With the window for holding meaningful elections fast closing, can the three initiatives underway deliver more than previous efforts?
The December 2026 election will be the third attempt to conclude the transition outlined in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). While the country prepares for the polls, the commission overseeing the peace process warns of increasing insecurity and the danger of a 'relapse into full-scale conflict.'
By January 2026, South Sudan's ceasefire monitoring mechanism had recorded a 14% increase in violations and a 43% rise in hostilities involving R-ARCSS signatories. The United Nations expressed concern over the 'dangerous escalation' in the country.
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This regression follows a recurring cycle that begins with political gaffes, leads to conflict, mediation efforts, partial implementation of agreements and then relapse. The rivalry between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his currently detained First Vice-President Riek Machar fuels this cycle. What began as a disagreement between the two before 1991 has become ethnicised, transforming intercommunal violence into proxy conflicts tied to national power struggles.
Over a decade has passed since South Sudan's first post-independence elections were scheduled for December 2015. The conflict that broke out in the nascent state in December 2013 triggered an arduous peace process culminating in the R-ARCSS. The agreement called for elections in December 2022 to formally end the transitional government's term in February 2023.
But that deadline was subsequently extended to February 2025, after elections scheduled for December 2024. In September that year, the polls were postponed again. After domestic and international pressure, the government finally committed to the December 2026 polls, with no further postponements.
By mid-2025, concerns about the 2026 polls began to emerge. The unity government deadlock intensified as the main political opposition disintegrated. Peace efforts like the Kenyan-led Tumaini Initiative and the African Union's (AU) High-Level Ad Hoc Committee (C5+) competed, ultimately losing momentum.
Meanwhile, the White Army ethnic militia and groups, including the National Salvation Front, ramped up armed activities against the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF). This provided the pretext for the Uganda People's Defence Force to intervene in support of the SSPDF, ostensibly to secure Juba and Uganda's interests there.
Kiir's unpredictable reshuffles of senior government officials also split the main armed opposition into factions supporting or opposing their detained leader, Machar. Meanwhile, the country's economic crisis deepened and humanitarian problems worsened - partly due to spillover from the Sudan conflict.
Although violence has decreased since the peace deal, ongoing political sabotage of the R-ARCSS and impunity continue to drive conflict in Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei. In Jonglei alone, violence has recently displaced over 280 000 people, adding to the more than two million internally displaced people already in the country.
In late 2025, the R-ARCSS signatories began discussions on salvaging the defunct agreement. Around that time, Kiir's faction in the unity government and its allies proposed separating the R-ARCSS from the constitution-making process and lowering the agreement's standing in South Sudan's legal order before elections. By this time, the unity government had been so compromised that these proposals had little legitimacy.
As elections approach, three initiatives are underway to stabilise South Sudan.
The first is the elections dialogue committee launched by Kiir on 30 January. This high-level body includes R-ARCSS signatories and other key stakeholders, and is tasked with building consensus on election-related issues.
The second is the Tumaini Initiative, reintroduced in late January, which advocates for a National Consensus Charter for Peace and Democracy. The emphasis is on stabilisation, civilian protection, humanitarian access, trust-building, holding elections and ending hostilities. Holdout groups distrust the revitalised initiative, and its launch on 9 February was delayed pending the outcome of the 39th AU summit.
The third initiative is the C5+ process launched on the sidelines of the AU summit. It is grounded on the primacy of the R-ARCSS, with no further extension of the transition period beyond February 2027.
C5+ calls for an immediate ceasefire, a leadership retreat in South Africa, Machar's release and a former head of state to facilitate negotiations between Kiir and Machar. On 22 March, Kiir returned from a week-long visit to South Africa, which his office described as a continuation of C5+ initiatives.
The three stabilisation processes differ in scope but generally aim to address ongoing issues such as political stalemate, insecurity and humanitarian crises. All three defer many tasks outlined in the R-ARCSS until a post-election government is formed. These include unifying the armed forces, drafting a permanent constitution and transitional justice reforms.
These proposals allow the election winner - likely the current government - to claim a mandate from the 'people' while disregarding the R-ARCSS and its institutions, as originally negotiated.
Tumaini and C5+ envision roles for Kiir and Machar in South Sudanese politics, both before and possibly after elections, yet fail to reckon with their persistent rivalry - the country's primary fault line. The C5+ also aims to coordinate with other peace initiatives while emphasising the importance of resolving electoral funding, which is ironically dependent on Kiir. On 27 March, his cabinet approved the C5+ proposals and discussed plans for funding road projects.
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It is unsurprising then, that the National Elections Commission won't have received the required funding by April, when the window for meaningfully implementing electoral reforms effectively closes.
The likely trajectory from here is troubled. Although elections are a standard democratic practice, their emphasis in South Sudan risks eroding the main reason for the peace process. At the very least, the proposals should avoid restoring the country to its pre-2013 political setup, as all previous efforts to do so, including the R-ARCSS, have failed to achieve stability.
Efforts to address South Sudan's crises must be managed through a single mechanism. This should involve the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the international community - not only for robust mediation, but also to prepare for potential clashes as December approaches.
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Moses Chrispus Okello, Senior Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, ISS Addis Ababa
