West Africa: Sahel - Resurgence of Boko Haram?

analysis

On the night of October 27 to 28, 2024, the Nigerian terrorist group, Boko Haram, attacked a Chadian garrison, located on Barkaram, island department of Kaya, near the Nigerian border. The terrorists took control of the military base, ransacked various equipment and recovered weapons before withdrawing. That tragedy raises the question of whether Boko Haram, supposedly weakened, has regained strength. The Barkaram attack also shows Chad and its neighbors' difficulties in fighting together against the terrorist hydra.

Boko Haram's assault took the lives of about forty soldiers including the garrison commander. As early as October 28, President Mahamat Idriss Deby announced the launch of Operation Haskanite, in order to track down the attackers and push them back beyond the country's borders. Lake Chad islands are isolated, in a swampy region. Elements of Boko Haram and its dissident branch, the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP), have taken refuge in this vast stretch, between Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad. Boko Haram is not a national enemy, but a sub-regional one. Chadian interim Prime Minister, Abderahim Bireme Hamid, recalled that dimension: Operation Haskanite is not aiming only at securing our peaceful populations, but also because the terrorist group harmful actions threaten the region and all countries around Lake Chad basin stability.

A sub-regional enemy.

To fight terrorist groups, the four Lake Chad bordering countries and Benin set up the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in July 2015, initially 8,000 troops strong. Its headquarters is in Ndjamena. Nigeria and Chad are its main troops suppliers with 3,250 and 3,000 soldiers respectively. While Cameroon had 2,250 troops, Niger had 200 and Benin 150. In 2022, the MNJTF had approximately 10,000 soldiers. The new distribution by country is not known. On March 23, 2020, a similar attack on Chadian soldiers at the Bohoma base claimed the lives of around one hundred of them. The late Marshal of Chad, Idriss Deby Itno, the current head of state father, had then launched operation « Wrath of Bohoma » on March 31, under his own command with 6,000 soldiers deployed in the region. Images of helicopters in combat, terrorists killed and prisoners were shown on Chadian television. The soldiers had pushed their heroic advance into areas located in Niger and Nigeria. Nigeria, in support of the operation, had bombed the shores of the Lake. In early April, President Idriss Deby Itno, who led the operations from the island of Kaiga-Kindjiria, announced thousand terrorists killed and around fifty motorized canoes destroyed. In the fighting, 57 Chadian soldiers had died.

At the end of the operation « Anger of Bohoma », President Deby Itno was bitter. He complained that Chad was « alone to bear the full weight of the war against Boko Haram ». On April 9, he threatened to withdraw his soldiers from the MNJTF, thus putting his neighbors under great pressure. He was openly angry with the Nigerian soldiers who did not take over from the Chadians on the Lake. He also deplored the fact that the Nigerien military could not fight simultaneously on their Eastern and Western fronts. He had given them almost an ultimatum. For him, the sect had been decimated by 90 to 95%. The operations were over, but his forces, still stationed deep in the islands of Niger and Nigeria, were waiting to hand them over to these countries soldiers no later than April 24. Nearly four years later, an almost identical scenario is playing out. Mahamat Idriss Deby, like his father, is moving to the field and taking command of the counter-offensive, called Operation Haskanite. Under his orders, the first aerial observation actions are carried out, day and night, by the Chadian air force. Boko Haram's strategic positions are located in Kaiga-Kindjiria. So-called « surgical » strikes are carried out to neutralize terrorists, seen in their canoes. At the same time, he orders a claw movement of ground forces, supported by high-precision heavy artillery, in order to surround and eliminate any remaining resistance,

These successes are tempered by Nigeria. Chadian soldiers are suspected of having confused a group of fishermen with Boko Haram militia. These « typing errors » are said to have cost the lives of dozens of peaceful Nigerian fishermen on the island of Tilma. From HQ's, a Chadian general denies that: « The Boko Haram, each time they commit their crimes, often mixes in among the fishermen and farmers. It is therefore difficult to differentiate between the populations and the terrorists. » Also, like his father, Deby Jr deplores the little support he has received from neighboring and partner countries. He too brandishes the threat of withdrawing from the MNJTF. Was this a Damocles sword perceived, this time, as serious? In any case, Nigeria sent a mission to Chad on November 17, led by President Bola Tinubu's National Security Advisor, Mallam Nihu Ribadu accompanied, in particular, by the Armed Forces Chief of General Staff and senior security officials. The presidential emissary and President Deby reviewed their military cooperation. "In the coming days, the Joint Force will have a new face with the aim of exterminating the common enemy," declared the Advisor, at the end of the audience. Furthermore, the Chadian president had sent a mission to his Nigerien colleague, General Abdourahmane Tiani, on October 29, the day after the attack. The discussions focused mainly on coordinating security efforts in the face of common terrorist threats and strengthening bilateral relations.

The fatigue of the MNJTF.

Chad's complaints against its neighbors highlight the MNJTF inadequacies. The perennial problem of financing African sub-regional organizations is being faced. States are said to be paying their contributions with great delays. Organizational and structural difficulties are said to be affecting the chain of command and therefore operations. The MNJTF does not have sufficient mobility means.

Its fleet includes a few helicopters for the evacuation of wounded soldiers and the teams' movement. The level of commitment of member countries is considered unequal. Nigeria is reluctant to allow the MNJTF the freedom to operate on its territory.

It is also important to note that Niger had suspended its participation in joint operations, in the aftermath of the July 2023 coup d'état, following diplomatic tensions with Nigeria, which holds the presidency of ECOWAS. It rejoined the MNJTF at the end of September 2024. In the meantime, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria had launched an offensive aimed at liberating the traffic routes threatened by Boko Haram and other terrorist groups.

Coordination and liaison challenges between the MNJTF and national units would arise. As the state with the most offensive army in the coalition, Chad feels all of these weaknesses more acutely than the others. His complaints are also directed at the former colonial power. Indeed, France deploys aone thousand soldiers in Chad, spread across three cities: base 172 in Ndjamena, Capitaine-Croci base in Abéché and that of Faya-Largeau, in the far north. They are supposed to guarantee the protection of nationals present on site and of French interests. They also provide, in principle, logistical and intelligence supports to Chadian forces, in accordance with the 1996 agreement between the two countries. But, after the attack on Barkaram, the French army, reportedly, did not provide its Chadian ally with strategic information in its possession or air cover, despite being officially requested by the authorities. One of the immediate consequences: on November 28, 2024, the Chadian authorities announced that they were « terminating a defense cooperation agreement. »

The security context in other Sahel countries is just as difficult. In neighboring Libya, tensions between the various factions fighting since the fall of colonel Kadhafi in October 2011, have increased in recent months. Mrs. Koury, acting head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), said that "the status quo is unsustainable." In Sudan, war has been raging since April 2023 between Generals Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and his former ally Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo alias Héméti, head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The provisional toll is very heavy: 20,000 civilians killed, 11 million displaced and 25 million internally displaced persons. Chad is accused of transporting weapons, supplied by the United Arab Emirates, to the latter's troops, which it denies.

Terrorists continue their advance towards the gulf of Benin, causing more and more victims. Thus, on December 2, three Beninese soldiers were killed and four wounded in the northeast of the country. In June 2024, seven other soldiers were killed in the Pendjari National Park, on the border with Burkina Faso. These attacks, constantly increasing, are attributed by the authorities to the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). For its part, Togo deplored, during the year 2023, thirty deaths, twenty-nine wounded and three missing. Boko Haram will perhaps not brag for long, exploiting the dysfunctions of the MNJTF. In addition to Nigeria's awakening in the face of the Chadian outburst, Niger has now rejoined the MNJTF. A new era of fighting could begin...

AllAfrica publishes around 600 reports a day from more than 100 news organizations and over 500 other institutions and individuals, representing a diversity of positions on every topic. We publish news and views ranging from vigorous opponents of governments to government publications and spokespersons. Publishers named above each report are responsible for their own content, which AllAfrica does not have the legal right to edit or correct.

Articles and commentaries that identify allAfrica.com as the publisher are produced or commissioned by AllAfrica. To address comments or complaints, please Contact us.