Addis Abeba — The concepts of the right to self-determination and the right to peace are pivotal in international law and political theory. In Ethiopia, they are not abstract rights but a constitutional reality and an urgent demand, respectively. Since the adoption of the 1995 Constitution, Ethiopia has enshrined the right of "nations, nationalities, and peoples" to self-determination--including secession--in Article 39. This provision has profoundly shaped both the governance structure and the inter-ethnic politics of the country. More recently, with multiple conflicts, especially in the Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara regional states, public attention seems to have been turned toward how the right to peace might be realized in practice.
In this article, I trace how the legal, institutional, and political tensions around self-determination have both enabled and constrained peace, and what prospects and pitfalls lie ahead in moving from constitutional promises toward sustainable peace in Ethiopia.
Right to Self-determination: Constitutional promise, political tension
The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) establishes Ethiopia as a multinational federal state. Article 39 of the Constitution affirms that every "nation, nationality, and people" has the unconditional right to self-determination, including secession. It also allows for other multiple cultural, linguistic, and political rights of these groups, including use of language and establishment of regional state government.
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Yet, in practice, this constitutional provision has been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it was employed to address the long-held yearnings of several ethno-nationalist movements demanding greater autonomy, recognition, and in some cases secession. On the other hand, the federal government has often been accused of manipulating these constitutional rights--granting them rhetorically, controlling them bureaucratically, or neglecting them selectively--in order to preserve centralized power. Critics argue that despite the federal structure, real power remains concentrated in the center, limiting the meaningful exercise of self-determination.
The persistent gap between Ethiopia's constitutional promises and political practice has been a major driver of recurring conflict and violence. When the right to self-determination is undermined--whether through centralization, marginalization, or outright repression--grievances tend to accumulate, often erupting into armed conflict or mass protest. This dynamic fueled the widespread protests that began in Oromia in late 2014, eventually spreading to other regions and culminating in the fall of the TPLF-dominated EPRDF government in April 2018. Yet, even under the subsequent "reformist" administration, similar tensions have persisted, underpinning the war in Tigray (which began in 2020), the ongoing insurgency in Oromia, and the conflicts in the Amhara region and other parts of the country.
These challenges are further compounded by irredentist claims and inter-ethnic competition over land and administrative boundaries. In post-1991 Ethiopia, certain political groups and communities have sought unification with ethnic kin across internal and international borders--such as the Oromo, Somali, and Amhara--or have demanded the redrawing of existing regional boundaries. But the constitution remains vague or entirely silent on mechanisms for addressing such claims, leaving a legal and political vacuum.
Right to Peace: Legal norms, institutions, and challenges
The right to peace is less concretely codified in Ethiopian law, though it is implicit both in the constitutional preamble and in Ethiopia's international commitments, as well as domestic policy discourses. Peace is generally approached in terms of cessation of hostilities, political dialogue, negotiation, reconciliation, and restoration of legal and constitutional order.
The persistent gap between Ethiopia's constitutional promises and political practice has been a major driver of recurring conflict and violence."
Towards resolving the war in Tigray in late 2022, the Pretoria Agreement (also known as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement or CoHA) between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) promised a permanent end to hostilities, withdrawal of foreign forces, humanitarian access, political dialogue, transitional justice, and restoration of constitutional structures. Besides, the "reformist" federal government has convened the Ethiopia National Dialogue Commission (ENDC), which was seen as an attempt to foster inclusive political engagement.
Despite all this, achieving the right to sustainable peace keeps facing multi-faceted challenges. The foremost challenge involves fragile peace agreements and incomplete implementation. Although treaties like the CoHA mark formal cessation of war, many parties, sub-factions, or non-state actors have not fully complied or been fully incorporated. Issues such as demobilization, disarmament, reintegration (DDR), return of displaced persons, restoration of infrastructure, and cessation of human rights abuses remain only partially addressed.
The second challenge is factionalism and internal conflict. Even within groups that ostensibly have peace agreements, internal power struggles (e.g., within the TPLF) threaten stability and risk renewed conflict. Such intra-group strife weakens trust and complicates the implementation of unified peace strategies.
Thirdly, the problem of marginalization and exclusion persists. Minority groups, women, and civil society often remain sidelined. Reports highlight the underrepresentation of women in peace negotiations and a lack of grassroots participation in transitional justice efforts.
Furthermore, there is considerable legal ambiguity and politicization. While the constitution provides for rights like self-determination, the mechanisms to implement these rights are vague; political leaders have often interpreted or used constitutional provisions in partisan ways. Constitutional reforms are debated, but agreement is elusive. As detailed in this op-ed, even attempts to create new regional states expose the gap between principle and practice.
