the sometimes criminal conduct of their forces during the conflict.

Meanwhile, after a pause of more than two months during the rainy season, the army in September 2024 launched offensives to retake parts of Khartoum and Bahri, the capital's sprawling northern suburb. The assaults were partly successful, but the gains were small, and most of the city remains in the RSF's hands. The army made more headway in Sennar, a state in eastern Sudan. It retook the Jebel Moya area, a key transport hub, before seizing Sinjah, the state capital. The RSF withdrew from Sennar, redeploying its forces into neighbouring White Nile state, which borders South Sudan. In early January 2025, the momentum shifted in the army's favour again when it retook Wad Medani, which the RSF had captured in a surprise offensive in December 2023. The army has now moved back into Khartoum from several directions as the RSF has lost ground. Fighting has also continued in North Darfur, particularly around the state capital, El Fasher. The Joint Darfur Force, made up of local armed groups aligned with the army, has been battling the RSF in areas to the north and east of the city.

In December 2024, Türkiye offered to mediate new talks between the Sudanese army and the UAE, the RSF's key backer. Yet Ankara's efforts, while worthy of support, may encounter the same difficulties as previous attempts coordinated by the U.S. or Saudi Arabia - principally, the difficulty of marshalling various external interests to push the warring parties toward negotiations.

Trouble for the Neighbourhood

On top of the war's disastrous impact in Sudan, the effects on Sudan's neighbours are also severe, risking the stability of already fragile countries. South Sudan's economy has been pushed to the brink. In February 2024, the main pipeline transporting oil north from South Sudan's Upper Nile state to a Sudanese terminal at Port Sudan ruptured, causing a complete shutdown. The pipeline carries about three quarters of South Sudan's oil for export, with oil revenues comprising roughly 80 per cent of the government's budget. Fixing the pipeline is technically possible, but it has proven difficult for Juba to make agreements with the army and RSF on restarting production and export, including fees for transit through territory under their control. The pipeline has been closed for nearly a year, putting increasing pressure on South Sudan's economy that could have explosive political consequences.

More than 900,000 Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees have arrived in Chad since April 2023 - most of them now reside in Ouaddaï, an impoverished eastern province - a development that could have destabilising effects. Chad has reportedly allowed the UAE to send arms to the RSF via logistical hubs on its territory. The Chadian government's alliance with the UAE, which in June 2023 agreed to loan $1.5 billion to N'Djamena, has caused disquiet, particularly among the president's Zaghawa tribe, who see the RSF as targeting their Sudanese brethren across the border in Darfur.

The war is also causing security concerns for Ethiopia and Eritrea along their western borders. For Addis Ababa, which has not shown its hand in the conflict (despite apparently leaning toward the RSF's patron, the UAE), the main risk is that the insurgency in the Amhara region will overlap with fighting in Sudan's eastern states, with arms and militants crossing the frontier. Asmara, on the other hand, distrusts Emirati influence in the region and favours the Sudanese army. It has been training Sudanese militias in Eritrea to battle the RSF, according to regional and Western diplomats.

Competing Interests

In part due to its geostrategic location, Sudan is of deep interest to several external powers whose involvement has both fuelled the war and complicated peace efforts. The RSF has received substantial support from the UAE, which has built up enormous influence across the Horn of Africa in recent years and covets a Red Sea port. In contrast, Sudan's army has garnered backing from Egypt, which sees its southern neighbour's stability as crucial to its national security. Other regional actors, including Qatar and Türkiye, sympathise with the army, with Ankara being home to Islamist figures including Bashir-era officials. Iran has supplied drones to the army. Saudi Arabia holds sway over both sides, but its chief concern is maintaining stability in the Red Sea basin and not losing clout to the UAE in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. The UAE-Egypt relationship is crucial, as each nation has significant leverage over the faction it favours. Abu Dhabi and Cairo have close bilateral ties of their own, but because their ambitions in Sudan clash, they have been unable to cooperate in resolving the conflict.

