Addis Abeba — Each time I think about negotiation, my mind returns to a parable about camels that I read some time ago in one of William Ury's books, "Getting to Yes with Yourself: How to Get What You Truly Want." It tells a Middle Eastern story of three brothers whose father dies, leaving 17 camels. In his will, the oldest is to receive one-half, the middle one-third, and the youngest one-ninth. When the brothers try to carry out their father's wishes, they quickly discover the problem: seventeen camels cannot be divided this way without killing one. Frustration turns into argument, and the dispute drags on until they finally seek the help of a wise old woman. She listens quietly, then offers a simple solution. She adds one camel of her own, bringing the total to eighteen. Suddenly, the math works. The oldest receives nine camels, the middle six, and the youngest two. Their shares add up to the original seventeen, and satisfied, the brothers return the extra camel to the woman. This story demonstrates that the brothers fulfilled their promises without altering their demands. Ury's lesson is that disputes that seem impossible can often be resolved not by forcing outcomes, but by introducing a creative compromise that allows everyone to move forward.
Our political debates remain trapped between two old choices. Let's take one example--the old unitary government or the "new" ethnic federal system. Two visions. Two narratives. Two maps: the old 14 regions or the new ethnic boundaries. It's a rigid choice between A or B, trapped between dream and nostalgia--with no imagination for C, D, or anything beyond resentment and false hope.
In the camel parable, the mediator--the old woman--did not take sides or rewrite the father's will. Instead, she reframed the problem. The brothers were not really fighting over ownership; they were stuck on how the division had to be done. It was a positional way of thinking about division. By introducing a new element, she shifted their attention away from rigid positions and toward what actually mattered--the underlying interests. The conflict was resolved not by picking a winner, but by changing the structure of the negotiation itself.
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This distinction between positional and interest-based negotiation is critical to understanding Ethiopia's political impasse. In their book published in 2017, Richard Warrick and Albert Morales explain that position-based negotiations encourage fixed outcomes and adversarial postures, while interest-based negotiations invite creativity and compromise. Ethiopian political discourse has largely remained positional--defending systems, maps, and identities as non-negotiable--leaving little room for innovation or hybrid solutions.
As a result, national debates continue to revolve around binary choices. Each side frames the issue as existential, reinforcing fear and distrust. Like the brothers arguing over 17 camels, political actors remain locked inside a problem they refuse to reframe. The outcome is predictable: stalemate, escalation, and recurring conflict.
The conflict escalation model illustrates how this rigidity plays out. Political disagreements rarely move directly to violence; they pass through stages--polarization, incivility, breakdown of communication, and finally armed struggle. In Ethiopia, the stages where compromise and mediation could intervene are consistently bypassed or suppressed.
Politics without middle ground
Historically, state responses to incivility and peaceful dissent have emphasized control rather than dialogue. Civil protests and strikes--essential mechanisms for releasing political pressure--are often met with repression. This effectively removes the compromise phase from the conflict cycle, pushing disputes rapidly toward armed struggle. Today, large parts of the country are engulfed in violence, while other regions remain trapped in sustained political hostility.
At its core, this is a failure of political imagination. Ethiopia continues to present itself with only two possible futures. Two systems. Two maps. Two narratives. These are inherited positions, not problem-solving frameworks. They ask who should prevail rather than how a diverse society can govern itself sustainably.
In my previous article published in Addis Standard entitled "From Governance to Accountability: A Roadmap to Avert Tigray's Crisis," I argued that Tigray must begin building institutions grounded in political, bureaucratic, legal, and professional accountability. I received thoughtful feedback from well-meaning Ethiopians who argued that such institution-building is unrealistic under a deeply authoritarian and increasingly dictatorial political environment. While these concerns are valid, they risk conflating regime change with institutional development.
Politicians and human rights advocates are right to call for legal accountability and peaceful political transition. But institution-building cannot wait for ideal political conditions. Institutions are not only laws and offices; they are norms, expectations, and professional cultures that must be cultivated within society itself. Romzek and Dubnick (1987) argue accountability is broader than answerability--it is a mindset of managing public interest and expectation. Accountability must be instilled in minds and hearts long before it is enforced by courts or constitutions. It should have started yesterday--but better late than never.
Ethiopian political discourse has largely remained positional--defending systems, maps, and identities as non-negotiable--leaving little room for innovation or hybrid solutions."
The parable of the 18th camel reminds us that resolution often requires structural innovation, not victory. This lesson is reflected in real-world political systems--most notably Switzerland. Rather than concentrating power in a single prime minister or president, Switzerland operates under a seven-member Federal Council that collectively serves as the executive branch. Leadership is shared, and the presidency rotates annually among council members. This design minimizes personalization of power, lowers political stakes, and forces continuous negotiation and compromise among diverse political actors.
Switzerland's system is neither purely centralized nor fragmented. It is a deliberately engineered structure designed to manage diversity through cooperation rather than domination. In this sense, it functions as an institutional "18th camel"--a creative political design introduced to prevent deadlock, reduce conflict, and stabilize governance over time.
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Ethiopia's challenges are different in history and scale, but the lesson is transferable. Conflict resolution does not require choosing between old models; it requires designing new ones. Shared leadership, rotating executive authority, hybrid administrative arrangements, and consensus-driven institutions could all serve as Ethiopian versions of the 18th camel--mechanisms that reframe political competition and normalize compromise.
Ultimately, Ethiopia's recurring conflicts are not inevitable. They are the result of rigid positions, degraded discourse, and the absence of institutionalized compromise. Peace will not emerge from suppression, total victories, or endless debates over old maps. It will come from the willingness to innovate politically--to step into the uncomfortable middle where creativity, compromise, and shared interests guide governance.
Until Ethiopia finds the courage to introduce its own 18th camel, it will remain trapped in an argument over how to divide 17 camels--while the cost of that argument continues to be paid by the nation itself. AS
Editor's Note: Donek Zemo is a certified project manager working with consultants that support public institutions on their bond planning and implementation. Prior to her current role, she had many years of experience supporting disadvantaged people, including those affected by war. Donek can be reached at donekzemo@gmail.com
