The 2024 global summits season begins in Kampala, Uganda in January 2024 with a global south agenda. President Yoweri Museveni will host the nineteenth Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Heads of State summit from 15 to 20 January[i]. This will be followed by the Third South Summit of the G77+China between 21 to 23 January[ii]. It will be the first time that two developing-nation groupings are held back-to-back in Africa.
How do we make sense of these summits from an African agency viewpoint?
The starting point is to note a rise in high-level summits over the last couple of years. 2023 was particularly the year of global summits in which Africa was part or co-opted. The Russia-Africa summit was held in late July 2023 in St Petersburg, Russia[iii]. It allowed Russia to boost international credentials amid the condemnation and isolation wrought by its invasion of Ukraine. It also gave an international platform to African leaders with either difficult relations with the West or those sympathetic to Russia's stance towards the West. Top on Africa's agenda at St. Petersburg was Africa's plea to Russia to ease the restrictions placed on the transport of grain and fuel in the Black Sea owing to the Russia-Ukraine war. Although the summit did not achieve many tangible outcomes, Russia pledged food support to several African countries.
The BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in late August 2023[iv], was themed, "BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development, and Inclusive Multilateralism". It was thus an African-themed BRICS that saw the expansion of the group with the inclusion of Ethiopia and Egypt to the BRICS bloc. Several African leaders not only attended the summit but many reportedly requested to be incorporated into a BRICS increasingly forceful on the global stage[v]. It was largely read as an anti-West/North event with the attendance of African leaders broadening African presence in the BRICS.
Both Russia and the West/North will be absent in Kampala as they are not members of the NAM and G77. They will make do with observing a new global South agenda unfold from the outside. India and China – members of both the G20 and the BRICS – will be present as the former is a member and the latter a very strong observer of both the NAM and the G77[vi]. It can be expected that the two powers will be looking to extend their interests in Africa, particularly since the continent's invitation to the G20. An African agency approach would suggest that the African members of the NAM and G77 would do well to advance the same interests that they have expressed in the G20 and the BRICS.
The NAM has 120 member states while the G77 has 134. Convening two large summits can be overwhelming for the host nation. All eyes will be on Uganda as it marshals the logistics of managing events to be attended by thousands of delegates over a period of nearly two weeks. More importantly, coordinating the agendas of the two global South summits presents a policy challenge. The curious convening of the summits back-to-back almost suggests a merger of the NAM and the G77. Although a joint coordinating committee of the two groups has been in place for over a decade[vii], this is the first time a semblance of joint summitry between them can be seen in action. Whether the concurrent hosting of these events early in the new year is by design or happenstance, Uganda, the African Union, and African regional organizations, particularly the East African community will have to mobilize intellectual and diplomatic resources to make them a success. Beyond conveying delegates from Entebbe Airport to downtown Kampala, the capacity of Ugandan and African diplomats to negotiate from a point of knowledge and information will be important. However, Uganda has held similar conferences before, including the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) summit in June 2009.
The agendas and resolutions of the two summits will ratchet up the global South voices on the global stage at a time when long-running debates around an unequal global governance system are rebounding. As seen in debates surrounding the BRICS 2023 Summit and the Africa Climate Summit held in Nairobi in September[viii], the buzzwords during global South meetings revolve around the crisis of multilateralism. They have led to increasingly loud calls for reforms and transitions that would create a new world order[ix]. It would be a win for Africa if the agenda of enhanced representation of Africa in key United Nations institutions is prioritized and emphasized. Key among these is the knotty issue of Africa's representation in the United Nations Security Council. The Ezulwini Consensus[x], an AU position on the reform of the UN provides a starting point for African negotiators.
Although the NAM and G77+China are global South organizations, they cannot be treated as uniformly undivided entities. For instance, some of the countries in these organizations are global powers and middle powers at the same time. Membership in the NAM and the G77 is indeed that of unequal equals. For instance, Burundi, listed as the world's poorest country in the world in terms of Purchasing Power Parity at $708 will be[xi] at the negotiating table with Qatar, one of the top ten with a PPP of $97 097[xii].