The involvement of several external states with competing interests has made it difficult to find a path to peace drawing on broad foreign support. Achieving a resolution will require not only ending hostilities in Sudan but also addressing the tangled web of regional influence.

What the EU and Its Member States Can Do

Sudan matters for the EU and its member states. Beside the terrible humanitarian crisis, a long war in one of Africa's biggest countries will radiate instability well beyond the region and into the Mediterranean basin. Sudan also abuts the Red Sea, a maritime corridor that during the Gaza conflict was severely disrupted by attacks on shipping from the Houthis in Yemen, causing the EU to deploy a naval mission (following the announcement of a ceasefire, the Houthis have said their strikes will continue only on Israeli vessels). The Sudan war has intensified a struggle for access to Port Sudan, involving external powers including Russia and Iran, which all seek a foothold near a sea route that is disproportionately important to Europe's economic fortunes. Moreover, should Sudan's war further roil neighbours such as Chad and South Sudan, thousands of fleeing people may arrive on Europe's shores, where migration is a politically loaded issue.

For these reasons, the EU and its member states should in concert support efforts to end a conflict that has not ranked high on the agenda of many powers, including Brussels, due to the attention devoted to wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Europe may especially need to step up in the coming months to pick up the likely diplomatic slack from the U.S., where the Trump administration has signalled little interest in Sudan. To this end, the EU should rally its members to support the new Ankara-led mediation track or any other that picks up momentum. It should also hold back from following Washington's lead and imposing sanctions on the leaders of the warring parties unless they are attached to a clear political strategy, coordinated with partners, for ending the war.

Although it has limited leverage over the key players, the EU has over the past year made efforts to deepen its cooperation with the UAE, bilaterally and through the Gulf Cooperation Council (with the first ever EU-GCC summit to take place in October), and with Egypt, through the development of a "strategic and comprehensive partnership" (which comes with up to €5 billion in macro-financial assistance from Brussels) as well as support for the Egyptian armed forces. EU heads of state, foreign ministers and envoys should consistently point out to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as Egypt, that a prolonged conflict does not serve their interests. It should press the UAE and Egypt, in particular, to help bring the belligerents to the table. Annette Weber, the EU special representative for the Horn of Africa, who has engaged in extensive shuttle diplomacy with regional leaders and international stakeholders, should continue those efforts with the support of member states.

To coordinate its approach better, the EU should ... consider creating a dedicated contact group for Sudan.

To coordinate its approach better, the EU should also consider creating a dedicated contact group for Sudan, possibly helmed by foreign ministers from key member states. Such a group would allow member states with a major diplomatic interest, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and others, to harmonise their policies.

In addition, the EU should keep sending humanitarian assistance to Sudan and step up its assistance in Chad. The latter should target Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees, as well as host communities, and support projects that reduce intercommunal frictions among these groups. In 2024, Brussels allocated €72 million in humanitarian aid to alleviate the harm caused by the conflict, an amount that is set to increase to more than €90 million in 2025. The bloc should also encourage member states to maintain humanitarian funding commitments made at the April 2024 Paris conference, organised by France, Germany and the EU, totalling €2 billion, more than half from the EU and its member states. To facilitate humanitarian operations, the EU should also push, in concert with other external actors with influence such as Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the U.S., for safe, unimpeded humanitarian access, the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance across front lines and the free movement of humanitarian workers.

Finally, the EU should continue to support efforts, including by the AU, to encourage Sudan's various political and civil forces to forge a more united front toward ending the war, including potentially hammering out what a post-war unity government could look like. This political dialogue should include women, with a view to bolstering the progress that was made in increasing their participation in public life after Bashir's ouster, much of which has now been lost. By continuing to provide diplomatic and technical assistance, the EU can boost efforts to find common ground among political groups, community leaders and civil society, which will be essential to build a stable post-war future. The EU should also make clear to mediators that - if it is to endure - any deal to end the war must provide for broad, representative civilian participation in the new administration.

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