As a regional force ratchets up pressure, rival Islamist factions engage in a brutal fratricidal war. Is it a matter of time before Boko Haram falls?
On 7 January, militants of the Jamatu Ahli Al-Sunna lil Da'wa Wal Jihad (JAS) faction of Boko Haram swarmed over two enclaves of the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad basin, killing at least 35 combatants. Although this was by no means a one-off incident in the ongoing power tussle between the two Islamist groups, the timing and the heavy casualties inflicted by a side that was hitherto considered weaker, are telling.
"There is serious infighting between ISWAP and JAS criminal groups; we welcome this and hope it escalates," Major General Abdul-Khalifah Ibrahim, commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) tells African Arguments, not bothering to mask his approval. He also hints that the casualties could be far higher.
"The criminals are being killed, [their] supplies are being cut off and equipment is being recovered," he said. "The MNJTF has made significant gains and we hope to make more."
Ibrahim got his wish. On 24 January, ISWAP militants reportedly launched a series of reprisal attacks, killing several JAS fighters and forcing more than 200 others to surrender to the Nigerian troops in the country's north east.
Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by a radical, young Islamist cleric, Muhammed Yusuf with the aim of establishing a caliphate in Nigeria. Yusuf was killed in 2009, but not before gaining popular support for speaking out against poverty and corruption within the Nigerian state. Since then, Boko Haram has been more widely associated with the grievance politics of the Northern underclass. In the North, and especially in the Northeast of Nigeria, feelings of marginalisation have lingered since the return of civilian rule and the arrival of a laissez faire market economy, perceived as benefiting the South and impoverishing the North.
Chequered history
Soon after Yusuf's death, a charismatic, ambitious and ruthless leader, Abubakar Shekau regrouped his predecessor's followers into what eventually gave birth to JAS. Between 2010 and 2015, JAS focused its attacks on secular schools, government premises, international institutions and churches, while rarely targeting Muslim civilians.
Shekau was named leader of ISWAP in March 2015 after pledging allegiance to the so-called Islamic State. His despotic character, ideological extremism and poor operational skills would, however, cause his dismissal a year later. This led to the split of the group into two factions: Shekau's group, which returned to its old name JAS; and ISWAP, led by Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, the son of Muhammed Yusuf.
Ideological and strategic differences between the two factions were associated with each group's modus operandi. While JAS routinely engaged in indiscriminate killings, raiding whole villages and abducting women and children, ISWAP masterminded more sophisticated, organised large-scale attacks on military camps and oil exploration sites. Shekau's JAS' style is best exemplified by the abduction of the 276 Chibok girls in 2014. More than 100 of the girls are reportedly still in captivity to this day.
On 19 May, 2021, Shekau reportedly detonated his suicide vest, instantly killing himself during a clash with ISWAP.
"The death of Shekau in 2021 was indeed a major blow to JAS and the faction suffered from mass desertions and surrenders to ISWAP and to the Nigerian security forces," Daniel Matan, researcher at the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre (ITIC), an Israeli-based research group that tracks both ISIS and Al-Qaeda, told African Arguments.
But JAS showed that it still retains considerable operational nous when it successfully launched attacks at the beginning of 2022, and repeated the same thing at the beginning of 2023.
"Today, there are two main groups that encompass JAS operations: Bakoura Doro's group located in the Lake Chad region and Ali Ngulde's group located in the Mandara mountains along the Cameroonian-Nigerian border," explains Matan. ISWAP is still considered the strongest faction and will likely continue to be for the foreseeable future, he says. "It maintains a high-level of operational ability and even expands its area of operations to new territories in eastern and southern Nigeria."
Human costs
The UN estimates that 350,000 people have been killed in Boko Haram atrocities in northern Nigeria since 2009, while more than two million others have been displaced. Neighbouring countries Niger, Chad and Cameroon have not been spared. In 2020, the number of attacks against civilians in Cameroon stood at 234 - higher than Nigeria (100), Niger (92) and Chad (12) combined. The insurgents have claimed the lives of over 3,000 Cameroonians, while close to 300,000 others have been displaced.
