Israel's recognition of Somaliland on 26 December 2025 has introduced yet another twist to the already volatile geostrategic landscape of Northeast Africa. Though not unexpected, it sent shockwaves across the myriad layers of existing and emerging alignments spanning the immediate region and beyond. Reactions range from outward condemnation and rejection of the move to anticipation of possible measures by those with vested interests in the region. Now the whole trajectory is bound to assume an irreversible course, actors on the ground are forced to adjust to a new status quo.
Understanding the dynamics requires structural assessment of objective realities long informing the complex interactions among local, regional and global actors. Within the prism of unfolding state formation processes in the greater Horn, Somaliland's attainment of sovereign status was long overdue. Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011) were byproducts of similar entanglements. Geopolitical imperatives and considerations have informed their attainment of independence and subsequent recognition by the international community. Ample precedent exists whereby the three breakaway regions have enjoyed de facto recognition by significant others before their official accession to the community of world states. Somaliland's file simply proved to be more complex, pitting involved parties against one another, thus the protracted wait since 1991. In this vein, the way forward would not be smooth as far as Somaliland's sovereign statehood is concerned.
Israel's decision is generating sympathizers and advocates. Others might be less decisive, and test the waters before joining the fray. Members of the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco and Kazakhstan now have to carefully navigate the conundrum. Specifically attention is affixed on the UAE, given its strategic investment in Somaliland. The United Kingdom and the United States of America (USA) will be forced to weigh their next moves, for Israel's move countervails their long-held positions of advocating for the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia. Endorsement by either London or Washington would not only makes the whole situation irreversible, but would encourage others to follow suit.
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Somaliland's strategic position straddling the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea offers the appeal for other states to establish significance presence on the territory. Hargiesa has been keen on amplifying these assets and positioning itself as alternative gateway to global economic, military and geopolitical interests. Frequent interactions with the USA, investment ventures with the UAE, and Israel's formal recognition can be taken as incremental results of its calculated international repositioning strategies. In this regard, Somaliland's prevailing interactions with Ethiopia, and to some extent Kenya, were not enough to generate the desired result. Nonetheless, Ethiopia's closer ties and de facto recognition of Somaliland have long informed the undercurrent. The January 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU and subsequent altercations were cases in point.
It is not difficult to find others readily identifying with Somaliland's pursuit and even jumping onto the bandwagon. Taiwan could be among the first to issue a statement supporting the new development. Even African countries, especially those outside the immediate region, might venture into the mix entertaining the notion with some caveat. Foremost in this regard could be the Saharawi Republic. Otherwise, most African states will remain indecisive, closely monitoring the trajectory of the geopolitical tussle between major regional and global players. Notwithstanding statements by the African Union (AU), IGAD and the EAC, individual countries might later pursue a transactional approach strictly following the behest of their strategic benefactors.
Somalia, Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti and Eritrea were among the first to denounce and reject Israel's recognition of Somaliland. The move has equally elicited condemnations from the AU, IGAD, the EAC, the Arab League and the European Union (EU). In retrospect, the whole affair appears reminiscent of the 2024 MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, but with greater magnitude and a formidable actor. So far, the USA is maintaining a united Somalia policy; and China is pursuing a similar approach. Notwithstanding Somaliland's three decades of autonomous existence, and the fragile political economy of post-1991 Somalia, the emergence of Somaliland as an internationally recognized independent state might not be feasible soon. Nonetheless, the ice has been irreversibly broken and it is only a matter of time before it becomes a reality in the foreseeable future.
Positions adhered to by IGAD, the EAC and the AU primarily hinge on long-held principles and the desire to maintain institutional integrity. IGAD in particular cannot afford to diverge at this juncture and risk losing a critical member state, Somalia, and affronting Djibouti. The absence of Eritrea and Sudan has already affected its viability. The EAC remains equally mindful of the recent inclusion of Somalia into the community. The AU likewise is sticking with notions of territorial integrity of member states in spite of the erosion of the same principles in 1991 and 2011. It even failed to entertain the recommendations of the 2005 fact-finding mission to Somaliland which outlines the political realities associated with lack of recognition of the territory. More visible a shortcoming in the AU-IGAD-EAC recent statement is the potential divergence of views between member states and the institutions on matters pertaining to recognition of Somaliland. Individual orientations towards Somalia and Somaliland might not reflect standpoints amplified in multilateral settings. To what extent the regional and continental organizations stick to their current positions and withstand dissent from within and pressures from without remains to be seen.
The whole saga puts Somalia in the spotlight, in the process bringing windfalls to the political establishment at Villa Somalia while endangering the cohesion of the republic. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his administration are expected to venture towards internationalizing the whole fiasco and reap the dividends by way of advancing immediate political and diplomatic agendas. In a weird twist of developments, the situation also brings the federal government and Al Shabaab on to the same page in defence of the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia. The Somaliland case introduces a dangerous precedent to the fragile association between the centre and the Federal Member States, especially Puntland and Jubaland. Maintaining a delicate balance among the asymmetric political forces, while addressing the contradictory interests of external benefactors and players (Turkey, UAE, Qatar, Ethiopia, Egypt) remains a serious challenge beyond and above maintaining Somaliland in the figurative union.
Somalia appears to be hard pressed within the complex intermix of associations and interests. Balancing economic, political, security and strategic imperatives through the apparently non-complementary interactions with the AU, IGAD, EAC, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Gulf Cooperation Council as well as bilateral ties with states in the immediate region and beyond will not be an easy feat. There might come a point where Mogadishu has to choose and decide on a given line or position, in the process compromising its engagement with others. The Ethiopia-Egypt/Eritrea, Egypt-Turkey, Turkey/Qatar-UAE, USA/Israel-China lines could affect the course of Somalia's international engagement at bilateral and multilateral levels.
