Ethiopia: How National Army Battlefield Report, Fano Statements in Feb-March Lay Bare the Persistence and Intensity of Ongoing War in Amhara Region

Addis Abeba — More than two and a half years after the armed confrontation erupted in Ethiopia's Amhara region in April 2023, developments from early 2026 underscore not only the persistence of the war but also its deeply complex nature.

Military briefings issued on 03 March by the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), and by the Amhara regional state media outlet on 01 March, both of which came two weeks after a statement released by Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) on 14 February 2026, illustrate a war defined as much by clashing narratives as by sustained fighting on the ground.

The statements also reveal parallel and mutually exclusive interpretations of the same war, each claiming momentum, legitimacy, and popular support, directly contradicting earlier official assurances of imminent victory and casting doubt on the political significance of the December 2025 "peace agreement" announced by regional authorities.

March 2026: evidence of sustained military confrontation

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In a statement issued on 03 March 2026, the ENDF East Command announced that "coordinated operations" had been carried out across border areas of North Gojjam, West Gojjam, Awi Zone Administration, and Central Gonder.

The military said 203 members of what it described as an "extremist group" were "neutralized", with 135 killed and 68 wounded, and reported the seizure of dozens of firearms, including "automatic rifles, a PK machine gun, grenades, and ammunition."

The army provided detailed accounts of fighting in Dangla Zuria, Sekela Woreda, and Alefa Woreda, each involving dozens of casualties. It also named several senior figures it claimed were killed since late February 2026, portraying the operations as evidence that armed groups were "losing territorial space, leadership, and cohesion."

Yet to analysts, the scale and spread of these engagements signal continuity rather than closure.

An Ethiopian political observer, speaking to Addis Standard on condition of anonymity, said the March briefing itself undermines claims that the war is winding down.

"When the army is reporting large-scale operations and triple-digit casualties across multiple zones in March 2026, it suggests a war that is still structurally intact," the observer said. "This is not what post-conflict stabilization looks like."

Civilian impact and contested control on the ground

While the ENDF focused on combat outcomes, reporting by regional media on 01 March 2026 highlighted the devastating consequences of continued fighting on civilian infrastructure. In Delgi town, Takusa Woreda, Central Gonder, residents described widespread looting and destruction after armed groups entered the town. According to locals cited by the regional media, nearly all public institutions were damaged, and private homes were stripped of basic belongings.

The woreda administrator claimed security forces had initially withdrawn to avoid urban combat, after which "infrastructure, public utilities, and administrative records were destroyed."

Although officials later reported that government forces had "regained control and restored relative calm", the incident underscored the fragility of authority and the recurring exposure of civilians to violence and economic loss.

The February 2026 Fano statement: a rival account of the war

The statements by the national army and regional media followed a statement released by Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) on 14 February 2026 declaring what it described as a "victory in Gonder."

The statement rejected the government's framing of the war as a law-enforcement campaign and instead the armed group's existential struggle against what it called a "genocidal" project by the ruling Prosperity Party.

AFNM claimed that since the early stages of the war, it had captured thousands of firearms, heavy weapons including tanks and anti-aircraft guns, and had neutralized entire divisions and regiments of government forces across Gojjam, Gonder, Shewa, Wollo, and Wellega. It asserted that "large numbers of captured soldiers" had either been released to their families or handed over to humanitarian organizations, and argued that these developments had "shattered the morale of federal forces."

Beyond battlefield claims, the statement accused the federal government of "deliberately targeting civilians through drone, jet, and artillery strikes"; using shifting national agendas to distract from the war; constructing false narratives portraying Fano as externally controlled; and attempting to regionalize the conflict through confrontations with neighboring states. It also alleged that foreign-supplied weaponry had been tested on civilians in Amhara.

While Addis Standard did not independently verify these assertions, their tone and scope highlight how the war has evolved into a struggle over legitimacy, identity, and narrative dominance, not merely territory.

A second Ethiopian political observer told Addis Standard that such statements should not be dismissed simply as propaganda.

"The Fano discourse reflects a movement that sees itself as fighting a political and existential war, not a limited security operation," the observer said. "This helps explain why military pressure alone has failed to end the war."

Parallel claims, parallel timelines

The Fano statement also exists alongside earlier ENDF announcements that mirror the same pattern of competing claims. In October 2025, the army claimed killing dozens of fighters in West and North Gojjam and named several Fano commanders it said were "captured or killed". Around the same time, a report by Deutsche Welle (DW), citing residents and Fano leaders, said the group had seized control of multiple localities stretching between South Gondar and North Wollo.

"These parallel accounts, each asserting battlefield success, illustrate a war in which control is fluid, verification is difficult, and truth is often filtered through partisan lenses," said the second observer.

Peace agreement versus fragmented realities

Against this backdrop, the December 2025 "peace agreement" announced between the Amhara Regional Government and Captain Masresha Setie appears increasingly limited in scope. Although signed in the presence of mediators from the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the agreement was quickly undermined by statements from the Amhara Fano People's Organization distancing itself from Captain Masresha and denying his mandate.

The February 2026 Fano statement further underscored this fragmentation, portraying the movement as unified, self-reliant, and uncompromising, at odds with official portrayals of surrender, disarmament, or reconciliation.

A war defined by contradiction

Official optimism has repeatedly collided with on-the-ground realities. In June 2025, Army Chief of Staff Field Marshal Berhanu Jula told lawmakers that "90% of operations in Amhara region have been completed."

Yet by early 2026, the region remains marked by major military engagements, urban destruction, large-scale security mobilization, and deeply polarized narratives of "law enforcement campaign" for the state, an "existential struggle" for Fano, and a daily crisis for civilians caught between the two.

Above all, it is a war "sustained by unresolved political grievances, and competing claims of legitimacy that resist simple military or political solutions," the first observer told Addis Standard.

"Absent a credible, inclusive political process that addresses both the material and narrative dimensions of the war, the war appears likely to persist, continuing to oscillate between claims of victory and realities of violence, with civilians bearing the heaviest cost."

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