"The greatest social cost of the Islamist occupation is the fracturing of family structures and dislocation of socio-economic activities in the region," explains Prof. Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha, coordinator of the security, violence and conflict research group at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
Politically, the insurgency has led to a decline of voting population, he says. "It has forced the affected states to spend more on security and... on stability operations rather than on development," says Onuoha. He is, however, sceptical about allegations that the northeast's elite has succumbed to political Islam.
"If anything, political Islam has been steadily on the decline since 2015 when the group started losing much of the territory it previously controlled," he explains. "Its Islamic influence and radicalisation have been largely confined to the Tumbuns," he says, referring to the network of hundreds of small islands in Lake Chad that once formed the colonial transboundary line between Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger, and is now the centre of the ongoing jihadist insurgency and the military counter-insurgency.
Inadequate military firepower
A Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was established in 2013 to defend cities, towns and villages in northeastern Nigeria after the insurgency began in 2011. Initially, it had little effect.
"In the area of operations of ISWAP and JAS, most people [refrain] from any clear-cut statements or actions of defiance, either out of fear, or support for the factions," says Matan. As the Nigerian military counter-insurgency descended into chaos, the Multinational Joint Task Force, MNJTF - a pre-existing sub-regional force created in 1994 to combat transnational crime and smuggling in the Lake Chad Basin - was reactivated in 2015 and its mandate extended to containing Boko Haram. It is a 10,000-member force composed of forces from the Lake Chad member-states of Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger - plus Benin. MNJTF's operations run parallel to those of the Nigerian military.
Last year, the MNJTF claimed it killed over 1,000 Boko Haram fighters following coordinated land, sea and air offensives as part of an operation codenamed Operation Lake Sanity. Maj. Gen. Ibrahim of the MNJTF told African Arguments that his troops also killed more than 45 Boko Haram fighters in January this year. Since swinging into action in 2015, the MNJTF has carried out six different operations against the Islamic insurgents - although many didn't last long enough to root out the insurgents.
Analysing JAS's success in last month's clash with ISWAP, Maj. Gen. Ibrahim suggests ISWAP "suffered a bashing" given that it is "better organised and stronger" than JAS. "The death of Shekau obviously affected [JAS'] cohesion, which is good."
Underlying problems of insufficient funding, gaps in operational command and control, inadequate equipment and an intelligence-sharing cell have for long undermined the successes of the MNJTF.
Boko Haram "far from defeated"
The Nigerian military has, over the years, been heavily criticised for its alleged foot-dragging in the war against Boko Haram. As if to silence his detractors, President Buhari recently insisted that his administration has reclaimed all territories which Boko Haram formerly controlled. He said the insurgent group was "false" and accused its financiers of attempting to split the country.
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Matan, however, thinks ISWAP and JAS are "far from defeated" and still maintain "a strong presence and influence" in north-eastern Nigeria: "ISWAP and JAS combatants continue to enjoy a foothold in other Lake Chad-member countries of Cameroon and Niger specifically along the border with Nigeria and along Lake Chad's shores."
Onuoha argues that repeated attacks by the insurgent groups have often obscured the successes of the Nigerian military: "Inadequate equipment, flawed troop deployment and a weak intelligence structure are at the heart of the inability of the military to decimate the terrorists," he told African Arguments.
He adds that the MNJTF, meanwhile, has been effective in its area of operations essentially because of the "recalibration of its offensive strategy." "Its success is connected to the contribution of the Nigerian military operation Hardin Kai as with the national military efforts of the other three affected countries," says Onuoha.
Like Onuoha, Matan thinks the MNJTF is not "necessarily more effective" than the Nigerian security forces since ISWAP and JAS are currently concentrating their efforts in Nigeria and are preoccupied with inter-factional conflict even as they combat Nigeria's security forces.
"ISWAP and JAS operate in MNJTF operational sectors. But I believe it is a secondary front for the two factions and as such, there are [bound to be] fewer incidents there," he said.
Nalova Akua is a Cameroonian multimedia freelance journalist who treats news, features and other events with equal passion. He holds a BSc in journalism and has featured in outlets including Zenger News Service, The Epoch Times, Euronews Green, BBC Future Planet and Gavi, the Vaccines Alliance.
