The ongoing conflict is an existential threat to the very idea of Sudan, not to be solved by negotiations featuring the usual suspects working on the old power-sharing formula.
Five years ago, Sudan was a tale of optimism, democratic transition and stability. Today, the UN secretary-general describes it as a "humanitarian travesty", even as the UN's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, warns of the risk of genocide in Darfur. We are witnessing a campaign of atrocities and bloodbaths, hunger and disease. Millions of Sudanese people fleeing their homes, hunted by armed militia and aerial bombardments, stalked by poverty and a campaign of deliberate starvation. The number of civilian casualties could soon surpass 30,000. It feels like we are being punished for wanting to achieve democracy through peaceful means.
It is fair to say that the geopolitical environment surrounding Sudanese democratic aspirations was not favourable. The majority of Sudan's neighbours were wary about the possibility of Sudan's democratic transformation; the tales of justice and freedom going viral across the region needed to be arrested before they became infectious.
Numerous mistakes were made by international and regional actors regarding Sudan. However, the fatal errors that led to the current dreadful situation were committed by the country's military and civilian elites. Their complicity, ineptitude, and recklessness have largely contributed to this situation.
On April 15, 2023, the people of Sudan found themselves trapped between brutal armed militias, a weak and corrupt military that has failed to protect them, and local political actors who are polarised and unprepared to address the magnitude of the crisis or even comprehend its repercussions.
The consequences of Sudan's long period under an isolated, violent, war-oriented, and militant Islamist, totalitarian regime have significant implications on the country's future - indeed, its very existence. Sudan was in miserable shape at the dawn of the 2019 revolution. Decades of economic, social, and cultural isolation, the result of almost 30 years of sanctions, had taken a toll on generations of Sudanese. By 2019, the country was on the verge of collapse, and corruption was skyrocketing.
Toward the end of his dictatorship, Al-Bashir began to lose trust in his allies and subsequently worked to weaken the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) as a means to ensure his own protection. He also strengthened his alliance with the Janjaweed/RSF, the notorious tribal militia that has played a major role in the waves of crimes against humanity in Darfur since 2003. Al-Bashir became so close to RSF commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (a.k.a. Hemedti) that he began referring to him by the nickname: 'Hemaity, my protector.' This criminal alliance was based on extortion of resources and illicit transactions, and such alliances continue to operate in Sudan today, burrowing themselves in the very soul of the nation.
On the morning of April 11, 2019, when the Al-Bashir regime was toppled, multiple armies within the country watched closely to see what they could gain.[1] With its historical relationship with the military, the NCP, the Islamist former ruling party, assumed that a smooth transition to power would not interfere with their control of the national economy. This was a complete miscalculation on its part, as the general population had thoroughly turned against them, along with the majority, if not all, the regional forces.
Familiar with Al-Bashir's regime, Sudan's neighbours also watched the events surrounding the 2019 revolution closely, weighing their options for potential future alliances and being increasingly wary of the prospects of a democratic Sudan. Among them, the UAE and Egypt emerged as crucial actors. Egypt, with its historical ties and shared border security anxieties. The Nile, the lifeline of the Nile Basin states, held particular interest. Trade and movement across their shared border have served as a lifeline for millions on both sides. Notably, the Egyptian and the Sudanese armies had a strong connection, as the two had been a unified military prior to Sudan's full independence from joint Egyptian and British rule, which ended in 1956. It is worth remembering that Egypt has historically wielded significant influence over Sudan's political landscape, often undermining democratic initiatives.
The UAE is a newer player that has primarily engaged with Sudanese professionals who served as civil servants and technocrats in the 1970s and '80s to support the country's growing economy primarily by serving the construction sector. Later, the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia developed divergent relationships with Sudan when the Al-Bashir regime began acting as a supplier of soldiers to the Saudi-Emirati intervention in the Yemeni civil war. However, the UAE was more proactive in scanning the political scene in Sudan and building alliances with new emerging forces in the country.
The efficiency with which, since 2013, the RSF leadership has supplied soldiers to the Saudi-Emirati coalition, undertaking an active recruitment campaign among rural youth in Sudan and the eastern Sahel region, seems to have impressed their Gulf patrons. The vigorous engagement of the militia leadership in the extortion of gold and other resources, subsequently repatriated to the UAE, has boosted the position of the RSF as a favoured ally of the UAE. The UAE has also built alliances among the civilian actors in Sudan, hoping that they will act either as a form of managerial executive for the militia, or that via soft power, they will bolster their influence among the civilian elite and consolidate this position with their existing strategic alliance with the RSF.
Egypt has been attempting to maintain its influence over its former allies within the SAF. However, due to Egypt's internal economic and political crises, its ability to provide support to the SAF has decreased significantly.
If a serious and comprehensive political process had been implemented to support Sudan's transition, the war may have been prevented. Unfortunately, that was not the case. The international community's engagement with Sudan was minimal and superficial, downplaying the complexity of the third-largest country in Africa, which has struggled with wars and armed conflicts throughout its modern history. Furthermore, acts of impotence (or indifference) by international actors coupled with dangerous military build-ups and the limited capacity of the civilian contingent of the transitional government have manifested in the poorly drafted power-sharing agreement that enabled both Burhan and Hemedti to have the upper hand.
