Addis Abeba — Ethiopia and Eritrea have a complex history, defined by both periods of intense conflict and more recent efforts at cooperation.
The relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been historically complex, shaped by decades of conflict, including the Eritrean War of Independence (1961-1991) and the subsequent Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998-2000). However, the situation began shifting dramatically in 2018 when Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the peace agreement, formally ending the two-decade-long "no peace, no war" stalemate. The signing of the peace accord in July 2018 marked a major milestone in the improvement of bilateral ties after the new Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) announced a series of unprecedented reforms.
Following the said preliminary cooperation, the two countries achieved several steps forward, including the reopening of borders, the resumption of flights, the reconnection of telecommunication services, and the reopening of embassies both in Addis Abeba and Asmara. Moreover, they embraced people-to-people relations as families divided by the border were allowed to reunite, and a sense of reconciliation emerged.
As a person who did undertake profound research, including contributing a book entitled Ethiopia-Eritrea Relations since 1991: Wars, Stalemate, and Cooperation, I just wanted to share my independent insight, taking current developments into consideration.
This article explores the nature of the factors influencing existing relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, ranging from colonial legacies and impacts of longstanding compelling narratives to power struggles among competing political entrepreneurs.
Diverging Factors, Paths to Cooperation
The factors affecting relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea were divergent.
Firstly, the long-lived colonial legacies--territorial, social, and institutionalized segregation--had placed a critical blockade between the two countries.
Second, the compelling narratives have shaped the public memory negatively and remain a time bomb in the bilateral relations between the two countries, being living and thriving up-to-date.
Not only between Ethiopia and Eritrea but also in post-colonial Africa, the cumulative effects of the arbitrarily drawn territories among nations contributed to civil disobedience, quests for statehood, and post-independence crises. Following the revival of the Eritrean Liberation Movement beginning in the 1960s, the political actors from both sides have become contested by polarized narratives of self-identification. The compelling narratives led by the Ethiopia-first or death versus the Eritrean independence or death had brought Ethiopia and Eritrea from federation to annexation, thirty years of civil war, and finally to deadlocked isolation.
Under Emperor Haile Selassie I, the forced annexation of Eritrea, rather than maintaining its federation or allowing a referendum, fueled resistance and a protracted conflict. If the successive regimes had taken a different path--through democratic mechanisms like national dialogue or a referendum--it might have prevented the deep-rooted animosity and political instability that still affect Ethiopia-Eritrea relations today.
The Derg regime, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam from 1974 to 1991, inherited a deeply entrenched conflict from the previous imperial regime. After the forced annexation of Eritrea in 1962, the Eritrean independence struggle had intensified, culminating in a full-scale war between the Eritrean liberation movements and the Ethiopian government. By the time the Derg came to power, the conflict was already in its 13th year, and the Ethiopian government was deeply embroiled in the fight against Eritrean insurgents, most notably the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which was gaining significant traction and support.
In the post-Eritrean independence, the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea were shaped more by power struggles than by strategic, principle-based cooperation. The EPLF and the TPLF-dominated EPRDF, despite their shared history of armed struggle, had fundamentally different ideological visions and foreign policy priorities. Their mutual distrust prevented them from crafting long-term agreements that could have ensured a stable and cooperative post-independence relationship.
The rushed nature of Eritrea's independence, without binding strategic agreements, left unresolved issues--particularly economic and border-related disputes--that later escalated into the 1998-2000 war.
Instead of treating the referendum as a final solution, both sides should have addressed critical matters like border demarcation, citizenship rights, economic cooperation (especially ports and trade), and currency policies beforehand. If both parties had prioritized long-term state-to-state relations over short-term political gains, they might have secured a peaceful separation with lasting cooperation, rather than sowing the seeds for future conflict.
Instead of relying on party-to-party negotiations between the EPLF and EPRDF, a more inclusive process involving the general populace, experts, and other political stakeholders might have led to more sustainable agreements.
The question of Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea--especially the status of the port of Assab--was one of the most sensitive issues that should have been handled with transparency and public engagement. Had this been discussed openly and agreed upon before Eritrea's formal independence, it could have prevented future economic and political tensions.
The 2018 peace agreement marked a turning point, breaking the two-decade-long stalemate.
In addition, the dynamics of external influence--both in terms of Western intervention and temporary disengagement--also played a role in shaping the process.
In 2018, the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea marked a dramatic shift after nearly two decades of the so-called "no peace no war" state of stalemate following the border war (1998-2000). The decision by Prime Minister Abiy to resume peace and cooperation and his subsequent outreach to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki was a major turning point. This breakthrough was remarkable not only because it ended the "no war, no peace" status quo but also because it was initiated primarily by the two countries themselves.
The opening of borders, resumption of transportation links, and restoration of diplomatic ties were some of the immediate outcomes of the peace process, highlighting how significant these steps were in promoting reconciliation.
