Although many coalition governments at the local level have failed, coalition governance, as a form of government, has now become part of the political system of South Africa. Coalition governments, which involve multiple political parties governing collaboratively, are prominent in more than 40 countries and are a significant form of governance globally.
Since the end of colonialism in the post-Second World War period, it has been the most successful form of government in Africa's modern history. Of the 54 Africans, the two most successful African countries - in terms of peace, economic prosperity, and inclusivity, apart from Botswana, Mauritius and Cape Verde, for the past 100 years, have been governed by coalitions (Kadima 2006; Gumede 2017). Therefore, any argument that coalition governance results in instability, incoherent delivery and division is misinformed.
Fears that coalitions will bring instability, paralysis, and service delivery failures, are misplaced, as coalition governments, for South Africa, one of the most diverse nations on earth, are more fit for purpose than dominant-party governments. Coalition governance is particularly beneficial in ethnically, regionally, religiously, politically diverse and low-trust societies. In such diverse countries as in the case of South Africa, governing parties must be inclusive of all political, ethnic, language, regional and local differences. Often, coalition governance does this better than monopoly parties (Kadema, 2006; Gumede, 2017). All of South Africa's coalitions in the post-apartheid era were formed after elections when none of the political parties received an outright majority.
Coalition governance is even more appropriate in diverse societies
Effective coalition governments boost oversight of government management as individual coalition partners hold each other accountable for public service delivery. The coalition may therefore be a governance oversight structure over the management of government affairs under the coalition. Coalition partners may be more keen to be responsive to their partners' criticisms of poor delivery, corruption and dishonesty.
Coalition governance allows for the greater participation of minorities in governance; it helps cater for the interests of all groups in a country and for the adoption of policies that cater for marginalised constituencies, as dominant governing parties often only deliver to their own constituencies and exclude the interests of non-supporters.
Furthermore, because coalition governance forces participants to engage with each other regularly, get to know the other side, and build relationships, if done effectively, it is a good institution to build trust across political, racial, and class divides.
Effective coalition governance demands compromises for the greater good of public service delivery and the participation of all partners and parties governing in the interests of all the constituencies of the partnership. Successful coalition governance culture also transplants to the rest of society - making diverse societies more open to compromise, looking after the interests of all communities and stakeholders and encouraging a culture of conflict resolution. This means that coalition governance is likely to lead to more peaceful societies.
Most African countries are exceptionally diverse - ethnically, religiously, and linguistically - because of the way former colonial powers arbitrarily drew boundaries. However, since the end of the independence from colonialism, white-minority regimes and apartheid, most African countries have been run by dominant liberation and independence movements, military and personal regimes which often had their power base in one ethnic, religious, language or regional group.
They invariably governed only for their 'own' group rather than in the broadest interest of all communities in their respective countries. Furthermore, when most African countries launched multiparty regimes, they adopted 'winner-takes-all' electoral systems in which the party or leader that wins governs only for their 'constituencies' and excludes everyone else from the state, private sector, and societal positions. This has been among the main reasons for development, state, democratic, and economic failures in post-independence Africa. Coalition governments would have been a much more inclusive form of governance for our continent.
Coalitions critical in countries recovering from conflict
Coalition governments can either be established when no party secures a majority, or they can be formed when one party gains a majority but includes the losing parties in the form of a government of national unity (GNU). Coalitions can also be formed pre-election - before the parties have taken part in an election or post-election, based on the election results.
Coalitions have been particularly successful in countries rebuilding after war, ethnic conflict, and civil war. Following defeat in the Second World War, Germany had long periods of coalition governance, as parties spanning ideological and religious divides worked together to rebuild the country, foster national unity and boost industrial recovery. In fact, in the post-Second World War period, Germany was only governed for one term by a single party (Martin, 2017). The great German post-Second World War growth miracle happened under coalition governments.
Following the civil war in 1918, between socialists and those who opposed socialism, Finland had continuous coalition governments, often between parties with opposite ideological outlooks (Tornudd, 1969). The civil war was conducted between the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic (Red Finland) and the non-socialists (White Finland), during the country's transition from being part of the Russian Empire, to an independent state. The coalition governments helped the country bind together again after the violent divisions of civil war.
In Brazil, it took coalitions of parties to band together to push out military rulers and restore constitutional rule (Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power 2000). Following a long period of military rule, a coalition government took power following the 1945 elections, with the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático), founded by Getúlio Vargas in alliance with the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) forming the PSD-PTB alliance, which governed Brazil between 1946 and 1964 before the military staged another coup in 1964. The PSD-PTB governing alliance prioritised restoring constitutional order following military rule.