Finally, security threats and recurring violence continue to undermine peace. Even in "peace" periods, there are flare-ups: renewed fighting between the federal government and regional/state actors, human rights violations, and inter-ethnic violence. Rebel-government clashes also persist in areas of Oromia and Amhara. Ultimately, the trust required for sustainable peace was undermined.
From Self-determination to Peace: Prospects, preconditions
Transitioning from the legal right to self-determination to the lived reality of sustainable peace requires several preconditions and strategic orientations. Drawing on Ethiopia's context, the following elements are essential:
Clarity of legal mechanisms is critical. Ethiopia must define clear implementation paths for self-determination claims, particularly regarding boundary disputes, irredentism, and regional autonomy. Codifying who may pursue territorial reconfiguration or enhanced regional autonomy, under what conditions, and through which processes will help limit opportunistic or violent claims. This framework must be developed through broad consensus, involving regional, ethnic, civil society, and political stakeholders.
The right to peace should not be viewed as subsequent to self-determination, nor as its reward--rather, it must be its essential companion."
Genuine self-rule, rather than mere devolution of administrative powers, is necessary. Regional states must possess substantive fiscal, political, and administrative autonomy to make policy decisions affecting their populations--covering areas such as language, education, land, and resource management. Centralized control over security, finance, and major infrastructure fosters alienation. Authentic regional self-rule can help mitigate grievances that fuel conflict.
Inclusive peace processes and accountability mechanisms are essential. Peace agreements should encompass all relevant actors--not only major belligerents, but also smaller communities, women, and internally displaced persons. Effective mechanisms for truth-telling, reparations, and justice are crucial for legitimacy. Transparent monitoring, ideally supported by international or neutral oversight, strengthens public confidence in the process.
Addressing economic inequality and marginalization is equally important. Many self-determination claims are driven by perceived or real economic exclusion, including land alienation, resource extraction without local benefit, inadequate infrastructure, and high unemployment. Sustainable peace requires integrating these socio-economic dimensions into peacebuilding through equitable development plans, resource allocation, and ensuring local communities benefit from control over land and resources.
Building a shared national identity that balances diversity is vital. Ethiopia's many nations and nationalities must cultivate overlapping, inclusive identities. While ethnic identity--language, culture, and traditions--is important, all groups must feel they belong to a common polity, where rights, dignity, and opportunities are equitably shared. Education, civic dialogue, media, and national narratives can support this effort but must avoid imposing assimilation or suppressing differences.
External mediation, partnerships, and support play a key role. Given the scale of conflict and internal mistrust, international and regional mediation--through entities such as the African Union and IGAD--alongside humanitarian assistance, institutional capacity building, and neutral monitoring, is critical. External financing for reconstruction should be structured to encourage peace rather than exacerbate exclusion.
Critical reflections, risks
While the transition from self-determination to peace is undeniably necessary, there is a distinct risk of romanticizing peace as an endpoint rather than recognizing it as a continuous process. Several critical issues merit consideration:
Peace as a Façade: Agreements may inadvertently create the illusion of peace while underlying power asymmetries, unresolved grievances, and exclusionary practices persist. This structural imbalance significantly increases the likelihood of conflict relapse.
Institutional Fragility: Ethiopia's core institutions, including the judiciary, federal and regional governments, and security forces, have frequently been strained by periods of conflict. Weak or demonstrably biased institutions are prone to failing in their duties to enforce agreements or safeguard rights, thereby fundamentally undermining the foundation of peace.
The Federalism Paradox: Designed explicitly to acknowledge difference and mitigate conflict, Ethiopia's multi-national federalism may instead continue to entrench division, inter-group competition, and ethnic exclusion when coupled with the politicization of identity. Consequently, the principle of self-determination risks being employed as a mechanism for elite capture rather than genuine popular empowerment.
Geopolitical Pressures: The Horn of Africa is a region of substantial strategic importance, meaning that numerous foreign actors maintain vested interests in Ethiopia's stability and policy direction. These external actors, often possessing competing interests, can exacerbate internal divisions and discord through various means, including arms sales, the imposition of aid conditionalities, or strategic diplomatic positioning.
Conclusion
Ethiopia's constitutional embedding of the right to self-determination marked a bold recognition of its multi-ethnic reality. Yet, as the ongoing conflict and violence show, legal promise alone is insufficient. And the move from recognizing self-determination to realizing sustainable peace calls for deep institutional reform, inclusive governance, economic justice, and genuine decentralization.
For peace to be sustainable, all actors--federal, regional, civil society, and local--must see that their identity, aspirations, and dignity are respected, not merely placated. The right to peace should not be viewed as subsequent to self-determination, nor as its reward--rather, it must be its essential companion. AS
Editor's Note: Dagnachew Ayenew Yeshiwas holds a Ph.D. in Peace and Development Studies and serves as a senior lecturer and researcher in the Department of Peace and Development Studies at Wollo University, Ethiopia. He can be reached at [email protected]