The 2018 peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia marked a transformative moment in Eritrea's geopolitical and diplomatic trajectory. Under President Isaias Afwerki's leadership, Eritrea had faced significant isolation on both regional and international fronts, driven by a combination of geopolitical conflicts, economic struggles, and domestic policies that led the country being perceived as a pariah state. The peace agreement with Ethiopia, however, opened up new opportunities for Eritrea to emerge from this isolation and engage more actively in regional and global affairs.
Ethiopia's strategic gains from the 2018 peace agreement with Eritrea were profound, particularly in terms of securing its northern border and halting Eritrea's support for anti-government armed groups. These two developments were crucial in stabilizing Ethiopia, both domestically and regionally, and were foundational for several socioeconomic successes.
Had Ethiopia relied on these traditional diplomatic channels, Eritrea likely would have resisted, seeing them as instruments of foreign interference. Instead, the direct bilateral approach allowed both governments to achieve immediate, tangible benefits--including lifting Eritrea's isolation and fostering people-to-people ties that helped rebuild trust.
The Pretoria Accord
The Pretoria Peace Agreement, signed on November 3, 2022, between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), marked a significant milestone in ending the two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia. The agreement laid the foundation for peace, stability, and humanitarian relief--not only in the Tigray region but also in fostering broader peace across Ethiopia.
However, following extensive media coverage of the Pretoria Agreement, President Isaias' regime appeared notably displeased with the peace deal. Since the agreement primarily addressed Ethiopia's internal political landscape, President Isaias Afwerki's government, as a neighboring state, might have been expected to simply extend its best wishes for Ethiopia's return to stability.
Ethiopia's Quest for Red Sea Access
Another pressing issue is Ethiopia's concern regarding access to and from the Red Sea.
Ethiopia, Africa's second-most populous nation and one of the fastest-growing economies on the continent, has been landlocked since Eritrea's independence in 1993. Over the years, Ethiopian leaders have periodically raised the issue of securing access to the Red Sea, citing economic and strategic justifications.
Ethiopia has every legitimate reason to assert its claim, backed by historical, geographical, geopolitical, legal, and demographic considerations. This claim is not tied to the legitimacy of any particular regime--whether under Haile Selassie, Mengistu, Meles, Hailemariam, Abiy, or any future leader. Rather, the quest for Red Sea access remains a consistent and enduring aspiration of the Ethiopian people. Given Ethiopia's irreversible quest for access to the Red Sea, any political entity--domestic or foreign--that attempts to obstruct this aspiration will likely face strong resistance and potential boycotts from the Ethiopian people.
Ethiopia's recent efforts to secure access to the Red Sea have primarily centered on negotiations with Somaliland and the Republic of Somalia, rather than Eritrea. Given this in focus, Eritrea's strong objection to Ethiopia's maritime aspirations appears both misplaced and unwarranted. If President Isaias' government has concerns about regional matters following Ethiopia's claims for access to the Red Sea, it would be more logical to address them either through bilateral negotiations with Ethiopia or on multilateral platforms. Setting aside both bilateral and multilateral platforms, Eritrea's engagement with parties opposing Ethiopia's national interest serves no genuine Eritrean cause; rather, it only escalates tensions between the two countries.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
Despite ongoing assertions from the Eritrean side, it would be sensible for all of us to remain optimistic that Eritrea's government may reconsider its stance and engage in constructive dialogue with its Ethiopian counterpart to address any concerns.
Here, I would recommend that if President Isaias' government had a commitment to genuine peace and mutually beneficial cooperation with Ethiopia--especially through non-interventionist approaches, as witnessed in 2018--it could pave the way for lasting regional stability.
The Road to Lasting Peace
In this concluding section, I have aimed to highlight the key issues, stakeholders, mutual benefits of lasting peace, and the risks of failing to commit to these critical recommendations.
First and foremost, this generation must acknowledge that the challenges affecting Ethiopia-Eritrea relations are deeply rooted in colonial legacies, the byproducts of assimilation policies, and the power struggles among political elites. Understanding these historical complexities is essential for crafting sustainable solutions.
Moreover, it is not only the leaders in Addis Abeba and Asmara who bear responsibility.
We, Ethiopians and Eritreans, have fought several wars that yielded no meaningful results. Our forefathers engaged in recurrent conflicts in the name of preserving sovereignty or gaining independence. However, the people of both nations gained nothing but death, destruction, and deep psychological scars. The current generation must find an alternative path--one that leads to lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation. Failure to do so will not only create conditions for future wars but could also endanger the long-term stability and prosperity of both states and their people.
The international community, including the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the United Nations (UN), should play a constructive role in healing past grievances between the two states and their governments. However, for their efforts to be effective, these organizations must operate independently of superpower influence.
Most importantly, the scholarly community should conduct further research on sustainable peace and cooperation. Academic insights can inform policy recommendations that promote long-term stability and mutual prosperity in the Horn of Africa. AS
Miessa Elema Robe (PhD) currently serves as the head of the Addis Ababa City Administration Press Secretariat.
