1. We have failed on ALL three key issues. And the unresolved agenda endures
First, since the 60-0 of 1982, there is agreement in principle by all major political parties to reform the electoral system to provide for some parliamentary representation and fairness to a party that polls close to 30% of votes without obtaining a single seat. Forty three years on, the country has been incapable of introducing reforms to cure the defects of FPTP in terms of disproportionality between votes and seats. In spite of multiple attempts and several commissions, consultation papers, expert reports, proposals and recommendations.
Second, since the mid-1980s, all political leaders profess that they respect women and are fully committed to gender equity and fairness and women have a key role to play in politics. Almost forty years on, women, who represent 50.8 % of the population continue to suffer the worst democratic deficit and cruel indignity with only 18.2% of MPs and 8% of ministers. And the performative shows goes on even if it is so easy to cure this 'human rights' deficit by accepting the simple recommendation made 24 years ago by Sachs to field at least one woman in each of the 20 three member constituencies.
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Third, we have been chastised by the Supreme Court of Mauritius and warned by the Privy Council several times over the last 35 years or so that we cannot use the outdated population census of 1972 to allocate Best Loser (BL) seats. We were admonished by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in August 2012 and tasked to provide an effective and enforceable remedy for the violation of rights of our citizens as the country continues to use a population census of 1972 to allocate BLS in the 2010 elections. We had 180 days from August 2012 to communicate our decision. Almost 14 years later, we have dismally failed to do so. And the same demographic census which is now 54 years old is still in operation. And to add salt to the wounds, there are proposals to keep the BLS without an update of the 1972 statistics.
2. Why has it not happened when all parties agree on reform?
Forget the usual blame game of politicians accusing each other of policy failures and the partisan narrative. All major parties have been in office and had the required majority to implement reforms. The six-million-dollar question is why we have lamentably failed to implement electoral reforms when we all agree on the three issues on the table : fairness to parties, equity to women and the 'illegality or illegitimacy' of using 1972 statistics to allot BLS seats ?
Is it performative politics at its cynical best, optics versus substance, rhetoric against policies, disagreement on the details, vested interests, political brinkmanship, partisan blinkers. The weight or the burden of our political history leading to Independence. Or the country is very divided on what should be the best electoral formula in a plural society. The history, political environment, context and specific circumstances of the country have a determining role in the choice of the voting formula. It also depends on what the country wants to achieve and what weights it assigns to each of the conditions for a good voting formula. Electoral rules should not only be fashionable; they should also fit the circumstances and match the realities of the country. They cannot be bought off the peg; they must be made to measure. This is where it gets stuck.
There is also a lack of expertise and knowledge to fully understand the wide ramifications of a new electoral system. Its unintended consequences, its inherent risks, its capacity to surprise us with more than we bargained for. This creates a climate of fear, suspicion and uncertainty that leads to policy paralysis. There are also strategic and tactical political considerations when parties try to take advantage of either the status quo or the proposed reform.
3. Why open the floodgate to then disappoint people?
For electoral reform to have any chance of success, there is an absolute necessity to focus on key issues and not to get distracted with too many items on the agenda. In essence, to concentrate on three critical issues that matter for electoral reform as they have consistently been addressed since 2001, to ask the relevant questions and seek the appropriate answers, so as to facilitate the decision-making process. Instead of giving the impression that we are starting afresh with a completely new voting formula. Which is absolutely not the case.
While it is commendable to have broad-based participation, the views of stakeholders on electoral reforms are being sought without any guidelines on the direction of travel. Which is very different from the terms of reference of both the Sachs Commission of 2001 and the Parliamentary Select Committee of 2002. Equally the Consultation paper of Government in 2014 and the Government proposals of 2018 narrowed the scope and scale of the reform. These guidelines constituted the basis for an informed discussion on key areas of electoral reform. For instance, in all four documents, the 20 three-member constituencies were maintained as the bedrock of the electoral system.
As no guidelines have been provided this time, proposals and suggestions will likely go in all directions like a headless chicken. There are no guardrails to direct the debate and assist the deliberations. It would lead to chaos and confusion. Dangerously, it would raise expectations. We are witnessing it already. Three examples out of many that I have seen or read recently.
Some people are expecting a seismic shift in the electoral system (full PR with the whole country as one constituency), others want a rupture (single or two- or even four-member constituencies instead of the current three member ridings), some will argue for disruption (to review the largely unequal constituencies and redraw electoral boundaries).
4. The gameplan of Government looks very different
Frankly, I have very strong doubts that any of these 'disruptive' proposals will even be assessed, let alone adopted. At best, I believe what is being considered is an evolution that will retain the 20 three-member constituencies (plus 2 in Rodrigues) and superimpose a dose of PR in an attempt to cure the principal defect of FPTP on disparity between votes polled and seats obtained. And to find a mechanism to ensure fair and adequate representation to all socio-demographic groups as it exists today, in case the BLS is tweaked, subsumed or replaced.
