Uganda: A Political Obituary of Bobi Wine 2

opinion

What Uganda's opposition lacks and how it has relegated them into a position of perpetual sower losers

THE LAST WORD | ANDREW M. MWENDA | In our column last week, we argued that how to challenge President Yoweri Museveni in an election has to respond to the specific ways in which he organises elections. We argued that this is the realm of strategy. Strategy is the art or science of matching one's ends with one's means to achieve a specified goal. It is a framework of action that allows an actor--a commander of an army, a captain of a ship, a politician in a campaign, a CEO in market competition, etc.--to match their aim with the means at their disposal.

It is a clearly laid out sequence of actions on how to move from the beginning point to the end goal. Yet, between one's starting point and their end goal stand myriad obstacles: it is like using a compass. It can direct you to the right destination, but it will not tell you of the swamps, gorges, marshlands, rivers, mountains, wild animals, hostile tribes, intolerable weather, etc. along the way.

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This brings us back to the opposition's everlasting complaints about Museveni placing myriad roadblocks in their way, stealing their votes, etc. In other times and places, the roadblocks Museveni throws in the way of his opponents have been overcome, dodged and even exploited to defeat an incumbent. State brutality gives Museveni's opponents free publicity, buys them public sympathy, revolts Museveni's supporters, and dents the president's reputation domestically, regionally and even internationally. The challenge is how to exploit this public relations windfall to gain political advantage.

Where an opponent is strong, the strategy of a challenger is to use asymmetric tactics: this is how the USA was defeated in Vietnam and Afghanistan in spite of its overwhelming power and resources. It is the way Museveni wore down the government of Milton Obote and his UPC in Luwero. It is the strategy a David employs against a Goliath. The problem with Uganda's opposition is that they fight Goliath as if they too are Goliath.

Fighting a superior opponent who brutalizes you may score high on nobility and heroism but low on discretion and effectiveness. This is why underdog strategies, in situations where the starting balance of power would predict defeat, provide the real test for creativity. Such strategies always look to success through the creative use of superior intelligence. Here, the weak challenger employs decoys, deceptions, lies, ruses, feints, distractions, etc to outmanoeuvre a superior opponent. You win by dint of wit, not muscle power.

Museveni has effective personal control over the core institutions of the state: the security forces and the economy. He has the money to rent political support and the army and police to coerce it. He has an entrenched political party that is embedded within the state. This makes him very strong, but it does not make him invincible. One has to study his vulnerabilities carefully and look for ways to outfox him. This has been the biggest failure of the opposition.

For instance, Museveni has grown old and is now physically and mentally exhausted. He has no new ideas to inspire confidence in the young and has limited physical energy and zest to push his plans through. His party has grown increasingly corrupt and incompetent. Most people around him are out to line their own pockets rather than fight for him. He has lost a lot of the ideological (or spiritual) basis for his support. His erstwhile allies in the West have abandoned him. He faces a demographic challenge of young people whom he cannot connect to emotionally.

Consequently, Museveni's government has many failures that the opposition can exploit to rally support. The corruption in it stinks. The quality of public services and goods is deteriorating. Many young people who have been educated and exposed have become aspirational. But the state cannot address many of their existential challenges. So they are socially frustrated. They form a powerful pool of potential support for the opposition. Yet their support cannot be taken for granted. It needs to be cultivated, organized and then harnessed into purposeful political behavior.

Bobi Wine is young and energetic, and given his previous career as a musician, he is able to attract the young that form a big share of the Ugandan public. He has the sympathy of Western powers, a brand name and an army of highly motivated supporters. This enthusiasm of his supporters compensates for lack of money. Where Museveni spends billions to get one million votes, BW need not spend money at all. He needs to use his political capital. He doesn't.

Bobi Wine's problem has been a lack of strategy. For the last five years, he has done little or nothing to win over large masses of people in Uganda. There are many Ugandan elites from across the country who are frustrated with Museveni's government. Many are high-ranking intellectuals; others former ministers and senior politicians, including MPs. There are leaders of our traditional institutions, our religious groupings, the business community, the youth, students, workers, women, farmers, etc. How many of these did BW look out for to talk to? Many of these may not have joined him. But they could give him valuable advice.

But look at Museveni. The man is president of the country. He has held the job for 40 years. Everyone in every government institution today was appointed and rose to their rank under his patronage. He has all the resources of the state under his personal control. Yet one sees Museveni reaching out to people both high and low in rank. He will visit the Kabaka and the archbishop but also invite a lowly priest for a meeting. He will reach out to Full Figure or Kasuku or Kusasira and invite them for tea at state house. He talks to other musicians like Chameleon and Babe Cool more than Bobi Wine has ever tried.

It is in this context that Museveni and Bobi Wine went to battle. As I have already mentioned, I traversed the country with two professors, one in political science, the other in sociology. Both have a rich experience of Uganda and are some of the most insightful observers of Ugandan politics one can meet. By the time the road trip had ended, they had written Bobi Wine's political epitaph. They could see the election results in favor of Museveni, both predicting the president would get above 70%. Why? Outside of Buganda, there was little or no Bobi Wine. Yet in the echo chamber of social media in Kampala and its outlying areas, a small group of Ugandan activists were predicting a win for Bobi Wine that existed only on social media and in their imagination.

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