Addis Abeba — Having begun construction nearly 14 years ago, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is scheduled for inauguration in September 2025. During a parliamentary address two months ago, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced this milestone and formally invited Egypt, Sudan, and all Nile Basin countries to attend the ceremony.
Despite this progress, the GERD issue, which began as a technical disagreement over the shared management of water resources, has evolved into a complex geopolitical flashpoint due to foreign interference. This is particularly due to the repeated false remarks made by President Donald Trump.
Speaking at a White House dinner last month with Republican senators, Trump reiterated--his third such claim in a month--that the GERD was funded by the United States. "Ethiopia built a dam with United States money, largely," he said. In a previous post on Truth Social, Trump wrote, ".....I won't get a Nobel Peace Prize for keeping peace between Egypt and Ethiopia (a massive Ethiopian-built dam, stupidly financed by the United States of America, substantially reduces the water flowing into the Nile River)...."
The facts on the ground starkly contradict these statements. The GERD has been entirely financed by the Ethiopian people through public donations and domestic resources. Moreover, the project poses no threat to Egypt's water security--a point supported by technical assessments and ongoing negotiations among the concerned parties.
Follow us on WhatsApp | LinkedIn for the latest headlines
The announcement of the GERD's upcoming inauguration has not been welcomed by Egypt, which has intensified its lobbying efforts over Nile River issues by sending senior officials to Uganda. Earlier this month, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty met with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni in Entebbe to express what Cairo describes as its "existential concerns" regarding water security. Abdelatty reiterated accusations of "unilateral actions" in the eastern Nile Basin and warned that Egypt would pursue "all necessary measures under international law" to safeguard its share of the Nile's waters. In response, Ethiopia accused Egypt of "scrambling to create obstacles" in the wake of Addis Ababa's announcement concerning the GERD.
The dispute over the GERD is far more than a bilateral quarrel over a water infrastructure project; it reflects deeper structural power dynamics, historical grievances, and divergent perspectives on development and security that shape the geopolitics of the Nile Basin. To better understand this complex interplay, two interlinked theoretical frameworks--hydro-hegemony and securitization--offer valuable insights into how power is exercised and threats are perceived in relation to such vital water resources.
Hydro-Hegemony: Architecture of control in transboundary waters
The concept of hydro-hegemony highlights the power imbalances that dominate the management of transboundary river basins. It posits that domination extends beyond mere military strength, encompassing the sophisticated use of coercive, bargaining, and ideational power. Egypt has traditionally embodied this hydro-hegemonic role by establishing and maintaining structural control over the Nile Basin. This has largely been achieved through its unwavering reliance on the 1929 and 1959 Nile Water treaties--agreements forged without the consultation of upstream states. These treaties have greatly benefited Egypt by effectively enabling it to monopolize the Nile's water supply, institutionalizing an unequal distribution of this critical resource. Through its hegemonic regional discourse, Egypt has successfully positioned itself as the sole and imperial custodian of the Nile. By strategically controlling the narrative, it has influenced public perception in its favor.
Moreover, Egypt has consistently sought to advance its strategic interests on the Nile through indirect means, including proxy involvement in regional conflicts. Notably, during the wars of 1964 and 1977, Egypt is believed to have supported Somalia in its confrontations with Ethiopia. These efforts aligned with Egypt's broader policy of exerting influence over Nile-related geopolitics, while simultaneously fueling Somalia's aspirations for a Greater Somalia.
Egypt has consistently sought to advance its strategic interests on the Nile through indirect means, including proxy involvement in regional conflicts."
In this framework, the control of water resources becomes entrenched in legal, institutional, and geopolitical fabric in a manner that reinforces historicity and shapes the very rules of the game in transboundary water politics. Nevertheless, the existing strategic discourses seem to have become exhausted.
