From ongoing uncertainty in the north to logistical problems to simmering ethnic tensions, Mali's 28 July elections will face a range of challenges.
Mali is scheduled to hold presidential elections on Sunday, 28 July, 2013. A second round run-off vote will be held on 11 August should no candidate secure more than 50% of the ballot.
Initially scheduled to be held on 29 April, 2012, the vote was deferred following a military coup which toppled the government of former president Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012. Since the coup, and following a brief tenure of military rule, Mali has been administered by a transitional government headed by former National Assembly speaker and current interim president, Dioncounda Traore. Although the elections are presented as key to the consolidation of Mali's political institutions, the holding of the ballot is likely to be fraught with security and logistical problems which could impact both the impartiality and transparency of the vote. Should the voting process be deemed flawed or unrepresentative of the political will of the Malian citizenry, the election itself could bring further instability to the country.
The security situation in north
The holding of free and transparent elections in Mali is deemed intrinsic to the restoration of Mali's political institutions. Moreover, the appointment of an elected government is a prerequisite to the release of much needed foreign aid to the country - aid which was suspended in the immediate aftermath of the March 2012 coup. However, the process of planning and executing elections within the country is subject to a number of social, political and economic challenges which are threatening to derail the voting process or, at the very least, threaten the legitimacy of the ballot.
The primary threat facing the Malian elections stems from the precarious situation that continues in Mali's northern administrative regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Captured by a conglomerate of Tuareg separatist insurgents and Islamist militants following the fall of the Traoré regime, these regions were liberated by an alliance of French, Malian and Chadian security forces in January 2013. However, ousted from major towns and cities, rebel elements maintain a clandestine presence across Mali's vast and poorly policed desert north. They have regularly targeted government-aligned forces, employing acts of violence ranging from suicide bombings to armed ambushes.
There are also concerns that the formal withdrawal of the French military from Mali, as well as its replacement by a relatively less trained and equipped UN-led peacekeeping force, could result in a possible resurgence in militant activity across the region. Such attacks will likely be extended to election-related positions within the region; Islamist militants will likely seek to disrupt any potential voting process in order to undermine the authority of the Malian administration and its allies. In this regard, attacks in the form of bombings, armed incursions, and assassinations could potentially be conducted against election officials, polling stations, ballot counting centres and/or security personnel.
Tuareg separatism
Ongoing agitation by Tuareg separatist groups seeking the creation of an independent Tuareg-led state represents another potential obstacle to the holding of elections in northern Mali. This issue was at the forefront of the March 2012 coup and continued to remain a focal point when Tuareg and Islamist militants seized control of the northern half of the country. Tuareg separatism struggled for prominence when Islamist militants severed ties with their Tuareg counterparts and forced them from recently acquired strongholds in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. However, the fight for Tuareg independence regained pre-eminence following the re-emergence of groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), who aided in combat operations aimed at dislodging their former Islamist allies from northern Mali. Tuareg separatists have since assumed control of the Kidal region and continue to govern it as a de facto state.
The Malian government's relationship with the MNLA and HCUA is tenuous. The government has engaged the MNLA and HCUA in conciliatory talks, which have indeed culminated in the latter agreeing to allow elections in the Kidal region. Yet despite this small progress, there are ongoing reports of Malian political leaders and the country's armed forces inciting and even being complicit in acts of ethnically motivated violence against Tuareg populations. The Malian government has meanwhile accused the MNLA and HCUA of committing similar acts of violence against non-Tuareg ethnic groups residing within the Kidal region. If this cycle continues, it may not only derail recent conciliatory agreements between the Malian government and Tuareg separatist leaders, but could see the forthcoming election used as a platform for more collective and sustained outbreaks of ethnic violence across the country.
