Washington, DC — From Rwanda and Sudan in the east to Sierra Leone and Liberia in the west, alleged perpetrators of heinous acts of violence are under scrutiny, both within Africa and from world bodies like the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Pierre-Richard Prosper, the U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes, has the task of tracking those who has been accused of genocide and other serious violations of the Geneva Conventions.
In the following interview, he talks about the current status of these investigations throughout Africa, beginning with the detention earlier this month of Augustin Bizimungu, who served as Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) chief of staff during the 1994 genocide. Bizimungu was arrested in the northeastern Angola town of Luena, where he was hiding among demobilizing troops from the rebel movement Unita. After his arrest, he was transferred to Arusha, Tanzania, where he has declared himself "not guilty" on ten counts of genocide in his initial appearance before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
Tribunal officials had described Bizimungu, who they accuse as encouraging and training Hutu militias for this slaughter, as one of the "top three or two most wanted by the Tribunal." But despite the capture of Bizimungu, over a dozen other ICTR indictees remain at large.
Prosper also discusses the prosecution of war crimes in other parts of Africa. Here are major excerpts from the interview with AllAfrica's Charles Cobb Jr.:
Was Bizimungu in Angola without the knowledge of the Angolan government? Why was he there? What does his presence in Angola imply concerning the 15 or 20 people that you consider key leaders of the Rwandan genocide of 1994?
What the arrest of Bizimungu implies, particularly as far as the nature of the people that we're looking for, is that it is a mobile group. We know that they've spent some time in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We know that the leadership of the group has spent time in Congo Brazzaville. We know now, obviously, that some of them, particularly Bizimungu, are in Angola. We also know that there are approximately 60 combatants in Angola -- Rwandese combatants and we'll have to see who they are and if there are any indictees there. And we also know that some of these individuals have been captured in Europe. So what it is, you have a group of people who are not limited to the Great Lakes or central region of Africa. They move about in order to conduct their activities.
Well your 'most wanted' -- Felicien Kabuga -- is reportedly in Kenya. The Rwandan government charges that the Kenyan government knows where he is and is protecting him, or at least powerful people are protecting him. The specific question is whether that is so, and the broader question is that, given the spread of these fugitives which you've just described, how do you coordinate with the various governments?
Regarding Kabuga, all information points to Kenya. We've received credible information in the past that he spends time in Kenya -- particularly in Nairobi, Mombassa and Eldoret. Through our rewards program we've continued to receive information that focuses on Kenya. We do believe that he is receiving some sort of protection, either from a civilian population or influential people. We have strong suspicions as to who these people may be. We're not prepared to go public with it just yet, but we are prepared to make approaches to try to resolve this issue because we believe that Mr. Kabuga needs to be brought into custody and that the government of Kenya does have an international obligation. And we hope that they will continue to work with us to ensure that he is transferred to Arusha immediately.
Regarding the group as a whole, we really need to come up with a regional approach to this problem. The leadership group that is indicted by the tribunal and forms a leadership of the combatants in the Congo is a very mobile group. They have financial resources to move about. If we are to address this problem, if we are to bring peace and stability in the region, then every government in the region needs to play an active role and accept their responsibility. We are prepared to support any efforts that are launched to capture these individuals, and we are prepared to assist in looking throughout the globe to find these individuals.
Are these governments playing that role? Rwanda made the charge about Kabuga a year ago. What does the Moi government, the ruling party and the 'powerful people' have to say?
We have really put a sharp focus on this issue in the past few months. We felt that enough is enough. Too much time has passed that these individuals have been at large. And we really need to put whatever influence the United States has behind this effort to bring them into custody. Our first stop was in Kenya. I met with Kenyan officials; the attorney general was with me when we launched this program, and they've given their commitment to work with us. Obviously we need results. Though verbal assurances are welcomed, some of the actions they've taken on the ground are welcomed, but what we feel now a few months into this is that we need to step up the efforts and once and for all determine where Mr. Kabuga is and bring him into custody.
Is there a timetable for when you expect to have him in custody? Is there a timeframe for when you expect a hard and fast commitment from the Kenyan government or whatever government you need to get a commitment from?
It's difficult to place an exact time frame because there are too many variables at play, particularly the fact that these individuals are now on the run. They know that the area is becoming more and more inhospitable with each passing day. But what I can say with Mr. Kabuga is we feel we're getting closer. Our information is crystallizing. It's just a matter of whether or not the timing will be such that we'll be able to take the action that we need to bring him into custody.
With the others time is running out. While I can't say that others will be apprehended within the next weeks, months, or even this year, the situation has changed, particularly with the start of the apprehension process with Mr. Bizimungu.
We are waiting upon Congo Brazzaville to take action. We believe there are three individuals that are there. I have engaged the government on that, and we are expecting action. They have given us their assurances; not it's time to deliver. We are looking for President Kabila to take action and to search his country. He has given us the assurances to work with us. So we need that as well. If everyone does their parts then we should have developments in the coming months.
What happens to Bizimungu now? Indictment?
The indictment was issued previously for Mr. Bizimungu. It was a standing indictment, and the arrest warrant was served on the Angolans just last week. The next step is that he will be brought before a judge and arraigned on the charges that are filed against him and then proceed to trial when the case is ready.
