Addis Abeba — Thirty years after Ethiopia adopted its federal constitution, the country still faces recurring conflicts. These clashes cost lives, displace communities, and erode public trust. While many blame these problems on ethnic or political rivalries, there is a more profound issue: our constitution assigns security duties to both the federal government and regional states without clearly defining where one authority ends and the other begins.
This ambiguity has produced what may be described as fragmented sovereignty--a condition in which different levels of government simultaneously exercise coercive authority under overlapping legal mandates and competing political incentives. Rather than functioning as complementary institutions within a federal system, federal and regional security structures have at times operated in parallel or even in competition, complicating efforts to prevent violence and respond effectively to crises.
Constitutional Law & Civil Rights The root of the problem
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The roots of this dilemma lie in the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which guarantees the right of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination under Article 39; establishes the country's federal structure through Article 46; assigns responsibility for national defence and federal public security to the federal government under Article 51(6); and empowers regional states to establish police forces and maintain public order under Article 52(2)(g). These constitutional provisions were intended to balance regional self-government with national unity, but they leave unresolved a fundamental question: where does regional policing end and national security begin?
Discover morepoliticalAfricans & Diasporaconflict Individually, these constitutional provisions are coherent. Collectively, however, they create an operational grey area that manifests in two institutional weaknesses.
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Constitutional design matters as much as political leadership."
First, although Article 52(2)(g) empowers regional states to establish police forces and maintain public order, it does not clearly define the permissible scope of those forces. Over time, several regional states expanded their police institutions into heavily armed Special Forces whose capabilities extended well beyond conventional civilian law enforcement. While these forces were officially established to address local security challenges, they increasingly assumed quasi-military roles.
Second, although Article 46 establishes the country's federal structure, Ethiopia has lacked consistently effective institutional mechanisms for resolving inter-regional boundary disputes before they escalate into security crises. As a result, regional police institutions have increasingly been drawn into political disagreements over territory, identity, and representation. Rather than serving solely as neutral law-enforcement agencies, they have at times become participants in the very conflicts they were expected to contain.
Geographic Reference Discover moreLegalSecurityConflictConstitutionalIntelligence & CounterterrorismWar & ConflictDictionaries & EncyclopediasconstitutionalConstitutionNewspapers Internal security dilemma
Constitutional ambiguity alone does not produce violence. It becomes dangerous when political actors operate within a system where security responsibilities overlap and institutional boundaries are poorly defined. In Ethiopia, this has contributed to what political scientists describe as an internal security dilemma: measures that one level of government considers necessary for its own protection are often interpreted by others as preparation for confrontation. As Mehari Taddele Maru argued in "In-depth analysis: The Tigray dilemma," deepening mistrust between federal and regional authorities can create a self-reinforcing cycle in which defensive actions are increasingly perceived as offensive, thereby intensifying political instability rather than reducing it.
This dynamic became particularly visible during the federal government's reorganization of regional Special Forces in April 2023. Although the reform was officially presented as an effort to build a unified national security structure, its implementation generated intense political resistance, particularly in the Amhara region. As Addis Standard reported, regional authorities sought to reassure Special Forces members that the process was a "reorganization" rather than a dissolution, even as tensions escalated and armed confrontations were reported.
Security Products & Services The controversy illustrates a broader institutional problem. In a federal system where regional governments perceive security institutions as safeguards of their constitutional autonomy, attempts to centralize coercive authority can easily be interpreted as political encroachment rather than administrative reform. Conversely, the continued expansion of regional security structures may be viewed by the federal government--or by neighboring regions--as a challenge to the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The result is a cycle of mutual suspicion in which actions taken for defensive purposes are perceived as offensive by others.
Politics The speed with which the policy evolved into a broader political crisis further illustrates this dilemma. Addis Standard's coverage of the subsequent unrest in Amhara documented widespread protests, clashes between federal and regional forces, and growing public distrust of the reform process. Rather than strengthening national cohesion, the reform exposed how unresolved constitutional ambiguities can undermine confidence between different levels of government.
Government The experience also demonstrates that security institutions do not operate in a political vacuum. When constitutional mandates remain unclear, regional political leaders facing legitimacy challenges may frame security reforms as existential threats to regional autonomy. Such narratives can transform police institutions into symbols of political identity rather than neutral guardians of public order. Under these conditions, debates over institutional reform become inseparable from broader contests over federalism, representation, and political power.
