Ethiopia: Divided By Identity, United By Demands - Fault Lines Behind Ethiopia's National Dialogue

Mesfin Areaya, chief commissioner of the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (file photo).

Addis Abeba — On 15 July 2026, Ethiopia's long-awaited National Dialogue Conference officially commenced in Addis Abeba. The dialogue process, built around eight major thematic pillars, was concluded last week after four years marked by significant challenges and fluctuations.

Discover moreDemographicsMagazinesLocal News As a facilitator in the "State Structure and Form" thematic working group--not as a participant representing any particular community--I will refrain from commenting on the process or outcomes of the national dialogue at this stage. Instead, I will focus on synthesising the political fault lines that transcend party affiliations, the ruling-opposition divide, the conventional north-south dichotomy, and the political aspirations of various groups: the pursuit of recognition, inclusion, preservation of historical legacy, and, in some cases, political dominance.

Geographic Reference Four identities, one nation

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In Ethiopia, ethnicity remains the primary and most influential political fault line, cutting across ideological differences, party affiliations, and government-opposition positions. During the national dialogue, participants from both government and opposition camps often aligned to defend what they described as "the interests of their ethnicity." Representatives from both sides were equally vocal when they believed those interests were under threat.

Maintaining complete ethnic neutrality has also proven difficult, even among those associated with the "pan-Ethiopianist camp." Some representatives from this group appeared to shift positions depending on their ethnic backgrounds. A similar pattern was evident among religious representatives. A considerable number of participants openly aligned with their respective ethnic groups despite participating in the dialogue under religious representation.

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Ethnicity remains the most dominant political fault line."

Ethnicity, therefore, remains the most dominant political fault line shaping Ethiopia's national dialogue. Many of the major political groups that have boycotted the process are also ethnic-based organisations, further limiting prospects for reversing ethnic-based political mobilisation in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the dialogue has recommended promoting "civic" politics while discouraging "ethnic-based political parties."

Religion, although often overlooked in Ethiopia's political discourse, represents the country's second major political fault line. Within the national dialogue framework, one thematic working group comprising 500 participants is dedicated exclusively to religious issues. However, religious concerns have also emerged across nearly all eight thematic working groups. During the agenda-gathering phase, religious groups submitted highly organised proposals, some of which were more clearly articulated than those presented by political organisations.

Historically, the Orthodox Christian-Muslim rivalry, despite its asymmetrical nature, has been a major source of religious tension in Ethiopia. Today, this dynamic is evolving, as Ethiopian Protestant communities increasingly emerge as a significant political force, adding a third influential actor to the country's religious landscape.

Within the national dialogue, religion emerged as a clear political fault line. At times, religious and ethnic agendas converged, while at other moments they diverged. When these interests came into conflict, a considerable number of participants appeared to prioritise their religious positions.

The third visible political fault line identified during the dialogue process was geographical location or locality. Elites from ethnically and religiously similar communities were sometimes observed advancing different positions based on their places of origin. This dynamic was particularly evident among communities in Ethiopia's two largest regional states.

Class also remains a significant political fault line in Ethiopia, capable of mobilising considerable segments of society. The 2025 organised protest movement by health professionals demanding improved working conditions, for instance, transcended ethnic and religious divisions, bringing together professionals from across the country. With greater emphasis and organisation, class-based politics could still serve as an effective instrument of political mobilisation. This was also reflected during the national dialogue process.

History During the dialogue, some participants called for greater access to political power for wealthy groups, arguing that "Ethiopia is embracing liberalism." At the same time, several working-class groups called for representation in the country's two legislative chambers--the House of Federation and the House of Peoples' Representatives.

Recognition for some, inclusion for others

Political and social groups across these fault lines have expressed divergent aspirations within Ethiopia's political process. Drawing from Francis Fukuyama's framework on identity and recognition, the political demands articulated across the dialogue's thematic working groups can be broadly synthesised into four categories: quests for recognition, quests for inclusion, quests for the preservation of historical legacy, and quests for domination.

