Thousands of referrals fall through the cracks of the country's many anti-corruption agencies. Better cooperation, tracking and follow-up are vital.
Between 2011 and August 2026, South Africa's Special Investigating Unit (SIU) made 5 944 criminal referrals to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). But only 570 registered police dockets, 91 court cases and 263 convictions in relation to these referrals were reported by the NPA to Parliament.
This does not mean thousands of referrals disappeared, as several may be consolidated into one docket; and not all provide sufficient evidence for prosecution. Parliament's concern was that the SIU, NPA and Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI, or Hawks) could not provide a consistent, reconciled account of how individual referrals had progressed through the criminal justice system.
South Africa has numerous institutions with powers to investigate corruption, impose sanctions and pursue other forms of accountability. These include the SIU, NPA, Hawks, Financial Intelligence Centre, Auditor-General, Public Protector and financial regulators. Research from the Institute for Security Studies highlights that many depend on information or findings from other institutions to exercise their powers effectively.
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The SIU's investigation into alleged corruption at the National Lotteries Commission (NLC) involving grants intended for community projects shows the difficulty in tracking a matter after it's referred. Between 2022 and 2024, 19 criminal referrals were made to the NPA. In May 2025, the SIU reported no recorded progress on 18 of these referrals. By March 2026, the NPA had consolidated the referrals into 16 matters, with two in court and 14 under investigation.
The NPA identified the Hawks' difficulties appointing forensic accountants as a major cause of delay. The Hawks later submitted dockets to prosecutors, but some were returned with requests for further investigation, as the Hawks explained in parliamentary proceedings.
Not every delay is avoidable. Evidence warranting an SIU referral may fall short of what is needed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Complex financial investigations take time, and prosecutorial decisions must remain independent.
But the NLC case exposed shortcomings in accounting for matters as they moved between institutions. Their status was revealed only through parliamentary scrutiny, when routine reporting should have done so.
Similar difficulties can arise regarding referrals for disciplinary action. The SIU's investigation into procurement corruption at Tembisa Hospital produced 116 disciplinary referrals concerning 13 officials. By September 2025, 108 had been delivered to the Gauteng Department of Health. As of October 2026, the SIU had not received feedback on the progress of its recommendations.
While this does not establish that the department failed to act, it shows how referring institutions can remain unaware of next steps.
The Tembisa investigation also raises questions about how findings from one investigation inform subsequent action. The SIU identified repeated purchases just below competitive tender thresholds. Earlier SIU investigations in the Gauteng Health Department had identified procurement governance weaknesses, some of which persisted in the Tembisa case. This shows the importance of sharing lessons across facilities and checking whether corrective measures have been implemented.
Existing legislation offers examples of how institutions can be required to account for their handling of referrals. Under the Public Audit Act and Material Irregularity Regulations, public bodies receiving referrals from the Auditor-General to investigate suspected irregularities must promptly acknowledge receipt, report on progress at intervals specified by the Auditor-General, explain delays and communicate outcomes.
The Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act goes further. Police commissioners must initiate disciplinary proceedings within 30 days of receiving recommendations from the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) and communicate outcomes. Failure to comply is a criminal offence.
Although their effectiveness is uncertain, these arrangements establish obligations to report on referrals without prescribing the final investigative or disciplinary outcome.
Similar reporting duties should be extended to other significant corruption referrals. Receiving institutions should be required to acknowledge referrals, explain decisions and report on progress, without compromising investigative or prosecutorial discretion.
Agreements alone have not resolved the problem. The SIU and NPA signed a memorandum of understanding in 2017, followed by another involving the Hawks and police in 2022. Yet the institutions still struggle to reconcile their figures.
Efforts to improve referral tracking are underway. The Presidency's SIU Referrals Coordination and Monitoring Mechanism monitors the implementation of SIU recommendations. Within this initiative, the Presidency, SIU and NPA worked with the State Information Technology Agency to develop a proof of concept for a Case Monitoring Mechanism to track SIU referrals to the NPA. In time, the system could also track disciplinary, administrative and regulatory recommendations.
While important, agreements and software systems are not sufficient to complete this work. Institutional leaders must ensure that staff record receipt, take responsibility for the next step, share relevant information, update case records and respond when deadlines are missed. Parliament should monitor whether the arrangements are implemented and whether overdue referrals receive attention.
The United Kingdom's counter-fraud standards offer useful guidance, recommending auditable records of referrals received, assessment decisions, reasons, milestones and outcomes. Such records would help institutions follow matters to their conclusion, even when several referrals are consolidated into one investigation or a case moves between institutions.
These improvements should also change how institutional performance is measured. Reporting should go beyond the number of investigations completed or referrals made to show how many referrals were acknowledged, assessed and concluded, how long this took and why matters remained outstanding.
South Africa's anti-corruption institutions have different mandates, and their independence must be respected. But this should not prevent them from accounting for how they handle matters referred by other bodies. Ultimately, accountability should not end where one institution's mandate stops.
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Georgia Dorrington, Research Consultant, Justice and Violence Prevention, ISS
Martin Schönteich, ISS Consultant and former South African prosecutor