The case of social activist Osvaldo Caholo is not an isolated judicial failure. When examined alongside the detention of Serrote José de Oliveira, widely known as "General Nila," it reveals a consistent pattern of judicial non-compliance with the law in politically sensitive cases in Angola.
On 12 January 2026, the Guarantees Judge of the 5th Section of the Criminal Division of the Luanda District Court, Maria Nazaré Dias, ordered activist Osvaldo Caholo to stand immediate trial on charges of Rebellion, Public Incitement to Crime, and Public Apology of Crime. At the same time, she unlawfully refused the adversarial investigation (instrução contraditória) requested by the defense counsels Bruno Xingui and Simão Afonso, despite clear provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code requiring adversarial judicial scrutiny when legal or factual objections are raised.
Caholo had already been held in detention for over six months solely based on an interview in which he expressed political criticism of President João Lourenço. The subsequent decision to send him to immediate trial, while denying adversarial judicial scrutiny, therefore reinforced the use of criminal proceedings to penalize political expression rather than to adjudicate legally cognizable offences.
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The defense did not submit a generic or abstract request. It identified concrete deficiencies in the indictment, raised unresolved factual questions, challenged the absence of criminal typicity, and requested witness and expert testimony. Under Angolan law, such a request requires an adversarial hearing. The judge declined to apply the law.
A comparable pattern is evident in the case of Serrote José de Oliveira, widely known as "General Nila." A street bookseller, José Serrote is a regular presence at peaceful social protests, where he appears as a self-styled "general." He maintains an active presence on social media, where he openly criticizes President João Lourenço's rule, and is also known locally for organizing soup distributions for the poorest residents of his neighborhood.
After being shot by officers of the Criminal Investigation Service while walking to a hospital with his siblings, "General Nila" has been held in detention for over six months. The sole legal basis invoked to justify his detention was Article 4 of the Law on Crimes of Vandalism.
On 4 December 2025, Angola's Constitutional Court declared that provision unconstitutional, with universally binding and retroactive effect (erga omnes and ex tunc). From that moment, the offense underpinning his detention ceased to exist in legal terms. The law required immediate release.
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That release did not occur.
Judicial and prosecutorial authorities failed to act, allowing detention to continue in the absence of any valid criminal offense. What should have been an automatic legal consequence was instead suspended through institutional omission.
The legal framework is clear in both cases. Judicial authorities chose not to apply it.
In Caholo's case, a judge refused a mandatory procedural safeguard.
In "General Nila's" case, courts and prosecutors ignored a binding constitutional ruling.
This repetition establishes a pattern of concern: judicial actors selectively disregard clear legal obligations when cases intersect with political interests. Procedural guarantees are denied, constitutional decisions are rendered ineffective, and deprivation of freedom is sustained not through lawful justification, but through silence and inertia.
Such cases point to more than individual judicial error. They reveal a system in which the judiciary no longer even sustains the pretense of independence, operating instead as a permissive mechanism for politically convenient outcomes.
When judges ignore explicit procedural duties and fail to enforce binding constitutional rulings, the rule of law is not merely weakened, it is actively suspended. Detention becomes a political instrument, sustained by judicial inaction rather than legal authority.
This constitutes judicial capture in practice. Courts formally exist, but their decisions cease to be governed by law. Under such conditions, fundamental rights are no longer enforceable guarantees, but conditional privileges dependent on political alignment.