A coalition between the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Liberal Front Party (PFL) took power under José Sarney between 1985 and 1990 following the collapse of military rule and formed the first civilian government since 1965. The PMDB-PFL governing coalition restored democracy.
Former South African President Nelson Mandela presided over a Government of National Unity, a form of coalition government, to promote reconciliation, inclusiveness, and participation, when he included all the other major opposition parties in government, including the National Party, the former apartheid governing party, and the Inkatha Freedom Party despite the fact that the ANC won the 1994 elections outright (Gumede, 2005).
Zimbabwe had a GNU at independence in 1980. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, at the time, offered portfolios to the rival liberation movement, the Patriotic Front, and positions to former members of Ian Smith's white-minority government. Mugabe's then-Zimbabwe African National Union won 57 out of 100 parliamentary seats in the 1980 election. However, they signed a coalition agreement with the opposition Patriotic Front of Joshua Nkomo and with the Rhodesian Front, formerly a white governing party led by Ian Smith (Ross, 1980). In February 2009, Mugabe's Zanu-PF formed a GNU with Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change and Arthur Mutambara's faction of the MDC.
Coalitions in post-independence Africa
Botswana's opposition parties have forged coalitions ahead of national elections. In 2003, the Botswana National Front, Botswana People's Party and the Botswana Alliance Movement signed a Protocol of Election Pact ahead of the 2004 national elections. They agreed to avoid vote-splitting. The protocol left out the duration of the coalition. The Botswana opposition in 2005 signed an inter-election pact, an agreement covering by-elections between major elections. The inter-election pact involved the BAM, BNF and the Botswana Congress Party, a breakaway from the BNF. The inter-election pact stipulated that the agreement was a temporary measure between the elections.
Ahead of the 2022 national elections in Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) formed an opposition party alliance called the United Patriotic Front under the leadership of Adalberto Costa Júnior. The coalition came within a whisker of winning the election against the country's long-standing liberation movement government of, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by incumbent President João.
In Mauritius, a coalition of several opposition parties, called L'Alliance Lepep, led by the Mouvement Socialiste Militant (MSM) with other parties, including the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (PMSD) and the Muvman Liberator (ML), won the 2014 elections. Then 84-year-old Anerood Jugnauth led the L'Alliance Lepep. They won against the PTR-MMM alliance under Navin Ramgoolam. L'Alliance Lepep leader, the then 84-year-old Anerood Jugnauth, became prime minister in the Indian Ocean island nation. L'Alliance Lepep coalition won against a coalition led by the outgoing Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam's Labour Party (PTR) and the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) of Paul Berenger.
In 2016, seven of The Gambia's opposition parties, for the first time, united and formed an alliance called Coalition 2016 under the leadership of Adama Barrow, the leader of the United Democratic Party (UDP), then the largest opposition party, to take on the long, violent dictatorship of Yahya Jammeh and his then ruling Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC). Jammeh seized power in a military coup in 1994.
Coalitions spanning ideological divides
Coalitions can be successful even if the partners have different ideological outlooks, policies, and stances. Switzerland has been governed by coalitions since 1959. The parties represented in the Switzerland Federal Council include such disparate ideological organisations as the Liberals (FDP/PLR), the Social Democratic Party (SP/PS), The Centre (DM/LC) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC).
The Cabinet of German Chancellor Angela Merkel between March 2018 and October 2021 consisted of widely ideologically divergent parties, including the Christian Democratic Union, Social Democratic Party, and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria. The German economy expanded dramatically, unemployment dropped, and exports boomed during the Merkel years' multi-ideological coalition governments.
Since 1993 coalition governments have become the major form of governance in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito formed a coalition government in 1999. The two parties cooperated even when they were out of government between 2009 and 2012 (Siripala, 2022). In Japan's Diet (Japan's legislature), seats are allocated both through single seats on an individual candidate basis and through proportional representation. As a coalition partner, Komeito would support LDP candidates in single-seat districts, and the LDP supporters would vote for Komeito in the proportional representation seats.
Former Israel Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, in 2021, put together the most diverse coalition in the country's political history, made up of eight parties from across the political spectrum, with strong ideological differences (Berg, 2022). Bennett was from the rightwing Yamina party. The coalition also included an independent Arab party for the first time since Israel was created as a state in 1948.
