But Kinshasa will need significant peacebuilding and humanitarian support - and local communities must have some ownership of the process.
On 19 July, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) met with representatives of the M23 rebel group in Qatar to sign a declaration of principles, aimed at ending fighting in eastern DRC. The declaration outlines a framework for negotiations to start no later than 8 August, with a deadline for a finalized deal on 18 August. This is a significant step. For the first time, Kinshasa has agreed to formal talks with a group it previously labelled as a terrorist organization.
The declaration is a stepping stone following an earlier agreement reached in the US between leaders of the DRC and Rwanda - the 'Washington Accord'. That US-brokered agreement stops short of explicitly naming Rwanda's alleged support for M23 - something documented by UN experts but denied by Kigali.
But it does commit both parties to halting hostilities, ending support for armed groups, and respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity. On June 20, hailing the agreement, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that 'This is a Great Day for Africa and, quite frankly, a Great Day for the World!'
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Three decades of failed peace efforts have shown that no single agreement can resolve the DRC's deeply entrenched conflicts.
Taken together the new initiatives are certainly a promising development. But three decades of failed peace efforts have shown that no single agreement can resolve the DRC's deeply entrenched conflicts.
Past mediation efforts - notably the Nairobi and Luanda tracks - fell short due to institutional incoherence, poor coordination, and fundamentally different interpretations of the conflict. The Nairobi process treated M23 as a domestic insurgency. Luanda, backed by Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, viewed M23 as a Rwandan proxy and demanded its immediate disarmament. Neither succeeded in meaningfully involving affected communities or addressing the root causes of violence.
By contrast, the current US and Qatari initiatives offer a dual approach. Qatar is facilitating direct negotiations between Kinshasa and the M23. Meanwhile the US has mediated an 'elite bargain' between the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda, offering economic incentives that others could not.
The US and Qatari complimentary initiatives represent a big step for advancing diplomatic progress toward peace in eastern DRC. They have advanced dialogue between long-conflicting parties and laid the groundwork for resolving one of Africa's most complex and protracted crises.
But sustainable peace will require local and regional ownership, practical implementation and long-term support to prevent unintended consequences - especially where overlapping interests in minerals and regional security are concerned. They will also need consistent diplomacy and genuine commitment to implementation. Significant challenges lie ahead.
Reasons for caution
Even if Rwanda complies with the terms of the Washington Accord, the military frontlines may remain unchanged, unless M23 itself agrees to disarm and reintegrate.
There is initial agreement between DRC and M23 that state authority should be restored on all territories. But the rebel group still holds key territory in eastern DRC, including Goma and Bukavu. Both areas are central to cross-border trade and rich in minerals. M23's control is such that it acts as a de facto state entity, enforcing taxes and royalties on the sector.
M23 has shown no signs of folding easily. The group has demanded political concessions such as amnesty for its fighters and the reopening of state services in areas under its control, raising fears that concessions to one armed group could incentivize others to pursue their goals violently.
Related content The credibility of US backing for a DRC-Rwanda peace deal rests on the risk appetite of corporate America Consideration of other groups will also complicate any peace initiative. Rwanda has consistently demanded action against the FDLR, a Hutu militia it accuses of involvement in the 1994 genocide. While this concern is not without basis, it has been used to justify Kigali's security interests in eastern Congo. The complex web of alliances and war economies has blurred the lines between self-defence and regional interference.
Ultimately, much will depend on how faithfully agreements are implemented and whether the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to peace.
That will demand credible security sector reform and the revitalization of long-stalled Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. These efforts must be properly funded, independently managed, and firmly rooted in local reconciliation processes to have any lasting impact.
The DRC government also needs a credible, professional army to assert control, protect civilians, and enforce peace terms. That looks a long way off: the DRC's military remains weak, fragmented, and dependent on international and regional support. Recent SADC deployments have suffered heavy casualties with limited strategic gains.
Additionally, any peace process must include civil society groups, local leaders, and communities most affected by the violence. Both the Luanda and Nairobi processes failed to do so. The Washington Accord includes a 90-day timeline for action and sets out regional oversight measures, but whether Kinshasa and Kigali will follow through remains uncertain.
More importantly, unless communities in eastern DRC see real improvements - such as security, access to services, and freedom of movement - the deal risks going the way of its predecessors.
Economic stakes and international support
The prospect of US minerals agreements with DRC and Rwanda - separate investment deals for which a settlement of the conflict is a prerequisite - has added a new weight to peace efforts. The potential of investment in the region could be significant. But it will likely rely on the state backing of American actors with high-risk appetites and long-term planning horizons.
To contribute to peace, US operations must generate local benefits. That will be a tough ask when employment opportunities may be limited and service provision such as health care and education must be done in collaboration with the state. Sealing off mining operations in heavily securitized enclaves will offer little benefit for communities and potentially add to the challenges.
To contribute to peace, US operations must generate local benefits...Sealing off mining operations in heavily securitized enclaves will offer little benefit for communities.
International backing is another key piece of the puzzle. US engagement - and that of the EU and UK - must go beyond diplomacy. All have begun to pressure Rwanda through aid suspensions and sanctions. But broader commitments are needed, especially to support peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts.
Security provision is a political conundrum. The US, EU and UK are highly unlikely to commit forces. Regional deployments, such as SAMIDRC have not fared well, and there is little appetite for further deployment. Any private security force will face legitimacy challenges on the ground. The DRC government has previously called for the withdrawal of the UN's stabilization mission, MONUSCO. But enhancing that mission may be the only viable security solution in the near term, in cooperation with the DRC military.
Grassroot groups and local actors continue to call for a bottom-up approach to peace and security, and their work must be matched by international investment and attention.
Ultimately, peace in eastern DRC cannot be built from outside alone. Local ownership will be the decisive factor. Communities in the region have endured decades of violence, displacement, and exploitation. For them, peace means more than the absence of war. It means access to justice, economic opportunity, and dignity.
Unless their voices are heard and their needs prioritized, the promise of this latest accord will remain just that: a promise. Durable peace will only come if diplomacy is matched by implementation, accountability, and the political will to put local people first.