Washington, DC — Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Clinton Administration, was a key figure during a time of challenging transformation and turmoil in Africa and remains a keen observer of African affairs. In an interview with allAfrica's Charles Cobb Jr., Ms. Rice reflects on key events during her tenure, assesses the Bush administration's developing Africa policy, and insists that the Clinton administration's approach to Africa achieved a number of breakthroughs. Excerpts:
When the Bush administration took over, few expected that his administration would be very interested in Africa. Yet, his team seems to have been extremely energetic with regard to the continent. I wonder if you agree with that impression and, if you do, to what you attribute it?
First of all, when one looks at the overall record, it's really too soon to discern a pattern; but I think we can say several things at the outset. A number of observers were concerned at some of President Bush's statements about Africa during the campaign which might have led to this expectation of, at best, lack of interest and at worst, well, some negative perceptions. Many people have been glad to see that the early months of the administration, and the actions of the administration, have not matched that campaign rhetoric. The rhetoric was such that, quite honestly, many of us in the Clinton administration especially those of us working on Africa, toward the end of the term had a conscious determination to make it difficult for the Bush administration, should it have been so inclined, to walk away from Africa. We felt that one of the important steps we had made was to bring Africa from the bottom of the agenda on national security and foreign policy to a higher level, to give it greater attention, greater resources and a greater role in our overall perspective on international affairs.
So, if you go back, for example, and look at Secretary [of State, Madeleine] Albright's last trip to Africa - she took four trips to Africa, one each year, in the course of her tenure as Secretary, the last one in December, 2000 - she very consciously used rhetoric that said Africa is a place that has to be high on our priority list, come what may. And that was not unintentional. At Howard University, I think, she sat on a podium with Secretary [of State] Powell toward the end of the administration - I think we were even into the transition - and made a point of underscoring in his presence - in good humor of course - that we were intending to set the bar at a certain level and we hoped that they would take note of that. And, quite frankly, I think they've done so. And I think that is certainly something that I'm gratified by and proud of, and I think that Secretary Powell started setting the tone early. During the transition he made something of a statement in State department circles by asking to meet with the Africa bureau first. That shook some of the pinstripes a little bit. But it was a bold statement.
And by making a decision to travel to Africa early in his tenure, by the White House, after a few months, making a point to have some symbolic ceremonies, including the Rose Garden ceremony around the legally-mandated requirement to implement AGOA [African Growth and Opportunity Act]; and to then have some heads of state, including [Nigerian President, Olusegun] Obasanjo and [South African President, Thabo] Mbeki, and [Mali President, Alfa Oumar] Konare, and [Senegal President Abdoulaye] Wade, and others in the early months - these were all good, positive, symbolic steps. And I think what they convey is a determination not to be tarred with the brush of having let Africa fall off the agenda.
Obviously, the challenges have to go beyond the symbolism, visits or trips. This, of course, is the challenge any administration faces. There is an imperative to put muscle and money where our mouths are. That will ultimately be the basis on which this administration's, or any administration's, record will be measured. They have worked hard to indicate that even in the wake of September 11, they do not want to be accused of letting Africa slide off the radar screen. It's a good thing and I'm glad to see it.
Do you think this is being led by Powell or Bush?
It's hard to know. It's certainly Powell, I believe. I hope, and can't help but believe, that obviously also the National Security Advisor [Condoleezza Rice] and her staff play an important role. Certainly President Bush, who ultimately makes decisions about how he spends his time, has agreed to meet with a number of African leaders. For that he obviously deserves credit. I can't comment with great knowledge on the internal bureaucratic politics but I assume there's not great debate and dissent on this issue.
I do think it needs to be said that policymakers in national security affairs across the board, including those who work on Africa, were really dealt a horrendous blow following 'nine-eleven' [the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001]. We're all in uncharted waters when it comes to constructing and managing a global national security policy in the wake of a fundamental shift in the landscape.
I think that will be a particular challenge for Africa policy makers because it will be that much more difficult to keep Africa on the agenda, to preserve the resources that it needs, and in fact as I testified [before the House Subcommittee on Africa, November 15] I believe we ought to be looking at, in our national security interests, at substantial increases in the resources we devote to Africa and other developing parts of the world which are breeding grounds for terrorists.