Legal The consequences extend beyond elite politics. Communities that perceive local security institutions as politically or ethnically aligned may lose confidence in law enforcement altogether. Neighboring regions, in turn, may strengthen their own security structures in response, reinforcing the very cycle of insecurity they seek to avoid. This is the essence of Ethiopia's internal security dilemma: institutional uncertainty encourages defensive measures that, paradoxically, deepen mutual distrust and increase the risk of conflict.
Intelligence & Counterterrorism Reforming the rules, not just the forces
The federal government's decision to reorganize regional Special Forces acknowledged an important reality: Ethiopia cannot sustain multiple heavily armed security institutions operating under overlapping political mandates. Yet dismantling or restructuring those forces, by itself, cannot resolve the deeper institutional problems that allowed them to emerge.
As Addis Standard's reporting on the 2023 security-sector reform demonstrated, the controversy surrounding the policy was driven not only by disagreements over implementation but also by uncertainty about the constitutional balance between federal authority and regional autonomy. Unless that uncertainty is addressed, similar tensions are likely to resurface regardless of the organizational form that regional security institutions ultimately take.
Measures that one level of government considers necessary for its own protection are often interpreted by others as preparation for confrontation."Constitutional Law & Civil Rights
A durable solution therefore requires strengthening the constitutional and institutional framework that governs security relations between the federal government and the regional states. The first priority should be to clarify the relationship between Article 51, which assigns responsibility for national defense and federal public security to the federal government, and Article 52, which empowers regional states to maintain public order through their police institutions. The Constitution clearly distributes authority, but it offers limited guidance on the circumstances under which federal intervention becomes necessary or how overlapping mandates should be coordinated during major security crises. Greater legal precision would reduce uncertainty for both federal and regional authorities while limiting opportunities for political manipulation.
Legal clarification, however, must be accompanied by stronger intergovernmental cooperation. Security challenges that cross administrative boundaries cannot be managed effectively by institutions acting in isolation. Ethiopia would benefit from a permanent federal-regional security coordination mechanism through which intelligence could be shared, operational responsibilities jointly defined, and emerging disputes addressed before they escalate into armed confrontation. Such arrangements are common in federal systems because they encourage coordination without undermining regional autonomy.
Language Resources Institutional reform should also strengthen public accountability. Professional police services derive their legitimacy not from political loyalty but from their commitment to constitutional principles, impartial law enforcement, and the protection of all citizens regardless of ethnicity or political affiliation. Establishing an independent oversight mechanism capable of investigating allegations of politically motivated policing would help reinforce professional standards while restoring public confidence in security institutions.
Equally important is the need to cultivate a common professional doctrine across Ethiopia's security services. Regional police officers should certainly understand local languages and communities, but their primary allegiance must remain to the Constitution and the rule of law rather than to regional political interests. Shared training standards, common operational principles, and regular joint exercises would help foster a culture of cooperation instead of institutional rivalry.
These reforms should not be understood as efforts to weaken federalism. On the contrary, successful federal systems depend on clear constitutional boundaries, mutual trust between levels of government, and security institutions that serve citizens rather than political constituencies. Strengthening those foundations would make Ethiopia's federal order more resilient, not less.
Geographic Reference Ultimately, Ethiopia's recurring security crises reveal that constitutional design matters as much as political leadership. Peace cannot rest solely on temporary ceasefires or periodic security operations. It requires institutions that clearly define authority, encourage cooperation, and command public confidence across regional and ethnic boundaries. Until those structural questions are addressed, episodes of violence may continue to recur even as governments, security personnel, and political actors change.
Rather than viewing Ethiopia's security challenges solely through the lens of ethnicity or political rivalry, policymakers should also confront the constitutional architecture that shapes the incentives of those who wield coercive power. The central question is no longer whether Ethiopia needs security reform; it is whether that reform will address the institutional roots of conflict or merely its most visible symptoms. AS
Editor's Note: Gatluak Tut Khot, the author of this article, can be reached at gtutkhot@gmail.com. This article is adapted from the author's master's thesis, titled "Interface Between Multi-Level Security Governance and Ethnic Conflict Under Ethiopia's Post-1995 Federal System," submitted to the Department of Strategic Security Studies at the Ethiopian National Defence College.
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