This was followed by a sequence of strategic mistakes, such as ending the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in December 2020 - the peacekeeping mission that was meant to absorb tensions and mitigate the risks of atrocities against civilians in Darfur. Sudan's transitional government, comprising civilian and military branches, handed over all UNAMID bases in Darfur to the RSF. It is important to note that the RSF and affiliated militias have been actively carrying out aggressions against civilians in the Darfur region, and these atrocities increased significantly following the withdrawal of UNAMID in early 2021.
Moreover, the civilian government made another significant mistake by failing to hold Al-Bashir and other key actors in his regime accountable or hand them over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) based on their indictment in 2008. The executive body of the transitional government failed to push for accountability for the crimes of the Al-Bashir regime, particularly the regime crimes in Darfur and later the Khartoum Sit-in Massacre,[2] which was primarily perpetrated by the RSF and Sudan's political Islamists. Holding these powerful actors accountable could have also helped the civilian actors at the time gain popular support and establish themselves as agents of change. None of this happened, and therefore, the RSF has become increasingly confident as they continue to commit atrocities with impunity.
Turning to General Burhan. He believed that being on good terms with the RSF leader meant that Hemedti would continue acting as his protector - much as the latter had done for Al-Bashir. At the same time, the civilian contingent of the transitional government assumed that the RSF would help them confront and limit the power of political Islamists in Sudan, including the SAF. However, in doing so, both failed to challenge the expanded authority of the RSF and the power acquired by its leadership. Thus, the RSF leadership took advantage of the weaknesses of the military and civilian elites and emerged as the strongest actor, largely due to its capacity for brutality and support from the UAE.
Nonetheless, the RSF, despite its ambition, brutal force, and loyalty to the UAE, has nothing to offer Sudan other than a litany of destruction and atrocities that continue to cultivate utmost hate and rejection from Sudanese communities. The ongoing war has revealed the RSF's lack of capacity for organisation and governance, and its inability to engage with the people of Sudan. The widespread destruction of the country's infrastructure, including schools, universities, and hospitals, government facilities, as well as the rampant looting, systemic sexual violence and mass atrocities committed against civilians, all indicate a fundamental disconnect between the RSF militia, the Sudanese population and the concept of governance.
Conflicting Narratives:
I believe that this war is a significant turning point, not just for Sudan but also for the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions. Unfortunately, the RSF and its sponsors in the UAE and Russia, via the Wagner mercenaries, have ignited a wildfire that is spreading beyond Sudan's borders.
It is puzzling to see that many Sudanese civilian politicians and some international actors view the ongoing bloodshed in Sudan as a mere political crisis. They seem to believe that the two generals hold the solution to this crisis. They are, therefore, hoping to recycle the same old power-sharing formula when seats at the political table are reserved for the men in uniform responsible for the violence and atrocities, adding subordinate civilian men under the pretext of political transition. In my opinion, any power-sharing agreement that brings back the old faces is a recipe for war.
It is evident that the primary perpetrator of violence in Sudan at the moment is the RSF, which throughout its existence has relied on violence as both a means and an end. As such it has failed utterly to secure its place as a legitimate political outfit. Violence is integral to its organisational structure, dictating the nature of its mobilisations and operations. The RSF cannot function without violence, meaning that it automatically locks itself out of a Sudanese future without violence.
The war in Sudan has been marked by conflicting narratives coming from the multiple actors and their regional and international allies. However, as Sudanese people, we are caught in the middle. From a Sudanese perspective, it is important to understand the difference between the SAF and the RSF. Although the SAF has a long history of corruption and dysfunction, it still represents most of Sudan's rule of law and national identity. Therefore, when speaking about the political process to address this crisis and governance, it is logical to emphasise the militant and militarised state of Sudan as the root cause of Sudan's instability and to advocate for the rights of Sudanese citizens as civilians to have a say in the running of their country.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
At this point, Sudan is falling apart very quickly. We need a third path to centre the Sudanese people and their realities in a political narrative beyond the ambitions of the political actors, civilian and military, and their grievances against each other. We need a process that speaks to our situation, reflects on our realities, and acknowledges what is actually happening rather than denying it or being apologetic about it, as is the case in the discourse of the FFC/Taqdom coalition, or the NCP's Islamist discourse. It seems to demand that all Sudanese people act like jihadis, which we are not and will never be, but that does not mean we should surrender to the RSF/UAE and lose any say over how our country should be governed or structured.
The FFC and NCP should not hold us hostage to their grievances and hatred of each other. At this point, we don't care about either of them. While both are part of the civilian forces, they are not representative of the full civilian population, which is highly diverse. Many civilians at the moment are taking charge of their communities' welfare, providing protection, and making critical decisions about aid, humanitarian support, and human rights. In the states outside the active conflict zones, several communities have no interest in supporting either the FFC/Taqdom or the political Islamist /NCP. Instead, they envision a future Sudan with a higher degree of state and regional sovereignty and self-determination.
The reality is that Sudan will not be the same country after this brutal war. Therefore, we must anticipate and plan accordingly to avoid repeating the same cycles of violence.
The past is constantly shaping the present. However, the present evolves by the minute and shapes new realities and dynamics for the future. I believe the FFC and the NCP are stuck playing an outdated game, vying for control. Both forces need to be humbled and join a third inclusive path that focuses on addressing the needs of the people of Sudan.
Notes
[1] These included the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and The SPLM North with its multiple factions, and the Darfur armed movements which are also comprised of multiple factions.
[2] The massacre occurred on the 3rd of June 2019, when hundred of civilians were killed and sexually assaulted.
Hala Al-Karib is a Sudanese pro-democracy and women rights activist and essayist. She is the Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa.