So I think there is a real difficult and particular challenge in the current context, and it is going to take a great deal of commitment and energy on the part of the leadership in both the White House and State Department, as well as elsewhere, to give Africa the resources and attention that it needs as we continue to fight the war on terrorism.
In that hearing you referred to, in testimony, either you or Steve Morrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in expressing this kind of concern, seemed to suggest - I think the term that was used was "raid" - some resources allocated to Africa-related projects were being "raided" and deployed for use elsewhere.
That was Steve's point and a very good one. I was making the broader point of how Africa fits into the war on terrorism and how we can't fight that war globally with minimal resources in Africa. Steve was making the particular point that a few weeks into the new war on terrorism, we have seen African accounts being cannibalized to fund efforts on the foreign operations side in other parts of the world. And that is the case.
For example?
Out of 'Development Assistance' and, I expect, ultimately out of 'Economic Support Funds (ESF)'. These were funds that had been on the increase for Africa over the last few years. And now, not only are they not increasing, year over year, as should be the case, but in fact they are being raided and that worries me greatly.
Let's talk about the Clinton administration. President Clinton made two trips to Africa; Secretary of State Albright made four trips - it was clear that "Africa matters." On the other hand we're still looking at problems in Sierra Leone, or in DR Congo - you know all the places better than anyone. So, once we get past the symbolism what are we really looking at in terms of the accomplishments of the Clinton administration in Africa?
The answer is this. I said when we were discussing the Bush administration's record that ultimately they'll be judged, in part, on whether they put their money where their mouths are. Here is where I think the Clinton administration managed to succeed. You may recall that by 1996, with a newly Republican congress, resources to Africa hit an all-time low and the Development Assistance account fell down to the middle to low $600m from its previous historic high of $800m. President Clinton pledged during his first trip to Africa to work with Congress to restore Africa assistance levels to their historic high levels. He did that and more, such that this current fiscal year, which was the last budget of the Clinton administration, the combined resources of Development Assistance and Economic Support Funds exceeded $900m, it went up to $935m - a historic high.
We did that, in part, through the establishment and funding of a number of new initiatives - initiatives in education, initiatives on the economic growth side. We also expanded non-development assistance and non-ESF funds for Africa, putting in place programs, where they had never existed, to fight terrorism in Africa and to provide capacity-building and training for counter-terrorism in Africa; similarly, for fighting crime and narcotics. These were accounts but never headline items for Africa.
We funded and are in the process now of establishing an international law enforcement academy for Africa. We have in the Defense Department budget something that had never been there before: an African Center for Strategic Studies which is to train civilian and military officials in the tools and techniques and mores of civilian control of the military. We put in a program called Safe Skies for Africa which is designed to improve air traffic safety and security. Across the spectrum,, we launched a number of new initiatives and funded them and got them sustained and supported by Congress.
Also in the category of new programs which I think have borne positive results are the African Crisis Response Initiative for peacekeeping (ACRI), Operation Focus Relief in which we provided peace enforcement training to battalions from Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal to participate effectively in the UN operation in Sierra Leone. All of these are concrete initiatives that were funded and sustained, that fundamentally changed our programs for Africa.
Similarly we passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). That's become the most highly heralded piece of the Africa agenda in the new administration and it certainly deserves credit as a centerpiece. We worked long and hard with Congress to get that legislation passed and that may do more, over the long term, to change the relationship between the United States and Africa than anything else.
We also worked hard on conflict resolution, and that was a mixed bag. I think it goes without saying, as I am sure colleagues in the new administration will say, the United States is not often the sole determinant of - and I say this with tongue in cheek - whether African nations fight with one another or resolve their conflicts. But the United States played a very important role in the early days of the administration in helping to secure the peace in Mozambique. We worked very hard with, I think, some success, although not yet an irretrievable and ultimate prize in Burundi and the Great Lakes.
We worked very hard behind the scenes on the Congo conflict in ways that are not well-known. But many of the elements of the Lusaka Agreement were first contained in a white paper that we provided to [Zambia's] President [Frederick] Chiluba some months before. Obviously, also, we worked very long and hard, particularly my colleagues [National security Advisor] Tony Lake, Gayle Smith, John Prendergast and others to try and bring peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. And I think, quite frankly, we wouldn't be there if it hadn't been for the role that the United States played in that regard. And President Clinton himself, personally, and Secretary Albright and many others were very involved in that.
