Addis Abeba — Diplomacy prides itself on nuance, yet there are moments when nuance collapses under the weight of geography. Israel's recognition of Somaliland was not a symbolic flourish; it was a geopolitical intervention of the highest order--one that instantly rattled Ankara, unsettled anti-Israel Arab governments, and forced the international system to confront a basic question: What counts as a state in the 21st century? For decades, Somalia has enjoyed international recognition without genuine sovereignty, while Somaliland has exercised sovereignty without recognition. Israel's decision did not redraw the map--it revealed that the map has been outdated for a long time.
The immediate condemnations from Turkey, Qatar, and several Arab capitals were predictable. They invoked Somalia's "territorial integrity" as if repeating the phrase could conjure sovereignty into existence. But the very states that claim to defend Somalia's independence are the ones that have quietly hollowed out Somalia's autonomy. If anything, it is Somaliland's stability--and Israel's recognition of it--that represents a step toward geopolitical reality.
Turkey's grip on Somalia
Keep up with the latest headlines on WhatsApp | LinkedIn
Somalia's problem is not merely that it is weak; weak states can still be sovereign. Somalia's problem is that it has become a Turkish client state. Ankara does not simply advise from a distance--it controls infrastructure, trains soldiers, commands strategic assets, and manages revenue streams. Turkish companies operate at the heart of Somalia's economy and security sector: Turkish personnel control Mogadishu's Aden Adde International Airport, and a Turkish firm manages Mogadishu's seaport--both critical chokepoints for trade, aid, and diplomacy. When a foreign power controls your air and sea gateways, you are sovereign on paper but dependent in practice.
Turkey's military footprint in Somalia is equally decisive. Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu is Turkey's largest overseas military base, training thousands of Somali troops. In 2024, Ankara secured a ten-year maritime defense agreement that effectively places Somalia's coastal security under Turkish supervision. Diplomats often cite Somalia's coastline as 3,300 kilometers--but that figure includes Somaliland's 850 km coast, which Mogadishu has not controlled since 1991. Somalia's effective coastline is closer to 2,450 km, and it is now patrolled by Turkey.
Turkey's economic influence is just as expansive. Mogadishu's airport and port revenues--along with major construction contracts--are tied to Turkish state-linked firms. Offshore hydrocarbon blocks have been allocated to Turkey's national oil company. Somalia's fisheries, meanwhile, are now managed through a joint venture controlled by Turkey's military pension fund (the OYAK). Tellingly, any disputes are funneled to international arbitration rather than Somali courts, underscoring how even legal sovereignty has been outsourced.
None of this is accidental. It is a deliberate extension of Turkish grand strategy. Ankara's involvement in Somalia is part of the same geopolitical project that plays out in the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, and Libya. In the Mediterranean, Turkish drilling vessels escorted by warships have challenged maritime boundaries claimed by Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. In Syria, Turkish-backed militias and drones have complicated Israel's northern security environment, as Ankara postures as patron to groups openly hostile to the Jewish state. In Libya, Turkish drone strikes and advisors altered the course of an entire civil war. And in Qatar, Turkey maintains a military base that gives it leverage over Gulf politics.
How Somaliland outplayed Somalia
Against this backdrop, Israel's recognition of Somaliland was a diplomatic masterstroke. Somaliland represents everything Somalia is not: functioning institutions, genuine security, and independence from Turkish tutelage. Somaliland has governed itself since 1991, after withdrawing from a failed union with Somalia. That withdrawal was not "secession" in the usual sense; it resembled the dissolution of the short-lived Egypt-Syria union in 1961 or the end of the Senegambia confederation in 1989. Somaliland simply reverted to the borders it held upon its internationally recognized independence on June 26, 1960.
Somaliland represents everything Somalia is not: functioning institutions, genuine security, and independence from Turkish tutelage."
Unlike Somalia, Somaliland did not collapse into warlord fiefdoms or jihadist infiltration. It built institutions, held competitive elections, and transferred power peacefully. Its new president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi "Cirro," came to office via a careful, consensus-driven politics rare in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland even issues its own currency, runs its own central bank, collects taxes, and maintains internal stability without Turkish soldiers or foreign peacekeepers on its soil.
Even more significant from Israel's perspective is Somaliland's strategic geography. With Yemen's Houthi rebels attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Iran expanding its influence in Yemen, the Gulf of Aden has become a maritime frontline. Somaliland sits opposite Yemen's war zones--but on the stable, secure side of the strait. It offers Israel something Somalia never could: a friendly vantage point uncontaminated by Turkish, Iranian, or Arab League agendas.
The reaction inside Somaliland after Israel's announcement said more about Somaliland than any press release could. Crowds in Hargeisa, Borama, Erigavo, Gabiley, and Berbera poured into the streets in celebration--flags waved, music blared, and fireworks lit up the sky--as Somalilanders proudly marked the moment that a 34-year-old de facto state had finally been seen by the world. In contrast to the fierce anti-Israel protests that erupted in parts of the Muslim world, Somaliland's Muslim population did not respond with hostility or religious fury. The dominant emotion was pride--pride that a functioning African democracy denied recognition for so long was at last acknowledged on the global stage.
When Israel's foreign minister Gideon Sa'ar arrived in Hargeisa, he was greeted with normal protocol, hospitality, and calm dignity. Elders welcomed him with respect, and ministers treated him like any other visiting foreign dignitary. The images stood in stark contrast to the rage that often accompanies high-level Israeli visits elsewhere in the region. Somaliland demonstrated that Islam and political moderation are not incompatible--and that engaging with Israel does not require an abandonment of faith or principle.
Meanwhile, Mogadishu struggled to maintain diplomatic momentum. China's foreign minister abruptly postponed a historic visit to Somalia just days after Sa'ar met Somaliland's leaders--a visit that Somalia had hoped would validate its standing. For a government desperate for international recognition, the last-minute cancellation was deeply embarrassing. Somaliland gained recognition from a significant power; Somalia lost a diplomatic opportunity without explanation. The contrast was brutal and revealing. States that govern themselves attract engagement. Client states get managed.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
Netanyahu's Red Sea masterstroke
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's critics may never admit it, but his Somaliland decision reflects the same strategic instinct behind the Abraham Accords and Israel's Eastern Mediterranean gas partnerships. He saw that Turkey's presence in Somalia was not a regional footnote but rather a southern extension of Ankara's anti-Israel posture in Syria and the Mediterranean. He saw that the Red Sea was fast becoming central to Israel's security architecture. And he acted.
Israel's recognition did not reshape Somaliland--it reshaped the diplomatic context in which Somaliland exists. It forced regional and global players to choose between a dependency masquerading as sovereignty and a functioning state denied recognition mostly by inertia. It disrupted Turkey's quiet expansion in the Horn of Africa and introduced a pro-West, pro-Israel actor into a corridor where Turkey and Iran had assumed they would compete uncontested.
If the purpose of foreign policy is to recognize reality and use it to advance national interests, Israel's Somaliland move meets the test. Somalia depends. Turkey exploits. Somaliland governs. And Israel has finally acknowledged what everyone else will eventually be forced to admit: sovereignty is not a slogan--it is the ability to govern territory, secure borders, and conduct one's foreign affairs without waiting for permission. AS
Editor's Note: Hamse A. Khaire is a Somaliland political insider, strategist, and commentator. He serves on the Central Committee of the ruling Waddani Party. His analysis focuses on politics in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea geopolitics. He writes in a personal capacity.