Brazil's Lula da Silva regained the presidency in October 2022 in Brazil, defeating incumbent Jair Bolsonaro through a coalition of ten parties (Pereira, 2022). The broad coalition led by Lula's left-of-centre Workers' Party (includes political opponents united by the goal of getting Bolsonaro out of power. The coalition included the centre-right Social Democratic Party (, or PSDB), the centre-right União Brasil and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (, or MDB). Lula's vice-presidential candidate was Geraldo Alckmin, from the conservative Catholic wing (Pereira, 2022).
Why coalition governments have failed at the local level in South Africa
Coalition governments have failed in many cases in South Africa because dominant parties are not making enough compromises, smaller parties are often made to feel excluded, and coalition pacts are wrongly based on agreeing first on government positions or contracts each partner gets rather than on agreeing on a joint policy program first.
Furthermore, South Africa has so far been unable to foster a coalition governance culture - which includes parties making compromises, coalition partners giving each individual party a success story to report back to their constituency and coalition partners seeing the coalition as almost a political party on its own, that needs to be nurtured, by all the members of the coalition.
The challenge with coalitions is that they need compromises for the greater good of public service delivery, leadership maturity to rise above ego and pettiness, and self- or individual party interest Many of the leaders of parties in coalitions often lack maturity.
Many failed coalitions have not built conflict resolution mechanisms into their governance structures as part of their partnership deals. Coalitions should build a conflict resolution mechanism into their coalition agreement or as part of the coalition agreement, appoint an independent Ombud that will resolve conflicts.
Many of South Africa's parties are built around ethnic constituencies that feel excluded, based on the past or around individuals who see their parties as their properties and their source of income. In many coalitions, the basis of the coalition partnership is allocating government positions and contracts to coalition partners. They often 'own' these positions, only appointing their 'own' members and supporters and implementing their 'own' policies.
This increases silos in the government's coalitions preside over - undermining public service delivery. This is why many coalitions have not improved public service delivery. Effective delivery in any state can only happen in an integrated way rather than departments doing so in a standalone way. Furthermore, the South African state, particularly at the municipal level, has been hollowed out by corruption, mismanagement, and incompetence.
There is often no firewall between party politics and the public administration. This means that if a coalition collapses at the local level, public services often also collapse. In many mature democracies, the public administration is a professional one. And if coalitions collapse, the business of government continues uninterrupted.
Because coalitions are wrongly based on distributing positions or contracts to participating members, they do not prioritise putting together a policy program for the coalition based on the collective input of all the parties, while dominant parties in the coalition often wrongly insist on implementing their policies.
Coalition governments must put together a coalition policy platform based on the shared inputs of all partners, almost creating an entirely new policy program, which is not an individual party program, but a collective coalition program. Coalition partners - and the coalition itself, must transparently explain coalition policies to their constituencies and report back on their achievements.
Many coalitions struggle to manage the asymmetry of power in the coalition between parties with more voters and those with a lower voter base. Bigger parties often want to dominate coalition proceedings because of their voter strength. Yet, the recipe for success is for bigger parties to be seen by smaller parties to make more compromises for smaller parties.
Some parties opposing opposition-led local government coalitions often deliberately plot to bring down the government. Some opposition leaders wrongly believe that opposing a governing opposition-led government means collapsing it, which should not be the case. Many others, within and outside, deliberately attack coalition government as a form of governance, either out of ignorance or to sway voters not to vote for smaller parties. They wrongly create public sentiment against coalition governments.
Conclusion
Coalition governance, as a form of government, has now become part of the political system of South Africa. In theory, coalition governance is particularly useful in ethnically, regionally, religiously, and politically diverse and low-trust societies. However, in practice, it has often not worked effectively at the local level in South Africa, because parties have been unwilling to make compromises, put together joint policy programs and find amicable ways to resolve conflicts. For another, parties opposing opposition-led local government coalitions often deliberately bring down these governments under the misguided notion that to oppose a governing coalition means bringing down a government mid-election.
Yet, in the post-independence period in Africa, coalition governments have produced the highest economic growth rates, inclusive development, and peace. In many mature democracies, such as Germany, Switzerland, and Finland, it has produced stability, economic prosperity, and rapid industrialisation. However, coalitions have often failed in many other countries for similar reasons to South Africa. Ultimately, in South Africa, the failure of many coalitions is not coalition as a form of governance but how they are structured, managed, and nurtured.
End Note:
Prof William Gumede acts as the independent Chair of the Multiparty Charter for South Africa in his personal capacity as an independent consultant.
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