Logistical problems
Mali's vast geographical size and the general lack of infrastructure in the country's desert north have always posed a challenge to the holding of elections. The fact that all of the country's elections since independence have failed to see a voter turnout exceeding 40% bears testament to these difficulties. In the lead-up to a presidential election that marks a watershed moment in defining Mali's political future, current indications suggest that, logistically-speaking, the country is by no means ready. The president of the Commission Electorale Nationale Independante (CENI), Mali's electoral commission, has already made explicit his concerns regarding the meeting of the 28 July deadline, despite insistence to the contrary by Malian authorities. In a statement made in early May, Mamadou Diamountene claimed that the CENI had yet to recruit, let alone train, enough personnel to supervise the polling stations. The CENI had only begun distributing biometric voter cards as of 29 June, and many domestic and international observers have noted that the majority of the country's estimated seven million registered voters will not receive their cards on time and thus may not be able to vote.
The electoral process also coincides with both the peak of the country's rainy season and the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. These events impose time and mobility constraints on many potential voters, and will very likely translate into a reduction in public participation in the voting process. This dangerously diminishes the perception that the election is an accurate depiction of the political will of the Malian population.
The question of the Malian military
Despite formally handing over power to a transitional administration in the aftermath of the coup, the role of the Malian military within the country's political context remains ambiguous. Over the course of the past year, coup leader Captain Amadou Sanogo has stated on several occasions that the Malian military would play an active role in determining Mali's political future and would intervene in the country's governance if the need arises.
The ongoing involvement of the Malian military in the country's domestic affairs was possibly best demonstrated on 11 December, 2012, when members of the country's armed forces arrested and detained interim prime minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra. It was later confirmed that Diarra's arrest and subsequent resignation was directly ordered by Captain Sanogo, who allegedly claimed that Diarra had failed in fulfilling his duties as prime minister.
Although Captain Sanogo has recently apologised for orchestrating the coup and for any resultant actions, he remains a central figure within Mali's current political arena. Thus, the challenge that the popular election of a democratic government poses to Sanogo and the military's influence over Mali's governance should not be overlooked. The possibility of both a loss of political power and an outcome at odds with their political or economic interests means the military may very well interfere with the electoral process for its own ends.
Urban centres
Within major urban centres in Mali's more densely populated south, the primary security threat during the election period will likely stem from sporadic outbreaks of ethnically- and politically-motivated unrest. Acts of intimidation and/or violence could impact on minority groups, particularly Tuaregs and Malian nationals of Arab descent, and localised acts of violence could potentially even incite retaliatory attacks elsewhere in the country.
Politically-motivated violence will primarily be influenced by the perceived transparency of the vote; an electoral victory deemed fraudulent by any one of the 28 candidates contesting the ballot could incite spontaneous outbreaks of unrest in Bamako specifically, given the city's symbolism as the political and administrative capital of the country.
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Urban centres that host key military facilities, such as the town of Kati, could also be focal points for civil unrest should the military intervene in the election process. While the Malian military has garnered political support from civil society movements such as the pro-coup Coalition des organisations patriotiques du Mali (Copam), there is a large proportion of the Malian population which continues to be critical of the military's ongoing role in the country's governance.
Should the military forcibly take power, potentially violent protests by anti-coup groups remain a concern. Furthermore, should an unconstitutional action such as coup take place, Mali would likely be subject to similar economic and political sanctions which were witnessed in the immediate aftermath of the 2012 coup. These could include, but not be limited to, the imposition of border and airspace closures, in addition to other movement-restrictive measures. Intervention by the UN-peacekeeping force, whose mandate is to oversee Mali's transition back to democratic rule, is another possibility which cannot be discounted should such a scenario arise.
A power vacuum?
Whether or not all goes ahead as planned on 28 July, Mali's elections will undoubtedly have a profound impact on shaping the country's political future. An inclusive and transparent electoral process should result in the election of a legitimate government that can effectively address the country's myriad social, economic and political concerns. However, a process deemed to be corrupt or exclusive would likely increase civil discontent rather than satisfy it. There thus remains the potential for the creation of another power vacuum, open to exploitation by both the country's military and other militant elements.
Ryan Cummings is Chief Analyst for Africa for red24.
red24 is a crisis management assistance company providing advice, support and response within crisis management, travel tracking, product recall, kidnap and ransom and travel security. Follow red24 on twitter @red24security.