Politics The quest for recognition has emerged from various religious, ethnic, economic, and social groups. Among religious communities, "believers of the law of conscience"--associated with the Qemant religious tradition--who do not identify with either the Bible or the Qur'an have strongly called for recognition. Similarly, the Ethiopian Jewish community and followers of other traditional belief systems used the platform to seek acknowledgement of their identities and traditions.

Members of several ethnic groups, including the Quca/Kucha and Zeise, have also voiced demands for recognition. Representatives of groups seeking their own regional state, such as the Gurage, have actively presented their arguments. Participants also raised the "distinct issues" of communities such as Wokait, Raya, Agaw, Kimant, and Gedio, among others. Their determination to ensure that their "distinct cases" were formally recorded at every stage of the dialogue process was notable, despite the Commission's stated intention to focus on broader frameworks rather than specific cases.

Professional associations, including the Ethiopian Teachers' Association, as well as disability rights groups, women's organisations, and artisans, also advanced their own demands for recognition.

In the author's view, many of these demands fall primarily under the broader quest for inclusion: political inclusion, historical inclusion, symbolic inclusion, economic inclusion, inclusive civil service representation, and social inclusion. A representative from the artisan community, for instance, delivered an emotional appeal about the social exclusion faced by artisans in Ethiopia. She wept while calling for an end to the discrimination and marginalisation of her community. Religious groups, ethnic communities, professional associations, gender advocates, and political parties have all actively pursued broader inclusion within the Ethiopian state and society.

The quest for inclusion during the dialogue process took two main forms. The first was retroactive inclusion--a demand to revisit and transform existing symbolic, political, economic, and social manifestations of "Ethiopian identity." The second was prospective inclusion, which focuses on ensuring greater inclusivity in future policy-making and state administration. At the same time, some demands presented in the language of "inclusion" were themselves exclusionary in nature.

The early stages of the national dialogue revealed that group demands were not always consistently grounded in principle."

The national dialogue also revealed strong aspirations to preserve historical legacies. Established institutions and communities expressed concerns about safeguarding legitimate historical contributions, heritage, and national narratives from political delegitimisation. However, not every demand framed as the preservation of historical legacy can necessarily be considered legitimate. For example, calls to restore the former landlord-tenant relationship in Ethiopia would not constitute a legitimate claim for historical preservation. Therefore, the quest to preserve historical legacy must be distinguished between the genuine protection of heritage and attempts to maintain historical forms of dominance.

Finally, the dialogue process exposed aspirations by some actors to dominate Ethiopia's political order. Various groups sought to secure disproportionate influence based on numerical strength, historical roles, current political leverage, or perceived intellectual superiority.

History Conclusion

The early stages of the national dialogue revealed that group demands were not always consistently grounded in principle. A group advocating for inclusion at the federal level may, for instance, resist similar demands for inclusion at regional, zonal, or woreda levels. Likewise, ethnic groups that recently achieved regional state status after prolonged struggles have been accused of limiting the recognition and inclusion of other groups within their territories. In some cases, representatives from these regions reacted strongly when smaller ethnic communities raised their own demands for recognition.

It is evident that ethnicity, religion, geographical locality, and class remain significant fault lines within Ethiopian society. Across these divisions, patterns of political favouritism and co-optation, marginalisation and exclusion, as well as political and military mobilisation, are increasingly becoming established features rather than isolated incidents. Groups organised around these fault lines have political parties and, in some cases, armed movements advocating for their interests, with the notable exception of class-based political mobilisation.

The challenge, therefore, is to develop a political framework capable of accommodating these competing aspirations. Such a framework must recognise and address legitimate quests for recognition, inclusion, and preservation of historical heritage, while restraining attempts at domination--including efforts to preserve entrenched privileges or establish new forms of political supremacy at the expense of others. AS

Editor's Note: Kamil Abdu Oumer (PhD) is an Assistant Professor of Law at Wollo University. He can be reached at kamillaw2009@gmail.com

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