Angola's constitutional order is not merely dysfunctional but economically distortionary. Since taking office in 2017, President João Lourenço has authorized an estimated $61.5 billion in public spending by presidential decree, without open tender or transparent contracting, frequently benefiting private interests linked to his inner circle. This is not an aberration. It is the predictable outcome of a constitutional design that concentrates executive power while neutralizing oversight.
In Angola, the presidency is not anchored in a direct popular mandate but in party hierarchy, and its authority operates with incipient institutional restraint. The result is a system where political power and economic allocation are tightly fused. It undermines market confidence, distorts competition, and erodes the legal certainty on which long-term investment depends.
If Portugal adopted Angola's presidential model, the current president would not be António José Seguro. It would be Joaquim Miranda Sarmento, the top candidate of the most voted party in Lisbon in the 2025 elections -- effectively elevated by party hierarchy rather than direct popular choice.
The comparison is illustrative, but it exposes a structural flaw: Angolans vote for a party, not for a president. The head of state does not derive legitimacy from an individual mandate, but from internal party selection. The presidency is not chosen by the electorate -- it is delivered to it.
Keep up with the latest headlines on WhatsApp | LinkedIn
We use the Portuguese example deliberately. Angolan rulers have often mirrored the legislative models of their former colonial power -- except where institutional design might constrain executive control.
This has been the pattern since independence in 1975. The first president, António Agostinho Neto, was installed through MPLA (People's Movement for the Independence of Angola) structures. In 1979, José Eduardo dos Santos followed the same logic. Even João Lourenço emerged, in 2017, from internal designation, despite subsequent formalization.
The presidency, in practice, remains an extension of the ruling party's control for 50 years now.
Power without checks and balances
Angola is often described as having an "imperial presidency." But the main problem is not the existence of excessive executive power -- it is the absence of effective checks and balances.
In formal terms, the powers of Angola's president are not radically different from those of the U.S. presidency. The key difference lies in institutional oversight. In the United States, executive decisions are subject to scrutiny by Congress, the courts, and, in some cases, internal executive constraints.
In Angola, such oversight is elusive or politically subordinated.
The consequences are structural. The president, as head of the executive, can authorize major public contracts without meaningful scrutiny. This creates a systemic risk of blurring of boundaries between public resources and private interests.
History offers clear warnings. When the line between public treasury and private fortune becomes porous, states weaken. In pre-revolutionary France, Louis XIV treated state finances as an extension of his personal purse; the resulting fiscal strain contributed to systemic crisis and ultimately led to the French Revolution (1789-1799).
Angola risks reproducing a modern variant of this pattern.
Parliamentary design reinforces this imbalance. Members of Parliament depend not on voters, but on their position within party lists -- positions controlled by party leadership. This undermines legislative autonomy. Few parliamentarians will challenge those who decide their political future. The result is a structurally dependent, effectively rubber-stamping executive decisions rather than providing oversight or meaningful debate.
Beyond institutional design a deeper issue persists: the constitutional mindset itself.
Angola's constitution reflects a political logic shaped by war -- friend versus enemy, victory versus defeat. Such a framework may consolidate power in post-conflict settings, but it is poorly suited to sustaining a democratic culture.
It was not designed for a plural, competitive, and reconciled society. Instead, it perpetuates suspicion. Political disagreement is treated as threat; symbolic acts are interpreted as provocation.
Recent controversies around opposition symbolism are not anomalies. They are expressions of an unresolved constitutional logic that has yet to transition from war to peace.
Despite these structural flaws, there is little appetite for change among Angola's political elites.
The ruling MPLA benefits from preserving presidential power as a central instrument of governance. The main opposition UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), meanwhile, avoids constitutional debate ahead of the 2027 elections, wary of unintended consequences -- including legitimizing extended presidential tenure or constraining its own future authority.
For different reasons, both sides defer a debate that is essential to Angola's institutional future.
The Role of Civil Society
Meaningful reform is unlikely to originate within the political class.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
Civil society must lead. Institutions such as the Angolan Bar Association -- positioned between state and society -- have both constitutional authority and moral responsibility. Their role is not merely technical. They must act as a constitutional conscience, articulating the gap between formal law and lived reality.
Angola stands at a decisive historical juncture.
What is required is not incremental reform, but a new constitutional foundation - grounded in democratic legitimacy, institutional balance, and social inclusion.
A renewed constitutional order must:
- establish enforceable checks and balances
- guarantee effective judicial protection of rights
- ensure equality before the law in practice
- recognize diversity as a national asset within unity
Pluralism must be treated as strength, not instability.
Angola does not need symbolic change. It needs a foundational reset. A new constitution is not an abstract aspiration but a political and economic necessity.
Without it, the country will remain trapped in a system of state capture -- distorting markets, further depleting already fragile institutions, and eroding opportunities for the common citizen. With it, Angola can rebuild its institutional foundations and move toward a more just, stable, and prosperous future.
