Addis Abeba — On paper, the coalition assembled to protect the Red Sea remains formidable. Between the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and the European Union's Aspides mission--recently extended through early 2026--the waters off Yemen are patrolled by some of the most sophisticated destroyers in naval history. Yet, as we move into February 2026, the data tells a sobering story: despite a brief, optimistic uptick in transits following the late-2025 ceasefire attempts, commercial traffic through the Suez Canal remains structurally depressed, hovering roughly 60% below pre-crisis levels.
Insurance premiums, which had begun to stabilize, are climbing once again as major carriers like Maersk pause their return plans in the face of renewed Houthi threats. The world's premier navies are not just engaging in a daily, multimillion-dollar game of whack-a-mole against bargain-bin drones; they are attempting to enforce a maritime order that has fundamentally evaporated.
The failure is not one of capacity but of category. For too long, Washington and Brussels have treated the Red Sea as a "maritime domain"--a blue-water commons to be policed by frigates and international law. But the crisis radiating from the Bab el-Mandeb today is not a maritime problem; it is a terrestrial one. The Houthi movement in Yemen has demonstrated that a non-state actor, entrenched in mountainous terrain, can hold the global economy hostage without ever putting a navy to sea.
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This conceptual error has birthed a security architecture that is fundamentally broken. By focusing exclusively on the water, the international community has ignored the political and security dynamics of the shore. More dangerously, it has allowed a "littoral-only" doctrine to exclude the region's demographic and military heavyweight: Ethiopia. Unless the security architecture is expanded to include the power centers of the hinterland, the Red Sea will remain a theater of permanent crisis.
Terrestrialization of naval warfare
The strategic obsolescence of the current approach lies in the changing nature of the threat. Historically, piracy--such as the Somali surge of the late 2000s--was a criminal enterprise born of economic desperation, largely confined to the water. The current threat landscape is a different beast entirely. It represents the "terrestrialization" of maritime insecurity.
The Houthi blockade is a projection of land power into the sea. But the threat is metastasizing. Intelligence reports increasingly point to a burgeoning logistical bridge connecting the Houthi movement in Yemen with Al-Shabaab in Somalia. This trans-regional nexus bypasses traditional naval interdiction, moving lethal aid, drone components, and expertise across the Gulf of Aden not on large vessels, but via a "ant trade" of small skiffs that radar often misses.
Al-Shabaab is effectively acting as a terrestrial anchor for Houthi logistics, offering a warehouse and launchpad on the African continent. This is a textbook example of a Regional Security Complex, where the security of the peninsula and the Horn are indivisible. Attempting to sever this link with sea-based interceptors is akin to trying to stop a drug cartel solely by arresting street dealers while leaving the distribution hubs untouched. The solution requires a land-based security apparatus capable of dismantling the insurgent infrastructure before it reaches the surf.
Fallacy of liberal club
Despite this integrated threat landscape, regional diplomacy remains paralyzed by an archaic adherence to geography over strategy. The prevailing doctrine--championed most vocally by Cairo--insists that Red Sea security is the exclusive preserve of littoral states. This "club of the coast" approach excludes any nation without direct saltwater frontage, regardless of its economic or military relevance to the corridor.
Ethiopia is not merely a neighbor to the crisis; it is the center of gravity for the Horn of Africa."
This is a dangerous blind spot. In the 21st century, the stability of a waterway is determined by the stability of its hinterland. By limiting the security architecture to rim states, the current framework relies on some of the world's most fragile governments--Somalia, Djibouti, and a fractured Yemen--to secure a global chokepoint, while sidelining the region's dominant power.
It is a triumph of map-reading over realpolitik. A security pact that includes Eritrea but excludes Ethiopia is structurally unsound. It ignores the economic reality that Ethiopia's 120 million citizens are the primary consumers of the goods flowing through these ports, and it ignores the military reality that Addis Abeba possesses the only armed forces in the Horn capable of projecting stabilizing power beyond its borders.
Beyond Coastlines: Ethiopia, future of Red Sea stability
To stabilize the Red Sea, the definition of a "Red Sea state" must be decoupled from simple coastline ownership and re-anchored in strategic interest. Ethiopia is not merely a neighbor to the crisis; it is the center of gravity for the Horn of Africa.
Addis Abeba brings two assets that the current littoral coalition desperately lacks: strategic depth and a proven counter-terrorism capability. Ethiopia's military has spent nearly two decades degrading Al-Shabaab's capabilities inside Somalia. It possesses the intelligence networks, the troop numbers, and the operational experience to disrupt the land-based logistical chains that are now feeding the maritime threat.
Furthermore, Ethiopia's economic survival is tethered to the Bab el-Mandeb. Unlike distant powers for whom the Red Sea is merely a transit route, for Ethiopia, it is a lifeline. This creates a structural incentive for stability that foreign navies simply cannot replicate. A stakeholder with an existential need for open sea lanes is a far more reliable partner than a coalition of the willing looking for an exit strategy.
To be sure, integrating Ethiopia into a formalized Red Sea security forum is fraught with diplomatic friction. Relations between Addis Abeba and Cairo are historically strained over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) discussions regarding port access in Somaliland have raised hackles in Mogadishu regarding sovereignty. Critics will argue that inviting Ethiopia into the fold risks inflaming regional tensions rather than soothing them.
These concerns are valid, but they are manageable compared to the alternative. The status quo--a vacuum of power on the African shore filled by non-state actors and proxies--is a recipe for a wider regional conflagration. The diplomatic discomfort of bringing rivals to the same table pales in comparison to the economic devastation of a permanently closed Red Sea. Washington and its partners have the leverage to structure a forum that respects the sovereignty of littoral states while harnessing the security capabilities of the hinterland.
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Path Forward: Rethinking Red Sea strategy
The United States and the EU must pivot from a strategy of containment to one of integration. The "littoral-only" red line must be erased. A new Red Sea Security Forum should be established, one that includes Ethiopia not as an observer but as a core guarantor of regional stability.
This new architecture should focus on intelligence sharing regarding cross-border smuggling networks and coordinate land-sea interdiction efforts. It must recognize that the drone that hits a tanker in the Red Sea likely began its journey in a warehouse deep in the interior.
The era of treating the Red Sea as a moat is over; it is a bridge. As long as the international community relies on water-based solutions for land-based problems, the shipping containers will remain stuck in port. The security of the sea begins on the land, and in the Horn of Africa, that land is anchored by Ethiopia. It is time to bring the heavyweight into the ring. AS
Editor's Note: Jafar Bedru Geletu is the Executive Director of the Institute of Foreign Affairs. His career spans intelligence, national security policy, and strategic advisory. He has held key research and advisory roles in national security and international relations, contributing to high-level policy and strategic planning for the Ethiopian government.
