The same leaders who routinely invoke 'African solutions' seek external conflict mediation and treat African-led initiatives as optional or secondary.
African Union (AU) reforms to improve the body's effectiveness started 10 years ago in 2016. The ongoing process involves enhancing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which includes structures like the Peace and Security Council and regional economic communities (RECs).
But AU interventions in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Mozambique and the Sahel still appear marginal, as external powers reclaim dominance in Africa's security landscape.
Has the AU's reform agenda - with its focus on structures, financing and modalities - sidelined the more urgent task of sustaining collective African conflict responses grounded in member states' unity of purpose?
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A senior AU official told ISS Today that the core problem is not institutional design or policy frameworks, but rather insufficient member state support for African-led initiatives. A 2025 review concluded that the AU had a comprehensive normative architecture for peace, security, and governance, although some frameworks needed clarification.
And yet the same leaders who routinely invoke 'African solutions' undermine regional initiatives and seek external conflict mediation, treating African-led interventions as optional or secondary. This lessens the AU's influence despite its robust institutional presence.
In its first decade, the AU drove mediation and peace support operations with member states' backing. By the time the reform process began in 2016, the continental body's role in major crises had already started to weaken.
The United Nations (UN) took over the missions in Mali and the Central African Republic in 2013 and 2014, respectively. In 2016, the PSC reversed a decision to deploy peacekeepers in Burundi, inadvertently creating a risk aversion among council members toward approving future missions. The joint AU-UN Darfur mission was closed in 2020, leaving only Somalia with an active - albeit donor-dependent - peace support operation.
From 2013-23, RECs led several major initiatives, particularly peace support operations, preferring to tackle their challenges rather than wait for AU-level consensus. This was seen in the Lake Chad Basin, The Gambia, Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and DRC. And because RECs rarely engage one another, these ad hoc coalitions further undermined collective African efforts.
Cleavages deepened over the extent to which regions can independently lead peace initiatives, given the AU's primacy in African peace and security. Tensions like those between the AU and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Mali prompted efforts to clarify the division of labour between the AU and RECs as part of the reform process.
This lack of cohesion has undermined both AU and regional efforts to deal with conflicts, opening the door to external intervention.
The eastern DRC clearly illustrates the pitfalls of weak cohesion. When the M23 rebellion resurfaced in 2021, various AU institutions intervened with limited coordination, as the DRC, like many African countries, belongs to multiple RECs. The East African Community (EAC) deployed a force from 2022-23, followed by a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission from 2023-25. Both withdrew without collaborating or achieving security gains.
In June 2023, the AU convened the EAC, SADC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and UN under an AU-led roadmap. Yet during this period, Qatar and the United States brokered temporary arrangements with conflict parties.
These deals underscored that influence over belligerents mattered more than who had the mandate to mediate. Recent dynamics mark a departure from earlier episodes when the ICGLR, a regional mechanism within APSA, helped end the M23 rebellion in 2013.
At a January 2026 meeting in Togo, participants agreed on a unified mediation framework for eastern DRC under AU leadership. This is a positive step, but it continues a trend of the AU coordinating the growing number of regional and international mediators, while its own capacity to influence warring parties remains low.
Similarly in Sudan, the AU leads an effort to coordinate the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, UN, Arab League, EU and others. Although the AU's high-level panel for Sudan has pushed for sustainable peace through a political framework, a 2023 US-Saudi-mediated process led to temporary ceasefires.
The AU's coordination role is important - it ensures that mediation aligns with African frameworks and goals. But there's a perception that the AU seeks relevance through geography and turf politics rather than its ability to influence conflict parties. This is reinforced by member states' limited political backing for AU and REC mediation, which undermines their credibility and bargaining power.
The Sahel further exposes the gap between rhetoric and collective action. As Russia consolidates influence regionwide, neither the AU nor ECOWAS has fulfilled longstanding commitments - as part of the 2015 AU-led Nouakchott Process - to deploy an African Standby Force unit against violent extremism.
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Because RECs seem to have absolute control over their regional standby forces, the AU is unable to deploy these troops to joint missions. Affected states have formed parallel mechanisms, such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force and Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Warring parties and coup states like AES members Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, are cognisant of the AU's waning influence due to years of unimplemented decisions and an unwillingness to impose sanctions.
Rather than focusing on prolonged institutional reforms, the AU should prioritise persuading member states to invest their diplomatic, economic and military capital in AU-led initiatives. The real question is how to make that happen?
'The AU could achieve greater member state buy-in by focusing on regional anchor states,' says Priyal Singh, an Institute for Security Studies Senior Researcher. 'Even if the AU secured the support of many African states for a reinvigorated APSA, none of that will really matter if the big players are pulling in different directions.'
Any AU solution will require individual countries to acknowledge the practical value of collective action - not as abstract Pan-African idealism - but as a strategic investment in national, regional and continental stability
Ndubuisi Christian Ani, Senior Researcher and Project Lead, African Peace and Security Governance, ISS Addis Ababa