Is that going to be speedy? The ICTR has come under sharp criticism for its slowness.
We hope that it's within a reasonable time. We voted in the Security Council (August 14) to provide extra judges to the tribunal for Rwanda so can move more efficiently.
How many extra judges?
We will appoint a pool of 18. Four will be used first as the initial slot, and we'll see how that process is managed -- if that is sufficient. If not, we will continue to add judges until we reach the whole total of 18 additional judges.
Which bring the whole total of judges to....
It brings the total to 34, counting appellate judges. We currently have nine trial judges and seven appellate judges.
While we're on the question of the ICTR, last month the deputy prosecutor said that Rwanda's attitude toward the ICTR had hardened, apparently because the ICTR, in addition to investigating the perpetrators of the genocide, is looking into war crimes of the Rwandan army, known as the RPA. Is it true that the Rwandan army is being investigated for war crimes, and is it your view that the Rwandan government's attitude about the ICTR has hardened?
There have been, in the past few months, some difficulties between the tribunal and Rwanda and survivors groups in Rwanda. The survivors' groups have a few grievances that they feel need to be addressed. The tribunal feels that they are addressing them. There appears to be a situation where the parties are talking past one another, [but] I think that we've moved past that now. The reports that we're getting are that Rwanda has engaged in this issue, that they have facilitated the witnesses traveling to Arusha. It's improving.
But it has been intermittent. Survivors groups have shut off access to witnesses. But we feel that it needs to be turned on and turned on continually and the way to address grievances is through dialogue not through obstruction. I think we've made progress now. We're looking for continued cooperation from Rwanda. We don't want intermittent cooperation.
Regarding whether the RPA will be investigated, I think that's a question for the prosecutor. What I can say is that the mandate for the tribunal is such that it encompasses any violations of international humanitarian law that occurred in the calendar year of 1994. Obviously we have a genocide that occurred in Rwanda. I do not believe it can be said that the RPA committed genocide. There're reports of abuses, perhaps different crimes. The prosecutor apparently will look into that, but I don't think we should sit here and try to equate the level of abuse between the genocide and what the RPA may have committed.
I want ask you about Rwanda's Gacacas --village or community courts. As I understand it, there are still more than 100,000 people behind bars for participating in the genocide and the Gacacas will try and grapple with this. What's the relationship between the Gacacas and the ICTR? And are we talking about "war criminals" when we talk about these 100,000 or so people? That's an enormous number.
Technically we are talking about war criminals and genocidaires because the people who go through the process are accused of committing these acts -- these violations of international law, be it crimes against humanity or genocidal war crimes. The issue thus becomes, in order for them to go before the Gacacas, the level of their participation. Basically, the smaller the fish, the more likelihood that person will go before the Gacaca program rather than the Tribunal or the domestic courts of Rwanda.
Whether or not there is a link between the Tribunal and the Gacacas, technically there is no link. They are separate and apart. But when you look at the global justice picture, there is a link. I think that the way to move forward on the question of justice and accountability in Rwanda is by three processes: One, the Gacaca program, which will deal with the real lower-level people who perhaps did property offenses or lesser offensives or violations against a human being.
The second group will go through the Rwanda domestic criminal justice system to be prosecuted and perhaps punished and incarcerated. And then the last group -- the leadership, the hierarchy -- goes through the Tribunal process. Now if we have these three processes moving at once then I think we can answer the justice question in Rwanda.
I've heard that it is assumed that a lot of these people will just have the charges against them dismissed. That they are not really considered important to the question of war crimes in Rwanda. That by-in-large they'll get some kind of rap on the knuckles and sent home. Do you agree with that?
The punishment is designed to be insevere. It's designed to be perhaps community service of some sort or some sort of restitution. That's the idea behind the Gacaca because the offenders are deemed to be lesser offenders and what is the ultimate design of Gacaca is to hold persons accountable but not necessarily punish them for their action.
The idea is to have a discourse on the issue, have people accept their responsibility for their actions in order to help with the reconciliation process and then to continue with the reconciliation process the punishment is either nonexistent or is minimal.
These Gacacas exist simply because of the sheer number of people. There is no way for the ICTR to handle the volume of people. On a continent where Rwanda is not the only place where war crimes have occurred, is this perhaps some kind of model?
Is it a model for Africa? I think so. When I do my work throughout the continent and I look at other possibilities, I think we have to be not only sensitive to, but take a hard look at indigenous approaches that will help address some of the abuses that have occurred for a couple of reasons.
One, for the sheer numbers, because when we're dealing with war crimes and atrocities, not everyone can be prosecuted through a traditional system. And two, it's important to have a justice mechanism that the people can relate to. So if it is something that is grassroots in origin the society should be able to accept it as well as accept its outcome.
Let's leap to the other side of the continent. Someone who is at least as bad a guy as Rwanda's Kabuga, in many peoples' view, is Liberia's Charles Taylor. A month or so ago, Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA) called for him to be brought up before a war crimes tribunal. Other names also come to mind in terms of the conflicts that have raged in Sierra Leone and Liberia. What's your view? Is Charles Taylor a war criminal?
