Digital engagement and economic vulnerability mark protests ahead of the crisis.
Key findings
- Kenyans who posted about politics or community affairs on social media were 1.9 times more likely to participate in a protest than those who did not speak up on social media.
- Youth, urban residents, and men were significantly more likely to report protest participation than older cohorts, rural residents, and women.
- Kenyans experiencing higher levels of lived poverty were more likely to protest, underscoring the role of material hardship. At the same time, respondents who rated their living conditions more favourably were also more likely to participate, suggesting engagement both by those facing deprivation and by economically active citizens concerned about threats to their living standards.
- Respondents in full-time employment were more likely to protest than those outside the workforce, a pattern consistent with a national context shaped by fiscal reforms that disproportionately affected salaried workers.
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Protests - often described as "unconventional" or "non-institutional" forms of political participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Hooghe & Marien, 2013) - have increased markedly across Africa since 2010, a trend sometimes referred to as the continent's "third wave of protests" (Mueller, 2018; Najimdeen, 2024). Protests such as South Africa's #RhodesMustFall (2015) and #FeesMustFall (2016), Zimbabwe's #ThisFlag protests (2016), Nigeria's #EndSARS demonstrations (2020), and Madagascar's 2025 demonstrations that toppled President Andry Rajoelina illustrate both the breadth and political significance of this wave (Fihlani, 2019; Lawal, 2024; Princewill, 2025).
In Kenya, patterns of protest participation have evolved considerably over the past two decades. While the country has experienced repeated episodes of mass protest - most notably around contested elections in 2007, 2013, and 2017 - the character of protest activity has shifted, with recent protests increasingly centred on economic grievances, cost-of-living pressures, and perceptions of fiscal injustice rather than electoral disputes.
These dynamics came sharply into focus in June 2024. On 25 June 2024, thousands of predominantly young protesters stormed the Kenyan Parliament and set part of the building ablaze in opposition to proposed tax increases in the Finance Bill, rising living costs, and what many perceived as unresponsive governance (Muia, 2024). In the weeks that followed, dozens of protesters were killed, and hundreds were arrested, abducted, or tortured (Human Rights Watch, 2024; Mukoya & Mwangi, 2024). In total, more than 1,800 protests were reported in 2024 - more than double the number recorded in 2023 (ACLED, 2024a).
A defining feature of the 2024 protests was their mode of organisation. Mobilisation was spearheaded largely by young Kenyans, popularly referred to as "Gen-Z," and initially framed as "tribeless," "leaderless," and "partyless," before evolving into the broader "Gen-Zote" (all generations) movement. Importantly, mobilisation unfolded mostly through digital platforms such as X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, and Instagram, where activists circulated calls to action, simplified the Finance Bill for public consumption, and coordinated offline participation (Mwaura, 2024).
Afrobarometer conducted its Round 10 survey in Kenya in April and May 2024, approximately two months before the June-July protests. This timing provides a rare and analytically valuable pre-protest snapshot of public opinion. Importantly, the data cannot be used to explain participation in the June-July protests, as the dependent variable is retrospective and records self-reported protest participation over the 12-month period preceding the survey interview. As such, the data do not support causal claims about the outbreak of the 2024 protests.
Nevertheless, the data can be used to examine broad patterns of protest participation during the 12-month period from May 2023 to April 2024. This period is substantively relevant because it coincides with an extended phase of fiscal reform in Kenya. The Finance Act of 2023, enacted in June 2023, introduced a range of tax measures aimed at expanding domestic revenue, including changes to income-tax provisions and other levies, which generated public controversy and legal challenges (Republic of Kenya, 2023). Building on this fiscal trajectory, the Finance Bill of 2024, introduced in May 2024, proposed additional tax increases and amendments to existing tax laws as part of the government's broader Medium-Term Revenue Strategy (Rukanga, 2024; Magondu & Gathecha, 2025). Although the Afrobarometer survey does not explicitly measure perceptions about the Finance Bill itself, respondents' reported protest participation reflects a period in which the cumulative effects of the 2023 reforms - and associated cost-of-living pressures - were already being experienced. The analysis therefore situates protest participation in Kenya within a broader context of sustained economic strain and policy debate beginning in 2023, rather than treating the June-July 2024 protests as a discrete or isolated episode.
The analysis shows that protest participation in Kenya prior to the 2024 demonstrations was most strongly associated with digital political engagement. Kenyans who posted about politics or community affairs on social media were significantly more likely to report having participated in a protest, underscoring the role of online platforms in converting grievances into coordinated collective action.
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Participation was also more common among younger and urban residents, groups that are more densely embedded in social and digital networks and were more directly exposed to the economic and fiscal pressures that framed public debate in 2023-2024.
The relationship between economic conditions and protest participation in Kenya reflects a dual dynamic rather than a simple deprivation story. On the one hand, higher levels of lived poverty were associated with greater protest participation, suggesting that material hardship generates dissatisfaction that can motivate action. On the other hand, respondents who assessed their personal living conditions more favourably were also more likely to protest.
This pattern indicates that mobilisation was not confined to the poorest citizens. Instead, protest participation appears to emerge where economic strain intersects with perceived threats to living standards among economically active individuals who possess the resources, networks, and political efficacy needed to engage in collective action. In this sense, protest in Kenya prior to the 2024 demonstrations reflects both hardship and vulnerability, rather than deprivation alone.
Daniel Iberi Communications coordinator for East Africa
Kamal Yakubu Kamal Yakubu is Afrobarometer's capacity building manager (advanced Track).