Honestly and as well articulated by many electoral experts, we do not need electoral reform to provide for gender fairness. We have to implement the simple and effective recommendation of the Sachs Commission of 24 years ago to field at least one woman in each constituency, similar to what we had done for local elections in 2012. Period. The above conclusions are based on my experience researching and writing on electoral systems in Mauritius and in plural societies across the world over the last 25 years. And I wrote a thesis and obtained a PhD on a very apposite subject.
'Evaluating and proposing electoral systems for plural societies: the case of Mauritius'
I had to study electoral systems in plural and deeply cleaved societies like South Africa, Fiji, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Belgium, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and even UK, Singapore and India. In a comparative evaluation to understand how these plural countries reconcile the different attributes of a good electoral system. In terms of stability, fairness, inclusion and diversity. And also, to comprehend the dynamics of the process for proposing electoral reforms, even if they do not actually materialize. I have also submitted comprehensive reports to the Sachs Commission and to Select Committees on electoral reforms and to various governments on the subject.
5. The quest for the curated electoral system since the 1950s
From the talks culminating in the London agreement in 1957 to the Trustram-Eve Commission that underpinned the elections in 1959; from the De Smith constitutional reform Commission of 1963 to the Banwell Commission on electoral system and its modifications by Stonehouse in 1967; from the Sachs Commission of 2001 to the Parliamentary Select Committee of 2002; from Carcassonne, Bogdanor and Villanova report of 2012 to the UK electoral experts including John Curtice in 2012; and my own contribution over the years, there have been so many proposals and suggestions that it would be difficult to identify new ones.
Proposals varied from single, two- and even four-member constituencies in addition to the current three-member ridings with many variants of how to introduce a dose of PR in the system with different number of seats and allocation methods. Few want to embrace a complete PR system with the country being one constituency as was proposed in 1957 at the London discussion, some would like to adopt single transferable vote or limited vote. All these options have been appraised by many constitutional experts since the 1950s. There have also been many ideas on how to ensure fair and adequate representation to minorities and to women and young people.
Undoubtedly, the current consultation exercise will generate many suggestions. Similar to the Sachs Commission in 2001 which received more than 70 written submissions, met 69 persons and held meetings across the country to meet the public. Suggestions ranged from rupturing completely the current formula to keeping it as is, from some disruption to tweaking it to cure its deficiencies, from a major reform that includes constituency size and the financing of political parties to the right of the diaspora to vote, term limit, who decides on election date, amongst others. From lowering the number of seats for cost efficiency to raising it to 104 members for democracy. From retaining the BLS and updating the population census to its abolition, its replacement and its subsumption. From fairness to women to being against quota for them. We will have them all. It would be like ice cream that comes in different shape, forms and flavours according to one's taste.
6. An extremely challenging task to find the holy grail
Many do not realise that it is extremely difficult to embrace electoral reforms, even with the best of intentions. The UK has been trying to change its FPTP system for over 125 years. It took New Zealand over 75 years and two very distorted elections where the party that won more votes actually lost the elections to introduce change in its electoral formula. Canada and France have been considering electoral reform for a very long time. I have discussed electoral reforms with many of my fellow compatriots over the last 25 years. Many do not fully appreciate how challenging it is. That is why it has not happened yet.
In the case of Mauritius, for over 70 years, starting during the colonial days, some of the best constitutional minds, some excellent electoral experts and some who fully grasp the mathematics of electoral reforms have collectively racked their brains to identify solutions to the complex challenges of electoral system in a multi-faith, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country. Most have not found the holy grail. At best we have had 'workarounds' with two electoral systems since the introduction of universal suffrage in 1959. One was scrapped in 1967 because of the high risks of corruption and nepotism with the appointment of 12 members in the sole discretion of the Governor in addition to its inability to be fair to all segments of society while the current one has been criticised because of its propensity at times to deliver disproportionate outcome and the mandatory declaration of candidates' communities.
7. Do not throw the FPTP baby away with the bathwater
The FPTP voting system has served the country well. Stable, strong, effective, accountable, inclusive and decisive government have lifted the country from poverty and a 'basket case' to an upper middle income nation. Our unique FPTP electoral rules (three-member constituency with BLS) have delivered on most of the core values of a good electoral system.
i) It meets the stability attribute well. FPTP is effective, transparent, responsive and decisive. There is no better system than FPTP to produce a clear and distinct majority which is absolutely essential to govern the country;
ii) It satisfies the diversity criterion. FPTP, coupled with the BLS, has delivered relatively well on socio-demographic inclusion and diversity. It was intended to protect the two 'minority' communities. And it has, by and large, met that objective. The two communities have received relatively good representation through the functioning of the BL seats to compensate their underrepresentation after the FPTP outcome. In fact the system has been fairer to communities than to parties;
iii) It is very accountable. There is no better system to hold MP's accountable than FPTP. There are good linkages between MPs and their constituents and this encourages political responsiveness and accountability. We see it all the time in Mauritius when MPs are under significant pressure to defend and protect the interests of their constituencies. This is a perfect example of pork barrel politics at its best where politicians secure government funds for projects or benefits (even employment and promotions) in their own constituencies to win votes and support;
iv) It shuns communal parties. The FPTP formula with its relatively high barrier to be elected has avoided single issue and communal parties, which is good for peace, harmony, accommodation and tolerance in a multi-religious and multi-cultural society. FPTP places a high threshold of votes to be elected, especially in a two- or threehorse contest;
v) The FPTP system is not at all responsible for the low representation of women. It is due to the lack of political will. In three-member constituencies, it is so easy to implement the simple recommendation of Sachs in 2002 to field at least one woman in each constituency as we have done for local elections.
So, FPTP has done very well on 4 of the 6 key attributes of a good electoral system. It could address gender unfairness if political leaders play ball and field at least one woman in each of the 20 constituencies. The main drawback of FPTP is therefore the inequitable distribution of seats to votes in some elections. This is what should be addressed without abandoning its strengths which are critical for the sustained socio economic development of our country.
8. The task is to find concrete answers to three critical questions
While there are many issues that are relevant for electoral reform, there are three key questions that should be addressed in a very comprehensive and interlinked way. This is based on the assumption that the current First Post the Post (FPTP) mode with 20 three-member constituencies in Mauritius and 2 MPs from Rodrigues will be maintained and the objective is how to add a dose of PR to cure the disparity between votes and seats for unsuccessful parties. We also have to address the gender and the inclusion and diversity issues. My research, detailed analysis and comparative country evaluation suggest that the challenges to successfully address these three issues vary considerably.
a. Gender fairness is the easy one to handle
The easiest one to solve is the acute gender unfairness. It does not even require electoral reform. We simply have to implement the Sachs recommendation of 2002 and extend it to the Executive. It can be done immediately as was the case for local elections in 2012. The only issue is how long will it take to reach parity and cure completely the huge democratic deficit of women who represent 50.8% of the population, but have only 18.5% of MPs and 8% of Cabinet Ministers.
Do women have to wait for another 60 years to make only small progress? Or should we take the bull by the horn and attain parity by 2030? To reach parity in parliamentary and cabinet representation as advocated by regional organisations such as SADC and the African Union. This is also consistent with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 5.5 to achieve gender equality and empower all women by 2030 and ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political and public life.
b. Injecting a dose of PR could be difficult without conditions attached The critical factor would be how to cure the defects of the current FPTP formula in terms of mismatch between votes and seats with the introduction of PR seats without affecting the stability and effectiveness of the system. More specifically what is the trade-off that would be acceptable to the nation as the more proportional the system, the less stable it will be. This will depend on four factors such as the number of PR seats in the mixed system, the method utilised to allocate them, the threshold for eligibility to these seats and the exact mathematical formula used to distribute them. There could be serious risks to stability if there is too much fairness and the mixed FPTP/PR formula collapses into a complete PR mode.
c.The Best Loser System (BLS) is the big elephant in the room
There are three challenges. First, if it is kept as is or in a modified form, we simply cannot use the population census of 1972 as aptly put by the Supreme Court, the Privy Council and the UNHRC. We have to update it as recommended by the UNHCR as one of the two solutions to cure the violation of the human rights of our citizens. Again, as well articulated by the Supreme Court, candidates have to mandatorily declare their communities for the BLS to operate as intended by the Constitution. Otherwise, the BLS exercise becomes nugatory and useless. Worst, it could allocate seats to communities who are already overrepresented and deny seats to those who are severely underrepresented. That would be an unmitigated disaster for fair and adequate representation.
Second is the debate on whether we need one dose of PR for party fairness and also the BLS for community fairness. Instead of subsuming the BLS into the PR seats to achieve both party and community representation in only one dose of PR.
Third, in case the BLS is replaced, is there a credible and alternative mechanism to ensure equivalent representation, inclusion and diversity in Parliament for all socio-demographic groups, especially those who have relied on the BLS to gain 'fair and adequate representation' as contained in Clause 5 (1) of the First Schedule of the Constitution? If the alternative mechanism is not well curated, it could penalise some communities in terms of parliamentary representation compared to what they have today.
9. Electoral reform is difficult as there are inherent risks
As the choice of electoral systems is one of the most important constitutional and institutional decisions for any democracy, it is important to understand the need for reforms, grasp the consequences of each proposal, draw on the experience of other countries and build the necessary consensus for implementation.