Charles Taylor is a problem in the region. He has been a source of instability. We've always felt that Charles Taylor could have done more, and could do more, to assist in regional peace and security. He has not.
Regarding Charles Taylor and his activities, particularly in Sierra Leone, we are taking a very close look at it. We need to get a deeper understanding of what his role was, and what his involvement was in the abuses and atrocities that occurred there. We know for sure that there were war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Sierra Leone. That's without a doubt. We also know that some of those responsible are not simply Sierra Leoneans, but they're external actors.
What we hope that the Special Court of Sierra Leone does is look to see who those external actors are that bear responsibility for the atrocities that occurred in Sierra Leone, and, if they are sufficient enough rank for the Special Court to consider, then we expect the Special Court to take action.
Let's separate Sierra Leone and Liberia for a second. Before Sierra Leone, there was Liberia with its own ugliness -- the amputations, the arming of children, all of the things that are associated with the atrocities in Sierra Leone. And it was Taylor who led that. I know it's a more complicated problem -- Taylor being a head of government -- than say, the Interahamwe or ex-FAR in Rwanda. Is there enough evidence to consider Charles Taylor a war criminal?
There's enough information there regarding abuses in the area to warrant a closer look. The difficulty we have with Liberia at this moment is that we do not have a mechanism set up to investigate and prosecute the abuses that occurred there. This something that obviously has been talked about. It is something that human rights groups have raised.
We've looked at it. It's influenced our ways of dealing with Charles Taylor. Again, as I said, we recognize the problem that he poses to the region. But for those actions we have not had an investigative body to go in to actually determine specifically...
Taylor would have to agree to have his own self investigated for you to get that.
For Liberia either it would be something of that nature, or we would have to do it through the [United Nations] Security Council or some sort of regional, approach to deal with that. We are continuing to work with the region to see if we can influence the region to bring peace and stability, and we know that there is a decade worth of atrocities in Sierra Leone and, as I mentioned before, that there are external actors who played a role. Those investigations may cure some of the concerns we have for lack of peace and security in the region.
And on Sierra Leone, is the former rebel leader Foday Sankoh being formally held as a war criminal?
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I believe he was held under an emergency order by the government that allowed for his arrest and incarceration. He will ultimately be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Special Court, once they indict him. That is the design. And from there they will proceed with the trial, and, if he is found guilty, he will be incarcerated for whatever punishment the court deems appropriate.
Where else in Africa does your office attach importance to around this issue?
The other part of the Congo -- the Kivus area, which is something I want to take a closer look at this fall. There's been a lot of deaths in that region. We need to get a better understanding of what happened and what local groups may be responsible for it, because if we want the society to advance, these questions will have to be answered.
We attach importance to Burundi, which is a continual situation where there is a threat of breach of peace and security. We know there have been atrocities in Burundi in the past. The parties have agreed to some sort of mechanism to address this. We want to see the peace process go forward so that we can get to the fundamental questions of how to bring justice and reconciliation to the region.
Beyond that I just keep my eyes open for areas of concern. There are things that may not be quite at my portfolio, but they are areas that I keep an eye on to see if it will elevate to that, and one of them is Zimbabwe.
An area that you didn't mention, a little to my surprise, is Sudan. The Khartoum government is accused of everything from slave trading to indiscriminate bombing of civilians.
Sudan is something that I watch all the time and engage with some of our Sudan workers. I did not mention it because, at the moment, we are definitely taking a watch-and-see-what-happens approach. There's a peace process underway that promises to bring peace and stability in the region. And if that does occur we will have to see how to deal with the questions of the slave trade, how to deal with the questions of the indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations. That's not overlooked.
However, first and foremost on the agenda for Sudan is a stable and lasting peace agreement that will end these abuses. And then from there we will engage the parties to see what we can do to address the atrocities and violations that have occurred there because obviously we cannot sweep them under a rug.
What is your sense of African leaders response to war crimes on the continent? I ask because with the transformation of the OAU into the African Union, African leaders say they are turning a new page in how they approach a variety of issues on the continent. Is it your sense that African leaders and governments are willing to seriously come to grips with the war crimes issue -- the way civil conflict so often seems to devolve into criminal behavior?
I wouldn't limit this to Africa. To get states to accept their responsibility on the war crimes issues, comprehensive and routine engagement is required. One thing that I have learned in the past few months in our efforts in the Great Lakes region of Africa is that we need -- "we" the United States and the international community -- need to engage these governments and impress upon them their responsibilities to take action, assist them where we can so they can take action and I think it bears fruit.
We're already starting to see it with Angola -- the arrest of Bizimungu, President Kabila [in the Democratic Republic of the Congo]giving us the assurances that he's given us and working with us to find the other genocidaires. We're waiting for Congo Brazzaville to take action. So what I think we have to do throughout the continent is continue to engage and I think people respond to positive engagement.
They also respond to other types of engagement -- when we make it clear that lack of action will affect our bilateral relationships. This obviously not only holds true in Africa, but it holds true for parts of Europe -- the former Yugoslavia -- Asia and elsewhere.
