Military recruitment increasingly reflects the same demand-supply dynamics that shape global civilian migration.
In November 2025, Ukraine's foreign minister Andrii Sybiha said over 1 400 African nationals from around 36 countries were fighting with Russian forces in Ukraine, warning that foreign recruits faced extreme danger.
While some, such as those from South Africa, may be ideologically motivated, the main reason for joining Russian troops is likely the lack of job opportunities at home and the allure of large payments. Many recruits are deceived into volunteering, not realising their chances of survival are slim.
Viewed through a labour-market lens, military recruitment increasingly reflects the same demand-supply dynamics shaping civilian migration. Although civilian labour mobility differs institutionally and ethically from military enlistment, global demographic asymmetries between ageing states and youthful populations are already prompting new forms of security and defence cooperation.
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A recent example is the mutual defence treaty signed in October 2025, which provides for a recruitment pathway enabling Papua New Guinea citizens to join the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The agreement says a potential pool of up to 10 000 Papua New Guinea recruits could be eligible. That would be more than 10% of the ADF, including permanent and reserve personnel.
Australia's strategic motivation is no doubt to bind the island to defend Australia against China, given the mere 150 km strait separating Papua New Guinea from Australia. But the agreement also reflects the practicalities of labour supply and demand in the region.
Papua New Guinea has an age profile roughly similar to that of Africa, characterised by a large and growing youth bulge and high unemployment. Its profile contrasts with the decline in working-age populations in Europe and Australia.
Jobs are needed for Papua New Guinea's growing working-age youth, which, like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, presents a domestic security challenge linked to this mismatch. Creating 10 000 jobs for the country is a substantive deal, particularly as military training will cover leadership, discipline, driving, technical and related skills.
The Lowy Institute's Serena Sasingian notes that the treaty 'offers Papua New Guinea a chance to confront its most pressing internal threat: a youthful population with limited access to opportunity.' She quotes the island's defence minister Billy Joseph, who observed that given the large pool of youth, 'Australia can have as many as they want.'
Pacific island states such as Samoa, Tonga and Fiji have long benefitted from structured labour mobility schemes with Australia and New Zealand. These have reduced unemployment and become economic lifelines, as remittances sent home increase household incomes. The situation in the Pacific mirrors that of sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union (EU), although the push-pull demands in the latter are even stronger.
A similar logic is visible in recent civilian labour agreements. Kenya signed a labour migration agreement in 2024, aiming to facilitate the legal recruitment of several thousand skilled and semi-skilled workers into Germany's shrinking labour market.
In addition to curbing illegal migration, the agreement promotes mobility, apprenticeships and student training for vocational education and employment, including temporary jobs. Kenyans will be eligible for a temporary residence permit for up to two years for study purposes, with the possibility of extension.
As a result of ageing, the EU's labour force will likely decline by 24 million over the next 25 years, while sub-Saharan Africa's is projected to increase by 541 million. Largely due to its shrinking labour force, the EU's economy is growing slowly, rural areas are depopulating and labour costs are rising. Given concerns about future aggression from Russia, the situation is particularly acute in the military, which needs young people.
The labour supply situation in Russia is even worse. However, President Vladimir Putin has fewer qualms about using unconventional measures to compensate for Russia's decline in fighting-age youths.
One example is its military agreement with North Korea for the supply of ammunition and deployment of North Korean troops in support roles. Another is Russia's recruitment drive in Africa, which ramped up after the depletion of its pool of up to 180 000 prisoners and convicts deployed for combat duties by late 2024.
Taken together, these demographic trends and policy precedents raise the question of whether similar labour-security dynamics could emerge in Europe today.
What may initially seem counterintuitive becomes clearer when historical and labour market dynamics are considered. During Central Europe's brutal Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), foreign combatants were integral to virtually all belligerent armies. These composite units served under their own leadership, allowing European states to field large forces without mobilising their own citizens. Such dynamics ended only after the mid-19th century Crimean War.
What would happen if Europe entered into agreements with key African countries, offering to train and equip several brigades for service in their defence, with all the attendant benefits this would offer volunteers? The units could rotate in and out for deployment and return to Africa, where they could help enhance security in their own countries.
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Most sub-Saharan African countries underinvest in security, which is one reason the region is considered the world's most unstable. Because many governments cannot ensure national territorial integrity and internal security, development isn't possible. An agreement on the provision of combat troops could offer tangible benefits to African states.
Such agreements could even be part of a wider strategic partnership. Africa's agency and development trajectory will be determined by its ability to negotiate between the two elephants in the room, the United States and China.
But power asymmetries mean African countries cannot do so alone. Among large-scale partners, the EU offers proximity, market access and an interest in a rules-based order, provided both sides can negotiate equitable terms.
This article was first published in Africa Tomorrow, the blog of the ISS African Futures & Innovation programme.For permission to re-publish ISS Today articles, please email us. In Nigeria, Premium Times has exclusive rights to republish ISS Today articles.
Jakkie Cilliers, Head, African Futures and Innovation, ISS Pretoria
