Addis Abeba — From the liberation struggles of the 20th century to today's diplomatic flashpoints, the right of peoples to choose their political destiny has inspired countless movements and toppled several empires. Self-determination is also among the most celebrated principles in international politics. Enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reaffirmed in international human rights law, it is frequently invoked as a universal right.
Yet, in practice, self-determination functions less as a legal norm and more as a political instrument. It has been deployed selectively, depending on power, alliances, and geopolitical convenience. Here the diplomatic fallout following Israel's recent decision to recognize Somaliland as an independent state offers a revealing case study. The reactions, at least from Somalia, Eritrea, and a bloc of Arab, Islamic, and African states, expose the deep contradictions that shape how self-determination is defended in some contexts and rejected in others.
Question of historical statehood
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Somaliland's claim to self-determination is often framed by its opponents as a secessionist project that undermines Somalia's territorial integrity. This framing, however, obscures critical historical and legal realities. Somaliland was a British protectorate that became an independent state on 26 June 1960, before voluntarily entering into a union with the former Italian Somaliland days later. As widely documented, that union was never fully ratified through a mutually accepted legal instrument. More importantly, the Somali state later collapsed entirely. Following years of mass atrocities committed by the Siad Barre regime--particularly in the north--Somaliland reasserted its sovereignty in 1991.
Since then, Somaliland has functioned as a de facto state, holding elections, maintaining its own security forces, and exercising effective control over its territory. An op-ed published by Addis Standard has previously described it as a relatively stable political entity in a volatile region, noting that its lack of recognition reflects global political inertia rather than the absence of governance, as explored in its analysis on Somaliland as the Horn of Africa's stable star shunned by an outdated global order. Despite these realities, Somaliland has remained unrecognized for more than three decades, largely due to the African Union's strict adherence to inherited colonial borders.
Israel's recognition, immediate backlash, and Somalia's moral contradiction
On 26 December 2025, Israel announced that it would officially recognize Somaliland as an independent state, becoming the first UN member to do so. The announcement immediately triggered sharp regional and international backlash. A bloc of 21 Arab, Islamic, and African states issued a joint statement rejecting Israel's recognition, reaffirming Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and warning that the move violated international law. The details of this reaction were outlined in Addis Standard's news coverage of how Eritrea invoked the China-Taiwan analogy as states rejected Israel's Somaliland recognition.
The opposition did not stop there. Regional organizations--including IGAD, the Arab League, and the Gulf Cooperation Council--also issued coordinated statements rejecting Israel's move and reiterating their support for Somalia's unity, as documented in a report on how IGAD, the Arab League, and the GCC rejected Israel's recognition of Somaliland. Together, these responses highlight a familiar diplomatic reflex: when self-determination collides with fears of fragmentation, territorial integrity almost always prevails.
One of the most striking contradictions in this episode lies in Somalia's own diplomatic posture. On the global stage, Somalia presents itself as a vocal defender of Palestinian self-determination, condemning Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank and framing the Palestinian struggle as a moral and legal imperative. Yet, in practice, Somalia categorically denies the legitimacy of Somaliland's claim to self-determination, rejecting even the premise that Somaliland's historical statehood and three decades of de facto independence warrant serious political engagement. As analysts some have noted, Somalia invokes international law selectively--embracing self-determination abroad while emphasizing territorial integrity at home. The principle does not change; only its political usefulness does.
Geometry of selective recognition
Israel's recognition of Somaliland adds another layer of complexity. Israel grounds its own legitimacy in the principle of Jewish self-determination, yet continues to deny full sovereign self-determination to Palestinians, particularly in Gaza. Observers argue that Israel's recent move further reflects strategic calculation rather than a principled commitment to universal self-determination, especially given Somaliland's strategic location along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden--a point raised in the same reporting that detailed the regional backlash to Israel's decision.
The joint rejection of Somaliland's recognition by Arab, Islamic, and African states underscores how bloc politics frequently override legal nuance."
International coverage has echoed this assessment. A report by Reuters framed Israel's recognition of Somaliland as a move shaped by regional security considerations rather than legal precedent, highlighting how Israel's decision to recognize Somaliland triggered diplomatic controversy. The contrast is stark: Palestinians remain stateless after decades of international advocacy, while Somaliland--peaceful and administratively functional--has waited more than thirty years for recognition.
Eritrea's reaction, irony of liberation history
Eritrea's response has been among the most forceful. In a statement, Eritrean authorities condemned Israel's recognition of Somaliland as "neither sudden nor accidental," warning that it risked stoking regional and global instability and calling for urgent discussion at the UN Security Council. Eritrea's statement, which invoked an analogy with the China-Taiwan dispute, was detailed in Addis Standard's reporting on how Eritrea urged an unequivocal UN response to Israel's Somaliland recognition.
The irony is difficult to overlook. Eritrea itself gained independence in 1991 after a long liberation struggle grounded explicitly in the right to self-determination. Yet today, Eritrea rejects Somaliland's claim outright--illustrating how revolutionary legitimacy often hardens into conservative sovereignty once statehood is achieved.
Bloc politics, limits of solidarity
The joint rejection of Somaliland's recognition by Arab, Islamic, and African states underscores how bloc politics frequently override legal nuance. Many of the same states that rejected Somaliland's recognition are among the strongest supporters of Palestinian self-determination. The difference is not legal reasoning but political risk. Palestine unites public opinion and poses little threat of inspiring separatist claims within most Arab states. Somaliland, by contrast, raises uncomfortable questions about borders, recognition, and precedent in Africa. As commentators have argued on African diplomacy, stability is often prioritized over justice--especially when justice threatens inherited political arrangements.
Self-determination as political currency
What this tangled web reveals is not a failure of international law, but a failure of consistency in its application. Self-determination is too often wielded as a tool of political advantage rather than a principle of universal application. It operates less as a universal right than as a political currency. States support it when it weakens adversaries, strengthens alliances, or enhances moral legitimacy. They reject it when it threatens borders, regimes, or regional power balances.
International law remains present--but selectively interpreted. History is remembered when useful and forgotten when inconvenient. Territorial integrity is elevated when convenient; popular will is emphasized when useful. Referendums are celebrated in some contexts and dismissed in others. History is invoked selectively, with certain dates remembered and others forgotten. The tragedy is that people caught in these contradictions--Somalilanders, Palestinians, Gazans, Sahrawis, Kurds, and many others--experience self-determination not as a right but as a waiting room with no clear rules for entry.
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Toward more honest discourse
Still, none of this suggests that every claim to self-determination should be recognized. Recognition has consequences, and instability is a legitimate concern. But intellectual honesty requires consistency. If historical statehood, popular consent, sustained governance, and protection from mass atrocities matter in one case, they must matter in others. If they do not, states should admit openly that their positions are political choices rather than principled applications of international law. And Somaliland's case appears emblematic of a broader truth: self-determination is celebrated in rhetoric, constrained in practice, and granted only when power allows.
Indeed, Somaliland's case is especially instructive, for it challenges conventional categories. It existed briefly as a sovereign state, entered into a union that later collapsed, and has operated independently for over three decades. If politics continues to outweigh principle, then neither Somaliland nor other contested cases--whether in Palestine, Western Sahara, Taiwan, or elsewhere--will ever find just outcomes. Until then, self-determination will remain a contested, selective, and strategically deployed concept--applied with passion in some cases and dismissed with convenience in others. AS
Editor's Note: Dagnachew Ayenew Yeshiwas holds a Ph.D. in Peace and Development Studies and is a senior lecturer and researcher in the Department of Peace and Development Studies at Wollo University, Ethiopia. He can be contacted at dagnualem@gmail.com