In a weird twist of events, Somalia's unity and territorial integrity has remained a rallying point drawing the attention of divergent actors across the spectrum. The post-Cold War dispensation emphasized maintaining the geographic cohesion of Somalia. Wider geostrategic and security concerns, amplified by the desire to block a significant power (both regional and global) from singularly dictating proceedings on the ground, primarily inform policy considerations. Israel has opened a Pandora's Box; but others are bound to soul-search the ramifications associated with such a seismic move. International peacekeeping and security sector reform efforts in Somalia will be compromised as a result.
Pronouncements by the EU put pressure on strategic partners, including the USA, thus contributing to the latter's cautious approach. In similar vein, the United Kingdom distanced itself from the mater insisting on dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. China's firm position is bound to influence deliberations in African circles at individual and institutional levels. One has to factor in unfolding South-South cooperation and the BRICS dynamics. Overall, the asymmetry of strategic, security, economic and geopolitical realities further complicates the operating theatre for those directly and indirectly involved. Existing alignments are undergoing readjustments and new associations are in the offing. The Egypt-Turkey duo and the Egypt-Eritrea-Djibouti-Somalia interconnect are cases in point. Immediate strategic considerations bring together strange bedfellows, introducing more uncertainty to the future trajectory of inter-state interactions in Northeast Africa.
Ethiopia is critical a player. It will be forced to carefully examine proceedings before taking any major decision. Respective governments have accorded de facto recognition to the breakaway territory primarily as an instrument to leverage interactions with Mogadishu. The 2024 MoU with Somaliland, hinged on possible recognition in return for a 50 years lease for naval/commercial base adjacent to Barbara, took the whole dynamic to a new level. Subsequent international backlash, however, forced Addis Ababa to backtrack and examine the interaction matrix with Somalia. Egypt's strategic ploy to engage immediate neighbours with economic, defence and security cooperation agreements further muddled the operating theatre for Ethiopia. Coupled with the spiralling tension over the Two Waters' policy, Ethiopia advances regarding unhinged utilization rights over the Blue Nile and sovereign access to the Red Sea unnerved the status quo.
Israel's decision appears to smoothen the way for Ethiopia to follow suit. Long-held policy orientations whereby Ethiopia would closely follow any given international recognition of Somaliland have created anticipation. But an assortment of considerations have forced Addis Ababa to adopt strategic ambiguity on the matter. An array of condemnations and rejections, including by IGAD, the AU and the EU, immediate neighbours, and China, as well as hesitation by the USA and UK, issue a red flag. Backlash and repercussions on the verge of the 2024 fiasco are still fresh among policy decision-makers. In addition, the volatile internal political economy and the confused orientation on international engagement make it difficult for the government to assume a definitive position on Somaliland.
Recognizing Somaliland would automatically pit the country against strategic partners including Turkey and China. It further entrenches the Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia axis, this time extending to Djibouti and al-Burhan's Sudan. Somalia's presidency of the UN Security Council for January 2026 happens at a critical time. Potential security and economic challenges on the domestic and regional fronts weigh against the possible gains of recognizing Somaliland. Anticipated guarantees and bailouts, presumably coming from Israel and possibly the UAE, would not offset concerted pressure and marginalization. Rejections by IGAD, the AU and the likes of Djibouti have effectively removed the diplomatic instruments Ethiopia could have utilized in the advancement of the cause. Its strategic partnerships with China and Turkey, as well as membership in the BRICS, compromise any significant consideration by way of recognizing Somaliland.
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Ethiopia cannot afford to recognize Somaliland at this critical juncture. Economic, security and diplomatic imperatives dictate that it should further assess the situation. Somaliland is bound to be a flashpoint for local, regional and international contestations, compromising Ethiopia's desire to secure unhinged access to the Gulf of Aden. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are equally eyeing the port of Assab, as part of the regional design to ascertain the upper-hand on ever-spiralling geostrategic competition. In the process, UAE might be marginalized or even squeezed out of the Red Sea enclave. Turkey's growing presence in Somalia demands serious apprehension. These factors militate against Ethiopia's interests, with adverse effects for its economic, security, and diplomatic posture in the short to medium run. For the moment, Somaliland remains a small fish as far as Ethiopia is concerned.
Ethiopia has found itself in a complex position where multiple strategic policy considerations converge, demanding careful recalibration of its diplomatic approach. The Nile utilization matrix and the drive to secure sovereign access to the sea have unnerved actors in the immediate region. GERD might be operational, and Ethiopia appears intent on launching additional projects along the Blue Nile. The generational aspiration to secure sovereign presence on the shores of the Red Sea has dominated public policy pronouncements. These have generated serious security concerns, pitting the country with significant actors in the immediate region and beyond against backlashes visibly reverberating both on domestic and international fronts. Adding Somaliland to the mix will further undermine the volatile peace and security landscape of the wider Northeast Africa region. As far as Ethiopia is concerned, short of official recognition, Somaliland has been an autonomous entity. Complications associated with official recognition have been long perceived. Interactions were managed on the basis of mutual understanding. There were times when Ethiopia deviated from its course and in compromised the delicate arrangement. This time, calls for Addis Ababa to revisit its approaches in dealing with respective countries and entities in the Horn should design an engagement matrix accommodative of local, regional and global intricacies, and ensure the sustenance of outstanding economic, security and geostrategic imperatives in the region.
Belete Belachew Yihun is a foreign policy and international relations analyst specializing on the Horn of Africa and Middle East/Gulf.