The NAM is the more explicitly geopolitical of the two groups as it is ostensibly not aligned to the East or West. At the same time, however, it comprises many nations considered part of the global South; this suggests a form of alignment vis a vis the global North, principally, North America and the European Union. This is what most analysts call the new non-alignment[xiii]. The political character of the NAM is further shaped by the fact that it has no formal charter, act, treaty, or permanent secretariat[xiv] meaning that its agendas can shift based on the course of world politics. While the loose, non-binding nature of NAM is a potential weakness, it is also an opportunity when it serves as a platform for canvassing interests. This is where Africa should amplify its concerns over moral and historical problems, particularly underrepresentation in global institutions. Issues such as the continent's debt burden and the need for debt relief in the face of climate change-driven challenges such as drought and famine[xv] could also be canvassed.
The interests of global powers in the NAM, particularly India (a direct member) and, China and Brazil (strong observers), may be misaligned with African interests for the simple reason that they are the "big brothers" in the house[xvi]. It can be argued that the BRICS is an alignment within the non-aligned movement. Moreover, the old "East" of the Cold War era ended with the triumph of the West and the fall of the Union Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), coinciding with the rise of China and to some extent, India, and Brazil. African nations would do well to recognize that their relevance in the current geopolitical order should be directed at negotiating better deals as much with the traditional great powers in the G7 as with the emerging powers of the BRICS.
Compared to the NAM, the G77 is less explicitly a geopolitical grouping even though it brings together 134 developing nations with widely differing profiles. An interesting matter is that the 120 members of the NAM will remain in Uganda after the conclusion of their summit on January 20 as they are joined by the 14 additional members to complete the 134-member state G77 meeting.
As a United Nations institution, the G77 charts its agenda based on the rules and principles of the global governing body. Advancing its interests is much more constricted within the confines of its principal UN home, the Geneva-based United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), aligned with the UN Charter. Unlike the NAM, the G77 has a permanent secretariat at the UN headquarters in New York. This institutional framework means that the G77 can contribute to UN governance architecture directly while the NAM can do so only tangentially. Uganda, representing the African chapter will have to navigate between the global composition of the group which includes the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Caribbean chapters. From an agency perspective, African countries should prioritize Africa's UN-related issues during the G77 summit.
The G77 contrasts with the G20 and the G7 which only influences the UN from the outside as they are not formal UN bodies. In keeping with the less geopolitical character of the G77, it would be strategic for African nations to negotiate for projects and programs that would help them achieve the UN Agenda 2030 also known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)[xvii]. This may include negotiating with the global North to meet their obligations – for instance as historically high carbon emitters – within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP)[xviii]. The notion of a just energy transition[xix] could form a key plank on the African agenda. Moreover, Africa has already been invited into the G20. It would be interesting to see if the AU's interests in the G20 could also be advanced in the G77.
The relevance of the G77 as the largest grouping within the UN can also be its Achilles Heel. It wields a big voice thanks to its numbers, but this voice can end up a discordant Tower of Babel. This is the more reason why the 54-member Africa chapter should not lose sight of self-interested goals one of which is speaking with one voice. The Agenda 2063 could be the negotiation anchor generally and programs such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) could be specifically propounded.
The sequencing of the summits suggests that the explicitly political goals would be pursued during the NAM summit (15-20 January) while the more strategic goals will be focused on during the G77 summit (21-23 January). While Uganda has pledged to use the two summits to deepen south-south cooperation, it is unavoidable to consider global North perspectives. The theme of the NAM Summit tells it all, "Deepening Cooperation for Shared Global Affluence". First, from an African agency perspective "deepening cooperation" should be interpreted as Africa extracting more benefits, particularly from the great and middle powers in the group. Second, "shared global affluence" – which eerily sounds like 'shared influence', would suggest that African states and societies should partake of the same level of prosperity as, not just the global North, but also Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, and other societies.