We were disappointed to see peace slip away in Angola. That was Unita's doing, largely. But there was an area in which we had worked very hard, invested heavily in supporting a peace process which didn't pan out. We worked to try and bring about an initial ceasefire in Sierra Leone, which we did. And then to support the transition from Ecomog to the United Nations that fell apart. We then worked very hard with the United Nations, with the British and with the countries in the region to help put that back together. It's sustaining itself and our role in training battalions to go in there was an important contribution.
I also think it needs to be said that we invested substantially, and in a timely manner, to support critical transitions in South Africa and Nigeria. The United States put $600m into South Africa in the first three years after democracy there. We were the largest bilateral donor and I think we helped through the bi-national commission and the relationship established between Vice President Gore and [then] Deputy President [Thabo] Mbeki to support and play some role in helping to secure that transition.
Similarly, when democracy returned to Nigeria we radically shifted around resources raided from non-Africa sources and brought further money into the Africa fold to support the transition there and I think that was timely. I am proud of that. So, in many respects, we put our money where our mouth is.
There are other elements to the record that I would mention as well. Under the Clinton Administration we managed to do something that I hope and believe is being sustained in the current administration. And that is to bring all parts of the government into the business of policy and programs for Africa. It used to be just State and USAID and perhaps on occasion, the NSC that played a role on Africa. Now it's every agency from Agriculture to Defense to USTR [United States Trade Representative] to Labor that are actively involved in elements of our Africa policy. With more horsepower and with an inter-agency team that can work together and bring resources and expertise to bear we accomplished much more than we otherwise would have. And I think that's something that is being sustained and ought to be sustained.
Will you talk some about the Clinton administration's lack of response to the genocide in Rwanda?
I think by any standard, as Secretary Albright and President Clinton have themselves said, that was one of the greatest failings of the Clinton administration. It happened in 1994. I wasn't working on Africa at that point, but it is on all of our watches. This is something that I believe not just the administration, but Congress, and our public and our press share.
I assume there has been a fair amount of analysis of that failure. I'm interested in your insight into what was at play that caused this failure - how do you evaluate it? And I assume there has been internal evaluation.
Let me give you my personal evaluation. The first thing that you have to recall is the domestic context in which it occurred. April 7, 1994 was a week after the March 31 congressionally-mandated deadline to have the last American troops out of Somalia. You recall that Congress, in the wake of the tragedy in Mogadishu, basically ran the U.S. out of Somalia and we were "fortunate", I say with some irony, to have a six-month period in which to withdraw because there were many in Congress who wanted us out of there immediately. And we had an orderly and safe withdrawal that concluded on March 31st.
In that context, it was difficult to conceive at the time - even once we began to understand the magnitude of what was going on [in Rwanda], which frankly wasn't until a few weeks into it; we were hampered, in part, by the fact that our first priority was to evacuate American personnel and staff which left us with no eyes and ears on the ground - and nobody inside or outside of the administration was arguing for an American intervention - a military intervention.
I personally have thought many, many hours about this in the years since, and I am convinced that would have been the only possible way for us to have made a difference in slowing or stopping the genocide. It wasn't going to be done by the United Nations. The Belgians, who formed the backbone of this 2,500-person UN force that was there, called out their battalion as soon as their peacekeepers were killed. The Bangladeshis followed on their heels. The mission was evaporating. Nobody was signing up to go in. There is a lot of revisionist history going on about a capacity or will to intervene; that somehow the United States thwarted it. That's not true.
What is true is that the United States, itself, did not intervene. And I think we can debate forever whether we should have. I think if President Clinton had tried to order U.S. forces into Rwanda at that time, Congress would have eaten him for lunch. I think it's a bit sanctimonious and self-serving for some members of Congress and for the press, as they look back on this, to place all of the blame on the administration, although some of it belongs there. I defy you to find me a member of Congress, or an editorial board, who in the early weeks was arguing that the United States ought to intervene with American forces. This is not to say we were right; I think we were all wrong.
The other region for which there has been specific criticism of the Clinton administration is Sierra Leone in West Africa. You're familiar with that New Republic article that came out a year or so ago...
I think there was more than one and they were distinguished by being a pack of lies, most of them.
Do you think, in retrospect again, too much hope was pinned on Foday Sankoh's and RUF willingness to reach an accommodation with the government of Sierra Leone, at the expense of the government of Sierra Leone?