Securitization: Constructing existential threats for geopolitical leverage
In contrast to the framework of hydro-hegemony, the concept of securitization offers an alternative paradigm. It explains how certain states frame issues as existential threats in order to justify extraordinary measures. Egypt has highly securitized the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), portraying it not merely as a development project but as a direct threat to both its national security and water security. This framing serves several strategic purposes.
The first objective is the justification of preemptive actions. By presenting the GERD as an existential threat, Egypt legitimizes unilateral or coercive measures and fosters apprehension among other nations, thereby garnering sympathy and political support from the international community.
The second objective is to weaken Ethiopia's sovereignty. By framing the dam as a matter of survival, Egypt seeks to undermine Ethiopia's sovereign right to utilize its natural resources for national development and poverty alleviation.
This securitization has allowed Egypt to maintain its hegemonic status and normalize exceptional diplomatic and possible military reactions to disincentivize rights being exercised by the other riparian states under the formulation of equitable and reasonable utilization.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, has adopted a different approach to the issue. The nation highlights its sovereign right to pursue peaceful development, emphasizing that the GERD is entirely self-financed, which it views as a symbol of national dignity and self-sufficiency. Addis Ababa has consistently advocated for regional cooperation, mutual benefits, and adherence to international legal principles governing transboundary watercourses.
Ethiopia's approach, while principled in its legal and normative arguments, extends beyond mere defense of the dam. The nation is strategically focused on a long-term plan: solidifying its position through robust regional alliances and ensuring its enduring existence within the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has moved past symbolic discourse; its current objective is to establish a lasting strategic framework based on mutual interest, sovereignty, and collective security.
U.S. misrepresentation, GERD politics
The recent statement by President Donald Trump regarding the GERD not only contains factual inaccuracies but also presents a highly one-sided portrayal of the dispute, which diminishes the role of the African continent and the regional negotiation process. His assertion that much of the dam's financing came from the United States is easily refuted, as Ethiopia deliberately chose to fund the project through domestic bonds and similar mechanisms. This self-reliance was a conscious exercise of sovereignty, aimed at avoiding external conditionalities and maintaining national ownership of a strategically vital infrastructure project. By perpetuating this misrepresentation, Trump misled the international community, reinforcing a flawed perception of Ethiopia's development model as dependent on foreign aid--an inaccurate portrayal that undermines the legitimacy of Ethiopia's achievements.
Moreover, the way in which Trump referred to Egypt's dependence on the Nile as its "blood, heart, and everything" closely mirrors the Egyptian narrative of securitization, which frames the GERD as an existential threat justifying extraordinary measures. This framing reflects Egyptian anxieties but fails to acknowledge Ethiopia's right to the reasonable and equitable use of the Nile waters under international water law--rights recognized by the international community and not subject to override by Egyptian demands. Through his rhetoric, Trump effectively delegitimized Ethiopia's developmental aspirations and reduced a complex issue to a binary conflict, focusing solely on Egypt's vulnerability.
Furthermore, Trump's comments about monitoring the dam's construction via satellite reinforced a technocratic and paternalistic stance, implying an intrusive level of external control over an African-led development project. Such language echoes a historical pattern that prioritizes surveillance and interventionism over principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, and partnership.
This became particularly evident when Trump stated that the GERD issue had been "pretty well taken care of," despite Ethiopia's clear rejection of a draft agreement prepared during U.S.-led negotiations. Many in Ethiopia perceived this mediation as unfair, designed to impose a solution without equal input or consideration of the interests of all parties involved. Ethiopia's withdrawal from the process and subsequent demand for negotiations led by the African Union reaffirmed its sovereignty and signaled resistance to external pressure. Trump's proposed solutions were not only misrepresentative but, diplomatically, they undermined Ethiopia's voice and the legitimacy of African institutions.
His [Trump's] inaccurate claims, securitizing language, and reckless statements contributed to rising tensions, undermined Ethiopia's sovereign rights....."
