The Sudanese Armed Forces may retake Khartoum. But don't expect a decisive end to the war.
Sudan's two-year civil war has triggered what is now the world's largest humanitarian crisis, displacing tens of millions and pushing millions more into severe hunger. It is also a growing threat to stability in the wider region, compounding South Sudan's dire economic crisis and putting Chad under strain from the influx of thousands of refugees. To decisively end this horrific war, peace talks must reopen as soon as the dust settles on the recent battlefield developments.
For much of the war which started in April 2023, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) - a paramilitary group led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, more commonly known as "Hemedti" - has held the advantage. The army, under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, struggled to respond and the conflict got stuck in an ugly stalemate.
But in late 2024, the army and its allies launched better coordinated and well supplied attacks. Te tide of war began to turn. The RSF lost its hold on Wad Medani, capital of Gezira State, in early January, and later that month forces allied with the Sudanese army broke the siege on the army headquarters in Khartoum, in place since the start of the war. In late February, the army pushed westwards and retook El Obied, the capital of North Kordofan, and Dilling, an important hub in South Kordofan State. The RSF was also being driven out of northern and central Omdurman, Khartoum's sister city on the west bank of the Nile and large parts of Bahri, to the north.
This week, Burhan's forces retook control of the Presidential Palace which the RSF has occupied since the beginning of the war - a major symbolic victory.
A number of factors explain this turn. First, the RSF is struggling to supply its troops in Khartoum with arms.
Second, the paramilitary group's forces launched offensives across vast swathes of Sudan over nearly two years of war and now seem to be overstretched. And some of its top commanders recently defected to the Sudanese army, pointing to serious internal frictions within the group.
Finally, the army mobilised new militias, and allied with others, including Darfuri armed groups and Islamist brigades. The army has also recently mastered drones, supplied by Türkiye, one of its external backers.
Burhan and his allies now seem confident that they will retake the whole of Khartoum, where RSF forces remain in the centre of the city, and the army's advance into the Kordofans may be a precursor to a broader ofensive into Darfur, which is still mostly under RSF control.
An uncertain future
Retaking Khartoum would not end the war. What happens after is unclear.
Pushing into the RSF home turf in Darfur risks plunging Sudan into another protracted stalemate. The RSF could prove more difficult to defeat there, especially if its chief backer, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), continues to provide support. This could enable the RSF to regroup and even launch new ofensives in time. Worse, prolonged instability on that front could spread along the border into Chad, turning a national war into a regional one.
The other possibility is that Sudan becomes irrevocably divided, with each side entrenching itself in zones of influence. The complex web of external powers involved in the war, including the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, each with their own vested interests in Sudan, complicates things further.
A third way is to talk, of course.
Talks are unlikely to happen right now when the army and its allies believe they are on the cusp of a military breakthrough. But should Burhan retake Khartoum, he could feel that he is negotiating from a position of strength, which would open up opportunities for mediation.
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If his campaign drifts into a new stalemate, both sides could finally see that it is in their interest to seek a final, nonmilitary, resolution.
At either juncture, discussions between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, the regional powers with the most at stake in the conflict, will be critical. The new United States administration, which has yet to show any interest in Sudan's war, should encourage Riyadh, Cairo and Abu Dhabi to push for negotiations. Meanwhile, the African Union's presidential committee on Sudan, with five heads of state and led by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, should also try to engage the two sides.
Global humanitarian efforts to respond to large-scale food insecurity should remain a priority, especially given the severe reduction of U.S aid. The alternative is hellish: months or even years of conflict, fragmentation and suffering for Sudanese people who are already in a desperate situation, at risk of spreading to Sudan's neighbours.