That's not the way I'd look at it. You have to remember, again, the circumstances. You had basically the following reality: West African forces - the Ecomog forces had been in Sierra Leone and were the only thing between the government standing or falling. When democracy came to Nigeria it was clear that Nigeria, which had carried most of the burden financially in terms of maintaining that peacekeeping force, was going to leave.
It was Nigeria, with support from others, including the United States and with the understanding and agreement of the government of Sierra Leone, along with others in Ecowas, that worked to broker the first Lomé Accord. There were really two choices for Sierra Leone after it was clear that Ecomog was going; fight without that support, or accept a peace agreement. I don't think the government of Sierra Leone calculated that it could fight and win. And I think that, given its exhaustion, and that of its people, from the conflict, the government thought its best option was to give peace a chance. This is not to say that they, or we, or anyone else, had faith in Foday Sankoh; it was a cold, hard choice that they had to make.
It's basically the same dilemma that the government of Angola faced time and again with Unita. They could have said after the Bicesse Accords [of 1989], "Why negotiate with Savimbi?" They did and they had the Lusaka Agreement and Savimbi broke it again. Were they wrong to negotiate that? But ultimately they haven't resolved the conflict. But many times when it comes down to peace or war and war may be perceived by the legitimate government as unwinnable, peace becomes the only option.
The mistake, if there was one, in my opinion, is that the United States, and especially the rest of the international community - although the United States did more than most - did not give Ecomog the resources that it needed and the support that it needed to stay in there and fight on behalf of the government; and left no choice but an Ecomog withdrawal and peace agreement and then a UN Mission. The United States contributed over $110m to Ecomog; we were the largest donor in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nobody else would contribute! Not the Brits who later came to the rescue; not anybody else in the EU, except a few Dutch trucks. That, in retrospect, may have been the greatest failing.
I don't see how you blame the government of Sierra Leone or those that tried to support it and sustain the peace, for making that peace when the time came. The only thing that's now between the government and renewed conflict, apart from a reaffirmation of the peace agreement, has been a more robust UN force, reinforced by the battalions in part that we have trained, and by the British.
More broadly, the 1990s started out as the hopeful decade. Young leaders seemed to be emerging. Real conversation in Africa about transparency of government was underway. By the end of the decade many people were walking around shaking their heads wondering what happened. How did Eritrea and Ethiopia, whose leaders were symbols of this more hopeful Africa, get into such ugly conflict, for example? There were uncertainties in places that once seemed stable, like Côte D'Ivoire. Many were asking, 'has Africa lost it's way?'. What was your sense of this, as an administration official?
Two steps forward and one step backward. Toward the end of my tenure I gave a speech in Nairobi about the future of Africa. I think, first of all, I don't think we can measure progress in linear terms. We can't measure it year by year, or election by election, or coup by coup, or war by war. It's going to be a long term transformation if it's to succeed. I think, in sum, the decade of the nineties was a net positive. The number of democracies went from roughly five to about 25. Economic growth went from negative or zero in most places to around four or five percent. Wars ended and wars started, but South Africa emerged democratic and the southern Africa region emerged more stable and SADC and COMESA as real potential engines. Nigeria is now a constructive force for growth and peace - far from perfect, far from assured, but a lot better than it was in the early part of the decade.
But there are many things that have gone wrong and will continue to go wrong. I think anybody who is a serious observer has to take a long view; I do. It's not about any individual leader; it's not even about any individual "hot spot". It's about whether institutions can be built that will sustain and support democracy; whether or not we can make the complete evolution to a culture of accountability or transparency and a sense of responsibility. I think the rhetoric has changed; I think the mindset has changed in a lot of places but there is a lot of dead weight out there. [Zimbabwe President Robert] Mugabe is a classic case. There are others in that same vein.
And then of course there is the HIV/Aids pandemic which I think is the greatest challenge to all of this. You can get all of the other dimensions right but the critical challenge is whether African leaders, African government institutions and civil society with the support and resources from outside can make a critical difference in turning around this pandemic. I believe it's certainly possible to do but it's going to take a degree of focus and attention and money that hasn't been forthcoming, particularly the money.
Let's talk about Sudan. In a remarkably frank response at a press conference in Nairobi, when former Senator Danforth, the peace envoy to Sudan, was asked about peace prospects he replied, "I wouldn't bet much on this."
