The AU's response to the 2025 elections shows that it prioritises procedure over political competitiveness and democratic substance.
Africa's 2025 polls reveal a growing disjuncture between electoral activity and democratic performance, even as the African Union (AU) seeks to improve its election monitoring activities.
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance mandates the AU Commission to monitor and report to the AU Assembly and Peace and Security Council (PSC) on the freedom, fairness and credibility of polls. The commission can also call out abuses and encourage corrective action.
Last year, 14 countries held elections across very different governance contexts, accompanied by extensive AU observation, needs assessments and engagement before the polls. The AU recognises that electoral risk materialises well before voting - through governments' use of lawfare, exclusion of the opposition, and reduction of civic space.
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The outcomes show that elections no longer serve a uniform democratic function. While more open political systems enabled genuine competition, restrictive ones legitimised incumbent dominance.
Freedom House classified most African countries holding elections in 2025 as 'not free'. The credibility of polls in these contexts is doubtful, and the work of AU (and other) observers is made difficult by repression and internet shutdowns.
Last year's Malawi and Seychelles polls were exceptional cases that offered genuine political competition. Peaceful voting and acceptance of outcomes and defeats reflect governance systems in which electoral credibility stems from functional national institutions, judicial independence, and political norms.
Electoral quality in these cases reflects long-term democratic evolution rather than a response to external pressure or continental oversight. Over more than three decades of multiparty democracy, Malawi and Seychelles have experienced two peaceful transfers of power following the defeat of incumbents.
A second, much larger cluster of elections in 2025 reveals a more turbulent dynamic. In dominant-party systems like Tanzania, Cameroon and Togo, polls are routinely and procedurally administered but are increasingly non-competitive. Tanzania and Cameroon clamped down on the opposition while maintaining the appearance of legality. Such elections are instruments to keep political elites in power, not mechanisms for citizens to express their choice.
Togo's May 2025 election shows how lawfare can entrench incumbency through constitutional redesign. By shifting executive power from the president to the prime minister and imposing term limits only on the presidency, Faure Gnassingbé 'legally' retained power, extending his family's nearly six-decade rule.
Both of AU Commission Chairperson Mahamoud Ali Youssouf's half-year election reports and some election observer reports noted the likelihood and occurrence of political tensions and post-electoral violence in dominant-party systems. And although the AU has occasionally condemned repression and encouraged reforms, such as greater inclusivity in Tanzania, these measures are mostly weakly stated and non-binding.
After Tanzania's poll, Youssouf issued his statement before AU election observers made their report public. He congratulated the incumbent, with only a subtle reference to the glaring shortfalls later outlined in the observers' preliminary report. That report was remarkably candid, saying the election 'did not comply with AU principles [and] normative frameworks', making it inconducive for peaceful conduct and acceptable outcomes.
By focusing on procedural benchmarks like voting hours, the AU avoids sensitive topics like limited political competitiveness and exposes the limits of prioritising process over flawed electoral outcomes. As authoritarianism becomes increasingly legalised via the ballot box, the gap between AU norms and political realities widens.
At the opposite end of the democratic spectrum are countries that experienced coups, where elections are framed as milestones towards restoring civilian constitutional rule. Examples are Gabon in April and Guinea in December. In both cases, the AU lifted its suspension of the countries after their polls.
Yet these processes arguably legitimise unconstitutional power grabs rather than restore democracy. Article 25 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance explicitly bars perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government - including coup plotters - from contesting elections aimed at restoring constitutional order.
Coup leaders in countries like Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have repeatedly delayed election dates, extending their 'transitions to constitutional order.' Polls increasingly look like a strategy to consolidate their rule and achieve international recognition rather than an opportunity for a democratic reset.
The AU's Constitutive Act and other frameworks, which allow countries to be suspended after military coups and reinstated following elections, risk prioritising electoral procedure over democratic substance. Youssouf's second half-year report on elections in 2025 reflects this - conceding that existing instruments against unconstitutional changes of government often fail to deter violations. The report calls for better mechanisms at all levels to address such threats.
Allowing coup leaders to organise and contest elections may normalise power grabs. The November 2025 report on reforming Africa's peace and security governance framework, presented by Kenya's President William Ruto, recommended stronger sanctions against coup leaders. But would member states enforce them?
Ultimately, the 2025 elections highlight a growing gap between the AU's expanding election monitoring tools and the political realities shaping electoral outcomes. Although the AU's completion of more pre-election and needs assessment missions than in 2024 signals commitment, its findings and recommendations remain largely agnostic to problems such as authoritarian entrenchment.
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These trends are unlikely to change in 2026, with around 15 African countries expected to hold elections. Most will again occur in 'not free' countries, nearly half of which are authoritarian regimes.
Already in Uganda, the AU's preliminary report on the January 2026 polls noted harassment, arrests of opposition figures, civil society restrictions and an internet shutdown. Despite this, Youssouf issued a congratulatory statement '[applauding] Uganda for consolidating democratic gains.'
Although there have been some improvements, the AU's electoral mechanisms still lack the power to curb democratic erosion, leaving the AU as a chronicler rather than a referee. The continental body's task is not made easier by the fact that member states agree on normative principles, but set a different tone through their actions.
The test will be whether the AU continues to rely on observation and post-election recommendations, or devises ways to actively incentivise electoral reform before, during and after elections.
Zenge Simakoloyi, Research Officer, Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS
