It has now become a tradition. Immediately a new government comes to power, all hell will break loose.
Nigerians will be at each other's throats, not because of any fundamental differences over how to respond to the monumental challenges facing their country, but over who gets appointed to what post. And as soon as a new lineup is announced, the acrimony is apt to intensify rather than subside. It is at that point--the point at which the task of governing should commence in earnest-that cries of 'favouritism' and 'marginalisation' are apt to be loudest and most distracting.
As argued later, a few allegations of skewed appointments tend to be groundless and, are, in all probability, stirred by personal or partisan political calculations. However, not all gripes can be deemed frivolous and summarily dismissed. As a matter of fact, and for the reasons stated in subsequent paragraphs, allegations of favouritism in personnel selection are likely to be well-founded.
Incidentally, it has not always been like this. Under the parliamentary system that was in place until 1979, it was rare to hear complaints of favouritism in the appointment of ministers and other senior government officials. True, a member of the Constituent Assembly, Olu Awotesu, had in 1978 inveighed against the cronyism and 'old school tie' that prevailed under the military. By and large, the parliamentary system that the military overthrew operated differently. The understanding that prevailed under the system was that the party with the highest number of seats in the legislature had the prerogative to form the government, and while doing so, to reward party loyalists with cushy jobs and sinecures.
Under that dispensation, posts of consequence went to ranking members of the ruling party. Opposition party members might stomp all over the place, and, while at it, grumble loudly or silently. They were in no position to question the electorate's verdict or to accuse the ruling party of 'marginalising' a particular region and favouring one tribe or faith group over the others.
Then, the executive-presidential system entered the equation, and the word 'marginalisation' became firmly engrained in our psyche. Favouritism and marginalisation became bye-words uploaded to our individual and group hard disks, ready to be downloaded when the need arises. As luck would have it both those with valid, or even flippant, allegations of marginalisation need not exert themselves unduly to make their cases. They can either correctly cite, or cynically twist, the 'federal character' provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on their side. Chapter II, section 14(3) of the 1999 Constitution, for instance, specifically decrees that:
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few State or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.
The Constitution, in Section 14 (4), repeats the same proclamation for the state and local governments as follows:
The composition of the Government of a State, a local government council, or any of the agencies of such Government or council, and the conduct of the affairs of the Government or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise the diversity of the people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the people of the Federation.
The imprecise construction lends the 'federal character' provision to sophistry. The ambiguity in the language has unsurprisingly been exploited by ordinary citizens, by politicians, and by appointing authorities at both the federal and the state levels. Individuals fearful of losing in the patronage race can always wave the Constitution while whipping up ethno-religious emotions and soliciting the support of their ethno-religious blocs to out-maneuver competitors from rival ethnic or faith groups. Advocates of 'rotational presidency' who can't find a constitutional clause in support of their demand, frequently, albeit, tongue-in-cheek, fall back on Chapter II, section 14(3) of the 1999 Constitution!
The federal and the state governments must of course accept the accolade for the most fraudulent interpretation and most egregious misapplication of the Constitution's 'federal character' clause. Some state governors have gone as far as replacing elected local governments with their own appointees, thus dispensing entirely with the pretense to the reflection of federal character!
Also, in defiance of the Constitution's underlying intent--which is to promote national unity and command national loyalty--the federal and the state appointing authorities regard amorphous groups, such as heterogeneous states or 'geopolitical zones', as the bedrock of the Nigerian federation. Yes, states are important, insofar as they are recognised as the constituent units of the Nigerian federation. However, it is not states which make Nigeria tick. It is the citizens of each state and of Nigeria whose support and allegiance are critical to the country's unity. At least, it is individual citizens that cast votes at elections, and hurl stones during public protests.
Yet, the appointing authorities proceed on the assumption that each state is coterminous with the individuals living therein. Succeeding Nigerian presidents and state executives generally assume that the interest of a citizen of an otherwise heterogenous state is in harmony with the interest of all citizens in the state! That is not all. Continuing with the fallacious assumption that the interest of one is equal to the interest of all, the appointing authorities ban open competition, ignore the strengths and weaknesses of potential candidates, and hide behind the amorphous state or 'geopolitical zone' to appoint their favourites to key positions. How such a skewed arrangement could indefinitely go uncontested is anybody's guess. How a system built on patronage could produce public appointees that are unanimously accepted as deserving and competent is a question that Senator Shehu Sani recently dodged while defending what are basically patronage appointments.
No matter how the question (of how to reconcile patronage with merit) is answered, the lack of mechanisms for the competitive selection of public personnel cannot but generate controversy, especially, controversy over public appointees' claim to merit and competence. From 1999 to date, and except for the brief period during which President Umar Yar'Adua served as president, Nigerians never ceased contesting the methods by which candidates get appointed to public offices. The Jonathan administration was accused of appointing southerners as heads of security agencies. Muhammadu Buhari was accused of favouring northerners in appointment to important offices. Bola Ahmed Tinubu was accused of appointing members of his Yoruba ethnic group as heads of crucial agencies. It gets interesting. As Buhari's supporters defended his "pro-North" appointments by pointing to Jonathan's "pro-South", Tinubu's followers peremptorily ask "if Buhari did it, why can't their man". It is like insisting that two wrongs make a right!
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All the same, a caveat is necessary. It is grossly misleading to say that Jonathan favoured "Southerners", that Buhari leaned towards "the North", or that Tinubu preferred his Yoruba kinsfolk to all other ethnic nationalities. To so argue is to repeat and possibly, rationalise, the mistake of the appointing authorities. What is that mistake again? It is the mistake of equating a part with the whole. Jonathan did not favour Southerners. He favoured those close to him. Buhari did not favour Northerners. He favoured the candidates he knew and those proposed by his confidants. And Tinubu has certainly NOT favoured the Yoruba. He has favoured the Yoruba he personally knows and those known to his close aides.
These heads of state, past and present, favoured none but their personal acquaintances, their political associates, and those close to their gatekeepers. The earlier we come to terms with this reality, the closer we shall be to a formula likely to put an end to the constant bickering over public appointments.
Balogun is a former Special Adviser to the President of the UN General Assembly