It should be clear that electoral rules are not neutral in their translation of votes into seats. There is nothing automatic about the way in which votes are converted into seats and different electoral systems will perform this function in different ways. Often, the electoral formula will influence the political colour of a country's Government, the relative strength of the various parties in Parliament, whether a small party becomes a king maker and very likely the identity of the Prime Minister. The electoral system may even influence the way people vote and parties behave.
Proposals for reforms often suffer from many drawbacks.
i) Parties often favour the status quo from which they have benefited and/or are likely to benefit. They could also introduce changes either to increase their chances of success or to prevent their opponents from winning. Some often change their position on electoral reforms depending on how the system has treated their electoral fortunes. This is true in many countries like the UK, Canada and France. Equally true in Mauritius.
ii) Political actors, however well intentioned, may not always have all the knowledge and the information to fully grasp all the consequences and ramifications of different electoral systems. Unfortunately, some may even have the tendency to believe what they know best is what is best for the country; or what is best for their party is also best for the country. It is very difficult to have an informed discussion on electoral reforms if one does not have an understanding of the Constitution and how it was designed, is not well versed in the complexity of these reforms and has hardly any knowledge of the mathematics of electoral system;
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For instance, I am very surprised that many people are not aware that Clause 5 of the First Schedule of our Constitution contains a mathematical definition of what 'a fair and adequate representation of each community' means. And it actually converts the current electoral formula into almost a full proportional representation system based on the four communities. Many are seeking a dose of PR for party fairness. The framers of the Constitution were more concerned about fairness to ethnic groups.
iii) Electoral reforms are rarely made in a political vacuum. It depends on contextual and temporal factors. It is all too often about crude realpolitik and blunt negotiating brinkmanship. A good reform should avoid these pitfalls. Some politicians are often tempted to use their knowledge to design electoral systems to promote formulae which they think will give them a partisan advantage. This could lead to choices that are not the best ones for the long-term political development of the country with potentially far reaching consequences for the democratic process. The worst that could happen is an attempt to satisfy the short term objectives of some political parties.
A partisan approach would lead to frequent changes in the electoral system as new governments attempt to concoct recipes to their advantages. This occurred in Mexico where the five elections between 1985 and 1997 were held under five different electoral systems! The one-sided approach led to constant changes in the electoral formula until the adoption of a consensual mixed member model in 1997. It was argued that nobody should contemplate "tribal politics being allowed to choose a new voting system".
iv) We have to be alert to the unintended consequences of proposals for reform. As the choice of a particular electoral system has far reaching consequences on the future political life of the country and as, once chosen, it often stays in force for a very long period, we should consider its unintended consequences of reforms. There could be many. One such example is the proposal to return to single-member constituencies as they existed between 1959 and 1967. One unintended consequence would be on the socio-demographic composition of Parliament, in addition to corrupt practices;
v) There are the risks of the country faring worse than what it bargained for. For instance, some suggestions about PR seats will reverse the outcome of the main FPTP elections. It has happened in Rodrigues that has a mixed FPTP formula with 12 FPTP and 5 PR seats. This is not what the country wants. The objective is to inject a dose of PR to mitigate the unfairness of the formula and not to disrupt the system completely.
vi) The cure cannot be worse than the disease. For example, some of the recommendations on an alternative mechanism for the BLS could materially change the parliamentary representation of some segments of the population compared to what it obtains today because of reliance of the BL seats to secure political presence.
vii) Many people believe that different is same with respect to what they are proposing. The method used to allot the PR seats matters significantly for stability and effectiveness. Yet many do not make the simple but key difference between a parallel mode (Sachs A) and a compensatory one (Sachs C). They believe the two mechanisms are the same when they are absolutely different.
viii) Some think that same is different. I meet many very well intentioned and smart compatriots who are dead against a full PR system but agree on a mixed FPTP/PR formula. Little do they realise that a mixed FPTP/PR system, even with 20 PR seats, very often collapses into a complete PR mode if these PR seats are distributed according to the compensatory mechanism of Sachs C. This is how it works in Germany, New Zealand and Lesotho. And also in Rodrigues.
10. Conclusion: There is no magical wand
Choosing the right electoral system in a plural society is a very difficult process as it is never neutral. We need to understand both the flaws of the current system as well as the defects of the proposed solution. It is critical to ask the right questions and seek the right answers. Often, a country cannot choose a perfect system but has to settle for one that is significantly less imperfect than other formulae. The best voting system for a country is not one that satisfies only one criterion completely, but one that provides a fair balance among the different attributes. A prudent approach is to design an electoral system that avoids serious shortcomings.
Historical, political, social, cultural, contextual and temporal factors have to be taken into account as the system and any reform do not take place in a vacuum. There are also many risks involved in any change as there can be unintended consequences which are difficult to evaluate at this stage. We need to both back test and future proof the electoral system being adopted. The paper has tried to provide a framework for constructive discussion on three key issues that matter for electoral reform.