What was even more alarming was the inflammatory statement made by Trump suggesting that Egypt could blow up the dam. Coming from the president of a global superpower, such a remark risked legitimizing military intimidation and encouraging destabilizing actions. It represented an extreme lapse in diplomatic propriety, bolstering the position of hawkish elements within Egyptian politics and recklessly escalating the tension. This statement transformed the GERD issue from a developmental challenge into a potential geopolitical flashpoint, severely undermining any prospects for de-escalation through dialogue.
Trump's comment came at a particularly sensitive moment in the African Union-led negotiations, where African stakeholders sought a peaceful, locally driven resolution. The U.S. Embassy has long been central to the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia, and the United States openly attempted to sideline the African Union, positioning itself as the primary mediator. This move challenged the institutional legitimacy of African diplomacy and reinforced perceptions of foreign interference in African affairs. By actively disrupting multilateral efforts and exacerbating discord, the Trump administration weakened regional trust and deepened divisions among the Nile riparian states.
Overall, Trump's rhetoric and approach to the GERD dispute reveal a broader inability to engage constructively with African-led diplomacy in a fair and respectful manner. His inaccurate claims, securitizing language, and reckless statements contributed to rising tensions, undermined Ethiopia's sovereign rights, and pushed an already fragile negotiation process to the brink of collapse. This episode underscores the critical need for principled, historically informed, and multilateral engagement in managing complex transboundary conflicts--particularly in contexts where international involvement has too often overshadowed local authority.
Distorting reality for political gain
Equally alarming was President Trump's claim that the GERD would significantly reduce the Nile's water supply to downstream countries. This exaggerated assertion deliberately disregards the fact that, according to numerous scientific studies and technical evaluations, the dam's impact on downstream water flow can remain minimal and manageable. By uncritically echoing Egypt's rhetoric, Trump overlooked the Egyptian challenges related to internal water inefficiency--such as substantial evaporation and leakage from unlined canals--and instead attributed water loss solely to Ethiopia.
This approach reinforced Egypt's undeniable bias, framing the issue primarily as an environmental concern rather than a strategic geopolitical matter. Such deliberate distortion was a key element of the Trump administration's intervention. They did not merely misrepresent the GERD conflict; they fundamentally reshaped it--undermining trust, derailing negotiations, and encouraging extremist positions at the expense of a peaceful, fair, and science-based resolution.
The Trump administration's involvement in the negotiations surrounding the GERD wasn't a neutral act. Instead, it was shaped by a broader geostrategic approach rooted in the administration's transactional foreign policy. This perspective led U.S. diplomacy to use regional crises not to find equitable solutions but to gain maximum leverage across geopolitical fault lines, especially in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
Within this wider context, Egypt emerged as a key ally, particularly in relation to one of Washington's most contentious diplomatic priorities: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Egypt served as a geostrategic stabilizer in the region. Its proximity to Gaza, coupled with its long history of mediating Arab-Israeli relations, made Cairo indispensable to U.S. efforts to reshape the region's political architecture. Against this backdrop, Washington's open support for Egypt's position on the GERD appears less about water security per se and more about deploying the issue as a deliberate bargaining chip.
This strategic alignment was most evident in the Trump administration's quiet endorsement of the so-called "Deal of the Century," a peace initiative widely condemned by Egypt due to its strong pro-Israel bias. One of the plan's most controversial, though never-executed, elements was a proposal to relocate much of Gaza's population to Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Had this proposal gone forward, it would have had significant consequences for Egypt's sovereignty, national security, and demographic balance. Cairo's public rejection of the plan underscored the political and existential threat such a proposal posed to a long-standing U.S. ally.
Washington's open support for Egypt's position on the GERD appears less about water security per se and more about deploying the issue as a deliberate bargaining chip."
Seen in this light, Washington's hardline stance on the GERD--including withholding aid to Ethiopia and pressuring Addis Ababa to sign an agreement that disproportionately favored Egyptian interests--was not an isolated policy on transboundary water governance. Instead, it was a quid pro quo with the Egyptian government. Ethiopia, whose independent development path and resistance to being drawn into regional power plays defied U.S. expectations, became an incidental part of a larger diplomatic arrangement that traded water security for a realignment of Middle East strategy.