An analytical loop is evident in the naming of the G77 as G77+China. It almost immediately raises the spectre of China having an upper hand in its bid to reform the UN specifically and in its competition with the U.S. globally. Although China is described as a G77 observer, its global power suggests that it is the ideological driver of the group. There is no problem for the G77 to pursue more public goods from the UN with the global North meeting their moral and historical obligations as the more paying up for their affluent members of the world governance architecture. This should however be aligned with the ultimate goal of the UN's agenda 2030, "Leaving No One Behind", which is providently G77's Third South Summit theme. A focus on Africa's progress in the implementation of the SDGs and what more can be done on the road to 2030 would be a pragmatic African agenda at the summit.
Wekesa is the incoming Director of the African Centre for the Study of the US at the University of the Witwatersrand and Khadiagala is the outgoing Director and professor emeritus.
[i] Non-Aligned Movement. ND. The Uganda Chairmanship 2024-2027, https://nam.go.ug/.
[ii] Uganda Mission in New York. ND. Third South Summit, Kampala, Uganda 2024: "Leaving no One Behind"
[iii] The Roscongress Foundation. Undated. About the Summit, https://summitafrica.ru/en/contacts/.
[iv] BRICS. ND. Welcome XV BRICS Summit, https://brics2023.gov.za/.
[v] Norman Masungwini. 2023. More African leaders plead to join Brics, https://www.news24.com/citypress/politics/more-african-leaders-plead-to-join-brics-20230824
[vi] OPCW. 2008. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and China in the context of the OPCW and the Second Review Conference, https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2008/06/non-aligned-movement-nam-and-china-context-opcw-and-second-review.
[vii] See Union of International Associations. ND, Joint Coordinating Committee between the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 (JCC), https://uia.org/s/or/en/1100000994.
[viii] Office of the President of Kenya. 2023. Africa Climate Summit, https://africaclimatesummit.org/contact-us
[ix] For instance Aude Darnal. 2023.To Reform the Global Order, Listen to the Global South, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/us-global-order-south/.
[x] African Union. The Ezulwini Consensus and Africa's Quagmire on United Nations Security Council Reform, https://library.au.int/ezulwini-consensus-and-africas-quagmire-united-nations-security-council-reform-unpacking-dynamics.
[xi] World Population Review. 2023. Poorest Countries in the World 2023, https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/poorest-countries-in-the-world
[xii] The Global Economy.com. 2022. GDP per capita, PPP - Country rankings,https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/gdp_per_capita_ppp/
[xiii] See Madiha Afzal, Bruce Riedel, and Nathan Sachs. 2023. The United States, China, and the "new non-aligned" countries, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-united-states-china-and-the-new-non-aligned-countries/.
[xiv] Non-Aligned Movement. ND. History, https://nam.go.ug/history.
[xv] Caroline Kimeu. 2023. African leaders call for debt relief to help tackle climate crisis, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/06/african-leaders-call-for-debt-relief-to-help-tackle-climate-change.
[xvi] See Tarren Bolton. 2023. BRICS: What are the implications for Africa? https://www.miningreview.com/investment/brics-what-are-the-implications-for-africa/#:~:text=BRICS%20are%20major%20players%20in,and%20minerals%20resources%20in%20Africa.
[xvii] SDG Development Hub. ND. Third South Summit, https://sdg.iisd.org/events/third-south-summit/
[xviii] Ashwin Telang. Climate Debt: What Do Wealthy Nations Owe Their Poorer Counterparts? https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2023/03/16/climate-debt-what-do-wealthy-nations-owe-their-poorer-counterparts/#:~:text=Simply%20put%2C%20the%20polluter%20must,change%20inflicts%20on%20poor%20nations.
[xix] Khanyi Mlaba. 2023. How Can Africa Reach a Just Transition to Sustainable Energy? This Report Breaks It Down, https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/power-shift-africa-report-climate-just-transition/?gclid=CjwKCAiA1fqrBhA1EiwAMU5m_0L71Bh_hUxMsmMGvJwHsS31m0ASuwhf6crO_dZYOSaE1K-O8EsczBoCdjoQAvD_BwE