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
He's absolutely right.
I was just going to ask you what's your response to Senator Danforth's response! Do you think the Khartoum government and the SPLA are serious about peace?
No, they're not serious and they haven't been serious in years, if ever. Senator Danforth is a noble American and a noble public servant for taking on this challenge, as was [President Clinton's special envoy to Sudan] Harry Johnston and others before him. I do not believe that the conflict in Sudan is ripe for resolution, to use one of my predecessor's terms. I think the tremendous human toll that conflict has taken and continues to take, necessitates that any responsible administration continue to look for openings and opportunities, because it may not evident at the outset when the situation does change and mature and become more ripe for resolution. We certainly tried to keep our eyes open and our feelers out and to support the IGAD process and put effort and attention behind the problem; but I am not optimistic. I am, in fact, pessimistic.
Senator Danforth gave them a deadline. He said that they must show that they're moving toward peace by mid-January or he would advise the Bush Administration to wash its hands of the effort.
That is exactly what Harry Johnston said and did and his conclusion, unfortunately, was a negative one. And I agreed with him. There was not an opening for the United States to play a meaningful role.
Are both sides at fault?
You need two sides to make peace. Yes, I believe there is fault to be had on both sides. I believe there is much more fault on the government side, but there's fault on both sides. The policy dilemma this poses for the administration is an important one. The humanitarian consequences of this conflict are enormous. There is domestic and political interests greater than in most African conflicts. And the United States has some important additional interests in Sudan that extend beyond the conflict, such as terrorism, such as regional stability, such as human rights. And we aren't neutral. We can't be neutral and be faithful to our counter-terrorism concerns, to our human rights concerns, to our principles. It therefore is hard for the Sudanese to accept - particularly the government - and for the United States to provide leadership in the role of an honest broker. So this a difficult one for the United States, regardless of who is in the White House. It was risky. I'm not sure that it was the wisest choice; time will tell. I give them credit for trying.
The Bush administration has basically made this their top conflict-resolution priority. There are other conflicts out there, however intractable they may appear, places where the United States role and muscle may make a bigger difference, faster. And in Sudan - and I think this is why a number of people declined the honor of being the envoy - the odds of success are quite low and I'm pleased to see that Senator Danforth has a sort of clear-eyed view of the problem. I admire him for trying; I admire the administration for trying, provided that we remain faithful to our principles and provided that we don't lose sight of our other security interests.
There seems to be an inherent conflict in the Bush administration seeking Sudan's cooperation in the anti-terrorism fight and saying it is getting that cooperation while responding, at the same time, to domestic pressures and extending sanctions.
Not just domestic constituencies. This has always been a very complicated problem for the United States because we have multiple and sometimes competing concerns. We have concerns with terrorism, concerns with slavery, human rights, aerial bombardment, religious freedom. We have real concerns on the humanitarian situation and the fact that this is a place where, to a degree greater than most, food is being used as a weapon.
All of which the government denies.
All of which the government denies and is dishonest about. It's also a regional security concern where the government has supported radical Islamist insurgencies in neighboring countries. We have had, and I hope we will continue to have, a rational approach, neither black nor white. These concerns are on different tracks. It is conceivable, and in fact we tried, under the Clinton administration, to get greater cooperation on counter-terrorism without compromising on our principles when it comes to human rights or the conflict in Sudan. We have to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. As I said the other day, Sudan should not be allowed, and cannot be allowed a get-out-of-jail-free card on human rights simply by cooperating on terrorism; but we ought to elicit as much cooperation from them as we can get on terrorism; it's in our interest to do so.
One of the Sudanese Ambassador's complaints about Susan Rice, and the Clinton administration, is that they never met with Khartoum.
That is just a lie. Madeleine Albright went to Khartoum at the request of the President in 1994. We had two special envoys to Sudan. They went to Khartoum. I met with Sudan's foreign minister twice as Assistant Secretary. We met with their ambassador to the United Nations many times. The problem with the Clinton administration and Sudan was not lack of dialogue. The problem was that we were insisting that they should not just issue pretty statements and charming words, but that they should fundamentally change their behavior. And they didn't. And until they did, we were not going to change the fundamental nature of our relationship.
Susan Rice is now Managing Director, Intellibridge International, consultants on global affairs