More than merely a dam, the GERD ultimately became a geopolitical bargaining chip--entangled in a complex web of regional priorities, alliances, and conditionalities. It stands as a clear example that infrastructure projects can serve not only as tools for economic development but also as instruments of power in global negotiations.
Navigating GERD tensions, maritime ambitions
The obstacles Ethiopia faces in advancing its regional ambitions cannot be attributed solely to the GERD. While the dam has become the most visible battleground, it is far from the only arena of competition, which extends well beyond water politics. At its core, the contest is about power, access, and strategic positioning--particularly as Ethiopia grows increasingly determined to secure access to the Red Sea and position itself as a central player in the Horn of Africa and beyond.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
The dispute over Nile waters is not merely about Egypt's resistance to a shift in regional geopolitics. It also stems from the belief that a landlocked yet increasingly assertive Ethiopia could gain a maritime outlet and disrupt the established balance of power. Egypt, however, is not alone in holding this view. A range of regional actors--Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Arab states--have expressed varying degrees of unease, if not outright hostility, toward Ethiopia's pursuit of Red Sea access.
The rationale behind this resistance lies in a shared interest: preventing the emergence of Ethiopia as a maritime state, which would not only unsettle the existing security order in the Red Sea corridor but also undermine the strategic advantages enjoyed by states that benefit from Ethiopia's current landlocked status. Control over port infrastructure, maritime choke points, and regional trade routes remains a principal geopolitical asset--one that few powers are willing to see diminished by Ethiopia's potential restoration to the sea.
Ethiopia now stands at a critical strategic crossroads. To pursue its so-called "two waters policy"--the goal of maximizing sustainable use of the Nile while securing access to the Red Sea through maritime channels--it faces two difficult choices.
The first is Acquiescence. Ethiopia could maintain its recently adopted approach of cautious diplomacy, avoiding bold moves on both the GERD and Red Sea access. While this might ease short-term tensions, it would almost certainly deepen the country's structural vulnerabilities, including overreliance on foreign ports, persistent economic bottlenecks, and a marginal position in regional geopolitics.
The second is Strategic Realignment. Ethiopia could fully leverage its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, treating it not merely as a tactical arrangement but as the foundation for a transformative regional alliance. Recognizing Somaliland would immediately grant Ethiopia direct access to the Red Sea in exchange, formalizing a mutual agreement with a territory that has operated as a de facto independent state since 1988. While such a move would be contentious, it could unlock a rare geopolitical opportunity. Unlike Somalia and most Arab states, Somaliland is not bound to any existing Red Sea security framework, making it a relatively independent and predictable partner. In this way, Somaliland offers Ethiopia a maritime corridor free from the veto power of its regional competitors.
If Ethiopia opts for the second strategic path--leveraging its emerging alliance with Somaliland--one symbolic yet highly consequential gesture would be to invite Somaliland to the inauguration of the GERD. Though understated, such a diplomatic act would carry significant political weight, signaling a deliberate recalibration of Ethiopia's regional posture and hinting at a broader strategic realignment in the Horn of Africa.
The consequences of such a move would undoubtedly be diplomatically costly and regionally risky, provoking strong opposition from Somalia, the Arab League, and other actors invested in maintaining the status quo. Yet, this may be the necessary price of strategic independence. More importantly, it would breathe new life into Ethiopia's longstanding national aspiration of regaining access to the sea, positioning the country to advance its economic, geopolitical, and security interests fully and on its own terms.
In this context, the GERD and the Red Sea cannot be viewed as separate issues; they are deeply interconnected. Both are central pillars of Ethiopia's broader project of national sovereignty, regional influence, and security--and both remain subject to a complex web of regional resistance. The path Ethiopia chooses must go beyond cautious diplomacy; it must have the courage to reset the regional status quo through carefully chosen strategic alliances. AS
Editor's Note: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at [email protected]
